

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI**

CURTIS GIOVANNI FLOWERS,
Petitioner,

v.

Case Number _____

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,
Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT
Montgomery County No. 2003-0071-CR

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

W. Tucker Carrington, MS Bar #102761
Mississippi Innocence Project
P.O. Box 1848
University, MS 38677-1848
Tel: 601-576-2314
Email: wtc4@ms-ip.org
Counsel for Petitioner

David P. Voisin, MS Bar # 100210
P.O. Box 13984
Jackson, MS 39236-3984
Tel: 601-949-9486
Email: david@dvoisinlaw.com

Jonathan L. Abram*
Kathryn M. Ali*
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109
Tel: 202-637-5681
Tel: 202-637-5771
Email: jonathan.abram@hoganlovells.com
Email: kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
*Admitted *pro hac vice*

Benjamin J.O. Lewis*
4915 Thirteenth Street N.
Arlington, VA 22205
Tel: 919-600-3708
Email: bjolewis@gmail.com
* Admitted *pro hac vice*

February 28, 2019

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	vii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY	7
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES	14
STANDARD OF REVIEW	17
FACTUAL BACKGROUND	18
1. Doyle Simpson’s .380 Handgun.....	20
2. The Bloody Partial Shoeprint	23
3. The Gunshot Residue Particle	25
4. The Eyewitness Identifications.....	25
5. The Jailhouse Snitch.....	29
GROUND FOR RELIEF WITH SUPPORTING FACTS.....	31
GROUND A: NEW EVIDENCE	31
A. New Evidence Regarding Alternative Suspects Requires That Mr. Flowers’s Convictions And Sentences Be Reversed.	35
1. The State’s Evidence Does Not Exclude The Reasonable Hypothesis That Experienced Killers From Alabama Committed The Tardy Furniture Murders.	35
a. The evidence implicating the Alabama suspects is material and would likely change the outcome at trial.	37
b. The State of Mississippi’s investigation of the Alabama suspects and their connection to the Tardy Furniture murders is material and would likely change the outcome at trial.	38
c. The evidence implicating the Alabama suspects is new and could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence prior to trial.	40
2. The State’s Evidence Does Not Exclude The Reasonable Hypothesis That Willie Hemphill Committed The Tardy Furniture Murders.....	44

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

a.	The Hemphill interrogation, and what it brings to light, is material and would likely change the outcome at trial.	46
b.	The evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill is new and could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence prior to trial.	49
B.	Newly Discovered, Sound Forensic Evidence Shows That The State Relied On Discredited Ballistics Evidence And Inaccurate Shoeprint Evidence In Violation Of Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.	52
1.	New Evidence Demonstrates That The State’s Ballistics Evidence Was Unsound And Unreliable.	52
a.	New findings issued by the FBI and DOJ after Mr. Flowers’s trial constitute newly discovered evidence requiring reversal of Mr. Flowers’s conviction.	53
b.	The new FBI and DOJ evidence is material.	59
2.	New Evidence Demonstrates That The State’s Shoeprint Expert’s Testimony Was Unsound And Misleading.	62
C.	Newly Discovered Evidence Shows That Police Recovered A Potential Murder Weapon In A Location Incompatible With The State’s Theory of the Case.	63
D.	New Evidence Shows That Jailhouse Snitch Odell Hallmon Testified Falsely.	64
1.	New Evidence Shows That Mr. Hallmon Perjured Himself At Trial (Again) When He Claimed That Mr. Flowers Confessed.	65
2.	This Evidence Is Material.	70
E.	New Evidence Shows That The State’s Investigator John Johnson Falsified Witness Statements.	71
GROUND B: SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE		73
A.	The State’s Suppression Of Material Exculpatory Evidence Of Alternative Suspects Violated <i>Brady</i> And Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.	77
1.	The State Suppressed Material Evidence Of The Alabama Suspects.	78
a.	The State suppressed exculpatory evidence of the Alabama Suspects.	78
b.	The suppressed evidence regarding the Alabama suspects undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.	81

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

c.	The Defense could not have obtained the suppressed evidence regarding the Alabama suspects with reasonable diligence.	86
2.	The State Suppressed Its Material Investigation Into Willie Hemphill.	87
a.	The State suppressed exculpatory evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill.	87
b.	The suppressed evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.	91
c.	The Defense could not have obtained the suppressed evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill with reasonable diligence.	94
B.	The State’s Suppression Of Material Impeachment Evidence Of Benefits That Odell Hallmon Received For Testifying Violated <i>Brady</i> And Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.	95
1.	The State Suppressed Evidence Of Benefits That Mr. Hallmon Received For Testifying Against Mr. Flowers.	96
2.	Mr. Hallmon’s Deals With The District Attorney Were Material To Mr. Flowers’s Defense Because They Would Have Irreparably Impeached A Key Witness Who Provided The Only Direct Evidence In The State’s Case.	105
3.	The Defense Could Not Have Obtained the Suppressed Evidence Regarding Mr. Hallmon’s Deals With Reasonable Diligence.	107
C.	The State’s Suppression Of Material Impeachment Evidence Relating To Patricia Sullivan-Odom’s Pending Tax Fraud Indictment Violated <i>Brady</i> And Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.	108
1.	The State Suppressed Evidence Of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s Indictment.	109
2.	Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s Pending Tax Fraud Indictment Was Material.	114
3.	Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s Indictment Was Not Discoverable With Reasonable Diligence.	118
4.	This Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred.	119
D.	The State’s Suppression Of A Possible Murder Weapon Violated <i>Brady</i> And Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.	121
1.	The State Suppressed Evidence Of A Possible Murder Weapon That It Possessed In 2001.	121
2.	The State’s Suppression Of The Possible Murder Weapon Undermines Confidence In The Outcome Of The Trial.	124

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

3.	Details About The Recovered Weapon Were Not Discoverable By The Defense With Reasonable Due Diligence.	127
E.	The State’s Production Of Falsified Investigation Notes Violated <i>Brady</i> and Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.....	128
1.	The State Withheld Exculpatory And Impeachment Evidence When It Produced Falsified Evidence To Mr. Flowers.....	129
2.	Mr. Johnson’s Fabricated Notes Were Material to Mr. Flowers’s Defense.	131
3.	Mr. Flowers Could Not Have Discovered the Falsified Nature of Mr. Johnson’s Notes with Reasonable Diligence.....	136
GROUND C: PRESENTATION OF FALSE TESTIMONY		137
A.	The State’s Knowing Presentation Of False Testimony From Lieutenant Wayne Miller, Investigator Jack Matthews, and Investigator John Johnson About Alternative Suspects Violated Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.	139
1.	Lieutenant Wayne Miller’s Testimony Regarding His Photo Array Was False.....	140
2.	Investigator Jack Matthews’s Testimony Regarding the Alabama Suspects Was False.	141
3.	Investigators Jack Matthews’s And John Johnson’s Testimony Regarding Willie Hemphill Was False.	142
4.	The Prosecution Knew That Mr. Miller, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Johnson Testified Falsely.	144
5.	The False Testimony Was Material.....	145
B.	The State’s Knowing Presentation Of False Testimony From Odell Hallmon About Mr. Flowers’s Purported Confession Violated Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights...148	
1.	Mr. Hallmon’s Testimony Was False.....	148
2.	The Prosecution Knew That Mr. Hallmon’s Testimony Was False.....	149
3.	Mr. Hallmon’s False Testimony Was Material.	152
4.	In The Alternative, Mr. Hallmon’s Conversation With Mr. Flowers Violated His Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel.....	154

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

GROUND D: RACIAL BIAS IN JURY SELECTION	155
A. The Prosecution Violated Mr. Flowers’s Equal Protection Rights When It Struck Prospective Jurors On The Basis of Race.	162
1. The Strength Of The <i>Prima Facie</i> Case.	162
2. The Reasons Offered For The Strikes Were Pretext.	163
a. The prosecution’s history of racial discrimination in jury selection.	164
i. Statistical analyses of capital cases tried by Mr. Evans.	165
ii. Statistical analysis of capital and non-capital cases tried by Mr. Evans’s office.	169
b. Disparate questioning of African-American and white jurors.	176
c. Acceptance of white jurors sharing the proffered reason for the strike of African-American jurors.	178
d. Lack of record support for the reason cited.	181
B. The State’s Racially Discriminatory Exercise Of Peremptory Strikes Also Violated The Constitutional Rights Of The Excluded African-American Jurors.	185
GROUND E: CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF AN INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PERSON	189
A. Mr. Flowers Is Entitled Relief Under <i>Atkins</i> Or, At Least, To An Evidentiary Hearing To Prove Further That He Is Intellectually Disabled.	190
1. Expert Opinion That Petitioner’s IQ Is 75 Or Below, Which Is Within The Range Of Intellectual Disability.	193
2. Expert Opinion That Mr. Flowers Has Substantial Adaptive Skills Deficits That Manifested Prior To Age 18.	195
GROUND F: IMPROPER JUROR COMMUNICATIONS.	198
A. The Venire’s Actions Deprived Mr. Flowers Of His Constitutional Right To An Impartial Jury And Violated State Law.	199
1. Constitutional Violations Of Mr. Flowers’s Right To An Impartial Jury.	199
2. Violations Of The Court’s Procedural Rules And Oral Directive.	203

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

GROUND G: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.....	206
A. Mr. Flowers Was Denied His Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsel’s Failure To Develop And Present Evidence That He Is Intellectually Disabled.	210
1. There Is A Reasonable Probability That, Had Defense Counsel Introduced Evidence Of Mr. Flowers’s Intellectual Disability Prior to Trial, The Court Would Have Found Him To Be Intellectually Disabled And The State Would Have Been Precluded From Seeking The Death Penalty.	211
2. There Is A Reasonable Probability That The Jury Would Not Have Sentenced Mr. Flowers To Death If Trial Counsel Had Presented Evidence Of His Intellectual Disability.....	215
3. There Is A Reasonable Probability That The Jury Would Not Have Convicted Mr. Flowers If Trial Counsel Had Presented Evidence Of His Intellectual Disability.	218
B. Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Counter Expert Ballistics And Shoeprint Evidence.....	219
1. Failure To Counter Ballistics Evidence.....	219
2. Failure To Counter Shoeprint Evidence.	222
C. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Third Party Suspects.	226
1. Counsel’s Failure To Investigate Alternative Suspects Was Prejudicial.	227
2. Counsel’s Failure To Investigate Alternative Suspects Constituted Deficient Performance.....	231
D. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate And Present Evidence Relating To Mr. Flowers’s Lack Of Future Dangerousness And Adaptability to Prison.	232
E. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During The State’s Closing Argument.....	236
1. The Timing Of Sam Jones’s Discovery Of The Crime.	237
2. Mr. Flowers’s Nonexistent “Beef” With The Store.	239
3. Porky Collins’s Reaction To The Photo Array Containing A Picture Of Doyle Simpson.	240
4. The Location And Distribution Of The Victims At The Crime Scene.....	242

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

F.	Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Impeach Key State Witness Clemmie Fleming With Readily Available Evidence.	246
1.	Counsel’s Failure to Call Mr. Harris Constituted Deficient Performance.	248
2.	Counsel’s Failure to Present Ms. Fleming’s Recorded Recantation Constituted Deficient Performance.	250
3.	Counsel’s Failures to Discredit Ms. Fleming Were Prejudicial.	253
G.	Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Present Evidence Of The .380 Found And Turned Over To Law Enforcement In 2001.	254
H.	Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Present Evidence Of Investigator John Johnson’s False Notes.	258
I.	Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Uncover Critical Impeachment Evidence Relating To Key State Witnesses Odell Hallmon and Patricia Sullivan-Odom.	260
J.	Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Seek Sequestration Of The Venire, Or A Mistrial, Following The Venire’s Improper Discussions.	261
K.	Trial Counsel’s Failure To Pursue Pre-Trial DNA Testing Was Ineffective.	263
L.	Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Present Expert Testimony Showing That, Contrary To The State’s Theory Of The Case, It Is Highly Unlikely That A Person Could Have Committed The Murders Alone.	266
GROUND H: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATIONS		268
GROUND I: MISSISSIPPI’S DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL		274
A.	Standards Of Decency Have Evolved To The Point That The Death Penalty Can No Longer Be Tolerated.	275
B.	Mississippi’s Death Penalty Is Especially Inhumane.	277
C.	Mississippi’s Death Penalty Is Unconstitutionally Arbitrary.	285
GROUND J: CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE OF ERRORS		289
CONCLUSION		290

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
<i>Alcorta v. Texas</i> , 355 U.S. 28 (1957).....	137
<i>Alexander v. State</i> , 749 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 1999).....	153
<i>Anderson v. Butler</i> , 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988).....	250
<i>Andrews v. United States</i> , 179 A.3d 279 (D.C. 2018)	228
<i>Arizona v. Fulminante</i> , 499 U.S. 279 (1991).....	70, 106
<i>Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.</i> , 429 U.S. 252 (1977).....	161, 164
<i>Armstead v. State</i> , 196 So. 3d 913 (Miss. 2016).....	268
<i>Arnold v. McNeil</i> , 622 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2009).....	117
<i>Atkins v. Virginia</i> , 536 U.S. 304 (2002).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Bagwell v. State</i> , 763 S.E.2d 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014), <i>reh’g denied</i> (Oct. 21, 2014), <i>cert.</i> <i>denied</i> (Feb. 27, 2015)	265
<i>Banks v. Dretke</i> , 540 U.S. 668 (2004).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary</i> , 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964)	75
<i>Barnes v. State</i> , 460 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1984).....	95
<i>Barnes v. Thompson</i> , 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1996) (Murnaghan, J., concurring).....	43, 50, 94

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Batiste v. State</i> , 121 So. 3d 808 (Miss. 2013).....	161, 164
<i>Batiste v. State</i> , 184 So. 3d 290 (Miss. 2016).....	204, 206
<i>Batson v. Kentucky</i> , 476 U.S. 79 (1986).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Baxter v. State</i> , 177 So. 3d 394 (Miss. 2015), <i>reh’g denied</i> (Nov. 12, 2015)	211
<i>Beasley v. State</i> , 136 So. 3d 393 (Miss. 1985).....	34
<i>Bell v. Bell</i> , 512 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2008)	104
<i>Bell v. State</i> , 725 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1998).....	236
<i>Bennett v State</i> , 933 So. 2d 930 (Miss. 2006).....	76
<i>Berger v. United States</i> , 295 U.S. 78 (1935).....	73, 74
<i>Blackston v. Rapelje</i> , 780 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2015)	271
<i>Bowen v. Maynard</i> , 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1986)	86, 93
<i>Box v. State</i> , 437 So. 2d 19 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring).....	138
<i>Boyer v. Houtzdale</i> , 620 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2015)	71
<i>Bracy v. Gramley</i> , 520 U.S. 899 (1997).....	43, 84, 94
<i>Brady v. Maryland</i> , 373 U.S. 83 (1963).....	39, 74, 120
<i>Branch v. Sweeney</i> , 758 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2014).....	253

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Brent v. State</i> , 632 So. 2d 936 (Miss. 1994).....	117
<i>Brewer v. Aiken</i> , 935 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).....	216
<i>Brewer v. State</i> , 819 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 2002).....	34, 59, 62
<i>Brooks v. State</i> , 46 So. 2d 97 (Miss. 1950).....	16
<i>Brown v. State</i> , 749 So. 2d 82 (Miss. 1999).....	15
<i>Brown v. State</i> , 798 So. 2d 481 (Miss. 2001).....	14
<i>Brownlee v. Haley</i> , 306 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2002)	217
<i>Brumfield v. Cain</i> , 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2269 (2015).....	193
<i>Bruton v. United States</i> , 391 U.S. 123 (1968).....	70
<i>Byrd v. Owen</i> , 536 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 2000).....	114
<i>Calley v. Callaway</i> , 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975)	107, 123
<i>Caro v. Woodford</i> , 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002)	221
<i>Chamberlin v. State</i> , 989 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 2008).....	17
<i>Chambers v. Mississippi</i> , 410 U.S. 284 (1973).....	269
<i>Chapman v. California</i> , 386 U.S. 18 (1967).....	273
<i>Chase v. State</i> , 171 So. 3d 463 (Miss. 2015).....	190, 191, 192, 194

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Chase v. State</i> , 873 So. 2d 1013 (Miss. 2004)	189, 193, 195, 198
<i>Clemons v. State</i> , 593 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1992)	16
<i>Cole v. State</i> , 666 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1995)	16
<i>Coleman v. State</i> , 697 So. 2d 777 (Miss. 1997)	164
<i>Commonwealth v. Clemente</i> , 893 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 2008)	200
<i>Conerly v. State</i> , 544 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1989)	156, 182
<i>Conerly v. State</i> , 760 So. 2d 737 (Miss. 2000)	16
<i>Connors v. State</i> , 92 So. 3d 676 (Miss. 2012)	273
<i>Crawford v. Cain</i> , No. Civ. A. 04-0748, 2006 WL 1968872 (E.D. La. July 11, 2006), <i>aff’d</i> , 248 F. App’x 500 (5th Cir. 2007)	81
<i>Crawford v. State</i> , 867 So. 2d 196 (Miss. 2003)	33, 58
<i>Crawford v. Washington</i> , 541 U.S. 36 (2004)	268, 269, 270, 273
<i>Crivens v. Roth</i> , 172 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1999)	113
<i>Currie v. McDowell</i> , 825 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2016)	175, 176
<i>Curry v. State</i> , 820 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)	228
<i>Dahl v. King</i> , No. 1:09CV298-HSO-JMR, 2011 WL 7637258 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 9, 2011) <i>R.</i> & <i>R. adopted</i> , No. 1:09-CV-298HSO-JMR, 2012 WL 1072201 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2012)	139

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Davis v. Aslaska</i> , 415 U.S. 308 (1974).....	273
<i>Davis v. Ayala</i> , 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)	281
<i>Davis v. State</i> , 743 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 1999).....	15, 249
<i>Davis v. State</i> , 87 So. 3d 465 (Miss. 2012).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Davis v. State</i> , 980 So. 2d 951 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)	207
<i>Dawson v. Delaware</i> , 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).....	160
<i>DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp.</i> , 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992).....	204
<i>Delaware v. Van Arsdall</i> , 475 U.S. 673 (1986).....	273
<i>Dennis v. Sec’y, Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr.</i> , 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016).....	51, 75, 87, 94
<i>Dickerson v. Bagley</i> , 453 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2006)	231
<i>Douglas v. Workman</i> , 560 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009)	104
<i>Dunaway v. State</i> , 551 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 1989).....	236
<i>Duncan v. Louisiana</i> , 391 U.S. 145 (1968).....	199
<i>East v. Scott</i> , 55 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1995)	111
<i>Eddings v. Oklahoma</i> , 455 U.S. 104 (1982).....	233
<i>Edmonds v. State</i> , 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).....	60, 61

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Eldridge v. Atkins</i> , 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1981)	250
<i>Emerson v. Gramley</i> , 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996)	216, 233
<i>Enmund v. Florida</i> , 458 U.S. 782 (1982).....	283
<i>Fatumabahirtu v. United States</i> , 148 A.3d 260 (D.C. 2016)	230
<i>Ferguson v. State</i> , 507 So. 2d 94 (Miss. 1987).....	207, 256
<i>Flowers v. Mississippi</i> , 139 S. Ct. 451 (Nov. 2, 2018).....	13
<i>Flowers v. Mississippi</i> , 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2157 (2016).....	12
<i>Flowers v. State</i> , 158 So. 3d 1009 (Miss. 2014), <i>reh’g denied</i> (Mar. 26, 2015)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Flowers v. State</i> , 240 So. 3d 1082 (Miss. 2017).....	12, 159, 160, 162
<i>Flowers v. State</i> , 773 So. 2d 309 (Miss. 2000).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Flowers v. State</i> , 842 So. 2d 531 (Miss. 2003) (<i>Flowers II</i>)	8, 32, 236, 248
<i>Flowers v. State</i> , 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Floyd v. Vannoy</i> , 894 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2018)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Foster v. Chatman</i> , 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).....	12, 161, 181
<i>Foster v. State</i> , 687 So. 2d 1124 (Miss. 1996).....	166, 171
<i>Furman v. Georgia</i> , 408 U.S. 238 (1972).....	16, 275, 276

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Gallion v. State</i> , 469 So. 2d 1247 (Miss. 1985).....	16
<i>Gamble v. State</i> , 791 So. 2d 409 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).....	85
<i>Georgia v. McCollum</i> , 505 U.S. 42 (1992).....	155
<i>Gibbs v. Johnson</i> , 154 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 1998)	111
<i>Giglio v. United States</i> , 405 U.S. 150 (1972).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Gilliard v. State</i> , 614 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 1992).....	16
<i>Givens v. State</i> , 967 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007).....	65
<i>Glenn v. Tate</i> , 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1996)	216
<i>Glossip v. Gross</i> , 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Goforth v. State</i> , 70 So. 3d 174 (Miss. 2011).....	268, 271, 272
<i>Gonzales v. McKune</i> , 247 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir. 2001)	290
<i>Gore v. State</i> , 119 P.3d 1268 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).....	228, 230
<i>Gowdy v. State</i> , 56 So. 3d 540 (Miss. 2010).....	209
<i>Grayson v. State</i> , 879 So. 2d 1008 (Miss. 2004).....	264
<i>Gregg v. Georgia</i> , 428 U.S. 153 (1976).....	275, 277, 283, 287
<i>Groppi v. Wisconsin</i> , 400 U.S. 505 (1971).....	199, 203

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Guerra v. Johnson</i> , 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996)	15, 125, 126
<i>Hall v. Florida</i> , ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).....	189, 191, 193
<i>Hall v. State</i> , 245 So. 3d 396 (Miss. 2018).....	34
<i>Hansen v. State</i> , 592 So. 2d 114 (Miss. 1991).....	232
<i>Harris v. Reed</i> , 894 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1990)	253
<i>Hatfield v. State</i> , 161 So. 3d 125 (Miss. 2015).....	182
<i>Hentz v. State</i> , 489 So. 2d 1386 (Miss. 1986).....	76, 84
<i>Hester v. State</i> , 463 So. 2d 1087 (Miss. 1985).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Hickson v. State</i> , 707 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1997).....	200
<i>Hill v. Lockhart</i> , 28 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1994)	215
<i>Hinton v. Alabama</i> , 571 U.S. 263 (2014).....	60, 221
<i>Hodge v. Hurley</i> , 426 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005)	237, 243
<i>Holly v. State</i> , 671 So. 2d 32 (Miss. 1996).....	190
<i>Horton v. Zant</i> , 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991)	231
<i>Howard v. State</i> , 945 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2006).....	221
<i>Hutto v. State</i> , 227 So. 3d 963 (Miss. 2017).....	268, 273

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Irvin v. Dowd</i> , 366 U.S. 717 (1961).....	199
<i>Jenkins v. Artuz</i> , 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002).....	147
<i>Jermyn v. Horn</i> , 266 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).....	215
<i>Juniper v. Zook</i> , 876 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2017)	81, 91
<i>Kansas v. Marsh</i> , 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting op.).....	287
<i>Kennedy v. Louisiana</i> , 554 U.S. 407 (2008).....	283, 287
<i>Keys v. State</i> , 478 So.2d 266 (Miss. 1985).....	153
<i>Kiley v. United States</i> , 260 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Mass. 2003)	81, 91
<i>King v. State</i> , 656 So. 2d 1168 (Miss. 1995).....	74
<i>Kirkpatrick v. Whitley</i> , 992 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1993)	139
<i>Kittelson v. Dretke</i> , 426 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005)	269, 273
<i>Krider v. Conover</i> , 497 F. App'x 818 (10th Cir. 2012)	228
<i>Kyles v. Whitley</i> , 514 U.S. 419 (1995).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Lackey v. Texas</i> , 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)	278
<i>LaFevers v. Gibson</i> , 182 F.3d 705 (10th Cir. 1999)	264
<i>Leatherwood v. State</i> , 473 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1985).....	235, 249, 258

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Little v. State</i> , 736 So. 2d 486 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)	74
<i>Lockett v. Ohio</i> , 438 U.S. 586 (1978).....	232, 233
<i>Mahler v. Kaylo</i> , 537 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2008)	76
<i>Malone v. State</i> , 486 So. 2d 367 (Miss. 1986).....	15, 76
<i>Mancusi v. Stubbs</i> , 408 U.S. 204 (1972).....	270
<i>Manning v. State</i> , 112 So. 3d 1082 (2013).....	53, 55
<i>Manning v. State</i> , 158 So. 3d 302 (Miss. 2015).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Manning v. State</i> , 765 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 2000).....	162, 164
<i>Manning v. State</i> , 884 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 2004).....	15
<i>Martinez v. Wainwright</i> , 621 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1980)	113, 119, 138
<i>Maryland v. Craig</i> , 497 U.S. 836 (1990).....	268
<i>Massiah v. United States</i> , 377 U.S. 201 (1964).....	154
<i>Matson v. State</i> , 750 So. 2d 1234 (Miss. 1999).....	16
<i>Mattox v. United States</i> , 146 U.S. 140 (1892).....	200, 202
<i>Maynard v. Virgin Islands</i> , 392 Fed. App'x 105 (3rd Cir. 2010)	82
<i>McCleskey v. Kemp</i> , 481 U.S. 279 (1987).....	286, 287

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>McCullough v. United States</i> , 827 A.2d 48 (D.C. 2003)	228, 230
<i>McGee v. State</i> , 953 So. 2d 211 (Miss. 2007)	155
<i>McNeal v. State</i> , 551 So. 2d 151 (Miss. 1989)	95
<i>In re Medley</i> , 134 U.S. 160 (1890)	280, 281, 282
<i>Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts</i> , 557 U.S. 305 (2009)	60
<i>Mendez v. Artuz</i> , 303 F.3d 411 (2d Cir 2002)	86, 93
<i>Miller v. Pate</i> , 386 U.S. 1 (1967)	236
<i>Miller-El v. Cockrell</i> , 537 U.S. 322 (2003)	159, 178
<i>Miller-El v. Dretke</i> , 545 U.S. 231 (2005)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Mixon v. State</i> , 794 So. 2d 1007 (Miss. 2001)	73
<i>Mooney v. Holohan</i> , 294 U.S. 103 (1935)	137, 148, 150
<i>Moore v. Texas</i> , 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017)	189, 191, 192
<i>Murray v. Carrier</i> , 477 U.S. 478 (1986)	17
<i>Napue v. Illinois</i> , 360 U.S. 264 (1959)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Neal v. Puckett</i> , 286 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)	215
<i>Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink</i> , 131 So. 817 (Miss. 1930)	236

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Netherland v. State</i> , 909 So. 2d 716 (Miss. 2005) <i>reh’g denied</i> (Sept. 15, 2015).....	245
<i>Parvin v. State</i> , 113 So. 3d 1243 (Miss. 2013).....	56
<i>Patton v. State</i> , 109 So. 3d 66 (Miss. 2012).....	235
<i>Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado</i> , 137 S.Ct. 868 (2017).....	155
<i>Pennsylvania v. Ritchie</i> , 480 U.S. 39 (1987).....	273
<i>People v. Ghobrial</i> , 420 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2018)	228
<i>People v. Torres</i> , 962 N.E.2d 919, 920 (Ill. 2012)	272, 273
<i>People v. Tyburski</i> , 518 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1994) (Boyle, J., concurring).....	261
<i>In re Personal Restraint of Trapp</i> , No. 65393-8-I, 2011 WL 5966266 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2011)	58
<i>Petti v. State</i> , 666 So. 2d 754 (Miss. 1995).....	153
<i>Pinkney v. State</i> , 602 So. 2d 1177 (Miss. 1992).....	16
<i>Pitchford v. State</i> , 45 So. 3d 216 (Miss. 2010) (Graves, J., dissenting)	174
<i>Pointer v. Texas</i> , 380 U.S. 400 (1965).....	268
<i>Porter v. Clarke</i> , 290 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D. Va. 2018)	282
<i>Powers v. Ohio</i> , 499 U.S. 400 (1991).....	185
<i>Ex Parte Pressley</i> , 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000).....	85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Preston v. Blackledge</i> , 332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971).....	73
<i>Pyle v. Kansas</i> , 317 U.S. 213 (1942).....	137
<i>Quinones v. Commonwealth</i> , 547 S.E.2d 524 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).....	205
<i>Randall v. State</i> , 716 So. 2d 584 (Miss. 1998).....	163
<i>Randall v. State</i> , 806 So. 2d 185 (Miss. 2001).....	16, 17, 290
<i>Rauf v. State</i> , 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016)	289
<i>Reagor v. United States</i> , 488 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1973)	98, 153
<i>Reutter v. Solem</i> , 888 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1989)	104
<i>Riley v. Cockrell</i> , 215 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Tex. 2002).....	261
<i>Roach v. State</i> , 116 So. 3d 126 (Miss. 2013).....	200, 203
<i>Robinson v. California</i> , 370 U.S. 660 (1962).....	274
<i>Robinson v. State</i> , 662 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 1995).....	204
<i>Rodgers v. State</i> , 796 So. 2d 1022 (Miss. 2001).....	236
<i>Rompilla v. Beard</i> , 545 U.S. 374 (2005).....	232, 234, 236
<i>Roper v. Simmons</i> , 543 U.S. 551 (2005).....	85, 274, 287
<i>Rose v. Mitchell</i> , 443 U.S. 545 (1979).....	155

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Ross v. Oklahoma</i> , 487 U.S. 81 (1988).....	201
<i>Ross v. State</i> , 954 So. 2d 968 (Miss. 2007).....	207, 231
<i>Rowland v. State</i> , 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010).....	16
<i>Ruiz v. Texas</i> , 137 S. Ct. 1246 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).....	282, 283
<i>Russell v. Johnson</i> , No. 1:02-CV-261, 2003 WL 22208029 (N.D. Miss. May 21, 2003).....	279
<i>Sandlin v. State</i> , 156 So. 3d 813 (Miss. 2013).....	209
<i>Sawyer v. Whitley</i> , 505 U.S. 333 (1992).....	17
<i>Scott v. Hubert</i> , 610 F. App'x. 433 (5th Cir. 2015)	160
<i>Scott v. State</i> , 796 So. 2d 959 (Miss. 2001).....	273
<i>Seals v. State</i> , 44 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1950).....	201, 203
<i>Seidel v. Merkle</i> , 146 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 1998)	256
<i>Sewell v. State</i> , 721 So. 2d 129 (Miss. 1998).....	161
<i>Shinn v. State</i> , 174 So. 3d 961 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)	209
<i>Ex Parte Sifuentes</i> , No. AP-75,815, 2008 WL 151087 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008).....	230
<i>Simon v. State</i> , 857 So. 2d 668 (Miss. 2003).....	119
<i>Singletary v. Fischer</i> , 365 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)	219

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Skilling v. United States</i> , 561 U.S. 358 (2010).....	70
<i>Skipper v. South Carolina</i> , 476 U.S. 1 (1986).....	232, 233
<i>Small v. Florida Dep’t of Corr.</i> , 470 F. App’x 808 (11th Cir. 2012)	249
<i>Ex Parte Smith</i> , 213 So. 3d 313 (Ala. 2010)	206
<i>Smith v. Cain</i> , 565 U.S. 73 (2012).....	114
<i>Smith v. Mullin</i> , 379 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2004)	216
<i>Smith v. Murray</i> , 477 U.S. 527 (1986).....	17
<i>Smith v. State</i> , 23 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)	57
<i>Smith v. State</i> , 477 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1985).....	14, 16
<i>Smith v. State</i> , 492 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1986).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Smith v. State</i> , 500 So. 2d 973 (Miss. 1986).....	75, 76, 112
<i>Snyder v. Louisiana</i> , 552 U.S. 472 (2008).....	161
<i>State v. Abrahamson</i> , No. 34498-3-III, 2017 WL 2259050 (Wash. Ct. App. May 23, 2017)	200
<i>State v. Adams</i> , 280 Kan. 494 (2005)	228
<i>State v. Behn</i> , 868 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).....	58
<i>State v. Grant</i> , 799 A.2d 1144 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)	228

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>State v. Gregory</i> , 427 P.3d 621 (Wash. 2018).....	288, 289
<i>State v. Hallmon</i> , No. 2016-0018-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2016)	97
<i>State v. Jenkins</i> , 848 N.W.2d 786 (Wis. 2014).....	254
<i>State v. Moriwake</i> , 647 P.2d 705 (Haw. 1982)	73
<i>State v. Peeler</i> , 140 A.3d 811 (Conn. 2016)	289
<i>State v. Roman</i> , 817 A.2d 100 (Conn. 2003)	203
<i>State v. Storey</i> , 901 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. 1995)	73
<i>Steinkuehler v. Meschner</i> , 176 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 1999)	253
<i>Stevenson v. State</i> , 674 So. 2d 501 (Miss. 1996).....	190
<i>Strauder v. West Virginia</i> , 100 U.S. 303 (1880).....	155
<i>Strickland v. Washington</i> , 466 U.S. 668 (1984).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Strickler v. Greene</i> , 527 U.S. 263 (1999).....	51, 84, 107, 114
<i>Tarango v. McDaniel</i> , 815 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2016)	201
<i>Tassin v. Cain</i> , 517 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2008)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Thomas v. Clements</i> , 789 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2015)	226
<i>Thomas v. State</i> , 818 So. 2d 335 (Miss. 2002).....	203, 204, 205

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Thompson v. McNeil</i> , 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)	283
<i>Thorson v. State</i> , 721 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1998).....	155
<i>Toliver v. Pollard</i> , 688 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2012)	253
<i>Trop v. Dulles</i> , 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion)	274, 275
<i>Turpin v. Helmeci</i> , 518 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. 1999).....	231
<i>United States v. Addison</i> , 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974)	61
<i>United States v. Agurs</i> , 427 U.S. 97 (1976).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>United States v. Andrews</i> , 532 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 2008)	113
<i>United States v. Antone</i> , 603 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979)	75
<i>United States v. Armstrong</i> , 517 U.S. 456 (1996).....	43
<i>United States v. Auten</i> , 632 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.1980)	111, 113
<i>United States v. Bagley</i> , 473 U.S. 667 (1985).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>United States v. Boyd</i> , 833 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1993) <i>aff'd</i> , 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995).....	75
<i>United States v. Chaz Glynn</i> , 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).....	57
<i>United States v. Diaz</i> , No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 485967 (N.D. Cal. Feb 12, 2007)	57
<i>United States v. Fairman</i> , 769 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1985)	75

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>United States v. Frazier</i> , 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004)	61, 63
<i>United States v. Gordon</i> , 246 F.Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1965)	117
<i>United States v. Henry</i> , 447 U.S. 264 (1980)	154
<i>United States v. Hines</i> , 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)	63
<i>United States v. Iverson</i> , 637 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1980)	147
<i>United States v. Koetting</i> , 74 F.3d 1238 (5th Cir. 1995)	111
<i>United States v. Mauskar</i> , 557 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2009)	73
<i>United States v. Monteiro</i> , 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006)	57
<i>United States v. Perdomo</i> , 929 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1991)	113, 119
<i>United States v. Preston</i> , 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)	219
<i>United States v. Pridgeon</i> , 462 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1972)	205, 263
<i>United States v. Quinn</i> , 537 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2008)	114
<i>United States v. Richardson</i> , 781 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2015)	269, 270
<i>United States v. Shaffer</i> , 789 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986)	104
<i>United States v. Smith</i> , 814 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2016)	73, 150
<i>United States v. Staples</i> , 410 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2005)	117

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>United States v. Sutton</i> , 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976)	147
<i>United States v. Sylvester</i> , 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998)	200
<i>United States v. Vega</i> , 826 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016)	147
<i>Vaca v. State</i> , 314 S.W.3d 331 (Mo. 2010)	249
<i>Van Tran v. State</i> , 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001).....	216
<i>Vasquez v. Hillery</i> , 474 U.S. 254 (1986).....	160
<i>Veasey v. Abbott</i> , 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016)	176
<i>Vega v. Ryan</i> , 757 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2014)	253
<i>Wearry v. Cain</i> , 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016).....	74, 76
<i>Weems v. United States</i> , 217 U.S. 349 (1910).....	275
<i>Westbrook v. State</i> , 32 So. 2d 251 (1947).....	17, 34
<i>Wicoff v. State</i> , 900 S.W.2d 187 (Ark. 1995).....	254
<i>Wiggins v. Smith</i> , 539 U.S. 510 (2003).....	215, 232
<i>Wilcher v. State</i> , 863 So. 2d 776 (Miss. 2003).....	209
<i>Williams v. Ryan</i> , 623 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2010)	91
<i>Williams v. State</i> , 445 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 1984).....	16, 290

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

<i>Williams v. State</i> , 669 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 1996)	14, 233
<i>Williams v. State</i> , 754 So. 2d 591 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)	33, 71
<i>Williams v. Taylor</i> , 529 U.S. 362 (2000)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Williams v. Whitley</i> , 940 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991)	111, 112, 123
<i>Willie v. State</i> , 204 So. 3d 1268 (Miss. 2016)	57, 221
<i>Wilson v. State</i> , 81 So. 3d 1067 (Miss. 2012)	256
<i>Winfield v. United States</i> , 676 A.2d 1 (D.C.1996)	228
<i>In re Winship</i> , 397 U.S. 358 (1970)	34
<i>Wisehart v. Davis</i> , 408 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 2005)	104
<i>Wood v. Bartholomew</i> , 516 U.S. 1 (1995)	117
<i>Woodall v. State</i> , 754 S.E.2d 335 (Ga. 2014)	228
<i>Woodson v. North Carolina</i> , 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion)	283
<i>Woodward v. State</i> , 635 So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1993)	250, 252, 258
<i>Zamarippa v. State</i> , 100 So. 3d 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)	58
<i>Zapata v. Vasquez</i> , 788 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015)	237
Statutes	
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(2)	204

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(a).....	203, 204, 206
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(e).....	33
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1)	120
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6)	59
Miss. Code § 99-19-81.....	101
Miss. Code § 99-19-83.....	101
Miss. Code § 99-19-105(3)(a).....	16, 287
Miss. Code § 99-39-3(2)	<i>passim</i>
Miss. Code § 99-39-5.....	14, 265
Miss. Code § 99-39-5(1)(c).....	15, 190
Miss. Code § 99-39-5(1)(d)	15, 190
Miss. Code § 99-39-21(6)	14

Constitutional Provisions

Miss. Const. art. III § 14	1
Miss. Const. art III, § 26	1, 235, 268
Miss. Const. art. III, § 28	1, 274
U.S. Const. amend. VI	268
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.....	274, 289

Rules

Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(4).....	14
Miss. R. Unif. Cir. and Cty. Ct. Rule 3.06.....	203, 204
MRE 608(b)	117
MRE 616.....	118

Legislative Materials

Miss. HB 302 (2009 Regular Session).....	188
--	-----

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Miss. SB 2069 (2009 Regular Session)	187
Other Authorities	
Adam M. Clark, <i>An Investigation of Death Qualification as a Violation of the Rights of Jurors</i> , 24 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 29 (2005-2006)	212
African-American, DPIC, <i>Race Statistics</i>	288
Ala. Dep’t. of Corr., <i>Incarceration Details: Steve McKenzie</i>	85
Am. Civil Liberties Union, <i>Appeals Court Affirms that Mississippi Death Row Conditions are Unconstitutional</i> (June 30, 2004)	279
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, <i>Position Statement on Segregation of Prisoners with Mental Illness</i> (2017)	282
Am. Public Health Ass’n, <i>Solitary Confinement as a Public Health Issue, Policy No. 201310</i> (2013)	282
<i>An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death Eligible Cases</i> , 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 305 (2009)	286
APA, <i>Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders</i> 33 (5th ed. 2013)	192
<i>APM Reports / jury-data</i> , GitHub	171
Archives, <i>Justice Powell’s New Wisdom</i> , NY Times	286
<i>Bobby Townsend</i> , The Nat’l Registry of Exonerations (Dec. 16, 2016)	77
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, <i>Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions</i> , 95 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2009)	60
Brandon L. Garrett, <i>Judging Innocence</i> , 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (2008)	219
Brenda Goodman, <i>Prosecutor Who Opposed a Death Sentence is Rebuked</i> , NY Times (Sept. 15, 2007)	85
Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, <i>The Impact of Death Qualification, Belief in a Just World, Legal Authoritarianism, and Locus of Control on Venirepersons’ Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials</i> , 25 Behav. Sci. & Law 57 (2007)	212
<i>Charges dismissed against perjured Flowers’ juror</i> , The Mississippi Link (Oct. 8, 2009)	187
Craig Haney, <i>Death by Design</i> 110 (Ronald Roesch, ed., 1st ed. 2005)	147

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Craig Haney, <i>Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement</i> , 49 Crime & Delinquency 124 (2003)	281
Craig Haney, <i>On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process</i> , 8 J.L. & Hum. Behav. 121 (1984).....	212
Daniel L. Cork et al., <i>Ballistic Imaging</i> , Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Archives 3 (Nat’l Academies Press ed., 2008)	56
Dave Mann, <i>What Happened to the Gun? Lots of Questions, Little Evidence in Curtis Flowers</i> , Clarion Ledger (July 7, 2018)	122
David C. Baldus et al., <i>Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999)</i> , 81 Neb. L. Rev. 486 (2002)	286
David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, <i>Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis</i> (1990)	286
David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”: <i>Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice</i> (The Free Press, ed. 1996).....	278, 279
Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, <i>Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact</i> , 59 Hastings L.J. 1159 (May 2008).....	61
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>Charges Dropped Against Willie Manning; Becomes 153rd Death Row Exoneree</i>	284
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>Innocence and the Death Penalty</i>	283, 285
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>Jurisdictions With No Recent Executions</i>	275, 276, 277
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>National Statistics on the Death Penalty and Race</i>	287, 288
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976</i>	276, 277
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>States With and Without the Death Penalty</i>	276
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>Time on Death Row: ‘The Faces of Mississippi’s Death Row’</i>	278, 280
Eugene R. Milhizer, <i>Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions</i> , 81 Temp. L. Rev. 1 (2008).....	71
Fair Punishment Project, <i>America’s Top Five Deadliest Prosecutors: How Overzealous Personalities Drive the Death Penalty</i> 18 (June 2016).....	277

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Frank Newport, <i>In U.S., 64% Support Death Penalty in Cases of Murder</i> , GALLUP (Nov. 8, 2010)	213
Homer Venters et al., <i>Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates</i>	281
Hon. J. John Paul Stevens, <i>Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner</i> (Aug. 6, 2005)	212
Hon. Stephen S. Trott, <i>Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses</i> , 47 Hastings L.J. 1381 (1996)	104
<i>In the Dark S2 E. 11: The End</i> , APM Reports (July 3, 2018)	125
<i>In the Dark S2 E5: Privilege</i> , APM Reports	98
Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin & Kimberley B. Kahn, <i>Possibility of Death Sentence Has Divergent Effects on Verdicts for Black and White Defendants</i> , 39 L. & Hum. Behav.	286
James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, <i>Stuck in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court Decision Making and Legal Developments</i> , 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 379 (2004)	211
Jeff Amy, <i>Key witness in Tardy Furniture murders pleads guilty in triple homicide</i> , Clarion-Ledger (May 11, 2016)	102
Jerry Mitchell, <i>Almost executed by Mississippi, Michelle Byrom free</i> , Clarion-Ledger (Dec. 2, 2015)	285
Jerry Mitchell, <i>Health woes shut Parchman kitchen</i> , Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 29, 2016)	280
Jerry Mitchell, <i>Is Curtis Flowers Innocent? Pathologist thinks multiple killers behind quadruple murder</i> , Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 2, 2018)	122
John J. Donohue III, <i>An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?</i> , 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 637 (2014)	287
Kate Briquetelet, <i>Willie Jerome Manning spends two decades in prison over faulty hair science: On Death Row for the Wrong Hair</i> , Miss. Innocence Justice (Apr. 27, 2015)	282
Margaret Winter & Stephen Hanlon, <i>Parchman Farm Blues: Pushing for Prison Reforms at Mississippi State Penitentiary</i> , Am. Civil Liberties Union (2008)	278

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Maria L. La Ganga, <i>Death penalty is sought against James Holmes, but governor stands in the way</i> , L.A. Times (July 22, 2015)	276
Mental Health Am., <i>Policy Position Statement 24: Seclusion and Restraints</i> (Dec. 2015)	282
Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, <i>The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina</i> , 58 S.C. L. Rev. 161 (2006)	286, 287
Miss. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., <i>Innocence: List of Those Freed From Death Row</i>	283
Miss. Dep’t of Corr., <i>Earned Release Supervision Program</i>	101
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, <i>Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination</i> , 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 481 (2009)	213
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, <i>Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury</i> , 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 573, 586 (2011)	286
Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, <i>Public Policy Platform</i> , § 9.8 (Dec. 2015)	282
Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, <i>Kennedy Brewer</i>	285
<i>Perjured juror in murder trial pleads guilty</i> , The Mississippi Link (Nov. 17, 2009)	186
Pew Research Ctr., <i>Shrinking Majority of Americans Support Death Penalty</i> (Mar. 28, 2014)	212
Raymond Paternoster et al., <i>Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999</i> , 4 Md. L. J. on Race, Religion, Gender, and Class 1 (2004)	287
Richard Berk & Joseph Lowery, <i>Factors Affecting Death Penalty Decisions in Mississippi</i> (June 1985; unpublished manuscript)	286
Richard Salgado, <i>Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green</i> , 2005 BYU. L. Rev. 519 (2005)	214
Robert L. Schalock, et. al, <i>Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support</i> 1 (11th ed. 2010)	191
Ronald J. Tabak, <i>Capital Punishment</i> , in <i>The State of Criminal Justice</i> 193 (2018)	276, 277
Samuel Francis, <i>Statement of Principles</i>	188

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Samuel Gross et al., <i>Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death</i> , 111 PNAS 7230 (2014).....	284
Samuel P. Gross, <i>Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty—It’s Getting Personal</i> , 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1448 (1998).....	216
Samuel R. Sommers & Pheobe C. Ellsworth, <i>White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom</i> , 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 201 (Mar. 2001)	213
Sarah Fowler, <i>Ten inmates dead in less than 3 weeks in Mississippi prisons</i> , Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 22, 2018).....	280
Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, <i>On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis</i> , 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 469 (1997).....	71
Saul M. Kassin, <i>On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?</i> , 60 Am. Psychologist 215 (2005).....	71
Scott Phillips & Jamie Richardson, <i>The Worst of the Worst: Heinous Crimes and Erroneous Evidence</i> , 45 Hofstra L. Rev. 417 (2016).....	284
Soc’y of Correctional Physicians, <i>Position Statement, Restricted Housing of Mentally Ill Inmates</i> , Am. College of Correctional Physicians (2013).....	282
SPLC, <i>Council of Conservative Citizens</i>	188
Stephen P. Garvey, <i>Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?</i> , 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538 (1998).....	216
Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, <i>The Problem of False Confessions in the Post–DNA World</i> , 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891 (2008)	219
Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, <i>Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study</i> , 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1227 (2013).....	287
Stuart Grassian, <i>Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement</i> , 22 Wash U.J.L. & Pol’y 325 (2006)	281
Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, <i>Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty</i> , 30 J. Legal Stud. 277 (June 2001)	213
Tina Rosenberg, <i>The Deadliest D.A.</i> , NY Times Magazine (July 16, 1995).....	214

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

United States Census Bureau, <i>Attala County, Mississippi, 2010 Census Summary File 1</i>	173
United States Census Bureau, <i>Grenada County, Mississippi, 2010 Census Summary File 1</i>	173
United States Census Bureau, <i>Montgomery County, Mississippi 2010 Census Summary File 1</i>	156
United States Census Bureau: <i>Per Capita Income In 1999 Dollars</i>	22
United States Census Bureau, <i>Quick Facts: Mississippi</i>	288
United States Census Bureau, <i>Quick Facts: Montgomery County, MS</i>	22
United States Census Bureau, <i>Quick Facts: United States</i>	288
United States Gen. Accounting Office, <i>Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities</i> 5 (Feb. 1990)	286
Ward Schafer, <i>Minister Blasts Mississippi Senator’s Connections</i> , Jackson Free Press (July 10, 2009)	187
Will Craft, <i>Mississippi D.A. has long history of striking many blacks from juries</i> , APM Reports	<i>passim</i>
Will Craft, <i>Peremptory Strikes in Mississippi’s Fifth Circuit Court District</i> , APM Reports	<i>passim</i>
William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys., <i>Death sentencing in Black and White: An empirical analysis of jurors’ race and jury racial composition</i> , 3 U. of Pa. J. Const. L. 171 (Feb. 2001)	213
William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, <i>Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White</i> , 53 Depaul L. Rev. 1497 (Summer 2004)	214

COMES NOW, CURTIS GIOVANNI FLOWERS, Petitioner, and asks this Court, pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article III, §§ 14, 26, and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution; as well as other laws set forth below, to grant post-conviction relief in his case.

INTRODUCTION

After six trials and four appeals over more than twenty years, one might assume that the prosecutions of Curtis Flowers had run their factual course. Nothing could be further from the truth. Recent investigations—including interviews with scores of witnesses from Mississippi to Massachusetts, and points in between; discovery of thousands of pages of new documentary evidence; and an exhaustive review of the District Attorney’s pattern and practice of selecting jurors for capital prosecutions—have revealed a completely different, and much more accurate, portrait of a case whose tortured history is unparalleled.

Curtis Flowers is innocent of the Tardy Furniture Store murders. Newly discovered evidence demonstrates that the State succeeded in convicting Mr. Flowers—on its sixth try, no less—largely through prosecutorial misconduct, including false testimony by key law enforcement witnesses and a jailhouse snitch, suppression of material evidence, egregious racial discrimination in jury selection, and reliance on false and discredited forensic evidence. Mr. Flowers was entitled to have his guilt or innocence adjudicated on the basis of reliable evidence and truthful testimony. The State of Mississippi violated that right, in repeated and shocking ways.

The State’s case against Mr. Flowers was weak to begin with. No physical evidence ever connected Mr. Flowers to the crime. Investigators recovered no DNA, fingerprints, or other crime scene evidence that could be linked to Mr. Flowers. What little evidence they did

collect—seven projectiles fired from a never-recovered .380 handgun; several live rounds found on the floor indicating that the gun jammed during the murders; and a bloody partial shoeprint from a Fila Grant Hill shoe that was never recovered—did not connect Mr. Flowers to the crimes.

It was only with the testimony of numerous witnesses, each of whom claimed to have seen Mr. Flowers in various places around town on the morning of July 16, 1996, that the State was able to prop up its case. But there were two key problems with this testimony. First, most of these eyewitnesses did not come forward until weeks after the crimes, after the State had publicly focused on Mr. Flowers and had offered a \$30,000 reward for information. When these witnesses did finally present themselves to law enforcement, they gave hopelessly conflicting stories of when they saw Mr. Flowers, where, and what he was wearing. And second, testimony from eyewitnesses pointed at least as strongly to another perpetrator, Doyle Simpson, whose gun the State claimed was the murder weapon. One of Mr. Simpson's own family members saw him driving toward Tardy's on the morning of July 16, when Mr. Simpson was supposedly at work, and Simpson's car was seen outside of Tardy Furniture shortly before the murders. In sum, the evidence against Mr. Flowers was extremely thin.

Since Mr. Flowers's sixth trial and appeal, a cache of new evidence has come to light that not only dismantles the State's case against Mr. Flowers, but also reveals the lengths to which the State was willing to go to secure a conviction. Specifically, we now know that the perpetrators of a string of robbery-murders nearly identical to the Tardy Furniture murders traveled to Mississippi at the time of the Tardy Furniture murders, wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes and wielding a .380 handgun that tended to jam, and returned to their home state of Alabama with cash they did not have before they left. We have also learned that the State interrogated and

detained for eleven days a local man who wore Fila Grant Hill shoes, stayed in a house near Tardy Furniture, and had a long and violent criminal history.

More troubling are the lengths to which the State went to hide this evidence. New evidence proves that the State of Mississippi considered and pursued these individuals as suspects. But the prosecution not only hid all traces of its investigation of these alternative suspects from the defense; it also presented demonstrably false testimony from multiple law enforcement witnesses to cover up that investigation. Lieutenant Wayne Miller and Investigator Jack Matthews testified, repeatedly and emphatically, that the State of Mississippi investigated no other suspects. And other members of the prosecution team, including District Attorney Doug Evans and Investigator John Johnson, likewise made on-the-record representations to the Court that the State never considered any suspect other than Curtis Flowers. We now know these claims were false. Of course, we do not know that these other suspects committed the Tardy Furniture murders. But we do know that the jury was not presented with plausible, alternative explanations that would have debunked the State's central theory of the case: that although the evidence it relied on was almost entirely circumstantial, all of it pointed to Mr. Flowers—and no one else. Had the glaring flaws in this theory been exposed, it is reasonably likely that the outcome of Mr. Flowers's trial would have been different.

This false testimony and suppression of critical evidence warrants a new trial on its own. But there is more. Since Mr. Flowers's trial, new evidence has come to light showing that District Attorney Doug Evans struck a series of backroom deals with a critical witness, Odell Hallmon. Mr. Hallmon testified at trial that Mr. Flowers had confessed to committing the Tardy Furniture murders. We now know that Mr. Hallmon's testimony was false, as Mr. Hallmon recently admitted in a recorded interview. We have also learned that in exchange

for this false testimony, Mr. Evans ensured that Mr. Hallmon avoided decades of jail time for the numerous criminal charges he faced during the Flowers trials. In Mr. Hallmon's words, "I helped them, they helped me. That's what[] it all boiled down to." This quid pro quo was never disclosed to Mr. Flowers; to the contrary, Mr. Hallmon testified falsely that he had not received any benefits from the State. The jury was thus deprived of critical impeachment evidence that would have undercut the State's only direct evidence against Mr. Flowers.

The State similarly manipulated the testimony of another star witness, Patricia Sullivan-Odom—the only witness whose testimony purported to place Mr. Flowers near the crime scene. As it turns out, Ms. Sullivan-Odom was under a 16-count federal tax fraud indictment at the time she gave her testimony. The prosecution knew (or should have known) this information, but suppressed it. Further, multiple sources of new evidence confirm that another key prosecution witnesses—Clemmie Fleming, who gave testimony that Mr. Flowers had been spotted sprinting away from Tardy Furniture shortly after the murders—fabricated her testimony.

As for the forensic evidence adduced at Mr. Flowers's trials, new evidence reveals that the "scientific" ballistics and shoeprint evidence the State relied upon was unreliable junk science that never should have been presented to the jury. Contrary to the State's experts' contentions, there was no scientifically valid basis to claim that the projectiles recovered from the crime scene were fired from Doyle Simpson's gun, nor was it possible to claim that the bloody shoeprint found at the scene was made by a size 10 1/2 shoe.

The forensic evidence was also incomplete. New evidence confirms that in 2001, the State recovered a .380 handgun—the same caliber used to commit the Tardy Furniture murders—from underneath a home located near Tardy Furniture but in the opposite direction of

the route allegedly taken by Mr. Flowers on the morning of the murders. Winona Police Officers recently confirmed that they collected the gun and turned it over to the District Attorney.

But it was never disclosed to Mr. Flowers, depriving him of evidence that could have contradicted the State's ballistics evidence and exposed yet another flaw in the State's theory of how Mr. Flowers committed the Tardy Furniture murders.

Other errors infected Mr. Flowers's trial, too. As he had done in Mr. Flowers's prior trials, District Attorney Doug Evans exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race in violation of Mr. Flowers's equal protection rights. The trial record itself is replete with evidence proving this. But to the extent the State's motivation for its exercise of peremptory challenges was a close question, new overwhelming new statistical evidence adduced since Mr. Flowers's trial resolves it. Specifically, one analysis of non-capital and capital trials handled by Mr. Evans's office from 1992 to 2017 shows that he and his colleagues were *more than four times* more likely to use a peremptory strike against a black qualified venire member than a white qualified venire member. Another analysis of Mr. Evans's peremptory strikes across all capital cases he has tried for which data were available—13, in total—reveals that he was *eight times* more likely to strike a black qualified venire member than a white qualified venire member. And in the prosecution of Curtis Flowers, Mr. Evans's discriminatory strikes were even more aggressive. In those trials, Mr. Evans was *more than 20 times* more likely to strike black qualified venire members than white qualified venire members. This is not the product of happenstance. Indeed, a new statistical analysis shows that during Mr. Evans's tenure as District Attorney, race has been the most powerful predictor of whether a juror would be struck, even when controlling for more than 60 race-neutral explanations, such as prior criminal history or relationship with the defendant.

New evidence also demonstrates that the special venire assembled for Mr. Flowers's sixth trial was tainted in other ways. Specifically, several venire members have disclosed that venire members spoke with victims' family members at the courthouse during the *voir dire* process; that venire members openly discussed the case during that process, sharing sentiments such as "why we up here, he guilty"; and that certain white venire members made abhorrently racist comments, causing several black venire members to "self strike" off of the jury.

Further, evidence unearthed since Mr. Flowers's sixth trial and appeal shows that he is intellectually disabled. This evidence, which was never presented at trial, is critical not only because it renders him ineligible for the death penalty, but also because it casts further doubt on the State's theory of the crime. It is hard to imagine a highly-efficient, execution-style quadruple homicide like the Tardy Furniture murders being committed by any single individual, but it is utterly implausible to think that someone like Mr. Flowers—who has a tested IQ of 72, was highly accident prone throughout his childhood and young adult life, and struggled to complete complex tasks—could have done it.

If all these egregious instances of State misconduct and other errors were not enough to deprive Mr. Flowers of a fair trial, he also received seriously deficient assistance of counsel. Among their many errors, trial counsel failed to present readily available mitigation evidence, including evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability; evidence that would have discredited the prosecution's highly influential ballistics and shoeprint evidence; evidence that a rusty .380 handgun was found buried underneath a house near Tardy Furniture in 2001, but was never tested or disclosed by the State to defense counsel; expert testimony that one person acting alone could not have committed the Tardy Furniture murders; and other available evidence that would have discredited key prosecution witnesses.

* * * * *

The State's case against Mr. Flowers rested on a weak foundation. To the extent it was sufficient to support a conviction—a dubious proposition—there is no question it would have buckled under the weight of the new evidence that has come to light since Mr. Flowers's trial and appeal. Each of those new pieces of evidence independently establishes that, if introduced at a new trial, the outcome of this case would be different. Viewed in combination, the effect is staggering.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997, a Montgomery County Grand Jury returned four indictments against Mr. Flowers, each bearing a separate charge number and each charging him with a separate count of capital murder relating to the murder of four people at the Tardy Furniture Store in Winona on the morning of July 16, 1996—Bertha Tardy (Montgomery County Case No. 7447), Robert Golden (Case No. 7448), Carmen Rigby (Case No. 7449), and Derrick Stewart (Case No. 7450).

Having separated the murder into four indictments, the State selected the Bertha Tardy indictment, Case No. 7447 (*Flowers I*), for the first trial. Mr. Flowers pled not guilty and was represented at trial by John M. Gilmore and Billy J. Gilmore. He was tried by a jury, found guilty, and sentenced to death on October 17, 1997. Mr. Flowers appealed his conviction and sentence in *Flowers I*. He was represented by James Craig and Keith Ball.

While that appeal was pending, the State proceeded to trial again, this time on the Derrick Stewart indictment, Case No. 7450 (*Flowers II*). At this second trial, Mr. Flowers was represented by different defense counsel, Chokwe Lumumba and Harvey Freelon. On March 31, 1999, Mr. Flowers was convicted and sentenced to death.

On December 21, 2000, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed Mr. Flowers's conviction and sentence in *Flowers I* on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct relating to, *inter alia*, introduction of evidence concerning other separately indicted crimes, arguing facts not in evidence, improper cross-examination of Mr. Flowers, and improper comment by the trial court. *Flowers v. State*, 773 So. 2d 309 (Miss. 2000).

Mr. Flowers appealed his conviction and sentence in *Flowers II*. He was represented on appeal by James Craig and Keith Ball. On April 3, 2003, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed Mr. Flowers's conviction and sentence in *Flowers II* on the basis of the same kinds of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred in *Flowers I*, including introduction of evidence concerning other separately indicted crimes, improper attempts to impeach witnesses without a factual basis to do so, and gross misstatements of the evidence by the prosecution during closing argument. *Flowers v. State*, 842 So. 2d 531 (Miss. 2003) (*Flowers II*).

Both *Flowers I* and *Flowers II* were remanded to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Mississippi Supreme Court decisions. On remand, the State abandoned its effort to charge and try the four murders separately. The prosecution against Mr. Flowers was renumbered as Montgomery County Circuit Court Case No. 2003-0071-CR, and all subsequent trials dealt with all four charged capital murders.

Mr. Flowers was again tried by a jury and, on February 11, 2004, was convicted of four counts of capital murder and sentenced to death (*Flowers III*). Mr. Flowers was represented at trial by Ray Charles Carter and André De Gruy. Once again, Mr. Flowers appealed his convictions and sentences, this time represented by David Voisin and André De Gruy. On February 1, 2007, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed Mr. Flowers's convictions and sentences on the basis of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, including overt racial

discrimination by the prosecution in its exercise of peremptory challenges, and remanded to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for a new trial. *Flowers v. State*, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007) (*Flowers III*).

Mr. Flowers was tried a fourth time in November 2007 (*Flowers IV*). He was again represented by Ray Charles Carter and André De Gruy. At this fourth trial, the State elected not to seek the death penalty. That trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.

The State of Mississippi then tried Mr. Flowers a fifth time in September 2008 (*Flowers V*). This time, the State reverted to seeking the death penalty. Mr. Flowers was represented by Ray Charles Carter, André De Gruy, and Alison Steiner. Again, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on guilt or innocence, and Mr. Flowers's fifth trial ended in a mistrial.

Undeterred, the State pressed forward, trying Mr. Flowers for a sixth time in June 2010 (*Flowers VI*). Mr. Flowers was represented by Ray Charles Carter, André De Gruy, and Alison Steiner. On June 19, 2010, the jury found Mr. Flowers guilty of four counts of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Mr. Flowers appealed his convictions and sentences. On appeal, he was represented by Sheri Lynn Johnson, Keir M. Weyble, and Alison Steiner. A divided panel of the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on November 13, 2014, and denied rehearing on March 26, 2015. *Flowers v. State*, 158 So. 3d 1009 (Miss. 2014), *reh'g denied* (Mar. 26, 2015). Three justices dissented. Justice Dickinson filed a dissenting opinion with which Justices King and Kitchens joined. Justice King filed a dissenting opinion with which Justices Dickinson and Kitchens joined.

The Mississippi Supreme Court's mandate issued on April 2, 2015. Mr. Flowers filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of his his

convictions and sentences. *See Flowers v. State*, No. 14-10486 (*petition for cert. filed June 23, 2015*). And while that petition was pending, Mr. Flowers began post-conviction proceedings in this Court. On April 30, 2015, the Court remanded the matter to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for the appointment of post-conviction counsel. Thereafter, on May 22, 2015, the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel (“OCPCC”) filed a Notice of Selection of Counsel, pursuant to Mississippi Code § 99-39-117, informing the Court that W. Tucker Carrington and William McIntosh, attorneys at the Mississippi Innocence Project, had agreed to serve as *pro bono* counsel to Mr. Flowers. The State did not object, and on June 24, 2015, the Circuit Court determined that Mr. Carrington and Mr. McIntosh were qualified *pro bono* counsel and approved of their representation of Mr. Flowers. On August 25, 2015, the Mississippi Supreme Court admitted Jonathan Abram, Benjamin Lewis, and Kathryn Ali *pro hac vice* to represent Flowers, again without objection by the State.

Months later, on October 20, 2015, the State filed a motion challenging the qualifications of all five of Mr. Flowers’s post-conviction counsel—W. Tucker Carrington, William McIntosh, Jonathan Abram, Benjamin Lewis, and Kathryn Ali—under Rule 22 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.¹ At a January 29, 2016 hearing before the

¹ As noted, the State did not object to the OCPCC’s Notice of Selection of Counsel, which correctly stated that “Mr. Carrington will serve as lead counsel for Flowers, and he is in all respects qualified pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 to serve as lead counsel in this case.” Notice of Selection of Counsel at 1–2, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-005910-SCT (Miss. May 22, 2015). Nor did the State object to or appeal the Circuit Court’s June 24, 2015 determination that “Mr. Carrington and Mr. McIntosh are qualified private counsel,” or its “approv[al] of their representation of Mr. Flowers on a *pro bono* basis.” Order on Finding of Indigency and Appointment of Counsel, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir Ct. June 24, 2015). And when Messrs. Abram and Lewis and Ms. Ali sought admission *pro hac vice* to represent Mr. Flowers, the State again stayed silent. It was not until months had gone by and Mr. Flowers’s post-conviction legal team had devoted more than 3,000 hours and expended more than \$1.2 million in attorneys’ fees (excluding tens of thousands more dollars in investigative costs and other expenses) in preparing Mr. Flowers’s claims for post-conviction relief that the State decided it was necessary to assess the qualifications of Mr.

Montgomery County Circuit Court, Judge Loper found that Mr. Carrington, Director of the Mississippi Innocence Project and lead counsel on Mr. Flowers's case, was "[e]minently qualified to represent Mr. Flowers"; that the other attorneys who are part of Mr. Flowers's post-conviction team could work under Mr. Carrington's supervision; and that Mr. Flowers was constitutionally entitled to his counsel of choice (here, Messrs. Carrington, McIntosh, Abram, and Lewis, and Ms. Ali). *See* Hr'g Tr. 19–22, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter "Jan. 2016 Hr'g Tr."]. On March 16, 2016, David Voisin entered an appearance on Mr. Flowers's behalf.²

On March 17, 2016, Mr. Flowers filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, along with a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. But, on April 7, 2016, Mr. Flowers filed an Unopposed Motion to Stay Briefing on the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, requesting that the Mississippi Supreme Court stay briefing for 60 days and authorize the Circuit Court to address pending discovery matters. Unopposed Mot. to Stay Briefing on the Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. Apr. 7, 2016). On May 27, 2016, the Mississippi Supreme Court granted Mr. Flowers's motion. Order, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. May 27, 2016).

On June 20, 2016, the United States Supreme Court granted Mr. Flowers's writ of certiorari, vacated the Mississippi Supreme Court's judgment with respect to the direct appeal,

Flowers's counsel. And at the time the State filed its disqualification motion, Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was due in just a few short weeks. Although Petitioner ultimately received an extension to file that Motion, the State's Disqualification Motion was a transparent attempt to unconstitutionally strip Petitioner of his chosen counsel, with whom he had developed a relationship of trust and confidence.

and “remanded [the case] to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further consideration in light of *Foster v. Chatman*, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737, ___ L.E.2d ___ (2016).” *Flowers v. Mississippi*, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (Mem) (2016). Mr. Flowers’s *Batson* claim was once again back before the Mississippi Supreme Court on direct appeal.

Subsequently, on August 1, 2016, Mr. Flowers moved for an extension of the prior stay, given that: (1) there were still outstanding discovery motions; and (2) that the direct appeal was again before this Court. *See* Mot. to Extend Stay of Post-Conviction Proceedings at 1–2, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. Aug. 1, 2016). On December 15, 2016, the Court extended its stay of post-conviction proceedings until the Court issued its decision in Mr. Flowers’s direct appeal. *See* Order, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. Dec. 15, 2016).

The Court issued that decision on November 2, 2017, affirming Mr. Flowers’s conviction and sentence on the trial record. *See Flowers v. State*, 240 So. 3d 1082 (Miss. 2017). The Court denied rehearing, and the mandate issued on March 1, 2018. Again, Mr. Flowers petitioned for certiorari on his direct appeal in the United States Supreme Court.

In light of the new mandate from the Mississippi Supreme Court, on June 7, 2018, Mr. Flowers moved the Mississippi Supreme Court to lift its prior stay of post-conviction proceedings. *See* Mot. to Lift Stay of Post-Conviction Proceedings, Remand to Circuit Court, and Set Deadline to File Am. Post-Conviction Pet., *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. June 7, 2018). On October 18, 2018, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the stay had been lifted because “Mr. Flowers’s direct appeal has been decided,” and set a deadline to

² Mr. Voisin entered his appearance after an unexpected personal matter arose for Mr. Carrington, requiring participation of additional Mississippi counsel.

file an amended application for leave to proceed in the trial court for February 28, 2019. Order at 2, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. Oct. 18, 2018). Thus, Mr. Flowers's post-conviction process began anew. *See id.* at 3.

On November 2, 2018, the United States Supreme Court again granted Mr. Flowers's petition for certiorari. *Flowers v. Mississippi*, 139 S. Ct. 451 (Mem), 202 L.Ed.2d 346 (Nov. 2, 2018). His case is currently set for argument on March 20, 2019.

On December 7, 2018, Mr. Flowers filed a motion in the Circuit Court for discovery and mandatory disclosures. Mot. for Mandatory Disc. and for Leave to Obtain Discovery, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Dec. 7, 2018). On December 21, 2018, the State filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Preliminary Post-Conviction Proceeding in the Mississippi Supreme Court, seeking a stay of all post-conviction matters until the United States Supreme Court issues its decision in *Flowers v. Mississippi*, Case No. 17-9572. Emergency Mot. to Stay Prelim. Post-Conviction Proceeding, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. Dec. 21, 2018); *see also Flowers v. State*, 139 S. Ct. 451 (Mem.) (Nov. 2, 2018). On December 28, 2018, the State similarly asked the Circuit Court to stay preliminary post-conviction proceedings. Mot. to Stay Prelim. Post-Conviction Proceeding in Light of *Flowers v. Mississippi* and Mot. to Stay Before the Mississippi Supreme Court, or, Alternatively, Mot. for a Continuance, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 2018).

On January 11, 2019, Mr. Flowers filed a response to the State's motion in the Mississippi Supreme Court. Pet'r's Resp. to the State's Emergency Mot. to Stay Prelim. Post-Conviction Proceeding, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. Jan. 11, 2019). Mr. Flowers did not oppose a stay of post-conviction briefing, but did oppose a stay of

preliminary discovery and mandatory disclosures under Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(4). *See id.* On January 14, 2019, Mr. Flowers likewise filed a response to the State’s parallel motion in the Circuit Court, taking the same position. Pet’r’s Resp. to the State’s Mot. to Stay Prelim. Post-Conviction Proceeding, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2019).

On January 23, 2019, the Circuit Court granted the State’s motion and stayed “all proceedings in [that] court” until the United States Supreme Court renders its decision in *Flowers v. Mississippi*, Case No. 17-9572, or “until further order of the [circuit] court.” Order Staying Prelim. Post-Conviction Proceedings at 1–2, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Jan. 23, 2019).

The Mississippi Supreme Court did not rule on the State’s Emergency Motion to Stay, leaving Mr. Flowers’s February 28, 2019 filing deadline intact.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

Mississippi Code § 99-39-21(6) requires Mr. Flowers to allege in his Petition such facts as are necessary to demonstrate that his claims are not procedurally barred. For the reasons explained below, these claims are not barred.

“Post-conviction proceedings are for the purpose of bringing to the trial court’s attention facts not known at the time of judgment.” *Williams v. State*, 669 So. 2d 44, 52 (Miss. 1996) (citing *Smith v. State*, 477 So. 2d 191, 195 (Miss. 1985)); *see also* Miss. Code. § 99-39-5. Post-conviction proceedings have long been considered the appropriate vehicle for addressing “issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Miss. Code § 99-39-3(2); *see also Brown v. State*, 798 So. 2d 481, 491 (Miss. 2001). And the post-conviction relief statute authorizes courts to consider evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of trial. Miss. Code § 99-39-5. Nearly all of Mr.

Flowers's claims are based upon facts not known at the time of trial and thus not present in the record, or upon facts which could not have been raised on direct appeal due to the impossibility at the time of supplementing the record to include additional facts not known at the time of trial.

As explained in Mr. Flowers's discussion of his specific claims below, claims alleging the presentation of false or misleading evidence, the suppression of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence, or racial discrimination in the jury-selection process could not have been discovered prior to post-conviction proceedings. Mr. Flowers uncovered these grounds only as a result of investigation efforts conducted after Mr. Flowers's conviction was affirmed on appeal.

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); *Guerra v. Johnson*, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996); *Manning v. State*, 884 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 2004) (remanding for post-conviction hearing on multiple allegations of state misconduct); *Malone v. State*, 486 So. 2d 367, 369 (Miss. 1986).

Mr. Flowers's claim under *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), similarly is properly raised on post-conviction review because the facts supporting the claim were not discovered until after Mr. Flowers's trial and appeal and because the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act allows Mississippi courts to grant relief where, as here, "the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law." Miss. Code §§ 99-39-5(1)(c) and (d).

Likewise, Mr. Flowers's claims that trial counsel was ineffective rely on facts unavailable at the time of direct appeal. Post-conviction proceedings therefore are the proper vehicle for such claims. *See Brown v. State*, 749 So. 2d 82 (Miss. 1999); *Davis v. State*, 743 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 1999).

Where, as here, the Mr. Flowers is under a sentence of death, the Mississippi Supreme Court's statutory responsibility requires it to go beyond the specific points raised on direct appeal and determine whether the death sentence is imposed under influence of "passion, prejudice or

any other arbitrary factor.” Miss. Code § 99-19-105(3)(a). The claims in this Petition relate to such arbitrary factors, including egregious prosecutorial misconduct and the consideration of unlawful and improper evidence, which improperly contributed to Mr. Flowers’s convictions and death sentences. Because the Court must go beyond the specific points raised on direct appeal to fulfill this responsibility, it may not refuse to review a claim simply because of any procedural defect associated with direct appeal.

Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court has a venerable tradition of applying less stringent procedural rules in death penalty cases to ensure the interests of justice and in an “awareness of the uniqueness and finality of the death penalty.” *Williams v. State*, 445 So. 2d 798, 810 (Miss. 1984); *see also Randall v. State*, 806 So. 2d 185 (Miss. 2001); *Conerly v. State*, 760 So. 2d 737, 740 (Miss. 2000) (“This Court has recognized an exception to procedural bars where a fundamental constitutional right is involved.”) (quoting *Matson v. State*, 750 So. 2d 1234, 1237 (Miss. 1999)); *Rowland v. State*, 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010); *Gilliard v. State*, 614 So. 2d 370, 375 (Miss. 1992) (“This Court has looked beyond a procedural bar in instances where the error was of constitutional dimensions.”); *Smith v. State*, 477 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1985); *Cole v. State*, 666 So. 2d 767, 782 (Miss. 1995); *Pinkney v. State*, 602 So. 2d 1177 (Miss. 1992); *Clemons v. State*, 593 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Miss. 1992). And, critically, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that procedural bars will not prevent consideration of issues on the merits “where the errors at trial affect fundamental rights.” *Gallion v. State*, 469 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Miss. 1985) (citing *Brooks v. State*, 46 So. 2d 97 (Miss. 1950)). The claims raised in this Petition implicate “fundamental rights”—most particularly, the right not to be convicted and sentenced to death except in accordance with legal and constitutional principles. *See Furman v. Georgia*, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Thus, even if the Court believes that some of Mr. Flowers’s claims might

have been brought sooner—and they could not have been—failure to consider these claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice and would violate Mr. Flowers’s constitutional rights. *See Smith v. Murray*, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986); *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); *Sawyer v. Whitley*, 505 U.S. 333, 352 (1992).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s well-established standard for review of capital convictions and sentences is “one of ‘heightened scrutiny’ under which all *bona fide* doubts are resolved in favor of the accused.” *Flowers I*, 773 So. 2d at 317 (internal quotations omitted); *see also Chamberlin v. State*, 989 So. 2d 320, 330 ¶ 22 (Miss. 2008) (“The thoroughness and intensity of review are heightened in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.”); *Randall*, 806 So. 2d at 200 (“[T]he rule in this State is clear: death is different. In capital cases, all *bona fide* doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.”). Thus, “what may be harmless error in a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death.” *Flowers I*, 773 So. 2d at 317 (internal quotations omitted).

Further, because the State’s evidence against Mr. Flowers is entirely circumstantial, it carries an onerous burden of proof: It must have presented evidence “such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that the contention of the State is true.” *Westbrook v. State*, 32 So. 2d 251, 252 (1947). On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that this heavy burden of proof did not apply, but only because Odell Hallmon’s testimony that Mr. Flowers confessed to the crime constituted direct evidence. *See Flowers v. State*, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1040 ¶¶ 56–58 (Miss. 2015). We now know Mr. Hallmon’s testimony was false. *See* Grounds A, B, C, *infra*. The Court should therefore hold the State to the higher burden of proof when assessing the adequacy of the evidence it presented.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Sometime before 9:30 a.m. on July 16, 1996, some person or persons entered Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, shot and killed three employees and the store's owner, and stole approximately \$389 in cash from the register. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 1834–35³, 2659; State Trial Ex. S-127 at 8 (Prior Testimony of Sam Jones⁴). The shots were precise: three victims were shot once in the head, and the fourth victim was shot twice in the head, although either shot would have been fatal. Tr. 2013, 2021, 2023. The victims were found in the store, where they had been killed. Three of the victims—Derrick Stewart, Carmen Rigby, and Robert Golden—were found roughly in a triangle, separated from each other by as many as five feet, while the fourth victim, Bertha Tardy, was found more than fifteen feet away from the others. *See* Trial Ex. S-39, S-40, S-51 (Sketch of Crime Scene and Key Measurements of Melissa Schoene), *Flowers VI*. There was no evidence that any of the victims had been restrained at any time during the robbery or murders. Thus, either a single perpetrator managed to kill four unrestrained victims with precision shots despite their separation by moderate to substantial distances, or the Tardy Furniture murders were not the work of a lone gunman.

No physical evidence connected Mr. Flowers to the crime. Investigators recovered no DNA, fingerprints, or other scientific or trace evidence that could be linked to Mr. Flowers, and they found no bloody clothing or other materials that even arguably connected him to the crime scene. The scant physical evidence recovered from the scene also could not tie Mr. Flowers to the crime: several projectiles fired from a .380 caliber handgun that was never found; several

³ Unless otherwise noted all “Tr.” citations refer to the trial transcript of *Flowers VI* (*State v. Flowers*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. 2010)).

live rounds found on the floor indicating that the gun repeatedly jammed during the murders; and a bloody, partial shoeprint made by a never-found Fila Grant Hill athletic shoe.

Nor did the prosecution have any evidence supporting a plausible motive for this horrific crime. The State posited that Curtis Flowers—a 26-year old gospel singer with no criminal record and an IQ of 72—was driven to commit a quadruple murder because he was angry over having been let go from a minimum wage job at a furniture store where he worked for a total of three and a half days. Tr. 2494–95. Even if that far-fetched theory could have been considered a motive, there was no evidence supporting it. The evidence at trial was that, while working on July 3, 1996, Mr. Flowers accidentally dropped and damaged several batteries after failing to secure them to a truck. Tr. 2495. He reported the damage to store owner Bertha Tardy, who told him he might “have to pay for them out of [his] check” if they could not otherwise be replaced. *Id.* But despite the battery incident, Bertha Tardy graciously loaned Mr. Flowers thirty dollars before he left work that day. Tr. 2496–97. The store was closed for the July 4 holiday and, as he had done in other jobs, Mr. Flowers failed to show up for work during the next three business days. Tr. 2496. When he called the store the following week to ask whether he should come in, Bertha Tardy informed him that he no longer had a job, and that most of his paycheck for the few days he had worked “was pretty much covered up with them batteries . . . That was it.” *Id.*

Absent from the trial record is any evidence or testimony from even a single witness that Mr. Flowers ever expressed anger at Tardy Furniture, its owner, or other employees of the store. Nor was there any evidence that Mr. Flowers was upset or disappointed by Bertha Tardy’s

⁴ Mr. Jones was deceased at the time of the *Flowers VI* trial, his testimony was read into the record and admitted as Trial Ex. S-127. See Tr. 1895; Trial Ex. S-127 (Prior Testimony of Sam Jones (Nov.29,

reasonable decision to let him go after he failed to show up for work several days in a row. The record was likewise devoid of any evidence that Mr. Flowers had any history of violence, mental health problems, or criminal record of any kind. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence at trial was that Curtis Flowers was a man who had spent his entire life as a law-abiding, stable, non-violent citizen, and who reacted to the loss of his short-term job in a manner consistent with that history.

To make its case against Curtis Flowers at trial, the State relied on five categories of evidence: (1) testimony that a .380 caliber handgun was stolen from Doyle Simpson's car at the Angelica Factory parking lot on the morning of the crime; (2) a shoebox found at Mr. Flowers's girlfriend's home; (3) a single particle of gunshot residue found on Mr. Flowers's hand after he had ridden in a police car and spent time in a police station; (4) inconsistent testimony from eyewitnesses, most of whom did not come forward until months after the murders, after the State publicized a \$30,000 reward for information; and (5) testimony of a jailhouse informant and self-confessed perjurer that, despite the fact that Mr. Flowers has maintained his innocence throughout six prosecutions and turned down repeated plea offers for a life sentence, Mr. Flowers confessed to him.

1. Doyle Simpson's .380 Handgun

Among the State's most crucial theories was its claim that the murders were committed with a gun stolen from Doyle Simpson's car. On the morning of the murders, Doyle Simpson reported that his .380 handgun had been stolen from the glove compartment of his car while parked outside Angelica Garment Factory, where he worked. The State claimed at trial that this was the murder weapon. But the evidence revealed at least three critical defects in this theory.

2007)) [hereinafter "SJ Tr."].

First, Mr. Simpson did not notice that the gun was missing until around 11:00 a.m. *See* Tr. 2334–35. And his testimony—at all six of Mr. Flowers’s trials—suggested that the gun did not go missing until at least 10:25 a.m.⁵ Mr. Simpson testified that he went out to his car at “about 9:15” to get his breakfast and again at “about ten-something. Ten—about 10:25” to let his windows down, and did not notice anything unusual about his car at either time. Tr. 2333–35. It was not until he went back out to his car a third time, after 10:25 a.m. at “something-to-11,” that he noticed signs of a break-in. Tr. 2334–36. Thus, one of the few consistent facets of Doyle Simpson’s testimony across the six trials was that his gun likely was not stolen until nearly an hour after the Tardy Furniture murders occurred.⁶

Second, the State never recovered the gun, so it could not perform forensic analysis comparing bullets found at the scene with bullets shot from a subject gun in a controlled test environment. Instead, they visited Mr. Simpson’s mother’s house and dug several bullets out of a fencepost that Mr. Simpson used for target practice. *See* Tr. 2520–21. The State presented these fencepost bullets to its own ballistics analyst, Steve Byrd, who compared them to bullets recovered at the crime scene and reported that it was not possible to conclude that the two sets of bullets were fired from the same gun. Dissatisfied with its own ballistics expert, the State went shopping for another, ultimately hiring David Balash. Mr. Balash opined that, unlike the State’s expert, he could match the bullets using toolmark examination evidence, *see* Tr. 2133–48—a

⁵ *See also Flowers V* Tr. 404; *Flowers IV* Tr. 393; *Flowers III* Tr. 1337–38; *Flowers II* Tr. 1810; *Flowers I* Tr. 657–658.

⁶ Sam Jones testified that he first discovered the crime scene at “between 9:15 and 9:30.” SJ Tr. 6–7. And the 911 call in which the Tardy Furniture murders were first reported to law enforcement occurred at 10:21 a.m. *See* Ex. 1 (Winona Police Dep’t Radio Log (July 16, 1996)); *see also* Tr. 1834. Chief Johnny Hargrove was at the crime scene by 10:22 a.m. Tr. 1834–35.

methodology that has been discredited and abandoned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and many experts in the field.

Third, the State offered no evidence that Mr. Flowers knew that Mr. Simpson kept his gun in his car. The evidence at trial was all to the contrary. Mr. Simpson testified that he did not usually keep his gun in the glove compartment, and that “there was no way that [Mr. Flowers] would have known that gun was in the car that particular morning.” Tr. 2358. In the face of this testimony from the owner of the gun, the State relied on the testimony of a bystander, Katherine Snow, who said that she had seen Mr. Flowers leaning up against Mr. Simpson’s car at approximately 7:15 a.m. on the morning of the murders. Tr. at 2221–22. But even though Ms. Snow claimed that she was certain Mr. Flowers was the person she saw, and “figured it was [Mr. Flowers]” who committed the Tardy Furniture murders, she did not tell her co-workers or the police that she had seen him until a month after the crime, and several weeks after a \$30,000 reward for information—a sum roughly double the annual per capita income of Montgomery County⁷—had been widely publicized. Tr. at 2224–25, 2235, 2245–46; *see also* Trial Ex. D-1 (Reward Poster), *Flowers VI*; Trial Ex. D-2 (Winona Times News Article (July 25, 1996)) (advertising reward). And based on the facts reported by Mr. Simpson, the gun could not have been stolen at 7:15 a.m., when Ms. Snow says she saw Mr. Flowers, because it was still there when he went to his car three hours later.

Undeterred by the timing of the supposed theft (after 10:25 a.m.) or the thin ballistics-match evidence, the State pressed ahead with its theory at trial that Mr. Flowers had

⁷ See United States Census Bureau, *Quick Facts: Montgomery County, MS*, <http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/INC110214/28097,00> (last visited Feb. 22, 2019); *see also* United States Census Bureau: *Per Capita Income In 1999 Dollars*, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/00_SF3/P082/05000000US28097 (last visited Feb. 23,

walked across town to Mr. Simpson's car to steal a gun he did not know was there, and then used it to commit the Tardy Furniture murders sometime before 9:30 a.m., when the gun was still in Mr. Simpson's car.

2. The Bloody Partial Shoeprint

The State also relied heavily on a bloody partial shoeprint that was found at the scene of the crime and was later determined to have been made by a Fila Grant Hill shoe. With respect to this evidence, the State's theory at trial was simple: the shoeprint found at the scene was made by the killer; Mr. Flowers could have made the shoeprint; and, therefore, Mr. Flowers must have been the killer. However, as with the State's ballistics theory, there were several gaps in the evidence.

First, even if the shoeprint was left by the perpetrator, shoeprints are not fingerprints. Anyone could have been wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes that day. They were hugely popular in the 1990s. *See* Tr. 2620. And the closest investigators ever came to linking Mr. Flowers to shoes that might have made the shoeprint was their seizure of an empty shoe box labeled "MS Grant Hill No. 2 mid FILA, red, navy and blue, size ten and a half," from the home of Mr. Flowers's girlfriend, Connie Moore. Tr. 2106. The State enlisted an expert to testify that the bloody shoeprint at the scene of the crime was "consistent" with a size 10 1/2, and then seized on this expert testimony to state, definitively, to the jury during closing argument that the partial shoeprint was made by a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill shoe. Tr. 3196 ("They could tell what size it was. It was size 10 1/2. So you have got a special kind of shoe of a certain size.").

Second, Connie Moore testified that the shoes had belonged to her son, not Mr. Flowers. Tr. 2856. That was borne out by the State's own investigators, who lifted several latent prints

2019) (listing the per capita income of Montgomery County in 1999 as \$14,040).

“of value” from the shoebox, none of which matched Curtis Flowers. Tr. 2696. And of the five witnesses who allegedly saw Mr. Flowers on the morning of the Tardy Furniture murders and described his clothing, only one—Patricia Sullivan-Odom⁸, who we now know had a substantial incentive to falsify her testimony⁹—suggested that Mr. Flowers was wearing a pair of Fila shoes. Tr. 2046.

Third, there was ample time between when the murders were first discovered and when law enforcement arrived at the scene for someone other than the killer to leave the shoeprint. Sam Jones, who first discovered the crime scene, testified that he arrived at the crime scene “between 9:15 and 9:30,” SJ Tr. 8, and did not see the shoeprint at that time, *id.* 22–24, 34. Law enforcement did not arrive on the scene and see the bloody shoeprint until at least fifty minutes later. *See* Tr. 1834–35 (Chief Johnny Hargrove testifying that he arrived on the scene at “10:20-something”). Given that Tardy Furniture was located in a busy downtown area, and that the relevant gap was during Tardy’s normal business hours, it is well within the realm of possibility that a person other than the killer could have entered the store and left the bloody shoeprint.

Finally, new expert evidence discovered since Mr. Flowers’s trial reveals that the shoeprint impressions from the crime scene could have been made by a shoe anywhere from a size 8 1/2 to 11. *See* Ex. 2 (Alicia Wilcox Aff. at ¶ 5 (Mar. 16, 2016)). So the State’s claim that “they could tell what size it was,” and that the print was made by a size 10 ½ shoe was not just unsupported by its own witness’s testimony; it was false.

⁸ Ms. Odom is referred to by different last names “Patricia Sullivan Odom” in *Flowers VI* and “Patricia Hallmon Sullivan” in *Flowers III*.

⁹ Patricia Sullivan-Odom was under indictment for tax fraud at the time of *Flowers VI* and received favorable treatment for her cooperation. *See* Ground B, Section C, *infra*.

3. The Gunshot Residue Particle

The State also emphasized the collection of a single particle of gunshot residue found on Mr. Flowers's right hand several hours after the murders. Tr. 2615. But police did not swab Mr. Flowers's hands for residue immediately upon taking him into custody. Instead, they waited until after they had placed him in a police car, driven him to a police station, and held him there for some period of time. Even the State, therefore, conceded that the evidence was probative only of whether Mr. Flowers "was in the presence or the environment of gunshot residue"—like a police car or a police station. Tr. 2273. Indeed, even the State's own expert agreed that Mr. Flowers could easily have picked up the single particle of gunshot residue during his ride in a police car or his time in the police station earlier in the afternoon. Tr. 2630–32.

4. The Eyewitness Identifications

The State produced six witnesses who allegedly saw Mr. Flowers near Doyle Simpson's car and/or moving toward Tardy's on the morning of the crime. But the testimony of these witnesses was wildly inconsistent, both in terms of what they saw and when they saw it. In chronological order of events, the six witnesses testified as follows:

James Edward Kennedy claimed he saw Mr. Flowers walking past his home at 635 South Applegate, Tr. 2288, towards the Angelica Clothing Factory at "7:15 that morning," *id.* at 2289–90, wearing "white pants and a black sweater," *id.* at 2293.

Katherine Snow claimed that she saw Mr. Flowers at exactly the same time approximately six blocks away in the Angelica parking lot "leaning up against Doyle Simpson's car," *id.* at 2221–22, while wearing "[b]lack jeans [and a] white shirt," *id.* at 2238.

Edward Lee McChristian¹⁰ claimed he saw Mr. Flowers "[g]oing north" on Academy Street—away from Angelica and toward Connie Moore's

¹⁰ Mr. McChristian first spoke to investigators when he was picked up by police on August 16, 1996. He was "nervous when the police had picked [him] up," and they explained to him "that they wanted to

house—“[b]etween 7:30 and 8:00,” Tr. 2301–02; he did not describe Mr. Flowers’s clothing.

Patricia Sullivan-Odom claimed that she saw Mr. Flowers arriving at Connie Moore’s house, some twelve blocks away from Mr. McChristian’s house, at 7:30, and that he was wearing “some black . . . wind suit pants, and . . . a white shirt[,] . . . [a]nd the pants . . . unzipped at the leg.” *Id.* at 2044–46. She also claimed to see Mr. Flowers leave Moore’s house at “like 7:50 or 7:51,” *id.* at 2055, and gave no indication that he had changed clothes in the meantime.

Mary Jeannette Fleming¹¹ claimed she saw Mr. Flowers walking toward downtown Winona at “five after nine,” Tr. 2312, over an hour since he reportedly left Moore’s house, and that he was wearing “brown pants . . . a white shirt and a . . . gray jacket.” Tr. 2313; *see also id.* (“I never said black pants. He had brown pants on.”); *id.* (“His pants was not black.”); *id.* at 2314 (“His pants was brown.”).

Beneva Henry¹² testified at Mr. Flowers’s previous trial that she saw Mr. Flowers walking down the street in the direction of downtown Winona “between around 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning,” BH Tr. 1319; *see also id.* at 1320, and wearing “some shorts” that “were white,” *id.* at 1322, and no hat, *id.* at 1324.

These accounts cannot be reconciled. They require Mr. Flowers to be on Academy Street and in the Angelica parking lot—six blocks away—at the same time. They also require Mr. Flowers to be near Mr. McChristian’s house and at Ms. Moore’s house—twelve blocks away—at around 7:30. They suggest it took Mr. Flowers fifteen minutes to travel from the

know if [he] had seen Curtis Flowers.” Tr. 2304. Moreover, Mr. McChristian recently recanted his story, explaining that he does not actually know whether Mr. Flowers walked past his house on the morning of the Tardy Furniture murders. *See* Ex. 3-B (Rehman Tunekar Aff. (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 2 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 2 Tr.”] at 12–14; *see also generally* Ex. 4-B (Samara Freemark Aff. (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 2 Tr.); Ex. 5-B (Madeleine Baran Aff. (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 2 Tr.); Ex. 6-B (Natalie Jablonski Aff. (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 2 Tr.); Ex. 7-B (Sarah Parker Yesko Aff. (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 2 Tr.). He only remembers seeing Mr. Flowers at some point that summer. *See* Ex. 3-B (ITD Ep. 2 Tr.) at 13.

¹¹ Mary Jeannette Fleming did not speak with investigators until February 1997—approximately seven months after the crime. She was picked up without warning by police, and specifically asked to recall whether she had seen Mr. Flowers on July 16, 1996. At the time of this interview, Ms. Fleming was well aware of the \$30,000 reward. Tr. 2317–18.

¹² Beneva Henry was an elderly woman who did not speak to investigators until September 3, 1996, when she was asked specifically whether she had seen Curtis Flowers more than six weeks earlier on the morning of July 16. Mrs. Henry had passed away by Petitioner’s sixth trial. Her testimony from an

Angelica Factory and Ms. Moore's house, as Ms. Snow and Ms. Sullivan-Odom combine to claim, but over seventy-four minutes to travel roughly the same distance between Ms. Moore's house and where Ms. Fleming and Ms. Henry say they saw him at around 9:00. Moreover, each witness who described Mr. Flowers reported him wearing different clothing. The closest any two descriptions come to one another is Katherine Snow describing a white shirt and black jeans, and Patricia Sullivan-Odom describing a white shirt and black wind pants. But wind pants—which Ms. Sullivan-Odom said were “unzipped at the leg”—are visibly distinguishable from men's jeans. These inconsistencies are fatal to the witnesses' credibility. Indeed, the only unifying feature of their testimony is that not one of those witnesses came forward until after a substantial cash reward for information had been widely published, by which time it had become well known that Curtis Flowers was the person in whom law enforcement was interested.

Setting aside the hopelessly conflicting stories of sightings around town, the State offered two witnesses who placed Mr. Flowers at the Tardy Furniture Store on the morning of July 16, but these were among the State's least credible and reliable eyewitnesses. First, the prosecution offered the testimony of Porky Collins, who testified that while running errands that morning, he saw two black men standing near a dirty, brown or tan-colored car “somewhere around a little bit before 10:00 to a few minutes after 10:00.”¹³ PC Tr. 1601, 1610, 1639. He noticed these men because he “thought they was fixing to fight.” *Id.* 1606. Mr. Collins only caught a “brief glimpse” of one of the men, *id.* 1640, 1649, and at the time was on “a lot of medication” that

earlier trial was read to the jury. See Tr. 2640; Trial Ex. S-128 at 8 (Prior Testimony of Beneva Henry (Feb. 7, 2004)) [hereinafter “BH Tr.”].

affected his memory, *id.* 1613. Nevertheless, the State waited six weeks before presenting Mr. Collins with photo arrays to attempt to identify the men he had seen. Tr. 3014, 3017. In the first array, which did not include Mr. Flowers, Mr. Collins identified Doyle Simpson as the person he had seen. Tr. 3031. That would not do, so the State showed Mr. Collins a second array, this one without Mr. Simpson but with Mr. Flowers. This time, Mr. Collins pointed out Mr. Flowers and said, “I believe that’s him, it looks like him.” Tr. 3032. Law enforcement followed up by suggestively asking “Do you know Curtis Flowers?” Tr. 3032. From that prompting, Mr. Collins’s prior identification of Mr. Simpson and equivocal identification of Mr. Flowers turned into certainty that Curtis Flowers was the man he had seen. But that certainty was fleeting: Mr. Collins again had difficulty identifying Mr. Flowers during the first trial. *See Flowers I* Tr. 435. Mr. Collins’s “brief glimpse” of the two men and his poor memory, coupled with the State’s undue influence during the presentation of the photo array, renders Mr. Collins’s identification of Mr. Flowers entirely unreliable.¹⁴

Finally, the State called Clemmie Fleming to testify that she saw Mr. Flowers fleeing the scene of the crime shortly after 10:00 a.m. Like the State’s other witnesses, however, there were significant defects in Ms. Fleming’s testimony. As an initial matter, Ms. Fleming waited nine months after the crime—until after Curtis Flowers had already been charged with the murders and the \$30,000 reward for information had been widely publicized—to offer herself as

¹³ By the time of Petitioner’s sixth trial, Porky Collins was deceased. His testimony from a prior proceeding was read into the record. *See* Tr. 2395; Trial Ex. S-115 (Prior Testimony of Porky Collins (Mar. 24–25, 1999)) [hereinafter “PC Tr.”].

¹⁴ Flowers proffered expert testimony to explain how, based on the expert’s extensive criminal-justice experience and training, the photo lineup presented to Porky Collins was unduly suggestive, but the trial court erroneously excluded that testimony from trial. *See* Tr. 3122–23. The trial court also erroneously excluded expert testimony from an experienced psychologist explaining the factors

a witness to law enforcement. Tr. 2374. When she did finally come forward, she gave an utterly implausible reason for claiming she had been outside Tardy Furniture. She said that a man named Roy Harris drove her to the store “a little after 10:00” so she could pay her overdue furniture bill. Tr. 2367–68. When they reached the store, however, she suddenly changed her mind and decided to go home. Tr. 2368. Moreover, several members of Ms. Fleming’s own family testified that she was lying. Mary Ella, her sister, testified that she and Ms. Fleming were together from 7:30 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. on the day of the crime, and were nowhere near the furniture store around 10:00 a.m. *See* Tr. 2845–46. Latarsha Blissett, her cousin, testified that Ms. Fleming had admitted to manufacturing her story to avoid paying for her furniture, and that she was afraid to come clean for fear of going to jail or losing her kids. Tr. 2819. Ms. Blissett even recorded one of these conversations with Ms. Fleming, who stated repeatedly, “hell no, I ain’t see him come out no store.” *See* Ex. 8 (Audio Recording of Clemmie Fleming and Latarsha Blissett (Sep. 12, 1998)) at 0:05.19. And since Mr. Flowers’s trial, two other witnesses—including Roy Harris, the man Ms. Fleming supposedly was with on the morning of July 16—have confirmed in sworn affidavits that Ms. Clemmie Fleming’s testimony was fabricated. *See* Ex. 9 (Roy Harris Aff. ¶¶ 3–4 (Mar. 9, 2016)); *see also* Ex. 10 (Frederick Woods Aff. ¶ 3 (Mar. 9, 2016)).

5. The Jailhouse Snitch

Odell Hallmon testified for the prosecution that he was incarcerated with Mr. Flowers, and that Mr. Flowers admitted to him that he killed the people at Tardy Furniture. Tr. 2415–16. Mr. Flowers has steadfastly maintained his innocence for two decades, throughout a gauntlet of

that are relevant to the jury’s assessment of Mr. Collins’s eyewitness account and photo-lineup identification. *See* Tr. 300–305.

six trials, and has declined several plea offers that would have spared his life. It is therefore inconceivable that he would suddenly decide to confess to a random fellow prisoner. But even putting that aside, there were many reasons why Mr. Hallmon's testimony was untrustworthy, and more have come to light since Mr. Flowers's trial.

In Mr. Flowers's second trial, Mr. Hallmon testified that his sister, key State witness Patricia Sullivan-Odom, had manufactured her testimony that she had seen Mr. Flowers on the morning of the crime in an effort to obtain reward money. *See, e.g., Flowers II* Tr. 2571–73. Later, however, Mr. Hallmon claimed that this testimony was a lie. Tr. 2417–18. He explained that he had agreed to commit perjury and accused his own sister of lying because Mr. Flowers had promised him thousands of dollars and was supplying him with cigarettes. Tr. 2417–18, 2420, 2424, 2456–57. He explained that he had decided to come clean because his family “turned against [him].” Tr. 2419. But Mr. Hallmon later switched to another explanation for why he had changed his testimony: he had been diagnosed with HIV, Tr. 2473, and therefore needed to “get [him]self right with God” in the little time he had left. Tr. 2428.

Alive and well eight years later, Mr. Hallmon recanted his testimony that Mr. Flowers confessed to the Tardy Furniture murders. By then, he was in prison for a 2016 murder spree, sentenced to life without parole. *See* Ex. 11 (Judgment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2016-0018-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2016)). There was no longer anything the District Attorney could do for him in exchange for favorable testimony. As the prosecutor in Mr. Hallmon's murder case, Mr. Evans had already declined to seek the death penalty for Mr. Hallmon's brutal slayings. Thus, when investigative reporters reached Mr. Hallmon in his cell via his contraband cell phone, he explained, “As far as [Mr. Flowers] telling me he killed some people, hell naw, he ain't ever told me that. That was a lie.” Ex. 3-F (Rehman Tungekar Aff. (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 6

Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 6 Tr.”] at 6; Ex. 4 (Samara Freemark Aff. ¶¶ 4–5 (Feb. 27, 2019)) (*In the Dark* Ep. 6 Tr.) (APM reporter stating that the *In the Dark* podcast series accurately depicts what witnesses they interviewed told them); *see also* Ex. 5 (Madeleine Baran Aff. ¶ 4 (Feb. 27, 2019)) (same); Ex. 6 (Natalie Jablonski Aff. ¶ 4 (Feb. 27, 2019)) (same); Ex. 7 (Sarah Parker Yesko Aff. ¶ 4 (Feb. 27, 2019)) (same); *see also* Ex. 3 (Tungekar Aff.) ¶ 3 (Mr. Tungekar attesting that “I manually transcribed . . . eleven episodes of Season 2 [of the *In the Dark* podcast]; *id.* at ¶¶ 3–13 (attaching “accurate and complete” transcripts).¹⁵

GROUND FOR RELIEF WITH SUPPORTING FACTS

GROUND A: NEW EVIDENCE

NEW EVIDENCE RELATING TO POTENTIAL THIRD-PARTY PERPETRATORS, THE FORENSIC “SCIENCE” THE STATE RELIED ON AT TRIAL, A POTENTIAL MURDER WEAPON, FALSE TESTIMONY BY A KEY STATE WITNESS, AND AN INVESTIGATOR’S FABRICATED EVIDENCE REQUIRES THAT MR. FLOWERS’S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES BE VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The State’s theory that Curtis Flowers single-handedly killed four people execution-style, in broad daylight, and in a very short window of time, was based entirely on circumstantial physical evidence, dubious eyewitness testimony about Mr. Flowers’s whereabouts on the morning of the crime, and a jailhouse informant’s incredible claim that Mr. Flowers confessed to the crime after years of steadfastly maintaining his innocence. This was the same thin evidence

¹⁵ *In the Dark* is a series of podcasts produced by American Public Media. Season Two of *In the Dark* reports the results of an extensive investigation into Mr. Flowers’s case by a team of APM reporters and staff. Affidavits from those reporters and staff are attached hereto as Exhibits 3–7. Further, attached to each of those affidavits as Exhibits A–K are transcripts of the *In the Dark* Season Two Podcast series. For ease of reference, citations to the *In the Dark* transcripts throughout this brief will refer only to Exhibits A–K attached to the affidavit of Rehman Tungekar, who manually created the transcripts. *See* Ex. 3 (Tungekar Aff.) ¶ 3.

that led to two prior mistrials because the jury could not agree on a verdict.¹⁶ And it was constitutionally insufficient to support “a verdict worthy of confidence.” *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434; *cf. id.* at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact that the jury was unable to reach a verdict at the conclusion of the first trial provides strong reason to believe the significant errors that occurred at the second trial were prejudicial.”). Further, newly discovered evidence now calls much of the State’s evidence presented at trial into question.

Since the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Flowers’s convictions and sentences on appeal, substantial new and material evidence has come to light:

- We now know that the perpetrators of nearly identical robbery-murders in Alabama traveled to Mississippi at the time of the Tardy Furniture murders, wearing Fila shoes and wielding a .380 handgun that tended to jam, and returned to Alabama with cash they did not have before they left.
- We know that the State pursued these individuals as suspects but hid those efforts from the defense, even going so far as testifying falsely under oath to cover up their investigation of the Alabama suspects.
- We have also learned that in the early days of the investigation, the State searched for, arrested, interrogated, and held for 11 days a local man who had lived near Tardy Furniture and who wore size 9 or 10 Fila Grant Hill shoes. The State failed to disclose these efforts to the defense.
- New forensic evidence shows that the State’s ballistics expert relied on a wholly discredited methodology to conclude that bullets recovered from Tardy Furniture Store were fired from Doyle Simpson’s gun.
- New forensic evidence also demonstrates that the State’s shoeprint expert’s testimony that the bloody partial shoeprint found at Tardy’s was made by a size 10 1/2 Fila shoe was inaccurate and misleading.
- New evidence shows that police recovered a potential murder weapon, a .380 handgun, in a location incompatible with the State’s theory of the case, but never

¹⁶ Although Mr. Flowers was convicted based on this evidence in his first three trials, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that those convictions were tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. *See Flowers I*, 773 So. 2d at 321; *Flowers II*, 842 So. 2d at 538; and *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 937. They are therefore unreliable measures of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.

disclosed this fact.

- New evidence also confirms that the State’s jailhouse informant, Odell Hallmon, lied on the stand—once again—when he testified that Mr. Flowers confessed to the Tardy Furniture murders.
- And we know that another key witness, Patricia Sullivan-Odom, was under indictment for tax fraud when she testified, and was subsequently given favorable treatment for her unwavering cooperation throughout the six *Flowers* trials.
- Finally, we have learned that the District Attorney’s investigator, John Johnson, fabricated several witness statements in his notes used at trial, as well as fabricated the testimony of Edward McChristian.

Each of these new sources of evidence independently establishes a reasonable probability that, if introduced at a new trial, the outcome of this case will be different. Taken in combination, the effect is staggering. Mr. Flowers deserves to have all of the relevant evidence heard in court. The interests of justice require that the Court vacate Mr. Flowers’s convictions and death sentences and grant him a new trial.

Legal Principles

Mississippi law requires the grant of post-conviction relief when “there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(e). Mississippi courts have interpreted this provision to require:

(1) that the new evidence was discovered since the trial, (2) that when using due diligence the evidence could not be discovered prior to trial, (3) that the evidence is material to the issue and that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) that the evidence will probably produce a different result or verdict in the new trial.

Williams v. State, 754 So. 2d 591, 593 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing *Smith v. State*, 492 So. 2d 260, 263 (Miss. 1986)). These procedural requirements are relaxed in death-penalty cases, where “[t]here is no margin for error.” *Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 265; *see also Crawford v. State*,

867 So. 2d 196, 205 (Miss. 2003) (noting “the heightened scrutiny of death penalty review”); *Brewer v. State*, 819 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Miss. 2002) (“[T]his Court has previously recognized that death penalty cases require a higher level of scrutiny because of the irreversible nature of the penalty.”). To vacate a death-penalty conviction based on new evidence “there must only be a reasonable probability that a different result will be reached.” *Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 265. Moreover, courts are obligated to remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial, even when there was other evidence sufficient to convict the defendant. *Brewer*, 819 So. 2d at 1174 (“While there may appear to be sufficient evidence to convict Brewer notwithstanding this new DNA evidence, the fact that this is a death penalty case justifies the need to revisit this matter in light of these test results.”).

The State’s burden of proof informs whether new evidence is reasonably likely to produce a different result. A jury may find a criminal defendant guilty only if the State proves its case beyond any reasonable doubt. *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When the State’s theory relies on circumstantial evidence, for example, “it must be such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that the contention of the state is true.” *Hester v. State*, 463 So. 2d 1087, 1093 (Miss. 1985) (quoting *Westbrook*, 32 So. 2d at 252); *see also Hall v. State*, 245 So. 3d 396, 401 (Miss. 2018) (explaining that in cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, “the State b[ears] the burden of proving [the defendant]’s guilt ‘not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.’”) (quoting *Beasley v. State*, 136 So. 3d 393, 402 (Miss. 1985)). Thus, if in light of newly discovered evidence, “[t]he web of circumstances established by the [S]tate does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that a third party, not [the defendant], was [the] assailant,” *Hester*, 463 So. 2d at 1094, the Court can only conclude that a reasonable jury would find the defendant not guilty in a new

trial.

A. New Evidence Regarding Alternative Suspects Requires That Mr. Flowers's Convictions And Sentences Be Reversed.

1. The State's Evidence Does Not Exclude The Reasonable Hypothesis That Experienced Killers From Alabama Committed The Tardy Furniture Murders.

On July 25, 1996, nine days after the Tardy Furniture murders, Marcus Presley and LaSamuel Gamble entered a pawn shop in Shelby County, Alabama—just three hours away from Winona—cleaned out the cash register, and killed the two store clerks on duty with precision gunshots to their heads.¹⁷ They used a .380 caliber handgun. That gun jammed repeatedly, requiring Presley, the shooter, to manually clear the gun on several occasions. *See* Ex. 12 (Trial Tr. 1148, 1198–99, 1201, 1386, 1883–84, *State v. Gamble*, Nos. CC-96-813, 814 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1997)) [hereinafter “Gamble Tr.”]; *see also* Ex. 13 (Trial Tr. 1140–41, *State v. Pressley* [sic.], Nos. CC-96-815, 816 (Ala. Cir. 1997)) [hereinafter “Presley Tr.”]. Gamble wore Fila shoes during the robbery. *See* Ex. 12 (Gamble Tr.) 1955.

That robbery-murder was part of a string of crimes committed by Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble during the late spring and summer of 1996, several of which involved similar, execution-style murders and/or shootings. Their *modus operandi* in each was largely the same: they entered a store in broad daylight; forced the employees to the floor at gunpoint; shot the employees using a .380 handgun, often killing them; and then stole cash and other portable goods. *See* Ex. 14 (Chart of Alabama Suspects's Criminal History). Their attempts to elude authorities also had a common theme: shortly after each murder, they traveled to Boston to lay low, where both Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble had family. *See* Ex. 13 (Presley Tr.) 1575–77.

¹⁷ A third man, Steven McKenzie, was present during the robbery-murder but never entered the store. He drove the getaway car.

Relevant here, within a few days of robbing Curt's Package Store in Birmingham on June 30, 1996, Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble escaped to Boston on a Greyhound bus. Ex. 15 (Marcus Presley Aff. ¶¶ 5–6 (Nov. 16, 2015)). They stayed for about one week, and returned to the Birmingham area on or around July 10 or July 11, 1996. *Id.* This time, they brought Steven McKenzie with them. *Id.*

New evidence places Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie in Mississippi on the day of the Tardy Furniture murders, July 16, 1996. According to Marcus Presley's sworn affidavit, sometime between July 10 and July 17, 1996, Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie traveled to Mississippi to visit Gamble's family and to buy drugs that they planned to resell.¹⁸ Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶ 7. They drove a Buick or a Cadillac, and were carrying two guns—a .380 and a .357. *Id.* at ¶ 9. When they came back to Alabama, Mr. Gamble had cash on him that he did not have before going to Mississippi. *Id.* at ¶ 10. On or around July 17, the day after the Tardy Furniture murders, Mr. Presley, Mr. Gamble, and Mr. McKenzie returned to Boston, where they stayed for several days, before again returning to Alabama on or around July 22 or July 23.¹⁹ *Id.* at ¶ 13. Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble then committed the pawn-shop robbery on July 25 using the same tried-and-tested method that they had employed for months.

¹⁸ Although Mr. Presley reports that it was Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie who travelled to Mississippi, it is equally, if not more plausible, that Mr. Presley himself was on the trip. Mr. Presley has a history of telling authorities true events, but removing himself from culpability. After his arrest for the pawn-shop murders in Alabama, for example, Mr. Presley conceded that the murder-robbery occurred, but insisted that Mr. Gamble was the shooter and that he was a mere bystander. *See* Ex. 13 (Presley Tr.) 1129–30. He stuck to this story until he was shown a surveillance video tape that clearly showed he was the shooter. *See id.*

¹⁹ Presley's account of the timeline is not only consistent with Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble's *modus operandi*—i.e., committing a robbery-shooting and then immediately fleeing to Boston to lay low—but also borne out by independent facts, which show that Mr. Presley was arrested in Boston on July 18 on a marijuana charge.

- a. *The evidence implicating the Alabama suspects is material and would likely change the outcome at trial.*

This evidence creates a “reasonable probability that a different result will be reached” if introduced at a new trial. *Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 265. The facts of the Alabama suspects’ crimes are eerily similar to those of the Tardy Furniture murders. And the evidence provides for opportunity: Mr. Presley attests that Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie were in Mississippi at the time the Tardy Furniture murders occurred.²⁰ *See* Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶¶ 7–8. We also know that these individuals were capable of committing execution-style multiple homicides, which solves one of the central weaknesses of the State’s “lone gunman” theory against Mr. Flowers. The theory that the Alabama suspects committed the crime is also more consistent with Porky Collins’s claim that he saw *two* men, not just one, in front of Tardy Furniture on the morning of the crime. Thus, the circumstantial evidence that the State relied on to convict Mr. Flowers “does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that [the Alabama suspects], not [Mr. Flowers], [were the] assailant[s].” *Hester*, 463 So. 2d at 1094.²¹

Moreover, the many connections between the State’s circumstantial evidence and the Alabama suspects discredit the State’s main theory of the case: that the disparate, disconnected evidence pointed only to Mr. Flowers. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 334 (Mr. Evans: “As far as I know, [Mr. Flowers] was the key suspect from the beginning. And everything that I’m aware of pointed to

²⁰ As discussed in n.18, *supra*, it is equally likely that Mr. Presley was present on the Mississippi trip, in place of, or in addition to, Steven McKenzie.

²¹ Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie used a .380 with a tendency to jam, just the sort of gun used at the Tardy Furniture Store. The only circumstance that is unexplained by the Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie theory is the theft of Doyle Simpson’s gun on the morning of the crime. But as discussed *supra* at 20–23, that theft occurred after the murders, the State’s own expert testified that bullets allegedly from that gun could not be matched to those found at the scene, and the State’s alternative hired expert based his testimony on a methodology that the scientific community has rejected as unreliable. The supposed theft

him.”). Jurors, no doubt, were impressed with the inevitability with which the State’s evidence came together to suggest that *only* Mr. Flowers could have been the murderer. But that inevitability was a sham. As described below, the State *had* investigated alternative suspects. And many aspects of the Tardy Furniture murders point towards these out-of-state killers. If this new evidence implicating the Alabama suspects is introduced at trial, the State’s evidence will be exposed for what it is: disjointed circumstances that cannot establish that Mr. Flowers committed the murders beyond a reasonable doubt. In a case that the State repeatedly argued is built on “connections,” Tr. 3188, such evidence will likely change the outcome at a new trial.

b. The State of Mississippi’s investigation of the Alabama suspects and their connection to the Tardy Furniture murders is material and would likely change the outcome at trial.

The State of Mississippi apparently agreed that these similarities were too striking to ignore; Mississippi investigators seriously pursued Presley and Gamble as suspects. On August 6, 1996, weeks after Mississippi law enforcement supposedly had zeroed in on Curtis Flowers to the exclusion of other suspects, they sent a copy of the Fila shoeprint impression recovered from the crime scene at Tardy Furniture to Detective Tim Murray of the Boston Police Department. *See Ex. 16* (Miss. Crime Lab., Microanalysis Section, Case Activity (Aug. 6, 1996)). Detective Murray was the lead investigator in Boston working to locate the Alabama suspects during the manhunt that ensued after the pawn-shop murders. Then, once it became known that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble had fled to Norfolk, Virginia, where they ultimately were arrested and taken into custody, Mississippi law enforcement contacted Virginia authorities for information about their whereabouts and potential connection to the Tardy Furniture murders.

of Doyle Simpson’s gun, therefore, does not exclude the Alabama suspects as the perpetrators of the Tardy Furniture murders.

Specifically, on August 9 or 10, 1996, Lieutenant Wayne Miller of the Mississippi Highway Patrol, who was actively following the efforts to locate and apprehend Gamble and Presley as he was investigating the Tardy Furniture murders, contacted Detective David Goldberg of the Norfolk Police Department as soon as he learned that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble had been apprehended. He asked Detective Goldberg to question Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble about the Tardy Furniture murders. *See* Ex. 17 (David Mark Goldberg Aff. ¶ 6 (Jan. 20, 2016)). Not only did he ask that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble be questioned about their possible involvement, Mr. Miller also requested that Detective Goldberg send Mississippi law enforcement a photograph of Mr. Presley. *Id.* at ¶ 7. Detective Goldberg did, and Mississippi authorities included that photograph in one of the photo arrays shown to Porky Collins on August 24, 1996. *See* Tr. 3014, 3017; Ex. 18 (State’s Color Photo Lineup and Side-by-Side Comparison); *see also* Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶ 22; Ex. 19 (Dr. Guodong Guo Aff. ¶ 5 (Jan. 25, 2016)). Finally, when interviewing Roxanne Ballard, the daughter of victim Bertha Tardy, Mississippi law enforcement showed her pictures of jewelry seized from Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble, who had been selling stolen jewelry in Boston, *see* Ex. 13 (Presley Tr.) 1577–78, and asked if she recognized it as having belonged to her mother, or having come from the furniture store. *See* Ex. 20 (Peter G. Skidmore Aff. ¶¶ 6–7 (Mar. 11, 2016)).

The State suppressed this information, at every single opportunity and in response to every single request by Mr. Flowers’s counsel and the court, in violation of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). *See* Ground B, *infra*. If the fact of that investigation, and the information it yielded, were disclosed to a jury, there is more than a reasonable probability that the result of Mr. Flowers’s trial would be different. Indeed, the prosecution’s evidence at trial was entirely insufficient to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the Alabama suspects committed the Tardy

Furniture murders. *See Hester*, 463 So. 2d at 1094.

c. *The evidence implicating the Alabama suspects is new and could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence prior to trial.*

Mr. Flowers did not learn of this evidence until after his trial and appeal, and is presenting this evidence for the first time in this Petition. As discussed *infra* at Ground B, Section B, notwithstanding its *Brady* obligation to disclose material information, the State actively concealed evidence regarding its investigation into the Alabama suspects and consistently and falsely represented that Mr. Flowers was the only suspect ever investigated:

The Court: Now, and I—I'll say—Has the State got any exculpatory evidence—
Mr. Evans: No, sir.
The Court: —at all, or have you ever had any that has not been provided?
Mr. Evans: We have never had any evidence that showed anything other than this defendant's guilt.

Tr. 442.

The Court: Do I have the State's assurance that everything you have had in your possession from an investigative standpoint in this case has been provided?
Mr. Evans: Yes, sir. Everything.
The Court: Well, as far as I'm concerned, I think that is sufficient.

Tr. 439. And Investigator John Johnson testified under oath: "I'm not familiar with another suspect," Tr. 383, and that Curtis Flowers "was the only one that was an initial suspect." Tr. 2935.

The State made these false representations in the face of explicit and repeated requests by the defense for information regarding alternative suspects. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 463 (renewing motion for information on other suspects submitted in *Flowers IV*); Notice of Renewal and Adoption of Mot. from the Previous Five Trials at 3, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 2010); Request for 9.04 Disc. and for Suppl. of Disc. Furnished to Date, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010);

Tr. 333–34 (oral motion for information on other suspects in *Flowers V*); Mot. to Produce Info. on Other Suspects, *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2007); Mot. for Disc. of *Brady* Material, *Flowers II* (Miss. Cir. Ct. July 16, 1998).²² And the State went so far as to present false testimony at trial from two law enforcement witnesses—Investigator Jack Matthews and Lieutenant Wayne Miller—to further cover their tracks. See Trial Tr. 2579 (Mr. Matthews denying that he had heard about crimes involving “[Presley] . . . and Gamble”); Tr. 2579 (“Q. And did you discover any similarly committed criminal acts to the one that occurred down there at Tardy’s? A. No. We didn’t run across anything.”); Tr. 3014, 3016–17 (Mr. Miller testifying that the only “persons of interest” were Curtis Flowers and Doyle Simpson).

The State has continued to represent that no such information exists. At a January 29, 2016 discovery hearing before the Montgomery County Circuit Court, the Court asked District Attorney Evans: “Does the State possess any information on any other suspects . . . ?” Mr. Evans responded “No, sir.” Jan. 2016 Hr’g Tr. 48–49. When questioned further regarding whether any law enforcement agencies might have such information, Mr. Evans was adamant that this “extend[s] to all law enforcement agencies.” *Id.* at 49. The Court asked again, “So

²² During an April 10, 2010 pre-trial discovery hearing, District Attorney Evans repeatedly represented that the State had turned over any and all information:

The Court: I will say this, Mr. Evans. The last thing I am going to have happen is this case come back to this court again from the Supreme Court because of some discovery issue.

...

Mr. Evans: We have told every defense attorney that has been involved. . . . ***There is no more discovery.*** This case has been tried so many times it’s pitiful already with the same evidence. And the evidence is clear.

Tr. 358–359 (emphasis added). Upon further requests for information by defense counsel, Mr. Evans repeated: “Your Honor, this is at the point of being ridiculous. We have let them come through our office. I know defense attorneys have been in there at least three times going through everything that is

we've got assurance from the State of Mississippi that there was no record[] of anything dealing with other perpetrators of anything of that nature; is that correct?" Doug Evans and Assistant Attorney General Brad Smith each assured the Court, "Yes, sir." *Id.* As the evidence in this Petition makes clear, these statements were untrue.

The State's denials that any other suspects were investigated had the intended effect. Although Mr. Flowers's trial counsel were vaguely aware of media reports from 1996 that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble had committed a pawn-shop robbery and killed two clerks, defense counsel were not aware of their other similar crimes, or of any further details linking those crimes with the Tardy Furniture murders. *See* Ex. 21 (Alison Steiner Aff. ¶¶ 12–13 (Mar. 4, 2016)); Ex. 22 (Ray Charles Carter Aff. ¶ 11 (Mar. 15, 2016)). The State did not disclose and defense counsel did not know at the time of Mr. Flowers's trial, for example, that the Alabama perpetrators used a .380 handgun; that their gun jammed just as the one used in the Tardy Furniture murders did; that many of the Alabama robberies were committed in broad daylight; that Mr. Gamble wore Fila shoes at the time; or that either Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie, or Mr. Gamble and Mr. Presley, were in Mississippi on July 16, 1996. Nor were defense counsel aware that the State had pursued Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble as suspects. *See id.*

Defense counsel could not have discovered this evidence using reasonable diligence, and no reasonable attorney would have expended scarce resources on a detailed investigation for the simple reason that the prosecution repeatedly represented that there were no other suspects and that it had no exculpatory evidence that had not already been turned over. *See Manning v. State*, 158 So. 3d 302, 306 (Miss. 2015) (the likelihood of trial counsel being able to obtain this

there. They have been in the trials every time. Everything that is there was sent in discovery." Tr. 438.

information through diligent investigation many years after the fact “defies computation of even a minimal degree of success”). The defense is entitled to rely on “the prosecution’s representation that it had fully disclosed all relevant information its file contained.” *Banks v. Dretke*, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004); *see also id.* at 695–696 (defendant is not obligated to “scavenge for hints of undisclosed *Brady* material”); *Bracy v. Gramley*, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997) (“Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have ‘properly discharged their official duties.’”) (quoting *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)); *Barnes v. Thompson*, 58 F.3d 971, 984 (4th Cir. 1996) (Murnaghan, J., concurring) (“[A] reasonable defendant would not have looked into the matter any further once the prosecuting attorney represented that the Commonwealth did not possess exculpatory evidence.”). Mr. Flowers should not be denied his right to a fair trial because his counsel reasonably chose not to waste scarce resources on leads the State represented were irrelevant or did not exist.

There is more than a reasonable probability that this suppressed evidence would lead to a different result in a new trial. And, as described in detail below, additional new evidence has come to light and new witnesses have come forward that undermine every other key element of the State’s case against Mr. Flowers. This new evidence confirms, for example, that Odell Hallmon and Clemmie Fleming testified falsely against Mr. Flowers. *See* Grounds A, C, G, *infra*. It shows that the State Crime Lab’s ballistics expert, Steve Byrd, was right in concluding that no ballistics match was possible, and that the expert the State hired in his place provided false and unreliable “junk science” that never should have been presented to the jury. The same was true of the State’s shoeprint-related “expert” evidence. *See* Ground A, *infra*. New evidence establishes that Patricia Sullivan-Odom’s testimony was tainted by a 16-count federal tax fraud indictment that was hanging over her head at the time of trial and not disclosed to

defense counsel. *See* Ground B, *infra*. There is also new evidence that the State recovered a .380 handgun in a location inconsistent with its theory of the case; that Investigator John Johnson falsified witness statements in his notes; and that Mr. Johnson also fabricated the testimony that Edward McChristian gave at trial. *See* Ground A, *infra*. There is a reasonable probability that any one of these new pieces of evidence—let alone all of them in combination—would lead to a different outcome at a new trial. Mr. Flowers had a right to present all of this evidence to the jury. That right was violated. The interests of justice thus require that this Court vacate Mr. Flowers’s convictions and death sentences and grant him a new trial.

2. The State’s Evidence Does Not Exclude The Reasonable Hypothesis That Willie Hemphill Committed The Tardy Furniture Murders.

The State made a habit of suppressing its investigations into alternative suspects. In addition to misleading the defense about its inquiries into the Alabama suspects, new evidence shows that the State concealed its pursuit of a local man—Willie James Hemphill. The State produced during discovery a one-page Miranda waiver form indicating that Investigator Jack Matthews and Lieutenant Wayne Miller had spoken with Hemphill in July of 1996. But when asked about this interrogation at trial, Mr. Matthews testified that it lasted only a short time and was useless to the investigation. Tr. 2587. Testifying under oath, Investigator John Johnson confirmed that Mr. Matthews and Mr. Miller “talked to [Mr. Hemphill] for five minutes,” and that “they [did not] learn[] anything.” Tr. 2972. The State also repeatedly stressed that it had no information on alternative suspects. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 442 (Mr. Evans stating that the State “has never had any evidence that showed anything other than this defendant’s guilt.”); *see also* Tr. 383 (Mr. Johnson testifying under oath: “I’m not familiar with another suspect”).

Newly discovered evidence tells a different story: one in which the State pursued Mr. Hemphill as a serious suspect. In June of 2018, Mr. Flowers learned that just days after the Tardy Furniture murders, the State went looking for Mr. Hemphill, and ultimately arrested, interviewed, and detained him for 11 days as the potential perpetrator. *See* Ex. 3-J (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 10 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 10 Tr.”] at 10–24.

At that time, Mr. Hemphill was living off and on in Winona, and was known to stay in a house only a few blocks from Tardy Furniture. *See id.* at 16; *see also* Ex. 23 (Willie James Hemphill Criminal Records) (showing several arrests in Winona before and after the murders). He was also a man with a criminal past: By July 1996, he had been charged with at least 25 separate criminal offenses, many of which were violent. *See* Ex. 23 (Willie James Hemphill Criminal Records) at 1 (noting, among other violent offenses, two separate convictions for assaulting a victim while shoplifting, as well as knocking another victim’s teeth out with a 2x4). *Id.* According to investigators, moreover, witnesses had reported that Mr. Hemphill had been seen around Tardy Furniture on the morning of the murders, and that he wore Fila Grant Hill sneakers. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 20–21; *see also id.* at 21 (Mr. Hemphill stating that his Fila Grant Hill sneakers were the only shoes he owned at the time). In a case with few leads, this information was tantalizing.

Tantalizing enough, in fact, to trigger a manhunt. “[A] day or two after the murders,” six police officers stormed Mr. Hemphill’s parents’ house and questioned his mother about her son’s whereabouts. *Id.* at 19. A “yard full” of officers also questioned Mr. Hemphill’s cousin, also named Willie James Hemphill. *Id.* at 12. The officers asked him whether he was near Tardy Furniture on the day of the murders. *Id.* After hearing that investigators were searching for him, and fearing that they may “shoot [him] down in the street,” the “real” Willie James

Hemphill turned himself into the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office on July 21, 1996, only five days after the murders. *Id.* at 19; *see also* Tr. 387. He was immediately arrested. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 19.

Investigators questioned Mr. Hemphill about the Tardy Furniture murders for two or three hours. *Id.* at 22. Two of the lead investigators for the Tardy Furniture murders, Jack Matthews and Wayne Miller, were present. *See* Ex. 24 (Criminal Investigation Bureau Interrogation; Advice of Rights Waiver of Rights: Willie James Hemphill (July 21, 1996)). According to Mr. Hemphill, investigators considered him a suspect in the crime. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 19. They inquired as to his whereabouts on the day of the murders. *Id.* They took his fingerprints and waved a light over his hands, presumably to test for residue or blood spatter. *Id.* at 22. And they asked him to remove his shoes—around a size 9 or 10 Fila Grant Hills—for testing. *Id.* at 21–22. Mr. Hemphill has stated that the investigators tape-recorded this interrogation and took handwritten notes. *Id.* at 22.

Investigators then held Mr. Hemphill in jail for 11 days. *Id.* Mr. Hemphill recalls that they were able to continue holding him because of “unpaid fines.” *Id.* Court records suggest that police may have also justified detaining him on an outstanding petit larceny charge. *See* Ex. 25 (Aff.: Willie James Hemphill, Winona Police Dep't (June 27, 1996)). Mr. Hemphill was ultimately released on August 1, 1996. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 22.

None of this evidence—except for the signed Miranda waiver—has come to light until now.

a. The Hemphill interrogation, and what it brings to light, is material and would likely change the outcome at trial.

If this evidence is introduced at a new trial, it is reasonably likely that the jury would be

unable to convict Mr. Flowers on the basis of the State’s theory—namely, that Curtis Flowers was the only suspect, and that all of the State’s circumstantial evidence pointed to him. *See Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 265 (explaining that materiality is established when the new evidence creates a “reasonable probability that a different result will be reached” at a new trial). As noted above, the “facts” the State marshalled “do[] not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that a third party, not [Petitioner], was [the] assailant.” *Hester*, 463 So. 2d at 1094. The State knew this, and yet claimed that the evidence pointed solely to Mr. Flowers. The reasonable doubt that would be injected into the proceedings by disclosing the Hemphill interrogation would likely preclude the jury from finding Mr. Flowers guilty.

In the words of the State, the case against Mr. Flowers was based on “connections.” Tr. 3188. The State marshalled eyewitness accounts, shoeboxes, and shoeprints and claimed that these disparate pieces of evidence locked together into overwhelming proof that Mr. Flowers committed the crime. *Id.* at 3203. The Hemphill interrogation, however, undercuts the State’s theory of “interlocking corroboration and connections.” *Id.* at 3202. The very same pieces of evidence connecting Mr. Flowers to the Tardy Furniture murders connect Mr. Hemphill. And in fact, the evidence—what little of it can be gleaned due to the State’s continued suppression²³—seems to weigh more heavily against Mr. Hemphill than it does Mr. Flowers. First, there is the fact that Mr. Hemphill lived off and on only a few blocks away from Tardy Furniture. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 16. Unlike Mr. Flowers, he would not have needed to

²³ Petitioner submitted a motion requesting permission to supplement his reply brief and to be permitted additional discovery to investigate this potential alternative suspect, after learning of the Hemphill interrogation. *See* Mot. for Leave to File Suppl. to Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Lift Stay of Post-Conviction Proceedings, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. June 28, 2018). The State firmly denied that it had any evidence pertaining to Mr. Hemphill a month later. Resp. in Opp’n to

parade four miles through town in order to get to the store. Further, 106 Knox Street—where a .380 handgun was dug up by a dog in 2001—is located roughly halfway between Tardy Furniture and Mr. Hemphill’s Winona address. *See* Grounds B, G, *infra*. That the potential murder weapon was found on Knox Street is much more consistent with the theory that Mr. Hemphill, and not Mr. Flowers, is the murderer, given that Knox Street would have been on Mr. Hemphill’s route home from Tardy Furniture. Second, Mr. Hemphill wore size 9 or 10 Fila Grant Hill shoes. The bloody shoeprint was a key piece of evidence against Mr. Flowers. But the State could connect Mr. Flowers to the shoeprint only by way of a shoebox in the closet of his shared residence, and the flimsy account of a discredited witness, Patricia Sullivan-Odom. *See* Factual Background, *supra*; Ground B, *infra*. Mr. Hemphill, on the other hand, owned a single pair of shoes at the time—Fila Grant Hills. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 20–21. In a case about “connections,” no reasonable jury would vote to convict Mr. Flowers when those connections are so obviously weak.

What’s more, this evidence shows that even the State had serious doubts about the identity of the murderer, despite claims to the contrary. The State and its witnesses consistently claimed that Mr. Flowers was the only suspect it had considered. Tr. 334 (Mr. Evans: “As far as I know, [Mr. Flowers] was the key suspect from the beginning. And everything that I’m aware of pointed to him.”); Tr. 383 (John Johnson testifying under oath: “I’m not familiar with another suspect.”); Tr. 2935 (John Johnson testifying that Curtis Flowers “was the only one that was an initial suspect.”). But the newly discovered evidence makes clear that the State was not always so sure. Only days after the murders, the investigation launched a manhunt to track Mr.

Mot. for Leave to File Supp. to Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Lift Stay of Post-Conviction Proceedings, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. July 25, 2018).

Hemphill down. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 12, 19. Once he was arrested, the State held him for 11 days. *Id.* at 23. And before it released him, it took his fingerprints, tested his hands, and took off his shoes for analysis. *Id.* at 20–22. These are not the actions of an investigation that has already decided to focus on a singular, other suspect. To the contrary, they reveal that the evidence did not point solely towards Mr. Flowers.

This investigation raises serious doubts as to the strength of the State’s case. Had this investigation been disclosed prior to *Flowers VI*, the jury would have known that Mr. Flowers was not the only suspect the State had considered. This, in turn, would have prevented the State from making grand claims as to the evidence pointing solely, and consistently, towards Mr. Flowers. A reasonable jury would have seen this evidence for what it was: disparate, disconnected, and based on circumstantial facts. Further, the State could not have excluded the “reasonable hypothesis” that Hemphill committed the crime. *Hester*, 463 So. 2d at 1093. In short, faced with these doubts, no reasonable jury would be able to find Mr. Flowers guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

b. The evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill is new and could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence prior to trial.

Mr. Flowers only learned of the State’s investigation into Mr. Hemphill after Mr. Flowers’s trial and appeal. Mr. Flowers is therefore presenting this evidence for the first time in this Petition.

As noted above, trial counsel was aware that a Willie James Hemphill existed, and had been questioned by the State. However, the State actively frustrated trial counsel’s inquiries into who, exactly, this mystery suspect was. First, the State made general denials that it had ever investigated *any* alternative suspects. *See* Ground A, Section A, *supra*. Then the State

denied that it had any exculpatory evidence pertaining to Mr. Hemphill in particular.²⁴ Finally, the State misled trial counsel as to the nature and character of the interrogation: Investigator Matthews, who led the Hemphill interrogation, claimed that the interview lasted only “a short time” and that Mr. Hemphill was quickly ruled out as being the murderer “from the get-go.” Tr. 2587–88. Investigator John Johnson testified that that the interview had lasted for a mere “five minutes.” Tr. at 2971–72. These three tactics were attempts to ward the defense away from inquiring into Mr. Hemphill.

The gambit worked. Mr. Flowers’s attorneys did not follow-up with Mr. Hemphill, and even posited a theory for why this waiver was included in the discovery file.²⁵ This was entirely reasonable: no attorney would have wasted precious time and resources tracking down a man whose only seeming connection to the case was a Miranda waiver. In other words, “the State’s nondisclosure may have reasonably led the defense to conclude no additional evidence existed.” *Floyd v. Vannoy*, 894 F.3d 143, 163 (5th Cir. 2018); *see also United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 682–683 (1985) (explaining that where the defense specifically requests certain evidence and the State fails to disclose it, it is reasonable for the “defense to assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist.”); *Barnes*, 58 F.3d at 984 (Murnaghan, J., concurring) (“[A] reasonable defendant would not have looked into the matter any further once the prosecuting attorney represented that the [State] did not possess exculpatory evidence.”). Further, trial counsel was entitled to rely on the State’s repeated, and varied, assertions that there

²⁴ The Defense specifically requested that the State produce “[c]ontents of any oral, written or recorded statement from Willie Hemphill pursuant to Miranda Waiver dated 7/21/1996.” Request for 9.04 Disc. and for Suppl. of Disc. Furnished to Date at 5, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010). At a discovery proceeding prior to trial District Attorney Evans asserted that “[a]nything that we have was furnished. . . . If it’s not furnished and listed on the discovery, we never had it.” Tr. 436–437.

were no alternative suspects, that no exculpatory evidence came of the Hemphill interrogation, and that the Hemphill interrogation was not a serious inquiry. *See Banks*, 540 U.S. at 693 (explaining that the defense is entitled to rely on “the prosecution’s representation that it had fully disclosed all relevant information its file contained”); *see also id.* at 695 (making clear that defendant is not obligated to “scavenge for hints of undisclosed *Brady* material.”); *Strickler v. Greene*, 527 U.S. 263, 283–284 (1999) (noting that it is reasonable for defense counsel to rely on “the presumption that the prosecutor would fully perform his duty to disclose all exculpatory materials”); *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–682 (explaining that it is reasonable for defense to rely on the State’s nondisclosure); *Dennis v. Sec’y, Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr.*, 834 F.3d 263, 291 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that the defense “was entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s duty to turn over exculpatory evidence”).

The Hemphill interrogation eats away at the theory of the State’s case. The crystal-clear connections the State made between Mr. Flowers and the scene of the crime would have grown cloudy. The grandiose assertions that the evidence pointed only towards Mr. Flowers would have been exposed as false. And the claims that the State only ever suspected Mr. Flowers would have been revealed as untrue. No reasonable jury would vote to convict Mr. Flowers in the face of such a weak case. The interests of justice thus require that this Court vacate Mr. Flowers’s convictions and death sentences and grant him a new trial.

²⁵ Ms. Steiner: “Or was this some other case y’all were prosecuting and it just fell behind the wrong file cabinet? Is that a possibility?” Tr. 436

B. Newly Discovered, Sound Forensic Evidence Shows That The State Relied On Discredited Ballistics Evidence And Inaccurate Shoeprint Evidence In Violation Of Mr. Flowers's Due Process Rights.

1. New Evidence Demonstrates That The State's Ballistics Evidence Was Unsound And Unreliable.

One of the most critical components of the State's case against Mr. Flowers was its claim that he had stolen a .380 handgun from Doyle Simpson's car and used it to commit the murders. But because the murder weapon was never recovered, the State needed a creative evidentiary link to prove this theory. On the day of the murders, the State recovered five cartridge casings and five bullet fragments from the scene of the crime.²⁶ After Doyle Simpson announced, hours after the murders, that a .380 handgun had been stolen from his car on the morning of the murders, State investigators went to his mother's house in search of bullets that had been fired from his gun, in the hopes they could match those bullet fragments to those found at the crime scene. Those investigators successfully pried two slugs out of a fencepost in Mr. Simpson's mother's yard, which they had out-of-state ballistics examiner David Balash analyze—an expert the State hired after becoming dissatisfied with the Mississippi Crime Laboratory's initial inconclusive findings. *See* Tr. at 2738.

Mr. Balash testified that he used firearm toolmark examination to examine the cartridge casings and the two sets of bullets—seven recovered from the scene of the crime and two pried from Mr. Simpson's mother's fencepost. *See* Ex. 26 (Chart of Ballistics Admitted at Trial and Corresponding Testimony of Mr. Balash). And according to Mr. Balash, he was able to conclude with 100 percent certainty that three bullets found at the crime scene and the two

²⁶ Approximately one month after the murders, State investigators returned to the scene of the crime, which had long since been cleaned up, and recovered two new bullet fragments; one from inside a mattress and the other near the loveseat at the store. Tr. 2522–26.

fragments found at Mr. Simpson's mother's house were fired from the same gun. Tr. 2133–48.

As a verifiable forensic scientific fact, this claim was unreliable, untrustworthy, and unscientific. New evidence supplied by the FBI, DOJ, and independent experts thoroughly discredits the toolmark analysis upon which Mr. Balash relied and the conclusions he reached using it. The admission of Mr. Balash's testimony at trial violated Mr. Flowers's due process rights and demands that he be granted a new trial.

- a. *New findings issued by the FBI and DOJ after Mr. Flowers's trial constitute newly discovered evidence requiring reversal of Mr. Flowers's conviction.*

In May 2013—three years after Mr. Flowers's sixth trial—the FBI and DOJ each publicly made a shared, critical finding: “[t]he science regarding firearms examinations ***does not permit examiner testimony that a specific gun fired a specific bullet to the exclusion of all others.***” Ex. 27 (Ex. E and F to Suppl. to Mot. to Stay Execution, *Manning v. State*, No. 2013-CR-00491, (Miss. May 7, 2013)) [hereinafter “*Manning* Ex. E and F”] (emphasis added). As the FBI explained, “claims of infallibility or impossibility of error are not supported by scientific standards.” *Id.*

These letters were stunning admissions from the nation's top law enforcement officials, and they have had a dramatic effect in Mississippi. In *Manning v. State*, 112 So. 3d 1082 (2013), Willie Manning was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death based primarily on the testimony of a forensic expert who claimed that microscopic hair analysis and toolmark analysis tied Manning to the crime scene. On May 6, 2013, one day before Mr. Manning's execution date, the FBI and DOJ released the above-described letters challenging

their own expert's testimony regarding the ballistics analysis he conducted.²⁷ See Ex. 27 (*Manning* Ex. E and F). After those issues—and only those two issues—were briefed by the parties, the Mississippi Supreme Court stayed Mr. Manning's execution.

The ballistics evidence discredited in the *Manning* case is identical to what the State presented in Mr. Flowers's case. Mr. Balash testified that he conducted scientific testing of the ballistics evidence recovered from the crime scene and reached, in his opinion, the certain conclusion that at least three of those recovered bullets and bullet fragments were fired from Doyle Simpson's never-recovered gun. Tr. 2134–39. He also testified that five cartridge casings found at the scene of the crime were fired “in one weapon, and one weapon alone,” Tr. 2133, and that he was “100 percent absolutely certain” of this conclusion. *Id.* As he explained to the jury, “There is no margin—if I identify them as coming from the gun, that's an absolute identification, 100 percent.” *Id.* When asked about the bullet recovered from the mattress and the two bullets recovered from Mr. Simpson's mother's house, Mr. Balash went on to state, again with 100 percent certainty, that “all three [bullets] were fired from the same weapon.” Tr. 2139.

He then concluded, again “with 100 percent assurance,” that two other bullet fragments recovered from the scene of the crime were fired from the same weapon that fired the bullet recovered from the mattress and the slugs recovered from Doyle Simpson's mother's house. Tr. 2142–49.

Mr. Balash was unable to identify any support for these findings, save his own “opinion.” Tr. 2154–55. When asked whether he needed to find a certain number of similarities between two bullets to find a “match,” he was unable to point to any established standard operating

²⁷ On May 2 and May, 2013, the FBI and DOJ submitted letters retracting scientific claims regarding microscopic hair analysis.

procedures (“SOP”) or any other protocols for that matter. Tr. 2161. Instead he testified that those determinations are “individual to the examiner,” *id.*, relying on his own subjective beliefs and making his testimony even more unreliable. See also Ex. 28 (Professor Clifford Spiegelman Aff. ¶ 4 (Mar. 12, 2016)) (“The absence of . . . SOPs is the main defect of toolmark analysis in general, and of this case.”). According to Mr. Balash, his method boils down to “mental gymnastics,” and is a practice in which “a fact in somebody’s mind may or may not be a fact in somebody else’s.” See Ex. 3-C (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 3 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 3 Tr.”] at 16–17. That is why, for example, the State’s original expert from the Mississippi Crime Lab, Steve Byrd, examined the same projectiles and projectile fragments, but could not conclude that any of the projectiles recovered from the crime scene were fired from the same weapon as those recovered from Mr. Simpson’s mother’s house. Tr. 2722–24, 2731–32.

Even in the best of circumstances—for example, if the gun had been recovered and subsequently tested in the crime lab—Mr. Balash’s analysis and testimony would have been impermissibly unreliable. See, e.g., Ex. 29 (Professor William Tobin Aff. ¶¶ 15, 30–31, 52–56 (Mar. 15, 2016)). But these were not the best of circumstances. No gun was recovered, and the slugs tested to find a “match” were dug out of a fencepost by inexperienced investigators using inadequate tools. Indeed, State investigator Jack Matthews pried out the slugs with a penknife. Tr. 2520–21.

In the end, Mr. Balash’s absolute conclusions turned out to be absolutely wrong, or at least absolutely unknowable. This is exactly the sort of testimony the FBI and the DOJ warned against in *Manning*. See *Manning*, 112 So. 3d at 1082 (staying execution where FBI rejected expert’s testimony that all bullets came from one weapon to the exclusion of all others in the world). It is also exactly the sort of “*ipse dixit* or self-proclaimed accuracy” that this Court has

made clear does not qualify as expert testimony. See *Parvin v. State*, 113 So. 3d 1243, 1251 (Miss. 2013). Mr. Balash’s conclusions were not supported by scientific standards and never should have been presented to the jury.

Indeed, since 2008, the National Academy of Science has published several reports discrediting toolmark examination “science,” on the basis of its unreliability. See e.g., Daniel L. Cork et al., *Ballistic Imaging*, Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Academies 3 (Nat’l Academies Press ed., 2008) (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.”). And many industry experts have in recent years abandoned and discredited toolmark analysis. For example, ballistics expert William Tobin states the following about firearm toolmark analysis:

There are numerous reasons why firearm identification pattern-matching practice cannot be considered a science. It has no falsifiable hypothesis (premise), no scientifically acceptable protocol articulating parameters of detection, no rules of application of such parameters, is missing the critical cornerstones of repeatability, reproducibility, and falsifiability required of the true scientific method and, thus, is a virtually 100% subjective practice once the possible sample pool is narrowed by class characteristic elimination (e.g., caliber, number of lands and grooves, direction of twist, etc.). There is no science that allows for 100% subjectivity or a non-falsifiable hypothesis.

Ex. 29 (Tobin Aff.) ¶ 15. Indeed, not only was Mr. Balash’s “100 percent certain” conclusion that all five bullets were fired from the same weapon based on junk science, but it also impermissibly implied a zero percent chance of error. Ex. 28 (Spiegelman Aff.) ¶ 7 (“Currently the error rate for toolmark examinations is unknown. Statements of zero or near-zero error rates claimed by toolmark examiners are not scientifically defensible.”). In fact, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently revisited the holding in *Manning*, confirming that firearms and toolmark identification testimony must be “limited under Rule 702 to the expert’s declaring a match to a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms and toolmark identification field, not to an absolute

certainty.” *Willie v. State*, 204 So. 3d 1268, 1288 (Miss. 2016). Mr. Balash’s conclusions were based on the flawed assumption that two or more guns can never produce similar results. Ex. 29 (Tobin Aff.) ¶¶ 36–37, 40, 52–53. This was wrong, for two reasons. First, to reach a near zero error rate conclusion, the examiner would have to test a large enough sample of bullets—no less than several thousand—which did not occur here. Ex. 28 (Spiegelman Aff.) ¶ 6. And second, numerous studies have confirmed that bullets fired from different weapons can share “virtually indistinguishable” characteristics. Ex. 29 (Tobin Aff.) ¶ 33, 42–43.

Due to the inherent unreliability of ballistics analysis like that Mr. Balash relied on and testified to, courts across the country have moved away from relying on ballistics evidence to support convictions. Specifically, trial courts are increasingly refusing to accept testimony that different bullets were fired from the same weapon to the exclusion of all others. *See, e.g., United States v. Diaz*, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 485967 at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Feb 12, 2007) (“[T]he evidence before this Court does not support the theory that firearms examiners can conclude that a bullet or casing was fired by a particular firearm to the exclusion of all other guns in the world.”); *United States v. Monteiro*, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 372 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding “there is no reliable . . . scientific methodology which will currently permit the expert to testify that [a casing and a particular firearm are] a ‘match’ to an absolute certainty”); *United States v. Chaz Glynn*, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that testimony that a bullet matched a particular gun to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty would seriously mislead the jury as to the nature of the expertise involved).

Likewise, state and federal appellate courts across the country have stayed executions or granted new evidentiary hearings on the basis of unreliable ballistics evidence. *See, e.g., Smith v. State*, 23 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing denial of post-conviction

relief because based on new evidence discrediting ballistics analysis relied on by the state at trial); *Zamarippa v. State*, 100 So. 3d 746, 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (determining that National Academy of Sciences comparative bullet lead analysis (“CBLA”) report may qualify as newly discovered evidence, and granting evidentiary hearing); *State v. Behn*, 868 A.2d 329, 343 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (finding defendant was entitled to new trial based on newly-discovered CBLA evidence).

Although the reliability of the toolmark examination analysis that Mr. Balash used to reach his “100 percent match” conclusion had been the subject of increasing scrutiny and criticism in the years prior to Mr. Flowers’s trial, the *Manning* FBI and DOJ letters marked the first time in Mississippi that the FBI and DOJ directly intervened in a pending case to question the reliability of expert testimony in this area. In other words, while the reliability of Mr. Balash’s testimony was suspect even at the time of Mr. Flowers’s trial, nothing so definitive as the FBI’s and DOJ’s all-out abandonment of this forensic evidence was yet available. And although Mr. Flowers’s appeal was filed a month after the issuance of the *Manning* letters, Mr. Flowers was limited to the trial record and therefore could not have presented this evidence at the direct appeal stage. See M.R.A.P. 10(a) (limiting the record on appeal to “designated papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and in all cases a certified copy of the docket entries”). The letters thus qualify as newly discovered evidence, and this claim is properly reviewed at the post-conviction stage. See *In re Personal Restraint of Trapp*, No. 65393-8-I, 2011 WL 5966266, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2011) (“[A] report generally calling CBLA evidence into question may have been published in 2004, [but, here] the extent of the FBI’s ‘misleading’ testimony . . . only became apparent after [trial].”); see generally *Crawford*, 867 So. 2d at 202 (“Petitioner will also defeat procedural bar if he can demonstrate

that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial” that “ [if] introduced at trial would have [probably] caused a different result.”) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6)).

b. The new FBI and DOJ evidence is material.

This new evidence is material; had it been known at the time of trial, it “probably [would have] produce[d] a different result or verdict.” *Brewer*, 819 So. 2d at 1172. Mr. Balash’s testimony that the bullets found at the crime scene and those found at Doyle Simpson’s mother’s house came from the same gun to the exclusion of all others was a central part of the State’s case against Mr. Flowers. The importance of Mr. Balash’s testimony comes into clear focus when reviewing the State’s opening arguments, during which the State took great pains to link Mr. Flowers to Doyle Simpson’s gun. Tr. 1819. First, the State used Mr. Flowers’s relationship with Mr. Simpson to link him to the alleged murder weapon. *Id.* (stating that Mr. Flowers knew of the gun in Mr. Simpson’s car because he was related to him). Then, the State used the bullets found at Mr. Simpson’s mother’s house as evidence that Simpson’s gun was the murder weapon.

Id. (“We’ll show you that projectiles were dug out of the post [at Mr. Simpson’s mother’s house], and it was determined that that **was definitely the murder weapon.**”) (emphasis added). The State’s opening statements were underscored by its closing argument, where the State reiterated, in no uncertain terms, that the victims were all killed “by one gun.” Tr. 3186; 3197–98 (stating that Mr. Balash said “one gun” and that “[a]bsolutely, we know what gun”); Tr. 3199 (“So the gun at the crime scene, the gun that killed Miss Tardy is the gun that shot the bullets in the post at Doyle’s house.”); Tr. 3200 (“Mr. Balash . . . was able to make a positive identification of that to the mattress bullet and the post bullets.”). Each of these statements was misleading; science does not support such claims. But the jury was not privy to any information regarding the unreliability of Mr. Balash’s testimony; to the contrary, the jury was left with the distinct and

unrebutted impression that Doyle Simpson's gun was the murder weapon, end of story.

Mr. Balash's unreliable testimony was made all the more damaging by the fact that jurors often place undue weight on forensic testimony: they have unrealistic expectations of the capabilities of forensic science and often erroneously presume that forensic scientific evidence is neutral and objective. In light of these factors, it is unsurprising that exaggerated and/or unsupported claims made by forensic experts are a leading cause of wrongful convictions. *See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts*, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) ("Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials . . . One study of cases in which exonerating evidence resulted in the overturning of criminal convictions concluded that invalid forensic testimony contributed to the convictions in 60% of the cases.") (citing Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, *Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions*, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2009)); *see also Hinton v. Alabama*, 571 U.S. 263, 276 (2014) (cautioning against "the threat to fair criminal trials posed by the potential for incompetent or fraudulent prosecution forensic experts").

The Mississippi Supreme Court, too, has warned that jurors are predisposed to give undue weight to expert testimony. In *Edmonds v. State*, the Court reversed the Petitioner's conviction upon finding that a forensic expert's testimony unduly influenced the jury. 955 So. 2d 787, 792 (Miss. 2007). In that case, the doctor who conducted the autopsy of the victim testified that the gun wound demonstrated that two people were holding the gun when the shot in question was fired. *Id.* The Court found that such testimony should not have been admitted because it was speculative and not based on scientific methods and procedures. *Id.* The Court thus reversed the conviction, finding that the Petitioner's "substantial rights were affected by [the expert's] conclusory and improper testimony." *Id.* The Court explained that improper expert witness

testimony is especially harmful because of lay jurors' reliance on such testimony:

Juries are often in awe of expert witnesses because, when the expert witness is qualified by the court, they hear impressive lists of honors, education and experience. An expert witness has more experience and knowledge in a certain area than the average person. Therefore, juries usually place greater weight on the testimony of an expert witness than that of a lay witness.

Id. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. *See, e.g., United States v. Frazier*, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding exclusion of forensic expert testimony and cautioning that courts must take steps to ensure that expert evidence does not “mislead or confuse” jurors since “expert testimony may be assigned talismanic significance”); *United States v. Addison*, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (expert scientific evidence may “assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen”).

The problem of jurors over-emphasizing the importance and accuracy of expert forensic testimony is made even more troubling by the fact that cross-examination is generally ineffective at correcting jurors' misperception of the value of expert testimony. *See* Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, *Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact*, 59 Hastings L.J. 1159, 1167–69 (May 2008) (“Whether or not jurors were informed about the limitations of microscopic hair examination on cross-examination or by the judge had little measurable or meaningful impact on their judgments about the likelihood that the defendant was the source of the crime-scene hair or their perceived understanding of the expert’s testimony.”).

Mr. Balash’s testimony is precisely the sort that other experts and courts have found to be too unreliable to fairly support a conviction. And it is precisely the sort of forensic expert testimony that has contributed to a startling number of wrongful convictions—including this one.

This Court should vacate Mr. Flowers’s conviction based on the newly-discovered *Manning*

letters and the recent nationwide consensus among courts and practitioners that toolmark examination analysis is not reliable. *See Brewer*, 819 So. 2d at 1174 (“While there may appear to be sufficient evidence to convict Brewer notwithstanding this new DNA evidence, the fact that this is a death penalty case justifies the need to revisit this matter in light of these test results.”).

2. New Evidence Demonstrates That The State’s Shoeprint Expert’s Testimony Was Unsound And Misleading.

In addition to the ballistics evidence described above, the State placed an emphasis on its claim that a bloody partial shoeprint impression left at the scene of the crime was made by a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill shoe—the same size shoe Mr. Flowers allegedly wore. The sum total of the shoeprint-related evidence in the case was the partial shoeprint found at the crime scene and an empty Fila Grant Hill shoe box, size 10 1/2, from the home of Mr. Flowers’s girlfriend, Connie Moore. At trial, the State relied upon its trace examination expert, Joe Andrews, to claim that the shoeprint left at the crime scene was made by a size 10 1/2 shoe. However, Mr. Andrews’s conclusions far exceeded any legitimate scientific basis. New testimony and evidence from footwear impression expert Alicia Wilcox reveals that the shoeprint impression from the crime scene could have been made by a wide range of shoe sizes—anywhere from a size 8 1/2 to 11. Ex. 2 (Wilcox Aff.) ¶ 5. The admission of Mr. Andrews’s unsound and misleading testimony violated Mr. Flowers’s due process rights and demands that he be granted a new trial.

In conducting the analysis about which he testified, Mr. Andrews contacted Fila and asked for a set of 10 1/2 outsoles that would have been consistent with the Grant Hill shoes that would originally have been packaged in the shoebox retrieved from Connie Moore’s home. Tr. 2601. This was a substantial error. What Mr. Andrews should have done was request a series

of sizes from Fila with which to conduct his analysis. That is the only way to ensure a thorough and accurate forensic comparison of the partial footwear impressions. Ex. 2 (Wilcox Aff.) ¶ 6. (“In cases where a suspect’s shoe is not recovered, the footwear examiner should request a series of sizes from the manufacture for comparison to the crime scene impression.”). Mr. Andrews limited the scope of his forensic comparison by only requesting size 10 1/2 outsoles from Fila, instead of a range of outsoles for comparison purposes. *Id.* As a result, his testimony was narrowly focused in a way that was misleading to the jury.

Indeed, without conducting the necessary comparison of a range of sizes, for Mr. Andrews to say that the footwear impression from the scene of the crime is consistent a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill is inaccurate and unduly prejudicial against Mr. Flowers. This is especially troubling given jurors’ propensity to assign significant weight to expert testimony. *See Frazier*, 387 F.3d at 1263 (“[E]xpert testimony may be assigned talismanic significance in the eyes of lay jurors, and, therefore, the district courts must take care to weigh the value of such evidence against its potential to mislead or confuse.”); *United States v. Hines*, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[A] certain patina attaches to an expert’s testimony unlike any other witness; this is ‘science,’ a professional’s judgment, the jury may think, and give more credence to the testimony than it may deserve.”).

Mr. Andrews’s improperly narrow analysis, disregarding the material fact that a wide range of sizes could have made the shoe print impression found at the crime scene, was too unreliable to fairly support a conviction.

C. Newly Discovered Evidence Shows That Police Recovered A Potential Murder Weapon In A Location Incompatible With The State’s Theory of the Case.

New sworn statements from witnesses and a recorded statement by a Winona police

officer confirm that, in October 2001, the police took possession of a .380 handgun that matched the profile of the murder weapon. *See* Ground B, Part C, *infra*. The weapon had been found not far from the Tardy Furniture store, but in the opposite direction that the State insisted that Mr. Flowers took after he allegedly committed the murders. *Id.* In 2018, Captain Dan Herod of the Winona Police Office told investigative reporters that he believed that the gun had been turned over to the D.A., after which it was never seen again. Ex. 3-K (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 11 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 11 Tr.”] at 4. The Chief of Police at the time told the witness who discovered the gun that they did not need it because they already “had the right person.” Ex. 30 (Statement of Jeffrey Armstrong (Aug. 18, 2006)) [hereinafter “J. Armstrong Statement”] at 2. This calls the integrity of the investigation and the verdict into serious doubt.

D. New Evidence Shows That Jailhouse Snitch Odell Hallmon Testified Falsely.

New sworn statements from two witnesses, and a recantation from Mr. Hallmon himself, confirm that jailhouse snitch and admitted perjurer Odell Hallmon testified falsely against Mr. Flowers at trial. The prosecution put Mr. Hallmon on the stand to claim that Mr. Flowers confessed to him and that he enlisted Mr. Hallmon, with whom he had no preexisting relationship, to testify falsely on his behalf. This was nothing new. Mr. Hallmon was the third jailhouse snitch the State used in its prosecution of Mr. Flowers. It presented similar testimony at earlier trials from Frederick Veal and Maurice Hawkins, each of whom claimed to have heard Mr. Flowers confess at different times. *See Flowers I*, 773 So. 2d at 314. Both witnesses, however, subsequently recanted, admitting that their testimony was false and that they had been pressured to testify falsely by the prosecution team, who had helped them fabricate Mr. Flowers’s supposed confession(s). *See* Ex. 31 (Frederick Veal Aff. ¶¶ 6–12, 15–18 (March 14, 2016)); Ex. 32 (Maurice Bernard Hawkins Aff ¶¶ 3–4 (Nov. 24, 2015)). The State thus had no choice

but to find a new snitch, and they found their man in Odell Hallmon. But new evidence now shows that, just like Mr. Veal and Mr. Hawkins before him, Mr. Hallmon fabricated his story. And because Mr. Hallmon was the only witness at Mr. Flowers's trial to testify that Mr. Flowers had confessed to the murders, his testimony was certainly material.

This evidence did not come to light until after Mr. Flowers's sixth trial, and could not have been discovered by prior counsel. Mr. Hallmon did not initially recant his testimony until 2012, two years after Mr. Flowers's last trial. *See* Ex. 33 (Charles R. Crawford Aff. ¶¶ 4, 9 (Mar. 8, 2016)); *see also* Ex. 34 (Clyde Smith Aff. ¶¶ 2, 4 (Mar. 2, 2016)). Nor could counsel have raised this new evidence on direct appeal, as they were limited to the record below. *Givens v. State*, 967 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 2007).

1. New Evidence Shows That Mr. Hallmon Perjured Himself At Trial (Again) When He Claimed That Mr. Flowers Confessed.

Odell Hallmon's testimony was short and simple: Mr. Hallmon claimed that he had been incarcerated with Mr. Flowers and that during this time, Mr. Flowers "admitted [to Mr. Hallmon] that he killed the people at Tardy Furniture." Tr. 2415–16. It also was false. New evidence proves that Mr. Hallmon lied under oath.

On April 23, 2012, Charles R. Crawford, a prisoner on death row at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, was sitting in his cell watching television when he heard a loud argument. *See* Ex. 33 (Crawford Aff.) ¶ 4. He walked to the door of his cell, where he saw and heard Mr. Hallmon arguing with Clyde Smith, another prisoner. *Id.* ¶ 5; *see also* Ex. 34 (Smith Aff.) ¶ 3. During the argument, Mr. Hallmon originally denied that he was a "snitch," averring instead that he had testified favorably for Mr. Flowers. Ex. 33 (Crawford Aff.) ¶ 6; Ex. 34 (Smith Aff.) ¶ 3. Later, however, Mr. Hallmon admitted that he testified against Flowers, and that his testimony

was false. Ex. 33 (Crawford Aff.) ¶ 8; Ex. 34 (Smith Aff.) ¶¶ 3–4. Mr. Hallmon bragged, “[t]hat dude never said anything to me about ‘doing’ those people. The dude fucked me over, so I fucked over him, and now he’s going to get what he deserved.” Ex. 33 (Crawford Aff.) ¶ 9.

According to Mr. Hallmon, he and Mr. Flowers had made some sort of financial deal, and Mr. Hallmon did not get paid what Mr. Flowers supposedly promised to pay him. Ex. 33 (Crawford Aff.) ¶ 9; Ex. 34 (Smith Aff.) ¶ 4.

But Mr. Hallmon’s most emphatic recantation came in 2018, after he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a 2016 murder spree. *See* Ex. 11 (Judgment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2016-0018-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2016)). Investigative reporters made contact with him through a contraband cell phone that he had been using to make calls and post on social media. *See* Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 1–3. Although he could no longer get leniency from the State by making deals, Mr. Hallmon—ever the dealmaker—tried to get something out of the reporters. *Id.* at 1–2. He asked repeatedly for money and the reporters repeatedly declined. *Id.* Eventually, he decided to speak with the reporters, no strings attached. *Id.* In the recorded conversation, Mr. Hallmon made clear that his testimony against Mr. Flowers was false. *Id.* at 4–6. He admitted that, with the aid of the District Attorney, he cooked up his testimony in exchange for leniency on the drug and gun-possession charges he perpetually faced—and, later on, even more serious offenses. *Id.* at 4–6. “All of it was just a fantasy, that’s all. A bunch of fantasies. A bunch of lies.” *Id.* at 6. That’s what allowed Mr. Hallmon to stay on the street long enough to commit a triple homicide. Reflecting on the District Attorney, Mr. Hallmon said, “He shoulda throwed me away a long time ago instead of using me to keep Curtis locked up.” *Id.* “As far as [Mr. Flowers] telling me he killed some people, hell, naw, he ain’t ever told me that. That was a lie . . . It was all make believe.” *Id.*

These revelations are consistent with a wealth of other evidence suggesting that Mr. Hallmon testified falsely at trial. Indeed, Mr. Hallmon was arguably the least trustworthy witness ever to testify in the six trials of Curtis Flowers. He began his reign as a star *Flowers* witness by testifying for the defense in *Flowers II* (later overturned on account of prosecutorial misconduct). At that trial, Mr. Hallmon rebutted the story told by his sister—key State witness Patricia Sullivan-Odom—that she had seen Mr. Flowers on the morning of the murders. Mr. Hallmon testified that he told her there was a cash reward for information about the person who committed the Tardy Furniture murders. *Flowers II* Tr. 2572. Ms. Sullivan-Odom asked Mr. Hallmon how to get that money, and he told her the police wanted to charge Mr. Flowers with the murders, so she should “tell them you know who did it and get the money.” *Id.* Mr. Hallmon explained that he passed this along to his sister because he wanted to use some of the reward money himself to pay a fine, so he would not be sent back to prison. *Id.* After his parole was revoked, Mr. Hallmon went back to jail where he saw Mr. Flowers. *Flowers II* Tr. 2574–75. His “conscience kept eating [him] up,” so he got Mr. Flowers’s attorney’s address and wrote him a letter saying: “I had my sister to lie on the stand.” *Flowers II* Tr. 2575, 2587. At the same time, Mr. Hallmon wrote another letter expressing his emotional turmoil, this one to Mr. Flowers’s mother. Tr. 2442. Mr. Hallmon wrote, “I know apologizing is not going to help, but I had to give it a try.” Tr. 2444. Mr. Hallmon went on to explain that he was trying to get out of jail, and that his sister was “lying for money.” Tr. 2445. He told Ms. Flowers, “My family might turn against . . . me for what I’m doing but I don’t care. And she [his sister] know herself what we was trying to do . . . so anything I can do to help in a matter, I’ll do it.” *Id.*

Later, however, Odell Hallmon switched sides, insisting that his earlier testimony that his sister was a liar was itself a lie he had delivered under oath because Mr. Flowers asked him to.

Tr. 2416. To explain this shift, Mr. Hallmon supplied a host of explanations that only further underscore his untrustworthiness. First, Mr. Hallmon said he decided to “lie on” his sister because Flowers “was the only one . . . keeping [him] supplied with cigarettes.” Tr. 2418, 2420–21. When he was unable to hold that story together on cross-examination, Mr. Hallmon quickly added a second incredible reason for his initial supposedly perjured testimony: Mr. Flowers (who had been in prison since 1997 and was drawing \$119 in unemployment benefits prior to his arrest) had “promised [him] thousands of dollars, too.” Tr. 2420–21, 2424, 2456–57.

The reasons Mr. Hallmon offered to explain his change of heart were equally numerous and implausible. Mr. Hallmon first testified that he came clean about having lied in *Flowers II* because his sister was not speaking to him and his mother wanted him to do something about it. Tr. 2417, 2419, 2450, 2471. Worried this was not convincing enough, Mr. Hallmon offered another uncorroborated whopper, professing that he was facing a “medical crisis” and so was trying to “get [himself] right with God.” Tr. 2428; *see also* Tr. 2460 (“Man, that why I’m up here now because my conscience is eating at me.”). “Well,” Mr. Hallmon explained, “I’ve been diagnosed with HIV. And I know my life ain’t far from coming so I just want to clear my conscience, get all this out of the way.” Tr. 2473. That much of Mr. Hallmon’s testimony was focused on explaining away previous lies he had told while under oath, *see, e.g., Flowers II* Tr. 2571–75; *Flowers III* Tr. 1659–65; *Flowers IV* Tr. 418–433; Tr. 2415–21, 2423–31, 2441–65, is itself telling.

In addition to Mr. Hallmon’s history of changing stories and admitted perjury *in this prosecution*, there was further evidence of his propensity for mistruths. Although Mr. Hallmon repeatedly claimed that Mr. Flowers had written him several letters relating to his requests that

Mr. Hallmon lie on his behalf, Tr. 2418, 2459–60, no such letter was ever introduced at trial or disclosed to the defense (so, presumably, the State was not in possession of any such letters). Nor could Mr. Hallmon remember what cells he and Mr. Flowers supposedly were in at the time Mr. Flowers made his alleged confession. Tr. 2416–17, 2425. Moreover, the State administered a polygraph examination to Mr. Hallmon, *see* Tr. 2432; *Flowers III* Tr. 1666, but never turned over the results of that examination to defense or post-conviction counsel, despite express requests for this information. *See* Second Mot. to Compel Produc. of Mandatory Post-Conviction Disc. at 3, *Flowers v. State*, Case No. 2015-DR-00591 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2016)) [hereinafter “Second Mot. to Compel”]; *see also* Ex. A to Second Mot. to Compel (Letter from W. Tucker Carrington, Miss. Innocence Project, to Doug Evans, Dist. Attorney (Jan. 11, 2016)).

Mr. Hallmon’s deplorable prison conduct prior to Flowers’s trial—conduct of which the State was surely aware—further undercuts his credibility and demonstrates his propensity for untruthfulness. *See* Ex. 35 (Miss. Dep’t of Corr. Incident Report: Odell Hallmon, Jr. (Feb. 11, 2016)). Hallmon has been cited repeatedly for forgery and providing false information to corrections officers and staff (1998, 1998, and 2007), *id.* at 2, 3, 6; and has been caught more than 20 times for possession of contraband, including two shanks (2008, 2009), *id.* at 5, 10; a razor (2007), *id.* at 6; a spear (2007), *id.* at 7; and a multitude of cell phones and illegal drugs, *id.* at 10–14. When asked about these documented incidents under oath, Hallmon denied them. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 2469 (“Yeah, I was charged with [illegal possession of a cell phone] . . . [B]ut it wasn’t mine.”); *id.* 2469–70 (“Q. Now, wasn’t you caught with some other stuff you wasn’t

supposed to have? A. Just a charger.²⁸ Q. No drugs? A. No, I wasn't caught with no drugs.”). And when he began to worry that his repeated disavowals of verifiable disciplinary incidents might not seem credible, he added another, even less credible explanation—the reason he would have tested positive for drugs is that he was taking medication (provided by the Mississippi Department of Corrections, no doubt) that contained marijuana. Tr. 2470–71. The prosecution put him on the witness stand anyway.

Although there were many reasons not to trust Odell Hallmon's testimony, it was not until several years after trial, when Mr. Hallmon recanted his testimony, admitting that he had fabricated the story of Mr. Flowers's supposed confession, that Mr. Flowers could prove that Mr. Hallmon had testified falsely.

2. This Evidence Is Material.

There is no doubt that Mr. Hallmon's testimony was material. Mr. Flowers has maintained his innocence from the start and on that basis has refused plea deals that would have spared him from the death penalty. Aside from admitted perjury from the State's other two jailhouse snitches at prior trials, Mr. Hallmon is the only witness ever to assert that Mr. Flowers confessed to the murders. This testimony plainly would impact the judgment of any reasonable juror. “A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. . . . Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury’” *Arizona v. Fulminante*, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (quoting *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968)); *see also Skilling v. United States*, 561 U.S. 358, 383 (2010) (“The defendant's own confession is probably

²⁸ Why Mr. Hallmon would have a cell phone charger in his possession when, according to the sworn testimony he gave just a few moments earlier, he did not have a cell phone, is puzzling.

the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.”) (internal quotations and alteration omitted); *Boyer v. Houtzdale*, 620 F. App’x 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2015) (“As [many] courts have recognized, a defendant’s confession is uniquely damaging.”). Indeed, empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated the uniquely powerful nature of confession evidence. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, *On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?*, 60 Am. Psychologist 215, 222 (2005) (confessions “tend to overwhelm . . . exculpatory evidence”); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, *On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis*, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 469, 476, 479, 481 (1997) (finding that confessions are more prejudicial than other powerful forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identifications and character testimony); Eugene R. Milhizer, *Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions*, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 5–8 (2008) (collecting sources and noting that, “[v]irtually every scholar who has addressed the subject agrees that confession evidence is singularly potent in achieving a guilty verdict”).

If, at a new trial, the State was forced to proceed without the benefit of Mr. Hallmon’s testimony and, thus, without any evidence of Mr. Flowers’s supposed confession, that would “probably produce a different result or verdict,” and the interests of justice therefore demand that Mr. Flowers receive a new trial. See *Williams*, 754 So. 2d at 593.

E. New Evidence Shows That The State’s Investigator John Johnson Falsified Witness Statements.

Newly discovered evidence has made clear that the State’s lead investigator, John Johnson, fabricated witness statements to support the State’s theory of the case. See Ground B.E., *infra*. More than a dozen witnesses have recently revealed that the statements attributed to

them in Mr. Johnson’s investigative notes are false,²⁹ including many statements that the witness had seen Mr. Flowers wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes.³⁰ The State produced these notes and relied on them at trial. *See, e.g.*, 2899–90, 2910, 2920–25, 2936–37, 2940, 2965–66, 2992. But the State never disclosed that many of these notes were the product of Mr. Johnson’s imagination. At a new trial, Mr. Flowers would use Mr. Johnson’s false notes to attack the integrity of the State’s investigation, further exposing the corrupt and reckless process employed by the State to convict Mr. Flowers at all costs. Mr. Flowers would also introduce evidence that Edward McChristian, one of the key witnesses who testified to Mr. Flowers’s whereabouts on the morning of the murder, has since recanted his story, explaining that he did not actually know whether Mr. Flowers walked past his house on the morning of the Tardy Furniture murders; he only gave that testimony at Mr. Johnson’s behest. *See* Ex. 3-B (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 2 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 2 Tr.”] at 12–14. Particularly when viewed in combination with other new evidence demonstrating that the State suppressed or fabricated key evidence in the case, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Mr. Flowers’s trial would be different.

²⁹ *See* Ex. 3-I (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 9 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 9 Tr.”] at 15–19 (noting more than a dozen false witness statements in Mr. Johnson’s notes); *see also* Ground B.E., *infra* (discussing false statements).

³⁰ *See, e.g.*, Ex. 36 (Tanya Sanders Aff. (Sept. 15, 2018)) ¶¶ 4–5 (“I have never told anyone, including John Johnson, that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes. I do not know what Fila shoes look like.”); Ex. 37 (Jacqueline Campbell Garron Aff. (Sept. 15, 2018)) ¶¶ 4–5 (“I have never told law enforcement, including John Johnson, that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes. As far as I can remember, Curtis Flowers always wore dress shoes, not Fila shoes, because he was in a singing group.”); Ex. 38 (LaWanda Glover Aff. (Feb. 21, 2019)) ¶ 5 (“I never told [John Johnson] that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes.”); Ex. 39 (May Frances Moore Aff. (Feb. 21, 2019)) ¶ 4 (“I have never told anyone, including John Johnson, that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes.”); *contra* Ex. 40 (Handwritten notes of Mr. John Johnson) at J.J. Notes_1 (noting under “Have seen Curtis wearing Fila–Grant Hill–Shoes Just prior to Murders” the names of “Tonia Sanders” [sic], “Jacqueline Garron” [sic], “Lawanda Glover”, and “Mary Sue Moore” [sic]); *see also id.* at J.J. Notes_2 (noting under “Glover, LaWanda” “Worn Fila T-Shoes—mostly white—high Top.”).

GROUND B: SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE

THE STATE'S SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL EXCULPATORY AND IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE VIOLATED THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND MISSISSIPPI LAW.

The prosecutor in a criminal case:

is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.³¹

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); *see also* *Mixon v. State*, 794 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (Miss. 2001) (“Although it is the duty of the district attorney to prosecute a case with diligence, it is also his duty to see that the defendant as well as the State receives a fair and impartial trial.”); *United States v. Smith*, 814 F.3d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[a] prosecutor’s role ‘is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done’”) (quoting *United States v. Mauskar*, 557 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)); *State v. Storey*, 901 S.W.2d 886, 901 (Mo. 1995) (“[T]he prosecutor has a duty to serve justice, not merely to win the case.”). Thus, although a district attorney “may prosecute with earnestness and vigor,” it “is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate

³¹ That the Prosecution eschewed its duty to seek justice in favor of a win-at-all-costs mentality is demonstrated not only by the egregious suppression of evidence and other prosecutorial misconduct that Mr. Flowers has unearthed since his trial, but also by the very fact that the State has tried Mr. Flowers six times for the same crimes. As Mr. Flowers argued prior to his sixth trial and on appeal, forcing him to endure six prior trials, three appellate reversals, and two hung juries violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and an analogous provision of the Mississippi Constitution. The prerogative of the government to try and re-try criminal defendants is not unlimited, and Mr. Flowers’s right to fundamental fairness outweighs the State’s right to pursue a conviction at all costs. *See, e.g., Preston v. Blackledge*, 332 F. Supp. 681, 687–688 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (“[T]o try the petitioners five times . . . exceeds the limitations on the right to retry an accused subsequently set forth by our Supreme Court.”); *State v. Moriwake*, 647 P.2d 705, 711 n.12 (Haw. 1982) (“[W]e cannot believe that an infinite number of retrials . . . are consistent with double jeopardy principles.”).

means to bring about a just one.” *Berger*, 295 U.S. at 88.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has long held that a defendant’s due process rights are violated when the government withholds exculpatory or impeachment evidence that is material to either the defendant’s guilt or punishment, *see generally, Brady v. State*, 373 U.S. 83 (196), or uses false evidence to secure a conviction or sentence, *see Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). *See also Wearry v. Cain*, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016). Newly discovered evidence makes clear that both types of misconduct infected Mr. Flowers’s trial.

Suppression of material evidence by the State violates due process “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87. Thus, *Brady* imposes a strict obligation upon the State to provide the defense with all exculpatory material, including impeachment evidence. And the State has a corresponding duty to “investigate all evidence regarding a crime” and not simply “those items which appear to support the case against a defendant.” *Little v. State*, 736 So. 2d 486, 489 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). A *Brady* violation may occur, therefore, “[w]hether or not the State knew of” suppressed evidence, if the State’s ignorance stemmed from its failure to investigate. *Id.* The State’s obligation under *Brady* also extends to information in the hands of law enforcement and others assisting in the prosecution, even where that information is unknown to the prosecutor himself. *See, e.g., Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 437 (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”); *Manning v. State*, 158 So. 3d at 306 (granting post-conviction relief based on failure to disclose materials in possession of police); *King v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1168, 1176 (Miss. 1995) (“[A] prosecutor is deemed to possess information in the hands of all members of the prosecutorial team, both

investigative and prosecutorial personnel.”); *Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 156, 166 (finding *Brady* violation for failure to disclose exculpatory fingerprint-comparison results in possession of police, but unknown to prosecution); *United States v. Antone*, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[N]ondisclosure, whether stemming from negligence or design, [i]s the responsibility of the prosecutor.”); *Dennis*, 834 F.3d at 288, 296 (finding that prosecutor came into “constructive possession” of key impeachment evidence once the police came into actual possession of the evidence); *United States v. Fairman*, 769 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir. 1985) (state’s failure to produce police ballistics report unknown to prosecutors but in police files violated *Brady* because “the withheld evidence [was] under the control of a state instrumentality closely aligned with the prosecution, such as the police”); *Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary*, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964) (failure to disclose police ballistics and fingerprint tests violated *Brady* because “[t]he police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State’s Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure”); *United States v. Boyd*, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1993) *aff’d*, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995) (it is “clear that the ‘prosecution’ includes police officers, federal agents and other investigatory personnel who participated in the investigation and prosecution of the case”). In short, *Brady*’s mandate is clear: “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police,” *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 437, and to turn any exculpatory and impeachment information over to the defense.

State prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose regardless of whether the defense submits a specific request, a general request, or no request at all for *Brady* material. *United States v. Agurs*, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); *see also Smith v. State*, 500 So. 2d 973, 979 (Miss. 1986) (a prosecutor has a duty to disclose under *Brady* “regardless of the nature of [the

defendant's] request"); *Malone v. State*, 486 So. 2d 367, 369 (Miss. 1986) (state had a duty to disclose its plea agreement with a key witness even though the defense did not specifically request information regarding a plea agreement); *Mahler v. Kaylo*, 537 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The duty applies, moreover, even when the accused fails to specifically request such evidence."). Mississippi courts further recognize that "as a matter of good practice and sound judgment," prosecuting attorneys should err on the side of disclosure and permit defense attorneys to make their own determination "whether or not the material is useful in the defense of the case." *Hentz v. State*, 489 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Miss. 1986). The prosecutor "should resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure," *Smith*, 500 So. 2d at 979, and this Court must consider "the cumulative effect of all such evidence suppressed by the government," *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 421. *See also Wearry*, 136 S. Ct. at 1007 (reversing denial of post-conviction relief in part because of "the state postconviction court[']s improper[] evaluat[ion] . . . of each piece of evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively"). These obligations are at their apex in capital cases, where "all doubts" must "be resolved in favor of the accused." *Bennett v State*, 933 So. 2d 930, 939 (Miss. 2006).

The governing principles that emerge from *Brady*, *Napue*, *Giglio*, and their progeny are simple: (i) the prosecution must affirmatively disclose to the defense all favorable evidence and (ii) the prosecution must not knowingly advance or fail to correct false testimony in its pursuit of a conviction. The State of Mississippi violated both of these basic tenets of fairness in its prosecution of Mr. Flowers when it suppressed material exculpatory evidence of alternative suspects, material impeachment evidence, evidence of the possible murder weapon, and evidence showing that its investigator falsified witness statements in his notes.

A. The State's Suppression Of Material Exculpatory Evidence Of Alternative Suspects Violated *Brady* And Mr. Flowers's Due Process Rights.

New evidence reveals that the State suppressed two separate and parallel investigations into alternative suspects. The first suppressed investigation centered on three suspects from Alabama who committed a series of murder-robberies similar to the Tardy Furniture murders during the late spring and summer of 1996. Relatedly, new evidence shows the State failed to disclose that Mississippi authorities included a mug shot of one of these Alabama suspects in the photo array shown to key eyewitness Porky Collins. The second suppressed investigation focused on a local man—Willie James Hemphill—who lived three blocks from Tardy Furniture, had a long criminal history, and wore size 9 or 10 Fila Grant Hill shoes. The State should have turned all of this information over to defense counsel. This is not a gray area. Had the State disclosed that it pursued these alternative suspects, Mr. Flowers could have properly investigated these leads and uncovered the details of the Alabama suspects' crime spree and Hemphill's connections to the Tardy Furniture murders. And had this information on either set of suspects been introduced at trial, there is a reasonable probability it would have changed the result. This evidence therefore was material, and the State should have disclosed it.³² See *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 433.

Mr. Flowers could not have been expected to discover this evidence on his own through reasonable diligence. Mr. Flowers had no way of knowing who the State secretly investigated.

³² This is not the first time Mr. Evans has failed to fulfill his constitutional obligation to disclose all exculpatory evidence. In a 1999 rape case, Mr. Evans and his team suppressed two critical pieces of evidence: the rape kit (that had tested negative for semen) and the medical examination of the alleged victim (which found no signs of bruising, tearing, or other trauma). Ex. 41 (Defs.' Request for New Trial at 3, *State v. Townsend* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Dec. 7, 2000)). When this evidence came to light, the Circuit Court of Webster County ordered a new trial. Ex. 42 (Order at 2, *State v. Townsend* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Dec.

And, in the face of sworn testimony by a State law enforcement witness that the pictures included in the photo array shown to Mr. Collins were simply “fillers,” Tr. 3014–17, Mr. Flowers had no reason to know or suspect that the array actually included a photograph of an alternative suspect.

A reasonable defendant would not waste resources on potential third-party perpetrators who, according to the State’s repeated affirmative representations, were never considered in the State’s investigation. Because the State’s suppression of this evidence deprived Mr. Flowers of material exculpatory evidence in violation of *Brady*, this Court must vacate Mr. Flowers’s convictions and grant him a new trial.

1. The State Suppressed Material Evidence Of The Alabama Suspects.

a. The State suppressed exculpatory evidence of the Alabama Suspects.

Mr. Flowers has discovered that, contrary to its representations regarding full disclosure, the State of Mississippi actively investigated three men from Alabama—Marcus Presley, LaSamuel Gamble, and Steven McKenzie—who in July and August of 1996 were wanted for murders markedly similar to the Tardy Furniture murders. Specifically, in early-to mid-August 1996, weeks after the Tardy Furniture murders:

- Mississippi investigators contacted officials in Boston, Massachusetts and Norfolk, Virginia about Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble, who were on the run and ultimately apprehended in those jurisdictions. *See* Ex. 16 (Miss. Crime Lab., Microanalysis Section, Case Activity) (showing transfer of information from Mississippi Crime Lab to Boston authorities); Ex. 17 (Goldberg Aff.) ¶ 6.
- On August 6, 1996, the Mississippi Crime Lab sent a copy of the Fila shoeprint recovered from Tardy Furniture to Tim Murray of the Boston Police Department—the lead investigator in Boston helping to direct the multi-agency manhunt for Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble following the pawn shop murders. *See* Ex. 16 (Miss. Crime Lab., Microanalysis Section, Case Activity).

13, 2000)). The defendant, Bobby Joe Townsend, was found not guilty at that second trial. *See Bobby Townsend*, The Nat’l Registry of Exonerations (Dec. 16, 2016), <https://tinyurl.com/yyyyreyq>.

- On or about August 9 or 10, 1996, Lieutenant Wayne Miller of the Mississippi Highway Patrol requested and received a photograph of Marcus Presley from Detective David Goldberg in Norfolk. *See* Ex. 17 (Goldberg Aff.) ¶ 6. Mr. Miller included this photo of Mr. Presley in the photo array shown to Porky Collins on August 24, 1996. *See* Ex. 18 (State’s Color Photo Lineup and Side-by-Side Comparison); Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶ 22; Ex. 19 (Guo Aff.) ¶ 5 (concluding to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Mr. Presley’s mug shot was used in the photo arrays).
- In mid-August, 1996, when interviewing Roxanne Ballard, the daughter of victim Bertha Tardy, Mississippi investigators showed Ms. Ballard photographs of jewelry recovered from investigations of Mr. Presley, Mr. Gamble, and Mr. McKenzie and asked if she recognized it. *See* Ex. 20 (Skidmore Aff.) ¶ 6.

These actions demonstrate not only that the State of Mississippi strongly suspected Mr. Presley, Mr. Gamble, and Mr. McKenzie of committing the Tardy Furniture murders, but that they acted on these suspicions and actively investigated the Alabama suspects’ potential involvement in those murders.

The State failed to disclose any of this information. The discovery file disclosed by the State does not contain even a single reference to Marcus Presley, LaSamuel Gamble, or Steven McKenzie.³³ Even worse, the State suppressed this evidence in the face of Mr. Flowers’s specific and repeated requests for the information, which put the State “on notice of its value.” *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–684. Mr. Flowers first requested information on alternative suspects in a motion filed prior to his second trial. *See* Mot. for Disc. of *Brady* Material, *Flowers II* (Miss. Cir. Ct. July 16, 1998)). Mr. Flowers also requested information on alternative suspects prior to his fourth trial. *See* Mot. to Produce Info. on Other Suspects, *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1,

³³ The sole trace of this investigation in the State’s discovery file is a single notation on the Mississippi Crime Lab Microanalysis Section Case Activity document, attached hereto as Ex. 16, dated August 6, 1996 and reading: “Sent photocopy of footwear impression to Jack Matthews with MHP-CIB and to Tim Murray with Boston Police Dept.” *Id.* But without knowing the connection of the Boston Police Department to the investigation and manhunt relating to the Alabama suspects, or that Tim Murray was leading that effort, this single reference, buried in a lengthy discovery file, was meaningless.

2007)). The State never produced information responsive to these requests. Mr. Flowers later renewed a motion for discovery regarding alternative suspects in *Flowers V*, which the Court granted. See Tr. 333 (reporting transcript of pre-trial proceedings in *Flowers V*). The State again produced nothing, maintaining instead that Mr. Flowers was the only suspect from the very beginning and that the State had no information on other suspects. Tr. 333–334 (“As far as I know, [Mr. Flowers] was the key suspect from the beginning. And everything that I’m aware of pointed to him.”). Finally, prior to his most recent trial, Mr. Flowers again renewed his request for information on alternative suspects. Tr. 463; Request for 9.04 Disc. and for Suppl. of Disc. Furnished to Date, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010). And again, the prosecution disclosed nothing and represented to the Court that “[it] has never had any evidence that showed anything other than this defendant’s guilt.” Tr. 442. See also Tr. 358–359 (“There is no more discovery.”); Tr. 383 (John Johnson testifying under oath: “I’m not familiar with another suspect”); Tr. 2935 (John Johnson testifying that Curtis Flowers “was the only one that was an initial suspect”); Tr. 439 (The Court: “Do I have the State’s assurance that everything you have had in your possession from an investigative standpoint in this case has been provided?” Mr. Evans: “Yes, sir. Everything.”).

More troubling still, the State went further than just suppressing this information; the prosecution presented several law enforcement witnesses at trial who testified falsely that no such information existed. Specifically, as discussed *infra* at Ground C, lead investigator Jack Matthews denied any knowledge of crimes similar in time and circumstances to the Tardy Furniture murders and denied any familiarity with Marcus Presley or LaSamuel Gamble. Tr. 2579. Likewise, when Mr. Miller was asked whether any “persons of interest” were included in the photo arrays shown to Porky Collins, he testified that the only persons of interest were Doyle

Simpson and Curtis Flowers—failing to mention that he had also included a photo of third-party suspect Marcus Presley in that array. Tr. 3014–17. He repeatedly referred to the other photographs as “just filler pictures” of people with “the same race, similar complexion, things of that nature,” *id.*, which were taken randomly from a collection of mug shots, Tr. 474; *see also id.* at 485, 3016. That testimony was blatantly false: Mr. Miller himself requested the photo of Presley from Detective Goldberg in Norfolk, and he himself included that photo in the array shown to Mr. Collins. The State’s flagrant suppression of evidence in response to specific inquiries violated Mr. Flowers’s due process rights. *Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 105; *see also Banks*, 540 U.S. at 694 (prosecution’s presentation of false testimony supports finding of *Brady* violation).³⁴

b. The suppressed evidence regarding the Alabama suspects undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.

The prosecution’s failure to disclose alternative suspects is material, and therefore must be disclosed, when there is “some plausible nexus linking the other suspect to the crime.” *Kiley v. United States*, 260 F. Supp. 2d 248, 273 (D. Mass. 2003); *see also Crawford v. Cain*, No. Civ. A. 04-0748, 2006 WL 1968872, at *19 (E.D. La. July 11, 2006), *aff’d*, 248 F. App’x 500 (5th Cir. 2007) (“When there is evidence available to link the alternative suspect to the crime, however, courts have found the prosecution’s failure to inform the defense about the alternative suspect material.”); *Juniper v. Zook*, 876 F.3d 551, 570 (4th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases in which “courts

³⁴ Although the knowledge of investigators is imputed to the prosecution by law for *Brady* purposes, *see Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 436, in this case there is no doubt the prosecution itself knew of the investigation into the Alabama suspects. District Attorney Evans recently represented at a discovery hearing that “there was nothing that went on [in the Flowers case] that I didn’t personally handle,” Jan. 2016 Hr’g Tr. 33, and that every agency working on the case “compiled one file at our office with everything that everybody worked on. Everything that was involved with any agency, police department, sheriff’s department, MDI,

found withheld evidence material when the evidence pointed to a different individual as perpetrating the convicted offense.”). To determine materiality, courts do not consider only the precise evidence that was suppressed by the State; instead, a *Brady* claim may be predicated on other evidence that the defense failed to uncover as a result of the State’s suppression. *See Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–683 (recognizing *Brady* violation when the suppressed evidence causes the defendant to “abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that [he] otherwise would have pursued” and that would have yielded admissible evidence that undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial); *see also Maynard v. Virgin Islands*, 392 Fed. App’x 105, 115, 118–119 (3rd Cir. 2010).

Here, materiality is self-evident. As an initial matter, the State’s case was built around the State’s claim that the evidence pointed solely towards Mr. Flowers. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 442 (Doug Evans stating that the State “never had any evidence that showed anything other than [Mr. Flowers’s] guilt”); Tr. 383 (John Johnson testifying under oath: “I’m not familiar with another suspect”); Tr. 2935 (John Johnson testifying that Mr. Flowers “was the only one that was an initial suspect”). That claim has now been proven false. Had trial counsel known of the evidence implicating the Alabama suspects, the State could not have made such grandiose claims. Instead, the jury would have had to confront the fact that the scattered pieces of evidence presented by the State did not inevitably come together into some grand mosaic illustrating Mr. Flowers’s guilt. The disclosure of this investigation, in short, casts doubt on the very theory upon which the State used to convict Mr. Flowers. This evidence is thus sufficient to “undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434.

crime lab, all of it was in our file,” *id.* 58–59. Jack Matthews’s trial testimony confirms that the investigation “funneled . . . through the D.A.’s office.” Tr. 2577.

But not only would the jury have had to confront the fact that a third party may have committed the crime, they would have to overcome mounds of evidence strongly suggesting that specific third parties—that is, the Alabama suspects—committed the crime. The evidence relating to the Alabama suspects’ crime spree matches the physical evidence recovered from Tardy Furniture to a tee. Slugs from a .380 handgun, live rounds showing that the gun tended to jam, and a Fila shoeprint are more consistent with the theory that the Alabama suspects committed the Tardy Furniture murders than the theory that Mr. Flowers did. First, Mr. Gamble himself admitted that he wore Fila shoes in July 1996, Ex. 12 (Gamble Tr.) 1955, while the State was left to rely on an empty shoebox and testimony from a tainted witness, Patricia Sullivan-Odom, to establish that Mr. Flowers wore Filas. Second, the execution-style shooting of the Tardy victims is far more plausible with multiple, experienced assailants than just a single perpetrator with no criminal record or history of violence. Third, the Tardy Furniture murders matched the method that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble previously employed in Alabama: entering a store in broad daylight and shooting the clerks execution-style during the course of a simple robbery. And fourth, the Alabama suspects theory is more consistent with Porky Collins’s testimony that he saw *two men* arguing in front of Tardy Furniture shortly before the crime was committed. Moreover, new evidence reveals that members of the Alabama suspects were in Mississippi on July 16, carrying a .380 handgun, on the day of the Tardy Furniture murders. See Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶¶ 7–9. Had this evidence been introduced, the prosecution could not have proven Mr. Flowers’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, because it could not have conclusively excluded the entirely reasonable hypothesis that the Alabama suspects committed the crime. This evidence therefore casts doubt on the State’s theory and is sufficient to “undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434.

Whether or not the State had knowledge of all the details of the Alabama suspects' crimes described above—and there is good reason to believe it did—is inapposite. What matters is that the prosecution prevented this information from coming to light. By affirmatively representing that the State never investigated alternative suspects, the prosecution steered the defense away from conducting its own investigation into those suspects. When potential *Brady* material is requested, prosecuting attorneys are obligated to err on the side of disclosure, so that they may allow *the defendant* to determine “whether or not the material is useful in the defense of the case.” *Hentz*, 489 So. 2d at 1388; *see also Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 437. In light of this obligation, a reasonable defendant would have taken the State at its word—that there were no alternative suspects—and would not have wasted precious time and resources in advance of trial digging up information on Presley, Gamble, and McKenzie. *See Banks*, 540 U.S. at 695–696 (explaining that defendant is not obligated to “scavenge for hints of undisclosed *Brady* material”); *Strickler*, 527 U.S. at 284 (noting that “it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on . . . the presumption that the prosecutor would fully perform his duty to disclose all exculpatory materials”); *Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 163 (rejecting argument that petitioner could have deduced from general evidence that additional specific evidence existed, because “the State’s nondisclosure may have reasonably led the defense to conclude no additional evidence existed”). “Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties.” *Bracy*, 520 U.S. at 909 (internal quotations omitted). That is exactly what Mr. Flowers did here.

Had the State turned over evidence relating to its investigation of the Alabama suspects, Mr. Flowers would have discovered the striking similarity between their crime spree and the Tardy Furniture murders. Additionally, Mr. Flowers’s counsel could have interviewed Mr. Presley, Mr. Gamble, and Mr. McKenzie, all of whom were incarcerated in Alabama in 2010

(and remain so today).³⁵ And had defense counsel done that, Mr. Presley likely would have told them exactly what he has now divulged in a sworn statement: that Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie were in Mississippi at the time of the Tardy Furniture murders, that they were carrying a .380 handgun, that Mr. Gamble was wearing Fila shoes, and that they returned with cash they did not have when they left. *See* Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶¶ 7, 9–10; *see also* Ex. 12 (Gamble Tr.) 1955. Indeed, Mr. Presley had no more incentive to keep quiet in the months leading up to the *Flowers VI* trial than he does now.

Moreover, the details of the Alabama suspects' crimes were material by themselves, but all the more so because of the State's investigation into them as alternative suspects. State investigators do not waste scarce resources in a time-sensitive murder investigation on dead leads.

In a case in which officials abandoned—after the first day—their investigation into Doyle Simpson, the owner of the alleged murder weapon, the connection between the Alabama suspects and the Tardy Furniture murders must have been substantial indeed. A reasonable juror could infer that there was enough information to believe that the Alabama suspects, and not Mr. Flowers, may have committed the Tardy Furniture murders. This alone would have been sufficient to create reasonable doubt about whether the State had proven its case against Mr. Flowers.

³⁵ Presley and Gamble were both tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in 1997. *See Ex Parte Pressley*, 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000); *Gamble v. State*, 791 So. 2d 409 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). However, Presley's sentence was commuted to life in 2005 pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed). Gamble's death sentence was commuted shortly thereafter when the district attorney who prosecuted his case advocated for the commutation on the basis that it would be unfair to execute Mr. Gamble when Mr. Presley, who was the shooter in the pawn shop murders, would be spared from execution. *See* Brenda Goodman, *Prosecutor Who Opposed a Death Sentence is Rebuked*, NY Times (Sept. 15, 2007), <https://tinyurl.com/y3oew6ms>. Mr. McKenzie

Finally, the State’s use of Mr. Presley’s photo in the photo array shown to Porky Collins was material evidence, independent of the suppressed details of the Alabama suspects’ crimes. With this information, defense counsel could have impeached Lieutenant Wayne Miller, a key State witness, by illuminating his false testimony that no other “persons of interest” were used in the photo array. Tr. 3014–17. This impeachment evidence would have not only undermined Mr. Miller’s credibility as a witness, but also his integrity as a primary investigator in the case. The jury would have been left with the impression that the State conducted a dishonest, or at least incompetent, investigation. *See, e.g., Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 445 (1995) (explaining that suppressed evidence can be material when it “would have raised opportunities to attack . . . the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation”); *Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 165 (applying this rule to find that a suppressed affidavit tending to show that the defendant did not fit the profile of the likely murderer was material); *Mendez v. Artuz*, 303 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir 2002) (applying this rule to find material suppressed information showing that police failed to investigate another suspect); *Bowen v. Maynard*, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) (same).

Because of the State’s misconduct, Mr. Flowers was precluded from developing these compelling lines of defense. Had this evidence been introduced, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of his trial would have been different.

c. The Defense could not have obtained the suppressed evidence regarding the Alabama suspects with reasonable diligence.

Defense counsel could not have uncovered the suppressed Alabama-related evidence through reasonable diligence. As explained above, Mr. Flowers was entitled to rely on the State’s representation that it did not investigate any alternative suspects. *See Banks*, 540 U.S. at

was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role in the pawn shop murders. *See Ala. Dep’t. of Corr.*

671 (“[The defendant] cannot be faulted for relying on [the State’s] misrepresentation.”); *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–83 (explaining that it is reasonable “for the defense to assume from . . . nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist”); *Dennis*, 834 F.3d at 291 (explaining that the defense “was entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s duty to turn over exculpatory evidence.”). Further, because the State’s investigation was not discoverable through reasonable diligence, neither were the details regarding the Alabama murder-robberies that Mr. Flowers would have uncovered if he knew of that investigation. No reasonable defendant would go looking exactly where the State swore that there was nothing to see. Defendants must be able to rely on the State’s representations to determine where to spend their finite resources preparing for trial.³⁶

The prosecution’s suppression of its investigation into alternative suspects requires this Court to vacate Mr. Flowers’s conviction and grant him a new trial.

2. The State Suppressed Its Material Investigation Into Willie Hemphill.

a. The State suppressed exculpatory evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill.

It was not only investigations into out-of-state suspects that the State suppressed; it suppressed inquiries into local suspects as well. Specifically, new evidence reveals that the State suppressed its investigation into Willie James Hemphill—a man with a violent criminal past, who lived three blocks away Tardy Furniture, was allegedly placed near the store the day of the murders, and wore size 9 or 10 Fila Grant Hill shoes. But throughout the trial of Mr. Flowers, the State asserted that he—Mr. Flowers—was the only suspect it seriously investigated.

Incarceration Details: Steve McKenzie, <https://tinyurl.com/y53tdr7d> (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).

³⁶ If the Court disagrees, and finds that defense counsel reasonably should have done more, defense counsel’s failure to investigate alternative suspects would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ground G, *infra*.

And when asked specifically about Willie James Hemphill, the State and its witnesses claimed that Mr. Hemphill had been quickly “ruled out” as a suspect. New evidence belies these claims.

The State began inquiring into Mr. Hemphill as a potential suspect only a few days after the murders. *See* Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 12, 19, 22. This was no cursory investigation; the State of Mississippi launched a manhunt to locate Mr. Hemphill. Six police officers reported to Mr. Hemphill’s parent’s home to ask his parents about his whereabouts. *Id.* at 19. Similarly, a “yard full” of investigators questioned Mr. Hemphill’s cousin—a man who shares Mr. Hemphill’s name and who lives only a half hour from Winona. *Id.* at 12. Hearing that the police were searching for him, Mr. Hemphill turned himself into the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office on July 21, 1996, and was immediately arrested. *Id.* at 10.

Investigators then questioned Mr. Hemphill about the Tardy Furniture murders for several hours. *Id.* at 22. They informed Mr. Hemphill that two pieces of evidence linked him to the murders. *Id.* at 20–21. The first connection was that Mr. Hemphill had been seen near Tardy Furniture on the day of the murders. *Id.* Tardy Furniture was just a few blocks away from where Mr. Hemphill periodically stayed in Winona during the summer of 1996. *Id.* at 16.³⁷

The second connection was that Mr. Hemphill wore Fila Grant Hill sneakers. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 20–21. Indeed, new evidence makes clear that Mr. Hemphill wore *only* a pair of Fila Grant Hill shoes in the summer of 1996. *Id.* at 21. His shoe size, he estimates, was a size 9 or 10. *Id.* What is more, Mr. Hemphill had turned himself in while wearing this pair of shoes. *Id.* As part of the interrogation, the police asked him to remove the shoes for analysis. *Id.* The police eventually returned to him his Fila Grant Hills, but only after Mr.

³⁷ Mr. Hemphill gave the investigators an alibi—that he was in Memphis on the day of the Tardy Furniture murders. *Id.* at 20. But the State apparently never verified it. Tr. 2587–88.

Hemphill was shoe-less for “more than a few minutes.” *Id.*

The investigation did not stop there. Investigators also fingerprinted Mr. Hemphill and waved a light over his hands, presumably to test for residue or blood spatter. *Id.* at 22. Further, investigators questioned Mr. Hemphill about his whereabouts on the day of the murders, making clear they considered him a suspect. *Id.* at 20. They tape-recorded the interrogation, in addition to taking handwritten notes. *Id.* at 22.

This investigation therefore should have given rise to mounds of evidence that would have been favorable to Mr. Flowers. The evidence would have shown that Curtis Flowers was not the only suspect with connections to the Tardy Furniture murders, as the State repeatedly claimed. *See* Tr. 334 (Mr. Evans: “As far as I know, [Mr. Flowers] was the key suspect from the beginning. And everything that I’m aware of pointed to him.”); Tr. 442 (Mr. Evans asserting that the State “never had any evidence that showed anything other than this defendant’s [Mr. Flowers’s] guilt.”); Tr. 383 (John Johnson testifying under oath: “I’m not familiar with another suspect”); Tr. 2935 (John Johnson testifying that Curtis Flowers “was the only one that was an initial suspect”). And it would have shown that the State considered Mr. Hemphill a serious enough suspect to launch a manhunt to track him down.

Yet the State refused to disclose any of this evidence to the defense. Instead, it included in its discovery file only a single reference to Willie James Hemphill—a signed Miranda waiver form with his name on it. Mr. Flowers’s counsel, reasonably intrigued by this scrap of information, repeatedly pressed the State on Mr. Hemphill. But the State refused to comply, and actively suppressed any evidence pertaining to Mr. Hemphill in three different ways.

The State first made a general denial that it had any evidence on alternative suspects. *See* Ground B, Part A, Section 1, *supra*. Each time Mr. Flowers made a request, the State

produced nothing in response, despite the fact that these repeated requests for information should have put the prosecution “on notice of its value.” *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682.

In addition to these general denials, the State specifically denied that anything came of the Hemphill interrogation. Upon discovering a stray Miranda waiver bearing Mr. Hemphill’s name, the Defense issued a discovery request for the “[c]ontents of any oral, written or recorded statement obtained from Willie Hemphill pursuant to Miranda waiver dated 7/21/1996.” Request for 9.04 Disc. and for Suppl. of Disc. Furnished to Date at 5, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010). The State disclosed nothing, and asserted that “[a]nything that we have was furnished. . . . If it’s not furnished and listed on discovery, we never had it.” Tr. 436–437. The newly discovered evidence shows that this claim was false.

Finally, not satisfied with merely claiming a lack of knowledge of Mr. Hemphill, the State muddied the waters and mischaracterized the nature of the Hemphill interrogation. The single piece of evidence alerting the defense to the Hemphill investigation—the Miranda waiver form—was signed by Investigator Jack Matthews. *See* Ex. 24 (Criminal Investigation Bureau Interrogation; Advice of Rights Waiver of Rights: Willie James Hemphill (July 21, 1996)). When Mr. Matthews was on the stand, therefore, the defense inquired into the purpose, and contents, of the Hemphill interrogation. Tr. 2587. Mr. Matthews told a far different story than the one the newly available evidence tells. Mr. Matthews testified that Mr. Hemphill was ruled out “[a]fter a short time;” from the “get-go” in fact. Tr. 2587–88. And Investigator John Johnson confirmed the brevity of the interrogation, remembering that it had lasted for only “five

minutes.” *Id.* at 2971–72.³⁸ In fact, as new evidence shows, Mr. Hemphill was interrogated for hours and ultimately held for 11 days as a suspect in the Tardy Furniture murders. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 22.³⁹

The State’s suppression of this evidence—by way of general denials in response to requests for information, specific denials that it had any evidence on Mr. Hemphill, and mischaracterizations as to the character and seriousness of the interrogation—violated Mr. Flowers’s due process rights.

b. The suppressed evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.

The suppressed evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill is material in two ways. First, it “point[s] to a different individual as perpetrating the convicted offense.” *Juniper*, 876 F.3d at 570; *see also Kiley*, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (explaining that alternative suspect evidence is material when there is “some plausible nexus linking the other suspect to the crime”). This kind of evidence, “has long [been] recognized . . . [as] ‘classic *Brady* material.’” *Juniper*, 876 F.3d at 551 (quoting *Williams v. Ryan*, 623 F.3d 1258, 1265 (9th Cir. 2010)). Second, the State’s suppression of the evidence caused Mr. Flowers to “abandon . . . defenses . . . [and] trial strategies that [he] otherwise would have pursued[.]” namely, that the State did not conduct a thorough investigation into the Tardy Furniture murders.

To begin with, the very fact that the State conducted an investigation into Mr. Hemphill is

³⁸ Earlier in the proceedings Mr. Johnson claimed that he had no knowledge of the Hemphill interrogation. At that time, he claimed that he was “not familiar” with Mr. Hemphill’s Miranda statement and that he did not “remember that name.” Tr. 387.

³⁹ The State has not stopped its deception in these post-conviction proceedings, now claiming for the first time that the sole reason Mr. Hemphill was held was an outstanding petit larceny charge and that he was not considered a serious suspect in the Tardy Furniture murders. *See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for*

material. The State’s case against Mr. Flowers relied exclusively on “connections” between Mr. Flowers and the scene of the crime. Tr. 3188. Crucial to drawing these connections was confidence. In the face of otherwise tenuous, circumstantial evidence against Curtis Flowers, the State repeatedly assured the jury that it “never had any evidence that showed anything other than [Mr. Flowers’s] guilt,” Tr. 442, and that Mr. Flowers “was the only one that was an initial suspect,” Tr. 2935. *See also* Tr. 383 (John Johnson testifying under oath: “I’m not familiar with another suspect.”). No doubt the jury was impressed with this self-assuredness, which encouraged it to conclude that the disparate pieces of evidence fit together in a singular way.

The Hemphill evidence reveals that those pieces did not always point toward Curtis Flowers. Had this evidence been disclosed, the jury would have known that, only two days after the murders, the State had a serious interest in another suspect. They would have known that the State sent six investigators to Mr. Hemphill’s parents’ home. They would have known that the State held Mr. Hemphill for 11 days, and interrogated him for hours. And they would have known that another person in town—a man with a violent criminal history, *see generally* Ex. 23 (Willie James Hemphill Criminal Records)—wore the very type of shoe that the State contended left the bloody shoeprint. In a case about connections, it is plausible that a man who was known to wear these shoes, and only these shoes, committed the crime, rather than a man who merely lived in a shared residence where an old, re-purposed Fila shoebox, was found in the closet. These facts would have stripped the false veneer of confidence from the State’s case against Mr. Flowers, and made it much more difficult for a jury to find that this evidence connected Mr. Flowers to the scene of the crime beyond any reasonable doubt. By casting doubt on the

Leave to File Supp. to Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Lift Stay of Post-Conviction Proceedings at 7, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2015-DR-00591-SCT (Miss. July 25, 2018)

prosecution's theory, this evidence is sufficient to "undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial." *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434.

Furthermore, the suppression of the Hemphill interrogation is material because it effectively hobbled defense counsel. The Hemphill interrogation gave rise to several new "defenses" Mr. Flowers could have used and "trial strategies" he could have employed. *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682. Specifically, Mr. Flowers could have used the Hemphill interrogation to challenge the credibility of the State's forensic technicians and the thoroughness of its investigation. According to Hemphill, the State took his fingerprints and analyzed his Fila Grant Hills. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 22–23. But according to the defense's fingerprint expert, Mr. McSparrin, and the State's trace evidence examiner, Mr. Andrews, neither a fingerprint sample nor a shoe sample was ever submitted to the State's laboratories for examination. Tr. 2624, 2703. With the Hemphill evidence in hand, the Defense would have been able to push back on these denials. At the very least, knowledge of the Hemphill interrogation could have been used to query why some fingerprints and shoe samples were tested and others were not, undermining confidence in the integrity of the State's investigation. *See, e.g., Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 445 (1995) (explaining that suppressed evidence can be material when it "would have raised opportunities to attack . . . the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation"); *Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 165 (applying this rule to find that a suppressed affidavit tending to show that the defendant did not fit the profile of the likely murderer was material); *Mendez*, 303 F.3d at 416 (applying this rule to find material suppressed information showing that police failed to investigate another suspect); *Bowen*, 799 F.2d at 613 (same).

The State's suppression of this information prevented Mr. Flowers from making any of these arguments at his trial. Had he been able to do so, there is a "reasonable probability" that

the outcome would have been different.

- c. *The Defense could not have obtained the suppressed evidence implicating Mr. Hemphill with reasonable diligence.*

The Hemphill interrogation, like the Alabama-related evidence, could not have been uncovered through reasonable diligence. Mr. Flowers rightfully relied on the State's general representation that it did not investigate any alternative suspects, whether from Alabama or Winona. *See Banks*, 540 U.S. at 671 (“[The defendant] cannot be faulted for relying on [the State's] misrepresentation.”); *see also Bracy*, 520 U.S. at 909 (“Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties.”) (internal quotations omitted); *Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he State's nondisclosure may have reasonably led the defense to conclude no additional evidence existed.”); *Dennis*, 834 F.3d at 291 (noting that the defense “was entitled to rely on the prosecutor's duty to turn over exculpatory evidence”). Further, defense counsel specifically asked the District Attorney, his investigator, and the officer who questioned Mr. Hemphill if the State had any other information on Mr. Hemphill. Defense counsel reasonably relied on the answers to these questions. *See Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–683 (“[T]he more specifically the defense requests certain evidence, thus putting the prosecutor on notice of its value, the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption.”); *Barnes*, 58 F.3d at 984 (Murnaghan, J., concurring) (“[A] reasonable defendant would not have looked into the matter any further once the prosecuting attorney represented that the Commonwealth did not possess exculpatory evidence.”). It would be entirely unreasonable for a defendant to waste precious time and money investigating an individual whom the State's

witnesses themselves swear, under oath, was worth only five minutes of their time.⁴⁰

The prosecution's suppression of its investigation into this alternative suspect requires this Court to vacate Mr. Flowers's conviction and grant him a new trial.

B. The State's Suppression Of Material Impeachment Evidence Of Benefits That Odell Hallmon Received For Testifying Violated *Brady* And Mr. Flowers's Due Process Rights.

Odell Hallmon's testimony that Mr. Flowers confessed to him was false. *See* Ground A, Section C, *supra*. And we now know why: Mr. Hallmon testified in exchange for leniency from District Attorney Doug Evans on a series of criminal charges throughout the last four *Flowers* trials. But these deals were never disclosed to Mr. Flowers. They should have been. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained, there is too often an:

unholy alliance between con-artist convicts who want to get out of their own cases, law enforcement who [are] running a training ground for snitches over at the county jail, and the prosecutors who are taking what appears to be the easy route, rather than really putting their cases together with solid evidence.

McNeal v. State, 551 So. 2d 151, 158 n.2 (Miss. 1989). That is not allowed. A prosecutor must proactively disclose any explicit or implicit deals. *Barnes v. State*, 460 So. 2d 126, 131 (Miss. 1984) (reiterating that "the 'deal' must be disclosed to the defense").

A prosecutor's failure to disclose witness bias—bias that he creates by offering deals for lenience—compromises a trial's fundamental fairness. "[W]here a key witness has received consideration or potential favors in exchange for testimony and lies about those favors, the trial is not fair." *Tassin v. Cain*, 517 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2008). The prosecutor has a duty to proactively disclose even implicit deals. *Id.* at 776–777 (no "firm promise" is necessary where

⁴⁰ If the Court disagrees, and finds that defense counsel reasonably should have done more, defense counsel's failure to investigate alternative suspects would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. *See* Ground G, *infra*.

the witness expected to receive beneficial treatment in return for testifying consistent with their prior inculpatory statements). Here, there is no question that the District Attorney's deals with Mr. Hallmon constituted material, exculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed. In a case otherwise dependent on dubious, circumstantial evidence, Mr. Hallmon's testimony that Mr. Flowers confessed to the Tardy Furniture murders was essential to the State's case. Without it, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result.

And defense counsel could not have discovered the State's deals with reasonable diligence. They explicitly and repeatedly sought disclosure of any deals, but District Attorney Doug Evans insisted that there were none. Mr. Hallmon testified repeatedly that there were none. And the payoff for the deals was obscured by the District Attorney's misrepresentations and the fact that some of the payoff came after trial. Mr. Hallmon was only ready to tell the truth years later, after committing heinous crimes that put him in prison without the possibility of parole—when there were no more deals to be made.

1. The State Suppressed Evidence Of Benefits That Mr. Hallmon Received For Testifying Against Mr. Flowers.

In Mr. Hallmon's words, "I helped them. They helped me. That's what[] it[] all boiled down to." Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 5. Mr. Hallmon further explained: "As far as [Mr. Flowers] telling me he killed some people, hell naw, he ain't ever told me that. That was a lie. I don't know nothing about this . . . It was all make-believe." *Id.* at 6.

Unfortunately, this fact was only revealed years after the District Attorney was duty-bound to disclose it. By 2018, when investigative reporters made contact with Mr. Hallmon in his cell at Parchman prison, he had pled to life without parole for a 2016 triple-homicide. See Ex. 11 (Judgment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2016-0018-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct.

May 11, 2016)). For him, there were no more deals to be made, and there was no more time to be added to his sentence. As Mr. Hallmon put it, he “[c]an’t get in no more trouble.” Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 3. Over the course of the *Flowers* trials, Mr. Hallmon became accustomed to getting out of “trouble” by making deals with Doug Evans.

Specifically, “it all got started” ahead of the third trial when the District Attorney dropped two drug charges and a robbery charge against Mr. Hallmon. *Id.* at 4. In early 2001, *Flowers II* was on its way to being overturned for prosecutorial misconduct. Looking ahead to a re-trial, the District Attorney saw a gap in his case: the State’s two jailhouse snitch “confession” witnesses had been irreparably impeached. *See Flowers II* Tr. at 288–372. As the witnesses have since admitted, they were pressured to lie because the District Attorney made them believe that they would receive leniency in their own cases and that he would not bring additional charges against them.⁴¹ Their impeachments left the prosecution without a witness who could claim that Mr. Flowers had confessed to the murders, should *Flowers II* be overturned.

⁴¹ See Ex. 32 (Hawkins Aff.) ¶¶ 2–4 (“In 1997, I testified against Curtis Flowers in his first trial in Tupelo, Mississippi . . . At that trial in 1997, I testified that Curtis Flowers had admitted to me in July 1997 that he had murdered four people at the Tardy Furniture Store. That testimony was not true. Flowers never told me that he killed anybody. . . . It was my understanding that in exchange for my testimony against Curtis Flowers, the drug-related charges pending against me would be dropped or lessened and that Sheriff Ricky Banks would recommend that I get house arrest for my pending burglary charge. After I agreed to testify against Curtis Flowers, I did receive a sentence of house arrest on my burglary charge, and my drug charge went away.”); Ex. 31 (Veal Aff.) ¶¶ 5–6, 8–16 (“I was desperate to get out of jail, so I contacted Sheriff Ricky Banks and asked if there was anything I could do to get myself out of jail. . . . Sheriff Banks told me that if I could get a confession from Curtis Flowers, he would help me out by speaking with the DA. . . . I never spoke with Flowers about the Tardy Furniture Store murders. . . . I told [Sheriff Banks and Mr. Evans] that Flowers did not say anything to me about his charges. . . . Sheriff Banks and Doug Evans made me write out a statement saying that Flowers had confessed to the murders. . . . On October 14, 1997, I testified against Curtis Flowers at his trial in Tupelo. . . . While in Tupelo, I decided I did not want to go forward with my testimony and tried to pull out of the situation. Doug Evans and John Johnson told me it was too late to back out and threatened me with a perjury charge if I did. I did not want to go back to jail, so I went forward with my untruthful testimony.”).

At that time, Mr. Hallmon had been indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and had also been arrested for three other crimes: armed robbery and two separate instances of crack cocaine possession.⁴² Although he had bonded out twice, he was stuck in jail as of March, 2001. Ex. 48 (Miss. Dep't of Corr., Jail Time Sheet (Apr. 12, 2002)). While awaiting indictment on his drug and robbery charges, he and Doug Evans connected. On May 7, 2001, Mr. Hallmon sat for two videotaped interviews with the District Attorney's office in which he reversed his testimony from the first two trials that his sister, Patricia Sullivan-Odom, had lied under oath about seeing Mr. Flowers on the day of the Tardy Furniture murders, and also insinuated—for the first time—that Mr. Flowers had committed those murders. *See In the Dark S2 E5: Privilege*, APM Reports, <http://tinyurl.com/y49zbd64> (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (embedding the two videos). He also wrote a letter addressed to Doug Evans, claiming that Mr. Flowers confessed to the murders. *See C.P.*⁴³ 00076–78 (Letter from Mr. Odell Hallmon to Mr. Doug Evans). One week after his videotaped interviews, his case for armed robbery was dismissed on motion of the prosecutor for failure to prosecute.⁴⁴ His two charges for possession of crack were not just “charged down.” *Reagor v. United States*, 488 F.2d 515, 516 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973) (evidence that key witness receives “substantial charging down” of his drug charges is material to the defense). He was never indicted for those drug charges *at all*. Ultimately, he

⁴² See Ex. 43 (Indictment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2001-0010-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. March 8, 2001)) (felon in possession of a firearm); Ex. 44 (Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, Arrest Report (Mar. 9, 2001)) (armed robbery arrest); Ex. 45 (Justice Court, Case File Maintenance Sheet (July 31, 2000)) (crack cocaine arrest #1, Vaiden) (issued July 28, 2000, bound over Sep. 14, 2000); Ex. 46 (Tommy Bibbs Aff. (Mar. 22, 2001)) (crack cocaine arrest #2, Winona); Ex. 47 (Crim. History Record (Mar. 24, 2009)) (listing March 22, 2001 crack cocaine arrest #2, Winona); *see also* Ex. 3-E (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 5 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 5 Tr.”] at 5 (Officer Brad Carver recalling crack cocaine arrest #1: “I tackled him. And that day he had like probably like eleven crack rocks on him that day.”).

⁴³ The clerk's papers are cited by page number as “C.P.” and were made a part of the trial record in *Flowers v. State*, No. 2010-DP-01348-SCT (Miss. July 1, 2013).

pled guilty only to the charge for which he had already been indicted: felon in possession of a firearm. But even that was taken care of. The court, at the urging of the State, granted him parole effective one year from his arrest—that is, two weeks later. *See* Ex. 50 (Tr. of Plea and Judgment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2001-0010-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. April 1, 2002)).

In 2003, pre-trial proceedings began in *Flowers III*. Defense counsel sought to preclude Mr. Hallmon from testifying, citing his contradictory statements, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s warnings about the unreliability of “snitch” testimony, and the United States Supreme Court’s guidance that reliability is particularly important in capital cases. *See* Mot. to Preclude Unreliable and Untrustworthy Snitch Testimony, *Flowers III* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 2, 2003). The motion noted that the prosecution’s two prior jailhouse snitches had proven unreliable precisely because of undisclosed deals with the prosecution. *Id.* at 1. Counsel also submitted a motion reminding the prosecution of its ongoing duty to provide *Brady* information, including “[f]ull and complete details regarding the benefits provided a witness in exchange for testimony.” Mot. for Order to Produce Kyles Information at 9, *Flowers III* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2003) (emphasis omitted).

Meanwhile, Hallmon was back in jail facing a new charge for a drive-by shooting. *See* Ex. 51 (Order Revoking Post Release Supervision, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2001-0010-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2003)). The *Flowers III* court denied defense counsel’s motion to preclude Mr. Hallmon, and he testified on February 10, 2004. He stated that he expected no benefits from the State in exchange for his testimony and that Mr. Flowers, “told me that he killed some peoples [sic.] at Tardy Furniture Company.” *Flowers III* Tr. at 1660–61. One month later, Mr.

⁴⁴ Ex. 49 (Abstract of Court Record, Montgomery County (May 16, 2018)) (entry on May 15, 2002).

Hallmon was indicted for the drive-by shooting, but the District Attorney did not seek the habitual offender enhancement even though the offense qualified. *See* Ex. 52 (Indictment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2004-0020-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. March 10, 2004)). Then, the District Attorney dropped the charges completely and Hallmon was released. *See* Ex. 53 (Order of Dismissal, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2004-0020-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 11, 2004)).

This was just the beginning. Recognizing the importance of Hallmon's testimony in his otherwise flimsy case against Mr. Flowers, the District Attorney would go to great lengths to protect his snitch.

When *Flowers III* was overturned for prosecutorial misconduct in 2007, proceedings began in what would become *Flowers IV*, *Flowers V*, and *Flowers VI*. At each trial, defense counsel renewed its motions to preclude Mr. Hallmon and to remind the District Attorney of his obligations under *Brady*. *See, e.g.*, Notice of Renewal and Adoption of Mots. from the Previous Five Trials, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 2010). The defense also requested updated criminal histories for all witnesses. *See* Mot. for Complete and Up to Date Crim. Histories of Any Potential State's Witness, *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2007)). Doug Evans replied, "The only change that we have found with regard to a criminal history update is Odell Hallmon's latest case which was a possession of cocaine charge in Carroll County in May of 2005." C.P. 1260 (Letter from Doug Evans to Ray Charles Carter (October 15, 2007)).

That was far from the truth, as the District Attorney well knew. In addition to the May 2005 charge, Mr. Hallmon had also been charged (again) with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Ex. 54 (Indictment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2005-0018-CR1 (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2005)). And a month earlier, Mr. Hallmon had *also* been charged with possession of cocaine. Ex. 55 (Indictment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2005-0006-CR1 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 19, 2005)). As

Hallmon would put it years later: “I was a local drug dealer. I used to get jammed up like every month. . . . I get locked up. I call Doug Evans. . . . Doug Evans say he would rather have a murderer in prison than a drug dealer. . . . I used them son of a bitches just like they used me.” Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 5. The three charges, which included habitual offender enhancements, could have netted Mr. Hallmon 46 years in jail without the possibility of parole. Instead, the District Attorney moved to dismiss the firearm charge, one of the drug charges, and the habitual offender enhancements. See Ex. 56 (Judgment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2005-0018-CR1 (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2005)). The District Attorney disclosed none of this to Mr. Flowers. Mr. Hallmon walked away with a sentence of 14 years in prison, but would not serve it out.

Mr. Hallmon—incarcerated for the time being on the one drug charge—maintained throughout the fourth, fifth, and sixth trials that Mr. Flowers had confessed to the murders. *Flowers IV* Tr. 422; *Flowers V* Tr. 437; Tr.; *Flowers VI* Tr. 2416. In exchange, Mr. Hallmon “earned” years off of his sentence for good behavior. See Ex. 57 (Inmate Time Sheet, for Odell Hallmon Jr. (Aug. 3, 2015)). This included, for example, credit for good behavior in April 2007.

That month, he masturbated through his cell bars (repeatedly), had a razor in his cell, had a “spear” in his cell, and assaulted an officer. See Ex. 35 (Hallmon Incident Report) at 6. In all, his disciplinary record shows more than eighty incidents while serving his sentence. *Id.* at 5–19.

Nevertheless, he was released on parole more than five and a half years early.⁴⁵ See Ex. 58 (Miss. Dep’t of Corr. Certificate of Earned Release Supervision (October 21, 2013)).

⁴⁵ Had Mr. Hallmon ever received the habitual offender enhancement that he repeatedly qualified for, he would not have been eligible for “Earned Release Supervision.” See Miss. Code §§ 99-19-81, 99-19-83. See also Miss. Dep’t of Corr., *Earned Release Supervision Program*, <http://tinyurl.com/y2zj6hv4> (last visited Feb. 25, 2019).

But with *Flowers VI* now on appeal, the District Attorney knew that Mr. Hallmon could still prove valuable. And so, the pattern of leniency for Mr. Hallmon's criminal behavior continued.

Indeed, after his early release, Mr. Hallmon quickly returned to his old ways, emboldened by a sense of impunity. And the District Attorney continued to protect him—a strategy that would ultimately have tragic consequences. In April 2014, Carroll County Sherriff's Deputies attempted to stop Mr. Hallmon while he was en route to a suspected drug transaction. *See* Ex. 59 (Carroll County Sherriff Dep't, Offense/Incident Report (Apr. 14, 2014)). Instead of stopping, Mr. Hallmon rammed one of the police cars and attempted to run over one of the officers. *Id.* at 2–3. Despite the serious charge, “Aggravated Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer,” Hallmon would not be indicted for a year. *See* Ex. 60 (Indictment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2015-0011-CR2 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2015)). Then, the prosecution delayed the case and he was released on \$25,000 bond. *See* Ex. 61 (Order, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2015-0011-CR2 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 2015)); *see also* Ex. 62 (Order Setting Bail, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2015-0011-CR2 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Aug. 10, 2015)). Then the State moved to delay the trial again—convincing the court to set trial for May 2016, more than two years after the original incident. *See* Ex. 63 (Order, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2015-0011-CR2 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2015)). That trial would never happen.

In the early hours of April 27, 2016, Odell Hallmon went on a killing spree. *See* Ex. 64 (Offense and Investigative Reports, Montgomery County Sheriff Dep't (May 6, 2016; Apr. 27, 2016)). He shot and killed his ex-girlfriend and her mother. *See* Jeff Amy, *Key witness in Tardy Furniture murders pleads guilty in triple homicide*, Clarion Ledger (May 11, 2016), <http://tinyurl.com/y283fsw9> [hereinafter “*Key Witness*, Clarion Ledger”]. He also shot at and

tried to kill his son, who was hiding in the closet. *Id.* In another part of town, he shot and killed one man and then shot another who survived. *Id.* Aware that he would inevitably return to jail, Mr. Hallmon turned himself in. When the booking officer told him that the first man had died, he replied “good.” *Id.* Prosecutor Doug Evans did not seek the death penalty. *See* Ex. 65 (Indictment, *State v. Hallmon*, No. 2016-0018-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2016)). Instead, Doug Evans told the families of the victims that he had appropriately agreed to a quick plea without seeking the death penalty or hearing victim impact statements because he believed that, “it’s almost like he did it and as soon as he did it, he regretted it.” Ex. 3-E (Tungekar Aff.) (*In the Dark* Ep. 5 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 5 Tr.”] at 17.

In sum, the State’s pattern of dealmaking proceeded in three acts. **First**, the State established the quid pro quo relationship that played out in *Flowers III*. Mr. Hallmon dutifully turned on the defense. In exchange, Doug Evans looked the other way on two drug charges. As Mr. Hallmon would later admit, “that’s how it all got started.” Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 4.

Then, the District Attorney sealed the deal going forward by under-charging for the shooting incident and ultimately dismissing the case. **Second**, as Mr. Hallmon accumulated new charges in the lead-up to *Flowers IV*, *V*, and *VI*, the District Attorney kept the actual indictments minimal and misled the defense about the true scope of the charges. And Doug Evans never risked Mr. Hallmon’s early “earned release” by indicting him as a habitual offender. Mr. Hallmon would then “earn” release despite being “the worst inmate of the prison” (according to one correctional officer). Ex. 3-E (ITD Ep. 5 Tr.) at 9. **Third**, the State would keep Mr. Hallmon happy until the *Flowers* case was settled once-and-for-all. When indicted for aggravated assault on a police officer, Mr. Hallmon walked free on a minimal bond. And the District Attorney would keep him free by repeatedly delaying the trial. In the end, peering into the soul of this

now-triple-murderer, Judge Loper saw “darkness and evil.” *Key Witness*, Clarion Ledger. A deal with the devil rarely goes as planned.⁴⁶

The Fifth Circuit has made clear that *even tacit deals* must be disclosed. *See Tassin*, 517 F.3d at 780 (a deal is material even if a witness merely reasonably expects to gain beneficial treatment). Other circuits agree. *See, e.g., Douglas v. Workman*, 560 F.3d 1156, 1182–87 (10th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases from other circuits). Where a prosecutor acts willfully, “his conduct warrants special condemnation.” *Id.* at 1190. An unspoken agreement must be disclosed. *Bell v. Bell*, 512 F.3d 223, 233 (6th Cir. 2008). Where “there might have been a tacit understanding that if [the witness’s] testimony was helpful to the prosecution, the state would give him a break on some pending criminal charge . . . it would have to be disclosed.” *Wishart v. Davis*, 408 F.3d 321, 323–324 (7th Cir. 2005). And any “facts which imply an agreement would also bear on [the witness’s] credibility and would have to be disclosed.” *United States v. Shaffer*, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1986). Even “[t]he fact that there was no agreement . . . is not determinative of whether the prosecution’s actions constituted a *Brady* violation requiring reversal.” *Reutter v. Solem*, 888 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1989). Instead, leniency that might indicate bias must be disclosed to the defense so that it can be presented to the factfinder. *Id.*

Here, however, Doug Evans’s deals with Mr. Hallmon were never disclosed. To the contrary, in response to defense counsel’s repeated pre-trial requests for assurance that the

⁴⁶ Hon. Stephen S. Trott, *Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses*, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996) (“The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims another prisoner has confessed to him”).

prosecution had made complete *Brady* disclosures,⁴⁷ District Attorney Doug Evans insisted that “[a]nything that we have was furnished.” Tr. 437–437. This suppression of critical impeachment evidence violated Mr. Flowers’s right to due process.

2. Mr. Hallmon’s Deals With The District Attorney Were Material To Mr. Flowers’s Defense Because They Would Have Irreparably Impeached A Key Witness Who Provided The Only Direct Evidence In The State’s Case.

Suppressed evidence is material under *Brady* when there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434–435 (internal quotations omitted). A defendant shows “reasonable probability” by showing that the suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” *Id.* (quoting *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 678). A deal with a “key witness” like Mr. Hallmon is material impeachment evidence. *See Dvorin*, 817 F.3d at 451 (a deal goes to credibility and is therefore material); *see also Tassin*, 517 F.3d at 777 (a deal is material even if there is no “firm promise”).

Mr. Hallmon’s testimony was the only direct evidence connecting Mr. Flowers to the Tardy Furniture murders. The State’s case otherwise depended on weak circumstantial evidence, including inconsistent eyewitness identifications of Mr. Flowers before and after the murders, junk ballistics evidence, and a contrived theory about shoeprints left at the scene. Direct evidence, such as testimony asserting that the defendant confessed, is therefore highly

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Request for 9.04 Disc. and for Suppl. of Disc. Furnished to Date, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010)); Notice of Renewal and Adoption of Mot. from the Previous Five Trials, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 2010) (renewing, *inter alia*, (a) Mot. for Order to Produce Kyles Information, *Flowers III* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2003)), (b) Mot. to Preclude Unreliable and Untrustworthy Snitch Testimony, *Flowers III* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 2, 2003)), (c) Mot. for Complete and Up to Date Criminal Histories of any Potential State’s Witness, *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2007)), (d) Mot. for Disclosure of Evidence Regarding “Snitch” [Mr. Hallmon], *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2007)). See also Report of Pretrial Disc. Conferences—Suppl. Disc. and Copies of Documentation Previously Disclosed, *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 20, 2010)) (reporting pre-trial conferences of May 10 and 14, 2010, and noting that verbal disclosures were made regarding some witnesses but not for Odell Hallmon).

persuasive to a jury. Indeed, a purported confession “is like no other evidence.” *Arizona*, 499 U.S. at 281 (“It is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted.”). That is why Doug Evans first recruited two jailhouse snitches—Maurice Hawkins and Frederick Veal—to testify falsely that Mr. Flowers had confessed. *See* Ex. 32 (Hawkins Aff.); Ex. 31 (Veal Aff.). And that is why, when those two snitches were impeached, Mr. Evans then went to such great lengths to secure Mr. Hallmon’s cooperation, calling him in every subsequent trial. *See, e.g., Flowers IV* Tr. 418; *Flowers V* Tr. 433; *Flowers VI* Tr. 2413. Mr. Hallmon was not just a “key witness” who received “potential favors in exchange for testimony” and “lie[d] about those favors.” *Tassin*, 517 F.3d at 778. He was the *only* witness to provide direct evidence that Mr. Flowers had committed the Tardy Furniture murders. And the jury bought his lies:

Janelle Johnson (*Flowers VI* Juror): I believed him. You know, I don’t think he had anything, he didn’t have anything to gain by coming in there, you know. I believed him. To me, I feel like maybe he was trying to do the right thing, actually.

Ex. 3 (Tungekar Aff.) at Ex. D (*In the Dark* Ep. 4 Tr.) [hereinafter “ITD Ep. 4 Tr.”] at 9.

The suppressed evidence would have eviscerated Mr. Hallmon’s credibility. The history of this case confirms it. When the defense raised questions about apparent benefits that the first two jailhouse snitches had received or expected to receive, *Flowers II* Tr. 288–372, the State was forced to abandon them as witnesses altogether. If defense counsel had obtained the similar information about Mr. Hallmon, the State would have been unlikely to even call him to the stand.

And if the State *did*, defense counsel would have impeached him with evidence that was at least as damning as the bias evidence against the first two snitches. Instead, the defense was left to make general insinuations that Mr. Hallmon was an untruthful person because he had changed his testimony—something that Mr. Hallmon explained away with myriad justifications. *See*,

e.g., Tr. 2417–19, 2428. The defense—lacking the key evidence showing that Mr. Hallmon had incentive to lie—could not effectively challenge those excuses. *Id.*

Had the State’s deals with Mr. Hallmon been disclosed, the State’s only witness to provide direct evidence that Mr. Flowers committed the murders would not have appeared at all or would have been irreparably impeached. That undoubtedly undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.

3. The Defense Could Not Have Obtained the Suppressed Evidence Regarding Mr. Hallmon’s Deals With Reasonable Diligence.

Defendants need not “scavenge for hints of undisclosed *Brady* material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been disclosed.” *Banks*, 540 U.S. at 695. Instead, “[T]here is an obligation on the part of the prosecution to produce certain evidence actually or constructively in its possession or accessible to it in the interests of inherent fairness.”

Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 223 (5th Cir. 1975); *see also Strickler*, 527 U.S. at 284 (noting that “it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on . . . the presumption that the prosecutor would perform his duty to disclose all exculpatory materials”).

In response to defense counsel’s repeated pre-trial requests for an assurance that the prosecution had made complete *Brady* disclosures and provided complete up-to-date criminal histories,⁴⁸ District Attorney Doug Evans insisted that “[a]nything that we have was furnished.” Tr. 436–437. Further, at trial, at the prompting of the District Attorney, Odell Hallmon insisted that he was not testifying in exchange for benefits. *See Flowers IV* Tr. 423; *Flowers V* Tr. 436–437; *Flowers VI* Tr. 2472–73. Defense counsel reasonably relied on the State’s representations that there were no deals with Mr. Hallmon to disclose, and no further criminal history to

⁴⁸ *See supra* p.100.

investigate.

And some of the payoff that Mr. Hallmon expected and received—getting off easy on *future* felonies—would not have been discoverable with *any* amount of diligence. That inchoate part of the quid pro quo existed only in the minds of State officials and Mr. Hallmon. It was only years later, with nothing left to lose and no more deals to be made, that Mr. Hallmon revealed the damning impeachment evidence suppressed by the prosecution: he had lied in exchange for a series of deals with the District Attorney.⁴⁹

C. The State’s Suppression Of Material Impeachment Evidence Relating To Patricia Sullivan-Odom’s Pending Tax Fraud Indictment Violated *Brady* And Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.

The State’s *Brady* obligations extend to all forms of exculpatory evidence, including impeachment evidence favorable to the accused. “When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility,” especially evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution, violates due process. *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154–155 (quoting *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269). And where, as here, defense counsel specifically requests certain evidence—here, the complete and up to date criminal records of all state witnesses—the prosecution is “on notice of its value” and it is reasonable for “defense to assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption.” *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–683. *See also Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 163 (“To the contrary, the State’s nondisclosure may have reasonably led the defense to conclude no additional evidence existed.”). Patricia Sullivan-Odom’s federal tax fraud indictment fits squarely within the parameters of what the

Supreme Court has defined to be *Brady* material, and the State violated Mr. Flowers's due process rights by suppressing it.

1. The State Suppressed Evidence Of Ms. Sullivan-Odom's Indictment.

On February 17, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Patricia Sullivan-Odom on sixteen counts of tax fraud for preparing "16 false tax returns for seven individuals from tax years 2004 through 2007," amounting to \$652,345.00 in falsely claimed items.⁵⁰ The sixth *Flowers* trial began soon after, on June 16, 2010. The State never disclosed the indictment, and defense counsel did not learn of it until several months after trial, sometime after October 1, 2010, when a jury found Ms. Sullivan-Odom guilty of eight counts of federal tax fraud. Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 14; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 14.

The prosecution team knew about Ms. Sullivan-Odom's indictment prior to trial. On April 15, 2010, two months before Mr. Flowers's sixth trial began, Mark K. Horan entered his appearance as Ms. Sullivan-Odom's defense counsel in connection with her federal charges. Ex. 67 (Entry of Appearance Upon Substitution, *United States v. Patricia Ann Sullivan*, Case No. 3:10-cr-00017 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2010)). Mr. Horan was no stranger to the *Flowers* case.

As a former member of District Attorney Doug Evans's office, Mr. Horan prosecuted Mr. Flowers in his first and second trials, and even examined Patricia Sullivan-Odom as a witness during *Flowers I*. Thus, he was intimately familiar both with Mr. Flowers's case and with the crucial importance of Ms. Sullivan-Odom's testimony to the State's case against Mr. Flowers. That Mr. Horan appreciated the importance of Ms. Sullivan-Odom's testimony to the prosecution

⁴⁹ If the Court finds that the material impeachment evidence relating to Mr. Hallmon could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, then trial counsel's failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ground G, *infra*.

of Mr. Flowers is evidenced by the fact that, at Ms. Sullivan-Odom's sentencing hearing in January 2011, he described himself as part of the *Flowers* prosecution team and highlighted Ms. Sullivan-Odom's testimony in Mr. Flowers's sixth trial as a reason why she should receive a reduced sentence:

Your Honor, I feel compelled to say something on behalf of Patricia. When I was in the DA's office and this Flowers murder case—the murder occurred in Winona. I was an assistant district attorney. The first person that came forward on behalf of the state or gave any information that led to the eventual conviction of Mr. Flowers was this lady right here. First time I saw her was in October of 1997 at a time when it was a very volatile situation in Montgomery county area involving this case. And she came to us when I was working in the DA's office at great peril to herself, and she did that, and she consistently testified on six separate occasions three times for me when I was an assistant district attorney. She has been ridiculed by certain members of the community up there for doing that, but she held fast, Your Honor, and she did something that I think warrants some consideration from this court in her assistance to the state of Mississippi, not only during the course of the trial but during the course of the investigation, Your Honor.

Hr'g Tr. 55–56, *United States v. Patricia Sullivan*, No. 3:10-cr-00017 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 5, 2011), ECF No. 76-1. Further, Patricia Sullivan-Odom's plea for a lesser sentence was further supported by a personal letter from the prosecutor who tried *Flowers VI*, District Attorney Doug Evans.⁵¹

District Attorney Doug Evans has stated that he had no knowledge of Ms. Sullivan-Odom's indictment at the time of Mr. Flowers's trial, and that he only learned about the indictment "sometime after the June 18, 2010 conviction of Curtis Flowers." Ex. A (Aff. of

⁵⁰ Ex. 66 (Press Release, *Jackson Woman Charged With Preparing False Federal Tax Returns*, United States Dep't of Justice (Mar. 5, 2010)).

⁵¹ District Attorney Doug Evans's letter was filed under seal with Ms. Sullivan-Odom's presentence investigation report. Mr. Flowers moved the federal court for production of the letters submitted on Sullivan-Odom's behalf in connection with her sentencing. Although the Government did not oppose the request, the district court entered an order denying it on April 11, 2012. See Ex. 68 (Op. and Order,

Doug Evans (May 17, 2012)) to Resp. to Mot. for Remand and Leave to File Suppl. Mot for New Trial, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2012). But even if that were true—an unlikely proposition in light of Mr. Evans’s close ties to Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s defense attorney—that does not shield the State from liability under *Brady*. To the contrary, Mr. Evans’s duty to disclose is not limited “by his knowledge,” *Gibbs v. Johnson*, 154 F.3d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1998), but rather includes all information “known *or available to* the prosecutor,”⁵² *United States v. Koetting*, 74 F.3d 1238 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting *United States v. Auten*, 632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir.1980)); *see also East v. Scott*, 55 F.3d 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the “prosecutor’s duty to investigate a witness’ criminal history”); *Williams v. Whitley*, 940 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he prosecution is deemed to have knowledge of information readily available to it and the failure to provide that information when requested is a violation of the *Brady* rule.”).

Here, Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s indictment was readily available to Mr. Evans through a routine update of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s criminal history. Defense counsel requested just that, though the prosecution’s obligation to provide updated criminal histories existed even

United States v. Patricia Sullivan, No. 3:10-cr-00017 (S.D. Miss. April 11, 2012)). To this day, Mr. Evans has not produced the letter to Mr. Flowers or his counsel.

⁵² Either Mr. Evans knew of the indictment or the information was readily available to him. That is all that is required to establish a *Brady* violation. But others on the prosecution team may very well have known about the indictment. Mr. Evans’s previously submitted affidavit makes a critical, glaring omission: nowhere does he attest that other members of the prosecution team, including members of the District Attorney’s Office for the Fifth District of Mississippi, the Winona County Police Department, and other members of the investigative team, were unaware of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s indictment prior to Petitioner’s trial. The Court should not give Mr. Evans the benefit of the doubt on this issue. As discussed *supra*, Mr. Horan was intimately involved in Mr. Flowers’s earlier trials as a former member of Mr. Evans’s District Attorney’s Office. And Mr. Horan began representing Ms. Sullivan-Odom under questionable circumstances. Ms. Sullivan-Odom was found to be indigent at her March 5, 2010 arraignment, and the Federal Public Defender was appointed to represent her. *See Ex. 69* (Order Appointing Counsel, *United States v. Sullivan*, No. 3:10cr17-WHB-LRA (S.D. Miss. Mar. 5, 2010)). Yet she somehow acquired the means to retain private counsel immediately thereafter. *See Ex. 67* (Entry of

independent of this request. *Smith*, 500 So. 2d at 979 (recognizing prosecutor's *Brady* obligations "regardless of the nature of [the defendant's] request"). On March 23, 2010, in preparation for Mr. Flowers's sixth trial, defense counsel filed a Request for 9.04 Discovery and for Supplementation of Discovery Furnished to Date. This motion requested that the prosecution confirm that it had provided the defense with all *Brady* materials. And this motion operated, at least in part, as a renewal of a prior motion for updated criminal histories that defense counsel originally filed on October 1, 2007, in connection with Mr. Flowers's fourth trial, and which had previously been renewed, and granted, in advance of Mr. Flowers's fifth trial. *See* Mot. for Complete and Up to Date Criminal Histories of any Potential State's Witness, *Flowers IV* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2007)). The 2007 motion for updated criminal histories specifically explained that Mr. Flowers was entitled to the updated federal criminal histories because he had no other means of obtaining them: "the defendant is legally prohibited from access to the criminal histories of government witnesses located at the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") data," *id.* at 4; a database which the Winona County Police check "daily at the station," according to testimony of Jack Matthews, Tr. 2579.

District Attorney Evans made several on-the-record representations, on April 20, May 10, May 14, and June 1, 2010, that there was no new criminal history information to provide. *See* Tr. 333–335, 436–437; Report of Pretrial Disc. Conferences, *Flowers VI*; Hr'g Tr. at s-98-99,⁵³ *Flowers VI* (June 1, 2010). The NCIC database was readily available to Mr. Evans at the time he made those representations, as it was during Mr. Flowers's previous trials. *See Williams v. Whitley*, 940 F.2d at 133 (charging the prosecution with knowledge of information readily

Appearance Upon Substitution).

⁵³ Citations to "s" page ranges refer to documents found in the Supplemental Record, *Flowers VI*.

available to it). In fact, the State provided defense counsel with an updated NCIC report for Ms. Sullivan-Odom prior to Mr. Flowers's other trials, including *Flowers V. Ex. 70* (NCIC Report at 9, *Flowers V* (Sept. 17, 2008)). Mr. Evans's failure to do the same prior to *Flowers VI* therefore amounted to an improper suppression of Ms. Sullivan-Odom's tax fraud indictment in direct contravention of *Brady*. The NCIC database would have revealed that Ms. Sullivan-Odom was indicted for federal tax fraud on February 17, 2010 and arraigned on March 5, 2010—months before Mr. Flowers's sixth trial. See Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶¶ 14–17.

Mr. Evans's failure to run this updated criminal history—one specifically requested by defense counsel, no less—"does not change 'known' information into 'unknown' information within the context of the disclosure requirements." *Auten*, 632 F.2d at 481 (reversing conviction where government witness admitted one prior conviction during trial testimony, but evidence later showed that he had two others which government failed to learn of because it did not run records check); see also *Crivens v. Roth*, 172 F.3d 991, 996–997 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding the state suppressed witness's criminal history when it "failed to respond adequately to [defendant's] request" for criminal history, including arrest records and rap sheets); *United States v. Perdomo*, 929 F.2d 967, 974 (3rd Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction on *Brady* grounds where prosecutor found no prior criminal records for witness in national database, but failed to check local records); *Martinez v. Wainwright*, 621 F.2d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecution had duty to furnish a rap sheet of decedent to the defense even where document was in possession of medical examiner, not prosecutor). To the contrary, *Brady* violations "cover a multitude of prosecutorial sins involving breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . includ[ing] both the failure to search for *Brady* material and the failure to produce it.'" *United States v. Andrews*, 532 F.3d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

Thus, “the government cannot shield itself from its *Brady* obligations by willful ignorance or failure to investigate.” *United States v. Quinn*, 537 F. Supp. 2d 99, 110 (D.D.C. 2008).

2. Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s Pending Tax Fraud Indictment Was Material.

Materiality does not require that a defendant demonstrate “that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal.” *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434. Instead, the “touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result, and the adjective is important.” *Id.* “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is . . . shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” *Id.* (quoting *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 678). Mr. Flowers need only show, therefore, that there is a reasonable probability of a different result if the State had not suppressed Sullivan-Odom’s tax fraud indictment. *Strickler*, 527 U.S. at 291. He easily clears that low bar.

The State’s case would have fallen flat without Patricia Sullivan-Odom—the only witness to link Mr. Flowers to physical evidence found at the crime scene. *See Smith v. Cain*, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012) (finding *Brady* violation when prosecution withheld evidence contradicting testimony of only eyewitness tying defendant to the crime); *Dvorin*, 817 F.3d at 451 (holding that the State violated the *Brady* doctrine by failing to disclose a plea agreement with “a key witness and the only other alleged conspirator.”); *Byrd v. Owen*, 536 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ga. 2000) (holding that suppression of impeachment evidence was material where witness’s testimony was key to establishing location and motive in murder case). Without Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s testimony, the State offered no evidence that Mr. Flowers was inside Tardy Furniture on the morning of July 16. Investigators found bloody shoeprints at the crime scene, which Mississippi State forensic scientist Joe Andrews testified matched a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill tennis shoe. Tr. 2606–11.

The State *never recovered* any Fila Grant Hill tennis shoes in Mr. Flowers's possession. Instead, the State found an empty Fila tennis shoe box in his girlfriend Connie Moore's home. Tr. 2104.

And because none of the fingerprints lifted off of that box matched Mr. Flowers's prints, and because Connie Moore testified that she purchased size 10 1/2 shoes for her son Marcus prior to the murders, Tr. 2855–56, the State lacked any credible explanation to connect Mr. Flowers, an empty shoe box, and a bloody shoeprint.⁵⁴ This is where Ms. Sullivan-Odom's testimony filled a critical gap. Six state witnesses testified that they saw Mr. Flowers on the day of the murders. Of those six, only three witnesses, including Ms. Sullivan-Odom, testified to the details of his clothing. And of those three, *only* Ms. Sullivan-Odom testified that Mr. Flowers was wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes on July 16, 1996. Tr. 2046.

Ms. Sullivan-Odom's testimony also provided the prosecution with the timeline it needed to support its claim that Mr. Flowers stole the purported murder weapon on the morning of the murders. Without this testimony, the prosecution could not have connected Mr. Flowers to the theft of Doyle Simpson's gun. Mr. Simpson's testimony suggested that his gun did not go missing until at least 10:25 a.m.—almost an hour after the murders occurred. Tr. 2333–35. The State therefore needed Ms. Sullivan-Odom's testimony to fill in this conspicuous hole in its theory of Mr. Flowers's alleged whereabouts on the day of the murders. Ms. Sullivan-Odom

⁵⁴ No other witness testified to seeing Mr. Flowers wearing Fila shoes on the day of the Tardy Furniture murders. Elaine Gholston (erroneously referred to in the transcript as Elaine Goldstein) testified that she previously saw Mr. Flowers wearing Fila shoes “[p]robably a couple of months before [the Tardy Furniture murders], something like that.” Tr. 2208. But Ms. Gholston's testimony was hardly credible. She could not remember whether she saw Mr. Flowers wearing the shoes on more than one occasion. *Id.* (“Mr. Evans: And did you see him on more than one occasion wearing those shoes? // Ms. Gholston: Not that I can remember.”). Nor could she recall Mr. Flowers ever wearing any other kind of tennis shoe during the eight years she lived near him. Tr. 2210–11. And on the one occasion she could recall seeing Mr. Flowers wearing Fila shoes, she testified to seeing Mr. Flowers from across the

testified that on July 16, 1996, she saw Mr. Flowers return home around 7:30 a.m. and then leave soon after in the same direction, toward downtown. Trial Tr. 2047. The State used this testimony—conveniently ignoring Doyle Simpson’s conflicting testimony—to suggest that Mr. Flowers returned home from Angelica around 7:30 a.m., having stolen Mr. Simpson’s gun for later use in the murders. Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s role as the lynchpin in the State’s case is exemplified by the prosecution’s repeated references to her testimony during closing arguments. Assistant District Attorney Hill pointed to Ms. Sullivan-Odom as a key witness providing details about Mr. Flowers’s movements and whereabouts on the morning of the murders, testimony which provided the logistical framework for his supposed movements to and from Angelica’s. Tr. 3189, 3191. Mr. Hill further emphasized that:

There is one other thing important about what she saw. The defendant was wearing his Fila Grant Hill II tennis shoes. She knew him to have the shoes. She had seen them before. They were, you know, a kind of a special shoe.

Id. 3190. The State’s case depended on this testimony—without it, nothing linked Mr. Flowers to the crime scene. *Id.* 3196. Accordingly, the State’s suppression of highly favorable impeachment evidence to attack her credibility “undermines confidence in the outcome of [Mr. Flowers’s] trial” in violation of *Brady*. *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 678.

A successful attack on Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s credibility would have shattered the foundational testimony propping up the State’s flimsy case, and the suppressed indictment therefore was favorable to Mr. Flowers. *See Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154–155. It is “beyond genuine debate” that Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s indictment “qualifies as evidence advantageous” to Mr. Flowers with respect to its value in indicting her character for truthfulness. *Banks*, 540 U.S.

street at an unknown time of day on an indeterminate day of the week, and could not recall *any* distinguishing characteristics about his clothing at that time. Tr. 2211–13.

at 691. The indictment also would have been admissible to show her bias and motivation to testify favorably for the prosecution in exchange for Mr. Evans’s favorable recommendation at her eventual sentencing—a favorable recommendation we now know she received.

Had defense counsel known of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s tax fraud indictment, they would have altered their pretrial and trial strategies in a number of material ways. Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 17; *cf. Wood v. Bartholomew*, 516 U.S. 1, 7 (1995) (finding withheld evidence was not material because counsel would not have changed his trial strategy with access to the suppressed evidence). First, defense counsel could and would have inquired into Sullivan-Odom’s conduct underlying the tax fraud indictment because it involved “lying, deceit or dishonesty” and was therefore “probative of [Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s] character for veracity.” *Brent v. State*, 632 So. 2d 936, 944 (Miss. 1994); *see also* Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 17; MRE 608(b); *United States v. Staples*, 410 F.3d 484, 489 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that where a potential witness was under indictment in a fraud case, that impeachment based on the conduct underlying the indictment “would have diminished greatly the value of his testimony”); *Arnold v. McNeil*, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1319–21 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (finding evidence of ongoing, pre-indictment criminal activity to be material when it impeached an important prosecution witness); *United States v. Gordon*, 246 F.Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1965) (finding that evidence putting the witness’s credibility in question may be enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt). Without knowledge of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s indictment or her underlying tax fraud offenses, defense counsel were unable to question her about her dishonest acts or to demonstrate her character for untruthfulness.

Second, Mr. Evans’s enthusiastic advocacy on Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s behalf, urging the federal court to impose a reduced sentence based on her extraordinary cooperation in the

prosecution of Curtis Mr. Flowers, suggests Ms. Sullivan-Odom was incentivized to testify favorably for the prosecution in exchange for Mr. Evans's support. Defense counsel certainly would have been on notice of this possibility if the State had complied with its obligation and disclosed Ms. Sullivan-Odom's indictment. And defense counsel could have, and would have, investigated Ms. Sullivan-Odom's motivations for testifying and thereafter cross-examined Ms. Sullivan-Odom about those motivations. MRE 616; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 17.

Instead, defense counsel were left to attempt to impeach Patricia Sullivan-Odom on cross-examination by inquiring into prior inconsistent statements regarding the frequency with which Mr. Flowers wore Fila shoes, Tr. 2066, and her knowledge of a \$30,000 reward in exchange for testimony, Tr. at 2067, 2069. But in the face of Ms. Sullivan-Odom's denial of these accusations, defense counsel was left without any effective impeachment evidence to call her credibility in to question.

3. Ms. Sullivan-Odom's Indictment Was Not Discoverable With Reasonable Diligence.

Defense counsel did not possess information regarding Ms. Sullivan-Odom's indictment, *see* Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 14; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 14, nor could they have obtained it through "reasonable diligence." *Manning*, 158 So. 3d at 305. When the State represents, as it did here, that all *Brady* material was disclosed, defense counsel is not obligated to "scavenge for hints of undisclosed *Brady* material." *Banks*, 540 U.S. at 695–696; *see also Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 163 (recognizing that "the State's nondisclosure may . . . reasonably le[a]d the defense to conclude no additional evidence existed."). Defense counsel instead reasonably relied on District Attorney Evans's representations during the sixth trial that there were no updates to the State witnesses' criminal histories. Although the State's *Brady* obligations apply regardless of any request for

exculpatory information, “the more specifically the defense requests certain evidence, thus putting the prosecutor on notice of its value, the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption.” *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682–683. Mr. Flowers’s rights under *Brady* would be “thwarted if a prosecutor were free to ignore specific requests for material information obtainable by the prosecutor from a related governmental entity, though unobtainable by the defense.” *Martinez*, 621 F.2d at 187. Defense counsel here did not have “any responsibility to be aware of the witness’ criminal record,” particularly because “the prosecution, not the defense, is equipped with the resources to accurately and comprehensively verify a witness’ criminal background.” *Perdomo*, 929 F.2d at 973.⁵⁵

4. This Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred.

This claim is properly raised on post-conviction review because an undeveloped record precluded defense counsel from raising it at trial or on direct appeal. M.R.A.P. 22(b); *see also* Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-39-3(2). Trial counsel did not even learn of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s federal tax fraud indictment until several months after Mr. Flowers’s sixth trial concluded. *See* Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Leave to Seek Disc., *Flowers v. State*, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015) [hereinafter “Resp. Opp’n”] at Ex. A, App’x 4 (Aff. of Ray Charles Carter (July 11, 2015)). Mr. Flowers’s *Brady* claim related to that indictment was therefore not raised, or capable of being raised, at trial. *See Simon v. State*, 857 So. 2d 668, 679 (Miss. 2003) (rejecting State’s argument that Mr. Flowers’s *Brady* claim was procedurally barred where Mr. Flowers alleged he did not have knowledge of any suppressed evidence at the time of trial); *see*

⁵⁵ If the Court finds that the material impeachment evidence relating to Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s testimony could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, then trial counsel’s failure to do so

also Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). There is no dispute on this issue—the State agrees that this *Brady* claim “[was] not presented to the trial court for review.” See Resp. Opp’n at Ex. B (Resp. to Mot. for Remand and Leave to File Suppl. Mot. for New Trial at 2, *Flowers v. State*, No. 2010-DP-01348-SCT (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2012)).

And although Mr. Flowers filed a Motion for Remand and Leave to File Supplemental Motion for New Trial to “assert[] a violation of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)” related to Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s indictment, Mr. Flowers did not seek an adjudication of that claim on the merits, nor did the court address them. Resp. Opp’n at Ex. A (Mot. for Remand and Leave to File Suppl. Mot. for New Trial, *Flowers v. State* at 1, No. 2010-DP-01348-SCT (Miss. Cir. Ct. May 1, 2012)). In fact, Mr. Flowers’s motion stated explicitly: “[Mr.] Flowers is not seeking—and does not intend to seek—an adjudication of his *Brady v. Maryland* claim until he has been afforded an opportunity to complete development of the necessary facts.” *Id.* at 13, n.21. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied the motion without addressing the merits of this prospective, undeveloped *Brady* claim. See Resp. Opp’n at Ex. C (Order, *Flowers v. State* at 1, No. 2010-DP-01348-SCT (Miss. Cir. Ct. June 20, 2012))).

Nor were the merits of this *Brady* claim considered on direct appeal. To the contrary, the Supreme Court of Mississippi denied Mr. Flowers’s request to set aside its prior order in response to his Motion for Remand “[b]ecause the issue was not presented to the trial court” and it was “not proper on appeal.” *Flowers VI*, 158 So. 3d at 1075. No court, therefore, has yet reached the merits of Mr. Flowers’s *Brady* claim and he is entitled to raise it on post-conviction review. See *Bennett v. State*, 990 So. 2d 155, 160 (Miss. 2008).

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ground G, *infra*.

D. The State's Suppression Of A Possible Murder Weapon Violated *Brady* And Mr. Flowers's Due Process Rights.

New evidence also shows that the State suppressed evidence of a .380 handgun—the same caliber pistol used to commit the Tardy Furniture murders—which the State recovered from a home near Tardy furniture in 2001. Members of the Winona Police Department itself have acknowledged that the gun was recovered, yet the State never disclosed it, or investigated its potential connections to the Tardy Furniture murders. It should have. Had evidence regarding the .380 handgun been introduced at trial, Mr. Flowers could have totally discredited the State's theory of the case: The location of the .380 handgun was inconsistent with the route that the State alleged Mr. Flowers took the day of the murders. He also could have used the gun to rebut the State's purported ballistics evidence; and used the State's failure to test the gun to attack the integrity of the State's investigation. There is thus at least a reasonable probability that evidence of the .380 would have caused the jury to have reasonable doubts about the State's case. This evidence is material, and the State should have disclosed it. *See Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 433.

1. The State Suppressed Evidence Of A Possible Murder Weapon That It Possessed In 2001.

In October of 2001, Jeffrey Armstrong was living with his mother in a house across the train tracks from Tardy Furniture. Ex. 71 (Jeffrey Armstrong Aff. ¶¶ 2–4 (Feb. 9, 2019) [hereinafter “J. Armstrong Aff.”]; Ex. 72 (Annie Armstrong Aff. ¶ 2 (Mar. 9, 2016)) [hereinafter “A. Armstrong Aff.”]. After their dog discovered a .380 handgun underneath the house—the same caliber pistol used in the Tardy Furniture murders—Mr. Armstrong remembered the murders and placed the gun in shed behind the house. *See* Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 3–4; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 5–8; Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 1. He then told Winona

Police officers that they should come get the gun because it fit the description of the Tardy Furniture murder weapon. *See* Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 1; Ex. 71 (J.Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 8–9. Moreover, the gun was rusty, suggesting it had been left under the house for some time. Ex. 71 (J.Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 7; Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 3. Winona police officers ultimately came to his mother’s home and retrieved the gun, but Mr. Armstrong never heard from them again. Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 1–2; Ex. 71 (J.Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 10–12; Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 5. Later in 2006, when Mr. Armstrong ran into Winona Police Chief Jonny Hargrove at Wal-Mart, he asked whether they had gotten a result from the crime lab. Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 2. Chief Hargrove responded that the investigators did not need the gun because they already “had the right person.” *Id.*⁵⁶

New evidence confirms that the State took possession of the .380 handgun from Mr. Armstrong. In 2018, investigative reporters from American Public Media interviewed Winona Police Officer Dan Herod, who remembered pulling over Mr. Armstrong in 2001. Ex. 3-K (ITD Ep. 11 Tr.) at 4. Captain Herod confirmed that Mr. Armstrong had notified him that “his dog dug a gun up over at his mama’s house.” *Id.* He also confirmed that “one of the guys” from the police department “went over there and got it and they gave it to the D.A.’s office.” *Id.* Specifically, Captain Herod believed that the gun was given to the District Attorney’s investigator, John Johnson, so that it could be sent to the crime lab for testing in connection with the Tardy Furniture murders. *Id.*

In light of this new evidence, there can be no doubt that the .380 handgun found by Mr.

⁵⁶ Mr. Armstrong recently recounted this series of events to investigative reporters from American Public Media and the Clarion Ledger. *See* Ex. 3-K (ITD Ep. 11 Tr.) at 1–2, 5–9; Dave Mann, *What Happened to the Gun? Lots of Questions, Little Evidence in Curtis Flowers*, Clarion Ledger (July 7,

Armstrong was “readily available to” the State, and therefore should have been disclosed to Mr. Flowers. *See Williams v. Whitley*, 940 F.2d at 133; *see also Calley*, 519 F.2d at 223 (“[T]here is an obligation on the part of the prosecution to produce certain evidence actually or constructively in its possession or accessible to it in the interests of inherent fairness.”). Moreover, even if the District Attorney’s office never received the gun, it had an obligation to learn that the police had taken possession and to disclose that to the defense. *See Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 437 (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”); *Manning*, 158 So. 3d at 306–307 (granting post-conviction relief based on failure to disclose materials in possession of police).

The State, however, never disclosed the .380 handgun, despite defense counsel’s unambiguous requests for all potentially favorable evidence. *See Notice of Renewal and Adoption of Mot. from the Previous Five Trials, Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 2010)) (renewing, *inter alia*, Mot. for Order to Produce Kyles Information at 1, *Flowers III* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Sep. 30, 2003)) (noting the mandatory disclosure of “any information which bears favorably for the defendant as to the defendant’s guilt”) (emphasis in original). Instead, the State has repeatedly claimed that there was no investigation of a .380 handgun recovered by Mr. Armstrong at all. Doug Evans was emphatic before trial that the State had disclosed everything: “We have told every defense attorney that has been involved There is no more discovery.” Tr. 359 (Mot. Hr’g on April 20, 2010). More recently, the State has stated in court that “there is no gun,” and that Mr. Armstrong’s account was the product of “mental problems.” Jan. 2016 Hr’g Tr. at 55. Further, the State has explained that it would have sent anything like the .380

2018), <https://tinyurl.com/yyhno5rw>; Jerry Mitchell, *Is Curtis Flowers Innocent? Pathologist thinks multiple killers behind quadruple murder*, Clarion Ledger (Aug. 2, 2018), <http://tinyurl.com/y6xenlq7>.

handgun “to the crime lab to be compared.” *Id.* at 53. No records of such testing have ever been produced.

The State’s suppression of the .380, and failure to investigate whether it was the gun used in the Tardy Furniture murders further, violated *Brady* and Mr. Flowers’s due process rights.

2. The State’s Suppression Of The Possible Murder Weapon Undermines Confidence In The Outcome Of The Trial.

Suppressed evidence is material under *Brady* when there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434–435 (internal quotations omitted). The defendant need only show that the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the verdict, not that the evidence was “more likely than not” to result in acquittal or hung jury. *Id.* at 434. And whether the suppressed evidence is material must not be considered on an item-by-item basis, but collectively. *Id.* at 436–437.

The now-confirmed fact that the State recovered a .380 handgun possibly used in the Tardy Furniture murders was material to Mr. Flowers’s defense in several respects.

First, had the State disclosed the gun and where it was found, Mr. Flowers could have debunked the State’s theory of his whereabouts before allegedly committing the Tardy Furniture murders. In his closing arguments, and throughout the trial, District Attorney Doug Evans emphasized that the jury should focus on the detailed route map based on his dubious witness testimony:

Y’all will have this map to go back there. To me this is one of the best things in this case. Because it shows the exact path. You can pinpoint where he went, what time he left his house, how he got to Angelica, how he got back to his house, how he went to store, how he went back to the his [sic.] house.

Tr. at 3241. The location of the .380 found at Mr. Armstrong’s house, however, is completely

incompatible with this theory of the case. The Armstrong house, at 106 Knox Street, is in the opposite direction—and on the other side of the train tracks—from the route that the State described. See Ex. 3-K (ITD Ep. 11 Tr.) at 5, 7–8; see also *In the Dark S2 E. 11: The End*, APM Reports (July 3, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y5a5rf3x> (showing map in section “*The killer might have headed the other direction*”). The State claimed that Mr. Flowers headed west from downtown after committing the murders; the .380 shows that the real killer headed east. This bare inconsistency would have been more than enough to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury about whether the State had proved its case. See, e.g., *Guerra v. Johnson*, 90 F.3d 1075, 1076–80 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing conviction where murder weapon’s location could not be reconciled with the State’s theory in light of suppressed evidence).

Second, and equally as compelling, disclosure of the .380 could have allowed Mr. Flowers to dispel the State’s claim that he used Doyle Simpson’s gun to commit the Tardy Furniture murders. Although the District Attorney boasted that he had “never seen a case that had so much evidence,” the State never produced an alleged murder weapon. Tr. 3241. Instead, the State asserted that Mr. Simpson’s gun was used based on a flimsy—and now discredited—comparison of bullets found at the crime scene and bullets pried out of a fence post at Simpson’s mother’s house. See Ground A, Section B, *supra*. Had the State disclosed the .380 recovered by Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Flowers could have put this theory to rest. For example, Mr. Flowers could have hired an expert to perform the same bunk ballistics analysis that the State relied on. Given the purely subjective nature of that analysis, an expert likely could have matched the .380 found by Mr. Armstrong to the bullets used in the murders. Or the expert could have determined whether this .380 handgun somehow differed from the gun reported stolen by Mr. Simpson. Either way, the physical characteristics of the .380 recovered

by Mr. Armstrong could have dealt a fatal blow to one of the State's most important pieces of evidence. *See, e.g., Guerra*, 90 F.3d at 1080 (scratch on exterior of gun was material, exculpatory evidence because it indicated how it had been used at the crime scene and who had used it). The State's suppression of that evidence, however, deprived Mr. Flowers and the jury of that side of the story.

Third, the jurors' confidence in the State's case would have been shaken if they had learned that a potential murder weapon had been found, but not investigated. It would be hard for jurors to accept that investigators "never had any evidence that showed anything other than [Mr. Flowers's] guilt," and "had the right person" Tr. 442; Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 2, if law enforcement had ignored evidence inconsistent with Mr. Flowers's guilt. As courts have repeatedly found, evidence that so undermines the integrity of the State's investigation is *Brady* material. *See, e.g., Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 445 (explaining that suppressed evidence can be material when it "would have raised opportunities to attack . . . the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation").

Fourth, the withheld .380 evidence bolsters other exculpatory and impeachment evidence described herein. *See Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 421, 424 (instructing courts to consider "the cumulative effect of all such evidence suppressed by the government," when determining whether this was "a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence"). For example, physical evidence collected from the .380 could show that the Alabama suspects committed the crime by matching fingerprints, DNA, or other features of the .380 with the .380 used in their other crimes. *See* Ground B, Section A, *supra*. Or it could confirm that Willie Hemphill was responsible. *Id.* The State's failure to test the gun would also reinforce the now-abundant evidence that its investigation and prosecution was conducted in bad faith, seeking to convict Mr. Flowers at all

costs rather than uncover who actually committed the Tardy Furniture murders. *See* Ground B, Sections A, B, & D.

Whether considered separately, or in combination with other powerful evidence suppressed by the State, there is at least a reasonable probability that a jury hearing of the .380 found by Mr. Armstrong would have harbored reasonable doubts about whether Mr. Flowers committed the Tardy Furniture murders.

3. Details About The Recovered Weapon Were Not Discoverable By The Defense With Reasonable Due Diligence.

Where the State represents that there is nothing to disclose, the defendant is apt to “abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that [he] otherwise would have pursued.” *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 682. Accordingly, if the defense is reasonably misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete disclosures, *Brady* requires reversal. *Id.* at 682–683. That is exactly what happened here.

Defense counsel unambiguously requested all potentially favorable evidence from the State. *See e.g.*, Notice of Renewal and Adoption of Mot. from the Previous Five Trials, *Flowers VI* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 2010) (renewing, *inter alia*, Mot. for Order to Produce Kyles Information at 1, *Flowers III* (Miss. Cir. Ct. Sep. 30, 2003)) (noting the mandatory disclosure of “any information which bears favorably for the defendant as to the defendant’s guilt”) (emphasis in original). Yet Doug Evans was emphatic before trial that the State had disclosed everything: “We have told every defense attorney that has been involved There is no more discovery.” Tr. 359 (Mot. Hr’g on April 20, 2010). And in post-conviction he attested again that this was true: “[T]here was nothing that went on in that case that I was not aware of.” Jan. 2016 Hr’g Tr. at 33. “Everything that was involved with any agency, police department, sheriff’s department,

MDI, crime lab, all of it was in our file. So everything that they have would be in our file that the defense already has.” *Id.* at 59. In light of the State’s protestations that it had disclosed all material evidence, defense counsel was under no burden to “scavenge for hints of undisclosed *Brady* material,” *Banks*, 540 U.S. at 695, including evidence of the .380 found by Mr. Armstrong.⁵⁷

The State’s suppression of the .380 found by Mr. Armstrong violated Mr. Flowers’s due process rights and requires the courts to vacate his conviction and grant him a new trial.

E. The State’s Production Of Falsified Investigation Notes Violated *Brady* and Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.

Newly discovered evidence has made clear that the State failed to disclose that John Johnson, its lead investigator, fabricated evidence to support the State’s theory of the case. More than a dozen witnesses have recently revealed that the statements attributed to them in Mr. Johnson’s investigative notes are false. The State produced these notes and relied on them at trial, but failed to disclose that many of them were the product of Mr. Johnson’s imagination. It should have. *Brady*’s requirement that the State disclose all exculpatory evidence is perhaps most important where, as here, the non-disclosed evidence calls into question the integrity and truthfulness of the State’s entire investigation. *See, e.g., Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 445 (explaining that express evidence is material when it “would have raised opportunities to attack . . . the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation”). Had Mr. Flowers been afforded the opportunity to attack the integrity of the State’s investigation using Mr. Johnson’s false notes, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. *See id.*

⁵⁷ If the Court finds that evidence relating to the .380 could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, then trial counsel’s failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. *See* Ground G, *infra*.

at 433.

1. The State Withheld Exculpatory And Impeachment Evidence When It Produced Falsified Evidence To Mr. Flowers.

To date, four of Mr. Johnson's interview subjects have sworn in affidavits that they never made the statements that Mr. Johnson's notes attribute to them. In direct contradiction to Mr. Johnson's notes, Tanya Sanders states "I have never told anyone, including John Johnson, that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes. I do not know what Fila shoes look like." Ex. 36 (Sanders Aff.) ¶¶ 4–5; *contra* Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_1 (listing "Tonia Sanders" [sic]). Similarly, Jacquelyn Garron swears "I have never told law enforcement, including John Johnson, that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes. As far as I can remember, Curtis Flowers always wore dress shoes, not Fila shoes, because he was in a singing group." Ex. 37 (Garron Aff.) ¶¶ 4–5; *contra* Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_1 (listing "Jacqaline Garron" [sic]). LaWanda Glover swears "I never told [John Johnson] that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes. Ex. 38 (Glover Aff.) ¶ 5; *contra* Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_2 (notes from Aug. 21, 1996 interview titled "Glover, LaWanda" noting "Worn Fila T-Shoes—mostly white—high Top."); *id.* at J.J. Notes_1 (listing "LaWanda Glover"). Likewise, Mary Frances Moore swears, "I have never told anyone, including John Johnson, that Curtis [F]lowers wore Fila shoes." Ex. 39 (Moore Aff.) ¶ 5; *contra* Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_1 (listing "Mary Sue Moore" [sic]).

Many more of Mr. Johnson's interview subjects have been similarly surprised by the statements falsely attributed to them. Jerry Ghoston, after being shown that Mr. Johnson's notes attribute to him a statement that Mr. Flowers told Mr. Ghoston he had a pistol, stated: "A pistol? What, what is this? I did not. I did not say that. I did not tell him that." Ex. 3-I

(ITD Ep. 9 Tr.) at 15; *contra* Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_3 (notes from Interview of Jerry Gholston [sic], Aug. 11, 1996, stating “4–5 months before 7-16-96 Curtis Flowers told Jerry he had a pistol[,] did not say what kind”). He continued, “There is no way I told this man that this man had a gun. There’s no way. That’s, that’s a false statement right there.” Ex. 3-I (ITD Ep. 9 Tr.) at 15.⁵⁸

In fact, *at least seventeen* of Mr. Johnson’s witnesses have said that what Johnson wrote in his notes and attributed to them is wrong. See Ex. 3-I (ITD Ep. 9 Tr.) at 19. Yet the State knowingly produced these falsified notes as legitimate and truthful evidence. In doing so, it violated *Brady* and Mr. Flowers’s due process rights.

As an initial matter, although the District Attorney likely knew that his lead investigator had falsified the notes, his knowledge is not determinative as to whether a *Brady* violation occurred.⁵⁹ See *Manning v. State*, 158 So. 3d at 306 (granting post-conviction relief based on failure to disclose materials in possession of police); *see also* Ex. 73 (Op. and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Mot. To Dismiss at 8, *Shepherd v. Metz*, No. 17-CV-11063 (E.D. Mich. August 2, 2017), ECF No. 14) (finding that a *Brady* claim was properly pleaded where a Defendant alleged that a lead-investigator hid from the prosecutor evidence which would call into doubt the state’s theory of the case). Rather, the test is simply whether the State withheld exculpatory or impeachment evidence that was material to Mr. Flowers’s guilt. By representing that the evidence it falsified was truthful, the State’s actions easily meet this

⁵⁸ Compare Ex. 3-I (ITD Ep. 9 Tr.) at 17 (Carol Lanney Moore stating that she did not tell law enforcement that Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes and Mary Sue More stating that she did not know if Curtis Flowers wore Fila shoes), *with* Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_4 (interview notes of Carol Lanney Moore, dated Sept. 5, 1996, noting “[w]ore Fila & Nike shoes”); and *id.* at J.J. Notes_1 (listing “Carol Lanney Moore” and “Mary Sue Moore”).

threshold.

Where a State knowingly creates false evidence, it has, in the same stroke, also created exculpatory evidence: the fact that the evidence is false.⁶⁰ Here, the falsity of Mr. Johnson's notes is crucial to Mr. Flowers's due process rights as he would have used their falsity to both impeach Mr. Johnson and call the State's entire investigation into question. *Brady* requires nothing less than full disclosure of the fictitious nature of these notes, and the State failed to comply.

2. Mr. Johnson's Fabricated Notes Were Material to Mr. Flowers's Defense.

As explained *supra*, evidence is material "when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 678). Had Mr. Flowers been able to present to a jury that the State's lead investigator falsified multiple witness statements—for at least *seventeen* different witnesses—the revelation would have struck at the heart of the investigation's motives, honesty, and competence.

This shocking discovery would have undeniably undermined the jury's confidence in the investigation, the State's theory of the case, and a possible conviction.

The importance of Mr. Johnson's notes to the trial proceedings is evident from the transcripts. By way of example, both sides repeatedly referenced the notes in *Flowers VI* during arguments regarding Mr. Flowers's Motion to Suppress Eye Witness Identification. *See, e.g.*, Tr. at 83, 107, 111, 117–118, 140. They were at the center of a debate about whether Porky Collins's purported eye-witness identification of Mr. Flowers on the day of the Tardy Furniture

⁵⁹ See Jan. 2016 Hr'g Tr. at 33 (noting Doug Evans claimed that "there was nothing that went on [in the *Flowers* case] that I didn't personally handle").

murders was sufficiently credible to be introduced at trial. *See id.* at 93–94 (Mr. Johnson admitting on cross-examination that his notes do not “indicate whether or not [he] showed [Porky Collins] a photograph display on [the day of the murders]”); 107 (Mr. Johnson stating “in my notes I should have the time” that elapsed between the report of the murders and his conversation with Mr. Collins); 112 (Mr. Johnson answering in the affirmative when asked: (1) if he is “a trained police officer, trained in the art of taking notes of what witnesses tell you;” and (2) “you know that it’s important when you are a police officer to take down as closely as possible precisely what they tell you when they tell it to you; right?”); 140 (Lieutenant Wayne Miller testifying that “I did not [take any notes]” and “I did not tape record [the interview with Mr. Collins]” because “Mr. Johnson was taking notes”). When the Court denied the Motion to Suppress, it clearly stated that “[t]he Court finds that there has nothing been done by the officers involved, Mr. Johnson or Mr. Miller.” *Id.* at 167. Had Mr. Flowers been able to present the Court with evidence of Mr. Johnson’s systematic falsification of notes, the Court reasonably could have found that *something* had been done, and in finding Mr. Johnson’s testimony regarding the eyewitness identification not credible, ruled to suppress the evidence from trial.

The State also relied on Mr. Johnson’s notes to bolster the credibility of the State’s investigation during the guilt phase of trial. *See generally id.* at 2899–90, 2903–04, 2910 (Mr. Johnson’s testimony). By Mr. Johnson’s own testimony, he took notes “[t]o be used if we needed [them], yes.” *Id.* at 2903–04. And these notes were certainly needed. Mr. Johnson referenced his notes numerous times to lend credence to his testimony regarding witness statements where no formal report, signed statement, or recording existed. *See e.g., id.* at 2899–

⁶⁰ Any argument that Mr. Johnson did not know his notes were false should be roundly rejected. It cannot be mere coincidence that his near-contemporaneous accounts of seventeen witness statements all

90 (no written statement from Jack Williams but Mr. Johnson affirmed “I made—in my notes, I wrote down that he had seen two men in front of Tardy’s”); 2919–21 (no recorded or written statement from Doyle Simpson where he noted that his gun had been taken, but Johnson had taken notes); 2922 (when asked for written support that the Tardy family considered Mr. Flowers a threat, Mr. Johnson first attests that this fact was “set forth in [a] written report” then follows by stating that this “report” was in fact his “notes”); 2924–25 (Mr. Johnson’s conversation with Dorothy Striker recorded “just [in] notes”); 2925 (not recording the names of people he interviewed at the factory where Doyle Simpson was employed, the questions he asked, or their answers in any permanent report, but instead noting “I made notes of the people that I did talk to”); 2936–37 (not memorializing testimony from Mr. Collins regarding the crime scene timeline in “any standard or common report” but instead “[i]n notes”); 2940 (Mr. Johnson stating, “It’s in my notes that [Katherine Snow] identified Curtis Flowers”); 2965–66 (no formal report after Porky Collins reviewed the photo lineup but Mr. Johnson wrote “a note” and did not “[p]ut it in a formal report”); 2992 (Mr. Johnson bolstering his testimony by referencing his notes).

In fact, Mr. Johnson even used his notes during trial to support his assertion that witnesses saw Mr. Flowers wearing Grant Hill Filas. This is the *exact same subject matter* that three interviewees now swear was falsified:

[N]ot a report like you’re saying, no. But I did make notes when I spoke to Kittery Jones and Cordell Jones. . . . And I think one—I know at least one of them or both of them may have said that they knew he wore Fila tennis shoes.

Id. at 2994. Notably, Mr. Johnson confirmed that he did not have a formal statement signed by either witness stating that they saw Mr. Flowers wear Fila shoes. In other words, he asked the

turned out to be false—and false in a way that favors the State’s theory of the case.

jury to trust him. And his notes.

Those false notes were just the tip of the iceberg. Had the State disclosed that the notes were false, trial counsel would have discovered many other false claims made by the State at trial.

Defense teams have limited resources and must make strategic decisions, in part, based on presumably truthful disclosures from the State. That is why when the State lies, the defendant is prejudiced not only by the jury's consideration of the false information itself, but also by the absence of other exculpatory evidence that the defense would have uncovered had the State disclosed the truth. *See Floyd*, 894 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he State’s nondisclosure may have reasonably led the defense to conclude no additional evidence existed.”).

Here, for example, the false information in Mr. Johnson’s notes likely precluded Mr. Flowers from developing powerful evidence that he did not wear Fila shoes, as the State claimed.

In Mr. Flowers’s first trial, Earl Campbell testified that he saw Mr. Flowers two or three times per week and had not seen Mr. Flowers wearing any kind of Filas in about seven years. *Flowers I* Tr. 832–33, 835. He told Mr. Johnson something similar, that he had not seen Mr. Flowers wearing Grant Hill Filas at any point. *Id.* at 833–834 (emphasis added). On cross-examination, however, District Attorney Evans relied on John Johnson’s testimony, supported by his notes, to insist that Mr. Campbell told Mr. Johnson he saw Mr. Flowers wearing Grant Hill Filas at least twelve times before the murders and not since. *Id.* at 835. Mr. Evans pitted Mr. Campbell’s word against that of presumably trustworthy law enforcement officials: “You are saying that these two trained investigators that between them probably have a total of 50 years in law enforcement would come up here and lie under oath about something you said?” *Id.* at 836. The jury apparently agreed with Mr. Evans, finding Mr. Flowers guilty after the first trial. Defense counsel did not call Mr. Campbell to testify again.

Had defense counsel known that Mr. Johnson had falsified his notes, however, the calculus would have been much different. Defense counsel likely would have called Mr. Campbell and presented the jury with an entirely different choice: whether to trust Mr. Campbell's statement that Mr. Flowers did not wear Filas, or the claims of a law enforcement official who had falsified similar statements for *seventeen different witnesses* in the process of his investigation, including many on the same topic of Mr. Flowers's shoes. Rather than brushing Mr. Campbell off as a rogue witness, a jury hearing this information could have reasonably found systematic corruption and dishonesty underlying the investigation and credited Mr. Campbell's observation that Mr. Flowers never wore Fila shoes.

Disclosure of the falsity of Mr. Johnson's notes would have led defense counsel to uncover other fabricated testimony as well. In *Flowers VI*, for example, Edward McChristian testified that he saw Mr. Flowers in front of his house between 7:30 and 8:00 on the morning of the murders. Tr. 2302. But Mr. McChristian has recently offered that he did not actually remember what day he saw Mr. Flowers; rather, John Johnson *suggested* the day to him. Ex. 3-B (ITD Ep. 2 Tr.) at 13–14 (“They had it down pat for me. So all I had to do was go there, and they asked me a question and I answered it.”). Mr. McChristian was asked directly “if you hadn’t been called in there, and they hadn’t said like, ‘July 16th, 1996,’ would you have even remembered the day?” *Id.* at 14. He answered, “No.” *Id.* Mr. McChristian explained, “[s]omebody had told [the investigators] I seen him, so I couldn’t say I didn’t see him.” *Id.* Though this statement is not a falsified note, *per se*, it similarly strikes at the heart of the investigation's integrity. And the State's illegal gambit would have been revealed had the defense team known to focus its investigation on the integrity of the State's investigation methods. As these examples show, Mr. Flowers would have been able to impeach additional

witnesses and call into question the methods and motivations behind the entire investigation, even in areas not directly reliant on Mr. Johnson’s notes.

The State’s knowing production of false information violated Mr. Flowers’s right to a fair trial, precluding him from attacking the integrity of the State’s investigation and the credibility of its witnesses. Because Mr. Flowers’s verdict cannot be viewed with confidence, the Constitution demands that this Court reverse his conviction.⁶¹ *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434.

3. Mr. Flowers Could Not Have Discovered the Falsified Nature of Mr. Johnson’s Notes with Reasonable Diligence.

Where the State allows the disclosure of false evidence, and represents that it fully disclosed all exculpatory materials, a defendant has no obligation to discover the State’s improper conduct.⁶² *Banks*, 540 U.S. at 698 (“It was not incumbent on [the defendant] to prove these representations false; rather, [the defendant] was entitled to treat the prosecutor’s submissions as truthful.”). The Supreme Court has directly rejected the argument that “the prosecution can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to . . . discover the evidence.” *Id.* at 696 (internal quotations omitted). Any rule “declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.” *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).

⁶¹ The State’s deliberate disclosure of falsified evidence also reinforces Mr. Flowers’s other *Brady* claims. Because the State has knowingly disclosed false evidence, the investigation’s other representations must also be viewed skeptically.

⁶² Though the Supreme Court is clear that Mr. Flowers had no obligation to discover the exculpatory evidence, it is still worth noting that Mr. Flowers could not have discovered the evidence with reasonable diligence. Nothing on the face of the notes suggested that this would be a fruitful line of investigation on which trial counsel should spend scarce resources. For example, Mr. Johnson’s notes regarding Jerry Ghoston consisted of just two sentences and lacked sufficient detail to make him a priority interview for the defense team. The false note simply said “4–5 months before 7-16-96 Curtis Flowers told Jerry he had a pistol[,] did not say what kind.” Ex. 40 (J. Johnson Notes) at J.J. Notes_3; *see also id.* at J.J. Notes_2 (notes from Interview of LaWanda Glover, Aug. 21, 1996 (“Worn Fila T-Shoes—mostly white—high Top”)); *id.* at J.J. Notes_1 (listing seventeen names with no supporting details).

Additionally, Mr. Flowers did not become aware of his *Brady* claims premised on the State's failure to disclose the falsity of its investigation notes until after his prior-decided hearings had been completed, when investigative reporters exposed the falsity of those notes. *See generally* Ex. 3-I (ITD Ep. 9 Tr.). The instant motion is the first opportunity for Flowers to raise the issue to this Court, so his claim cannot be procedurally barred. M.R.A.P. 22(b); see also Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-39-3(2).⁶³

GROUND C: PRESENTATION OF FALSE TESTIMONY

THE STATE KNOWINGLY PRESENTED FALSE AND PERJURED TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND MISSISSIPPI LAW.

The State may not knowingly advance or fail to correct false testimony in its pursuit of a conviction. *See e.g., Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269–271; *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 153–154. The United States Supreme Court first recognized this strict obligation in *Mooney v. Holohan*, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), where it admonished the State for its “deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.” Subsequent Supreme Court decisions sharpened *Mooney*'s holding, making clear that the State's presentation of or failure to correct false or misleading evidence violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See e.g., Alcorn v. Texas*, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957); *Pyle v. Kansas*, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942). To establish a due process violation based on the State's use of false or misleading evidence, a Mr. Flowers must show that: (1) the evidence was false, (2) the State knew that the evidence was false, and (3) the evidence was material. *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 153–154.

⁶³ If the Court finds that the falsity of John Johnson's notes could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, then the failure to do so and introduce such evidence at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. *See* Ground G., *infra*.

In *Napue v. Illinois*, the Supreme Court clarified two critical principles relating to the State's use of false testimony. First, the false testimony need not reach guilt or innocence to be material. 360 U.S. at 269. Instead, "a lie is a lie" and false testimony relating to a witness's credibility is equally damaging. *Id.* ("The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors . . . that a defendant's life or liberty may depend."). Second, the State violates due process whether it solicits the false testimony or allows the false testimony to go uncorrected when it occurs. *Id.*

"[W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor." *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154; *see also Martinez*, 621 F.2d at 186–188; *Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 97, 103 (false testimony violates due process where "the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury"). It is not enough for the State to claim that it was a good faith mistake or oversight. *See Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154; *Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 109 n.17. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney need not have actual knowledge of the falsity; information available to any member of the prosecution team, including investigators, is imputedly known by the prosecutor. *See Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154; *see also Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 267 ("The fact that the prosecuting attorney who asked the question may not have actually known [that a witness's testimony was false] is immaterial since knowledge of the information in the police file is imputed to him."); *Box v. State*, 437 So. 2d 19, 25 n.4 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring) (what information is known or available to police officers is "deemed known by or available to the State").

With respect to materiality, the *Napue/Giglio* standard is lenient—the relevant question is whether "the false testimony could . . . in *any* reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment

of the jury.’” *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added) (quoting *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 271). This is an even lower standard than *Brady* materiality. See *Kirkpatrick v. Whitley*, 992 F.2d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 1993); see also *Dahl v. King*, No. 1:09CV298-HSO-JMR, 2011 WL 7637258, at *24 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 9, 2011) *R. & R. adopted*, No. 1:09-CV-298HSO-JMR, 2012 WL 1072201 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Under *Giglio*, perjured evidence is material if ‘in any reasonable likelihood [it could] have affected the judgment of the jury,’ a lower threshold than in a *Brady* analysis.”) (quoting *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 766) (alterations in original).

Here, Mr. Flowers’s trial was infected by the State’s knowing presentation of false testimony from three law enforcement officers—Lieutenant Wayne Miller, Investigator Jack Matthews, and Investigator John Johnson—and from the State’s star witness, Odell Hallmon. These claims are properly raised on post-conviction review because Mr. Flowers was precluded from raising them at trial or on direct appeal; the critical evidence underlying these claims was previously withheld by the State, and was discovered only after Mr. Flowers’s appeal was decided. M.R.A.P. 22(b); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(2). Trial counsel had no knowledge of these issues, and could not possibly have raised these issues at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, Mr. Flowers’s *Napue/Giglio* claims are not procedurally barred and this Court must consider them.

A. The State’s Knowing Presentation Of False Testimony From Lieutenant Wayne Miller, Investigator Jack Matthews, and Investigator John Johnson About Alternative Suspects Violated Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.

Throughout the six prosecutions of Mr. Flowers, the State was adamant and unwavering in its position that Curtis Flowers was the only suspect they ever investigated. We now know that this was untrue; the State pursued at least two sets of alternative suspects—the Alabama suspects and Willie James Hemphill. See Ground A., Section A, Ground B., Section A, *supra*.

Not only did the State fail to disclose these investigations to the defense in violation of *Brady*, but three State witnesses testified falsely to ensure that these investigations would remain hidden. New evidence makes clear that Mr. Flowers was convicted on the basis of untruthful testimony. He is entitled to a new trial.

1. Lieutenant Wayne Miller’s Testimony Regarding His Photo Array Was False.

Lieutenant Wayne Miller of the Mississippi Highway Patrol assembled both of the photo arrays presented to Porky Collins on August 24, 1996. Tr. 3021. Mr. Miller personally selected the photographs for the arrays. Tr. at 3013–14. At trial, Mr. Miller testified that, other than Doyle Simpson in the first array, and Curtis Flowers in the second array, no other “persons of interest” were included in the arrays. Rather, Mr. Miller testified that all of the other photographs were “just filler pictures” from “various police departments” of people with “the same race, similar complexion, things of that nature.” Tr. 3016–17, 3025.

This testimony was false, as Mr. Miller well knew. At least one of the photographs in the second array was not a “filler”; it was a photograph of Alabama suspect Marcus Presley. See Ex. 18 (State’s Color Photo Lineup and Side-by-Side Comparison); Ex. 19 (Guo Aff.) ¶ 5; Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶ 22. Nor was that photograph chosen haphazardly from the “various police departments” to which Mr. Miller so casually referred in his testimony—departments that were so unimportant and forgettable that Mr. Miller simply neglected to note which ones had sent which photographs. Instead, the photograph of Marcus Presley that Mr. Miller included in the second array shown to Porky Collins was sent by Detective David Goldberg of the Norfolk Police Department *at the specific request of Mr. Miller himself*, a request he made in connection with the State’s investigation into the potential connection of the Alabama suspects to the Tardy Furniture murders.

2. Investigator Jack Matthews's Testimony Regarding the Alabama Suspects Was False.

During his trial testimony, Jack Matthews, an investigator with the Mississippi Highway Patrol who was closely involved in the investigation of the Tardy Furniture murders, was asked if investigators explored whether any similar crimes had taken place around the time of the murders, and which might have been related. Mr. Matthews said no, they “didn’t run across anything.” Tr. 2579. More to the point, when asked—twice—whether he had heard about crimes committed by two gentlemen by the names of “Prestidge” and “Gamble,” Mr. Matthews both times denied any such knowledge:

Q. And did you discover any similarly committed criminal acts to the one that occurred down there at Tardy’s?

A. No. We didn’t run across anything.

Q. And how did you check into that? What did you do?

A. Well, it was pretty much on the news in the area, and we didn’t have anybody that had anything of this magnitude anywhere else around at that time.

Q. And where did you check, Mr. Matthews?

A. Well, we checked NCIC’s information. We get that daily at the station.

Q. And you didn’t hear about some crimes taking place in Decatur, Mississippi involving – I think it might have been a gentleman by the name Prestidge, P-R-E-S-T-I-D-G-E and Gamble?

A. ***I don’t remember that, no.***

Q. Did you hear about any similar crimes taking place in Alabama involving a guy by the name of Prestidge and Gamble?

A. ***I did not.*** I don’t remember at that time.

Tr. 2579 (emphases added).

This testimony was false.⁶⁴ As discussed *supra*, Mississippi law enforcement actively pursued Presley and Gamble as suspects. They affirmatively reached out to law enforcement

⁶⁴ Mr. Matthews’s false testimony is not excused by the fact that in addition to referring to Gamble and murders in Alabama, trial counsel mispronounced and misspelled Presley’s name and mentioned a crime in Decatur. The State had investigated the murders sufficiently that Mr. Matthews plainly knew or

agencies in Alabama and Virginia (where Presley and Gamble were taken into custody) for information, and they sent evidence relating to the Tardy Furniture murders to authorities in Boston, where the manhunt for Presley and Gamble began.

That the prosecution knew Mr. Matthews's testimony was false but nonetheless failed to correct it is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. *See Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 110; *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154; *Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 267 ("knowledge of the information in the police file is imputed to him."). But Jack Matthews knew it, too. He played a central role in the investigation of the Tardy Furniture murders, Tr. 2879, an investigation we now know included an exploration of Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble as suspects. Indeed, Mr. Matthews played a vital role in every single step of the investigative process. Mr. Matthews interviewed numerous key witnesses, including Mr. Flowers on the day of the murders, Tr. 2482; Doyle Simpson, Tr. 2520; Porky Collins, Tr. 2553; Katherine Snow, Tr. 2569; Roxanne Ballard, Tr. 2563; and Clemmie Fleming, Tr. 2580, among others. Mr. Matthews also performed the gunshot residue test on Mr. Flowers, Tr. 2478; searched the home of Connie Moore, where Mr. Flowers was staying at the time of the murders, Tr. 2519; and pried slugs from Doyle Simpson's mother's fencepost. Tr. 2520. In light of his heavy involvement in the Tardy Furniture murder investigation, it defies belief that Mr. Matthews would not have been aware of the State's investigation of Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble in July and August 1996.

3. Investigators Jack Matthews's And John Johnson's Testimony Regarding Willie Hemphill Was False.

During his testimony in Mr. Flowers's trial, Mr. Matthews was also asked about another alternative suspect, Willie James Hemphill. Tr. 2587. Mr. Matthews admitted that he "talked"

should have known to whom counsel was referring. Nor is there any doubt that the State knew, or at the

to Mr. Hemphill, but claimed that their conversation lasted only a “short time.” *Id.* at 2587.

He further testified that the State quickly ruled Mr. Hemphill out as a suspect. *Id.* More specifically, Mr. Matthews testified:

- A. Best I remember is somebody brought [Mr. Hemphill’s name] to the attention of the investigators that they wanted us to talk to him, and he came in and we talked to him. After a short time, we realized that he didn’t know anything about the case.
- Q. Okay. And you ruled him out by that conversation you had with him?
- A. That’s correct.
- Q. And in ruling him out, he’s telling you that he—he told you where he was and what he was doing at the time that these occurred, I assume. Is that what happened?
- A. I think so.
- Q. And did you follow up with the people he said he was with? Did you also go to the places he said he was to see if, in fact, he was there and if he did, in fact—if he was, in fact, with the people he claimed he was with?
- A. I don’t remember that we did. I think we pretty much ruled him out from the get-go.
- Q. From the conversation?
- A. From the conversation, yes, sir.
- Q. His conversation and no follow up?
- A. That’s correct.

Id. at 2587–88. The District Attorney’s investigator, John Johnson, told the same story, testifying that Mr. Miller and Mr. Matthews spoke to Hemphill “for five minutes” and “didn’t learn anything.” Tr. 2971–72.

This testimony was false. As discussed in Grounds A and B, *supra*, Mississippi law enforcement did not just stumble upon Willie Hemphill; it launched a manhunt a day or two after the murders in order to find him. *See* Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 19. Once Mr. Hemphill turned himself in, investigators, including Mr. Matthews and Mr. Miller, interrogated Mr. Hemphill about the Tardy Furniture murders for two to three hours. *Id.* at 22. During that

very least should have known, that Mr. Matthews’s testimony was false.

time, investigators did not just speak with Mr. Hemphill or rule him out based on that conversation alone, as Mr. Matthew and Mr. Johnson suggested. Rather, they took handwritten notes; made tape-recordings; removed for testing his Fila Grant Hill shoes—the same brand allegedly worn by the killer; took his fingerprints; and tested his hands for residue or blood spatter. *Id.* at 20–22. After questioning him, they jailed him for eleven days. *Id.* at 22. In other words, despite Mr. Matthews and Mr. Johnson’s suggestions otherwise, Mr. Hemphill was a serious suspect. *See id.* at 19–22.

4. The Prosecution Knew That Mr. Miller, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Johnson Testified Falsely.

Here, there is no question the prosecution knew that Mr. Miller, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Johnson testified falsely. All information about the investigation was, according to Mr. Matthews, “funneled . . . through the D.A.’s office.” Tr. 2577. But if there were any doubt on that score, recent on-the-record statements by District Attorney Evans put it to rest. At a January 29, 2016 hearing in this proceeding, Mr. Evans emphatically represented to the circuit court: “As far as [the] Flowers case, there was nothing that went on that I didn’t personally . . . there was nothing that went on in that case that I was not aware of.” Jan. 2016 Hr’g Tr. 33. Mr. Evans further explained: “The way this case worked, every agency that was working on it, did different parts. They compiled one file at our office with everything that everybody worked on. *Everything that was involved with any agency, police department, sheriff’s department, MDI, crime lab, all of it was in our file. So everything that they have would be in our file.*” *Id.* at 58–59 (emphasis added); *see Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 110; *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154; *Smith*, 492 So. 2d at 267 (“knowledge of the information in the police file is imputed to [the prosecuting attorney].”).

There is additional evidence that the prosecution knew the details about the individuals pictured in the photo arrays shown to Porky Collins. In *Flowers II*, Mr. Miller insisted on the record that the police file included a record of the source of the photographs and who each individual was. *Flowers II* Tr. 873. Without prompting, District Attorney Evans added that “the originals at the Supreme Court have the names on the back of the original pictures.” *Id.* 874. Thus, by Mr. Miller’s and Mr. Evans’s own admissions, even if Mr. Miller’s contact with Detective Goldberg was never documented, Marcus Presley’s name was.

5. The False Testimony Was Material.

These falsehoods were material. The *Napue/Giglio* materiality threshold is exceedingly low. It is met if there is *any reasonable likelihood* that the false testimony *could have impacted* the jury’s judgment. *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154; *see Napue*, 360 U.S. at 271 (emphases added). The new evidence proving Mr. Miller’s and Mr. Matthews’s false testimony easily satisfies this standard.

If the jury had learned that, contrary to the State’s repeated avowals and Mr. Miller’s and Mr. Matthews’s false testimony, Mr. Flowers was not the only suspect in the State’s investigation of the Tardy Furniture murders, and that the State had investigated other suspects who either committed very similar murders nearby or who also fit the evidence used to convict Mr. Flowers, there is no question that it would have impacted the jury’s view of the case. Indeed, one juror recently stated as much in a recorded interview:

Madeleine Baran: Do you think that if they had evidence of someone else who could have done it, that that would have been helpful to know?

Alexander Robinson (*Flowers VI* Juror): It’d’ve been different in the jury room. It’d’ve been different. I don’t know how we would’ve voted, but it would’ve been different.

Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 25.

As discussed in Ground A.1, the crimes committed by Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble closely matched the facts of the Tardy Furniture murders, and Mr. Presley has now admitted in a sworn affidavit that Mr. Gamble and another co-defendant were in Mississippi during the time of the Tardy Furniture murders, carrying a .380 handgun and returning to Alabama with cash they did not have when they left. Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶¶ 7–10. And the fact that Mr. Miller requested a photograph of Marcus Presley for use in the photo arrays shown to eyewitnesses would further have impressed upon the jury that the connection of Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble to the Tardy Furniture murders was more than just a “hunch” on the part of Mississippi authorities. Had this evidence been presented, it would have “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 435.

Likewise, as discussed in Ground A.2, much of the evidence that the State claims links Mr. Flowers to the Tardy Furniture murders also links Mr. Hemphill. Indeed, some of that evidence more closely connects Mr. Hemphill to the crime than it does Mr. Flowers. For instance, in the summer of 1996, Mr. Hemphill was known to stay in a house about three blocks away from Tardy Furniture, just across the train tracks, Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 16, and near where a .380 handgun was discovered in 2001, *see* Ground G, Section G, *infra*. And in stark contrast to the State’s tenuous claim that Mr. Flowers wore Fila shoes, the State took a pair of size 9 or 10 Filas right off of Mr. Hemphill’s feet. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 21. Moreover, the fact that the State launched a manhunt to find Willie Hemphill, and then subsequently interrogated him for hours and detained him for 11 days, would make clear to the jury that he was a viable suspect. The State’s sworn testimony hiding these facts thus casts serious doubt on the jury’s verdict. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that jurors—and especially death

qualified jurors—tend to be “more trusting of prosecution witnesses (such as police officers),” *see* Craig Haney, *Death by Design* 110 (Ronald Roesch, ed., 1st ed. 2005), and thus tend to give the testimony of police officers more weight.

Courts routinely find *Napue/Giglio* violations in far less egregious circumstances, where the challenged testimony is based on an omission or where it is less clearly false than the statements at issue here. *See, e.g., Jenkins v. Artuz*, 294 F.3d 284, 294 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding *Giglio* violation where testimony was “probably true” but “misleading”); *United States v. Sutton*, 542 F.2d 1239, 1243 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding due process violation where “the prosecution allowed a false impression to be created at trial when the truth would have directly impugned the veracity of its key witness”); *United States v. Iverson*, 637 F.2d 799, 805 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that “it makes no difference” for purposes of discerning a *Giglio* violation, “whether the testimony is technically perjurious or merely misleading”); *see also United States v. Vega*, 826 F.3d 514, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Hair-splitting distinctions in degree of falsity and inaccuracy should not be the currency of . . . prosecutors.”). Mr. Miller’s, Mr. Matthews’s, and Mr. Johnson’s false testimony were not minor oversights. Instead, these falsehoods were part of a deliberate scheme to suppress the State’s investigation of the Alabama suspects and Willie James Hemphill, and leave the impression that Mr. Flowers was their only suspect.

Mr. Flowers was entitled to have his guilt or innocence adjudicated on the basis of truthful testimony. The prosecution’s knowing presentation of false testimony—and from law enforcement agents, no less—rendered Mr. Flowers’s trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause, and mandates reversal of his convictions and sentences.

B. The State’s Knowing Presentation Of False Testimony From Odell Hallmon About Mr. Flowers’s Purported Confession Violated Mr. Flowers’s Due Process Rights.

Odell Hallmon’s testimony was false twice over. He lied when he said that Mr. Flowers had confessed to the murders. And he lied when he said that he expected no benefits in exchange for his testimony. The District Attorney knew that Hallmon’s testimony was false. Yet the District Attorney not only left the testimony uncorrected—he actively solicited it in the first place. Because there is a reasonable likelihood that these lies impacted the judgment of the jury, Mr. Flowers’s must be given a new trial. *Tassin*, 517 F.3d at 778 (“[D]eliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with ‘rudimentary demands of justice.’” (quoting *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 153 (quoting *Mooney*, 294 U.S. at 112))).

1. Mr. Hallmon’s Testimony Was False.

Mr. Hallmon testified that while in prison, Mr. Flowers confessed to him that he committed the Tardy Furniture murders. In an effort to shore up his credibility, Mr. Hallmon also testified that he had received no benefits in exchange for his testimony. We now know that both statements were false. *See* Ground A, Section C & Ground B, Section B, *supra*.

On tape, with nothing to gain, Mr. Hallmon recently stated without reservation that he lied on the stand about Mr. Flowers’s supposed confession. “As far as [Curtis] telling me he killed some people, hell, naw, he ain’t ever told me that. . . . It was all make believe.” Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 6. “All of it was just a fantasy, that’s all. A bunch of fantasies. A bunch of lies.” *Id.*

Mr. Hallmon’s recantation is even more compelling now that his second lie has unraveled—his lie that he had nothing to gain by framing Mr. Flowers.

The State initiated the quid pro quo relationship for *Flowers III* when Mr. Hallmon was in jail facing several felonies. In Mr. Hallmon's words, "He had charges on my head. And that's how it all got started." Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 4. After Mr. Hallmon flipped, Doug Evans made sure that most of the charges went away. See Ground B, Section B, *supra*. Then Mr. Evans sealed the deal going forward by under-charging Mr. Hallmon for a drive-by shooting and then dismissing the case altogether. *Id.* As Mr. Hallmon accumulated two new charges for drugs and guns, Mr. Evans kept the actual indictments minimal and never risked Mr. Hallmon's "earned release" by indicting him as a habitual offender. *Id.* And once Mr. Hallmon "earned" early release, Mr. Evans kept him happy in case his lies were needed on appeal, in post-conviction, or for a new trial. Not even aggravated assault on a police officer was enough to keep Mr. Hallmon locked up. *Id.* But once he murdered three people, Mr. Evans could not keep him out of jail—even if he could keep Mr. Hallmon off of Death Row with a quick plea. *Id.*; see also Ex. 3-E (ITD Ep. 5 Tr.) at 14–15. Once Mr. Hallmon was in jail for life, he was ready to recant: "[I] [c]an't get in no more trouble." Ex. 3-F (ITD Ep. 6. Tr.) at 3.

"I helped them. They helped me. That's what[] it[] all boiled down to." *Id.* at 5. "I used them son of a bitches just like they used me." *Id.* "[Doug Evans] shoulda throwed me away a long time ago instead of using me to keep Curtis locked up." *Id.* at 6.

2. The Prosecution Knew That Mr. Hallmon's Testimony Was False.

Some prosecutors treat jailhouse snitch malleability as a problem. For others, it is an opportunity. Doug Evans put Mr. Hallmon on the stand because he knew he would lie.

A classic *Napue/Giglio* violation involves mere negligent presentation of false testimony; it requires no solicitation on the part of the prosecutor. See, e.g., *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154 ("[W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the

prosecutor.”); *Mooney*, 294 U.S. at 110 (holding that “knowing use” of “perjured testimony” violates due process); *see also Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 120 (internal quotations omitted) (holding that false testimony violates due process where “the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury”). But it is particularly noxious when a prosecutor takes a direct role in fabricating the testimony. “A prosecutor’s role is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” *Smith*, 814 F.3d 268 at 277 (internal quotations omitted).

Doug Evans knew, or should have known, that Mr. Hallmon testified falsely when he said that Mr. Flowers confessed to him. Prosecutors have known for decades that jailhouse snitch testimony is extremely unreliable because jailhouse snitches have so much to gain by lying. In the words of one federal judge:

Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what they want, especially when what they want is to get out of trouble with the law . . . [including] lying, committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more lies, and double-crossing anyone . . . especially—the prosecutor.

Trott, *supra* n.46 at 1383. Odell Hallmon was clearly no exception. In *Flowers II*, Mr. Hallmon had testified for the defense that his sister, Patricia Sullivan-Odom, had lied when she said that she saw Mr. Flowers on the morning of the Tardy Furniture murders. *See Flowers II* Tr. 2571–73. Mr. Hallmon then changed his tune in *Flowers III*, claiming that his prior testimony was false. *See Flowers III* Tr. at 1659–60. This alone should have demonstrated to Mr. Evans that Mr. Hallmon, the archetypal jailhouse snitch, was not to be trusted. On top of that, Mr. Hallmon’s new story—that Mr. Flowers, after steadfastly maintaining his innocence for decades, suddenly confessed to him in prison—was utterly implausible. But these were not the only red flags. Before *Flowers III*, Mr. Evans had Mr. Hallmon take a polygraph examination to test the truth of his new claims. *See* Tr. 2432; *Flowers III* Tr. 1666. The State has since

refused to disclose the results of that test. They must have confirmed the obvious. There is thus ample evidence that Doug Evans knew or should have known that Mr. Flowers never confessed to the Tardy Furniture murders.

Doug Evans also made sure that Mr. Hallmon lied about the benefits he received in exchange for his testimony. In each trial following *Flowers III*, he prompted Mr. Hallmon to lie about the benefits he had received and expected to continue receiving. In *Flowers IV*, Mr. Evans asked “Have you been offered anything to get you to testify for the State of Mississippi”? *Flowers IV* Tr. 22. Mr. Hallmon replied, “No, sir.” *Id.* Mr. Evans painted himself as the uncompromising prosecutor, and Mr. Hallmon as the altruistic penitent.

- Q. Matter of fact, since you gave the statement to me admitting that you lied [about Patricia Sullivan-Odom’s testimony in *Flowers II*] and admitting that he killed those people, what has happened to you since then?
- A. I’ve been locked up and constantly been locked up.
- Q. Who prosecuted you?
- A. You did. You did.
- Q. How many years are you serving?
- A. Fourteen.
- Q. So since you admitted the truth, I have gotten you 14 more years; is that correct?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. So have I done anything to try to get you to cooperate?
- A. No, sir. You ain’t did nothing but, but gave me 14 years, left me in Parchman.
- Q. Do you have any reason to lie against this defendant?
- A. No, sir. No reason. In fact, we are trying to straighten out about it.

Id. at 422–423. Mr. Evans introduced that testimony in *Flowers VI* and had Mr. Hallmon read it while on the stand. Tr. at 2474. But Mr. Evans went even further this time—prompting Mr. Hallmon to recount his excuses for turning on the defense.

- Q. Now, you’ve been asked about why you’re now telling the truth?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And you say your mother is the one that got you to come see me?
- A. Yes.

Q. And you've talked about it being in a medical crisis?

A. Yes, sir.

[Defense objection overruled.]

Q. What is your medical crisis?

A. Well, I've been diagnosed with HIV. And I know my life ain't that far from coming so I just want to clear my conscience, get all this out of the way.

Tr. at 2472–73.

Contrary to this exchange, Doug Evans knew that he had done Mr. Hallmon quite a few favors “since [Hallmon] gave the statement to [Evans]” in which Mr. Hallmon alleged Mr. Flowers’s confession. See Ground B, Section B, *supra*. After the statement, but before his testimony in *Flowers III*, Mr. Evans had looked the other way on a slew of Mr. Hallmon’s felony charges. *Id.* And, in the lead-up to *Flowers IV*, *V* and *VI*, Mr. Evans had under-charged and then dismissed Mr. Hallmon’s subsequent 2004 drive-by shooting charge. Then, in one stroke, he also dismissed the 2005 charge of felon in possession of a firearm and the 2005 charge for possessing more than 20 grams of cocaine—and had never indicted Mr. Hallmon as a habitual offender even though he was eligible many times over. So even Mr. Evans’s and Mr. Hallmon’s claim that he had received another “14 years” was a lie: as a non-habitual offender, Mr. Hallmon would be out early. Mr. Evans also knew that Mr. Hallmon had “reason to lie against the defendant” in exchange for benefits going forward as well. After aggravated assault on a police officer while on early release, Mr. Hallmon would be released on \$25,000 bail. Doug Evans delayed trial on assault of an officer for two years—until Mr. Hallmon went on a murder spree.

3. Mr. Hallmon’s False Testimony Was Material.

For starters, the State’s presentation of Mr. Hallmon’s lies is material for all the reasons stated in Ground B, Section B, *supra*. *Napue/Giglio* materiality is, if anything, even more

lenient than *Brady* materiality discussed there. Leniency that the prosecution gave to a key witness is undoubtedly material under *Napue/Giglio*. See *Dvorin*, 817 F.3d at 452; *Tassin*, 517 F.3d at 781. A court must vacate and remand for new trial if on “the face of [the] petition there is a strong suggestion that [the witness] testified after receiving promises of leniency.” *Reagor*, 488 F.2d 515, 516. Where, for example, the defendant was unable to effectively impeach a key witness who received “substantial charging down” of his drug charges in exchange for testifying, the deal is material. *Id.* at 516 n.3. That is true here.

And, in the words of Doug Evans, Mr. Hallmon’s testimony “goes to the whole issue of the case.” *Flowers III* Tr. at 32. Without Mr. Hallmon’s lies, there would be no direct evidence tying Mr. Flowers to the murders. And with Doug Evans actively coaching Mr. Hallmon, there is more than “reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony “affected the judgment of the jury.” *Reagor*, 488 F.2d at 516 n.2 (quoting *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154). Indeed, one of the jurors recently confirmed as much:

Janelle Johnson (*Flowers VI* Juror): I believed him. You know, I don’t think he had anything, he didn’t have anything to gain by coming in there, you know. I believed him. To me, I feel like maybe he was trying to do the right thing, actually.

ITD Ep. 4 Tr. at 9.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Moreover, had Doug Evans not solicited Hallmon’s lies, the Court would not have been misled into issuing less stringent jury instructions—a reversible error. See *Alexander v. State*, 749 So. 2d 1031, 1036 (Miss. 1999) (where evidence is wholly circumstantial, accused is entitled to a more stringent jury instruction and a court’s failure to give the instruction is reversible error) (quoting *Keys v. State*, 478 So.2d 266, 268 (Miss. 1985)); *Petti v. State*, 666 So. 2d 754, 757 (Miss. 1995) (in a wholly circumstantial case, the trial court must grant a request for a “two-theory” instruction). Defense counsel requested both a “circumstantial evidence” instruction and a circumstantial “two-theory” instruction. Tr. 3151–53. Judge Loper denied both—issuing no instructions about circumstantial evidence at all—stating that: “[T]he Court has proof before it that . . . Mr. Flowers confessed to Mr. Hallmon that he had committed the murders. So that makes it a direct evidence case and not a circumstantial evidence case. And he even went so far as to say he basically came clean, because he was trying to get right with God, because he knew based on his illness he wouldn’t be around that long.” *Id.* at 3152–53. For examples of such instructions, see Miss. Prac. Model Jury Instr. Criminal §§ 1:20, 1:21 (2d ed.); Miss. Plain Lang. Model

Doug Evans’s knowing presentation of false testimony by Odell Hallmon warrants a new trial.

4. In The Alternative, Mr. Hallmon’s Conversation With Mr. Flowers Violated His Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel.

Mr. Hallmon’s testimony was plainly false. After his recent recantation, there is no remaining evidence suggesting Mr. Flowers in fact confessed to Mr. Hallmon. But if the Court were to find that Mr. Hallmon told the truth about Mr. Flowers’s confession, then Mr. Hallmon’s conversation with Mr. Flowers would have violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In *Massiah v. United States*, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a cooperating witness who elicits a confession from the defendant while that defendant’s counsel is not present violates the Sixth Amendment. *Id.* at 202–206. That is exactly what happened here. Based on newly discovered evidence, we now know that Mr. Hallmon had a quid pro quo with the State and thus spoke to Mr. Flowers as its agent. Mr. Flowers thus had a right to have counsel present during those conversations. Because the State afforded no such opportunity, it violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Mr. Flowers should be afforded a new trial at which his unlawfully obtained statement is excluded. *See United States v. Henry*, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (statements obtained by state agents without counsel present are inadmissible).

Jury Instr. Crim. 201 (Presumption of innocence—Circumstantial evidence case); Miss. Plain Lang. Model Jury Instr. Crim. 207 (Use of circumstantial evidence); Miss. Plain Lang. Model Jury Instr. Crim. 208 (Circumstantial evidence—Two-theory instruction).

Furthermore, it was Hallmon’s now-recanted “confession” alone which obliged the Mississippi Supreme Court to review Petitioner’s direct appeal under a more onerous appellate standard. *See Flowers v. State*, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1040 ¶¶ 56–58 (Miss. 2015) (affirming the trial court’s finding that “Hallmon’s testimony provided direct evidence of the crimes” and dismissing Petitioner’s argument that the State relied on purely “circumstantial evidence” which would have imposed a higher burden of proof).

GROUND D: RACIAL BIAS IN JURY SELECTION

THE STATE EXERCISED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE BASIS OF RACE IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND MISSISSIPPI LAW.

“For more than a century,” the United States Supreme Court “consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause.” *Georgia v. McCollum*, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992) (citing *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)); *see also Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Underlying these precedents is the “unmistakable principle” that “discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” *Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado*, 137 S.Ct. 868 (2017) (quoting *Rose v. Mitchell*, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). Racial discrimination affecting the composition of a jury harms not only the defendant, but also the excluded juror, putting “a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.” *Strauder*, 100 U.S. at 308. It also harms the community at large by “destroy[ing] the appearance of justice and thereby cast[ing] doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.” *Rose*, 443 U.S. at 556.

The Mississippi Supreme Court, likewise, has repeatedly reaffirmed its unwillingness to tolerate racial discrimination in jury selection—including in the context of the prosecution of Mr. Flowers by this District Attorney. *See Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 935. (reversing and remanding for new trial upon finding “as strong a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination as we have ever seen in the context of a *Batson* challenge”); *see also, e.g., McGee v. State*, 953 So. 2d 211 (Miss. 2007) (reversing and remanding for new trial based on *Batson* violation); *Thorson v.*

State, 721 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1998) (same); *Conerly v. State*, 544 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1989) (same).

Nevertheless, racial discrimination in jury selection persists, in Mississippi and elsewhere, not least because of the “practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature[.]” *Miller-El v. Dretke*, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005) [hereinafter “*Miller-El II*”]; see also *id.* at 269 (Breyer, J., concurring) (lamenting the “practical problems of proof” in discerning *Batson* violations); *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 937:

[R]acially-motivated jury selection is still prevalent twenty years after *Batson* was handed down and . . . this case evinces an effort by the State to exclude African-Americans from jury service Unfortunately, as this case has shown, Justice Marshall was correct in predicting that th[e] problem [of racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges] would not subside [under the *Batson* formula].

In this case, however, the Court confronts no such difficulty. New evidence demonstrates beyond any doubt the racial motivation behind the State’s exercise of peremptory strikes at Mr. Flowers’s trial.

First, the facts. During *voir dire* in Mr. Flowers’s trial, the State managed to seat a jury of eleven whites and one African-American out of an original venire that was 42% African-American, in a county where 45% of the 2010 population was African-American.⁶⁶ Were there any serious question about the prosecutor’s motivation in peremptorily striking all but one of the African-American venire members tendered for service, his systematic exclusion of African-Americans during jury selection throughout this case puts it swiftly to rest:

⁶⁶ United States Census Bureau, *Montgomery County, Mississippi 2010 Census Summary File 1*, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/0500000US28097 (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) (reporting that of 10,925 Montgomery County residents in 2010, 45.5% were African-American).

- In *Flowers I*, District Attorney Evans peremptorily struck all five African-American venire members tendered for service. The jury that convicted Mr. Flowers and sentenced him to death was all white.
- In *Flowers II*, District Attorney Evans peremptorily struck all five African-American venire members tendered for service. But for the fact that the trial court disallowed one of those strikes on *Batson* grounds, the jury that convicted Mr. Flowers and sentenced him to death would again have been all white. Instead, the jury was made up of eleven whites—and the lone African-American the court prevented the State from removing.
- In *Flowers III*, District Attorney Evans exercised all fifteen available peremptory strikes (twelve strikes plus three alternate strikes) against African-American venire members. Although two African-Americans sat on the jury, they did so only because the State ran out of peremptory strikes. On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed Mr. Flowers’s conviction on the basis of two clear *Batson* violations and three more highly suspicious strikes. *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 936.
- In *Flowers IV*, District Attorney Evans exercised all eleven available peremptory strikes against African-American venire members. Although five African-Americans sat on the jury, that was, again, only because the State ran out of peremptory strikes. *Flowers IV* resulted in a mistrial.
- In *Flowers V*, District Attorney Evans used four of the five peremptory strikes he exercised to strike African-American jurors. Three African-Americans served on the jury. After a mistrial, wherein the sole holdout was African-American, Judge Loper ordered the arrest of two of the African-American jury members for perjury.
- In *Flowers VI*, District Attorney Evans accepted the first African-American venire person tendered for service, and then peremptorily struck the remaining five African-American panel members. The jury that convicted Mr. Flowers was made up of eleven whites and one African-American.

Put another way, across the six prosecutions of Curtis Flowers, the State accepted a grand total of four African-Americans for jury service. Every other African-American who made it onto a *Flowers* jury—and there were not many—did so either because the State ran out of peremptory strikes after using 100% of them to strike African-Americans, or because the trial court reversed a strike on *Batson* grounds. This track record is staggering. And it bears

directly on the Court’s inquiry into the genuineness of the prosecution’s stated reasons for its strikes of 83% of the African-American jurors tendered in *Flowers VI*. *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 96–97 (explaining that “all relevant circumstances” must be considered in determining whether a violation has occurred). As the Supreme Court noted in *Miller-El II*, “[i]f anything more is needed for an undeniable explanation of what was going on, history supplies it.” 545 U.S. at 266.

New evidence confirms that history explains what was going on here, too. Several newly conducted statistical analyses of Mr. Evans’s exercise of peremptory strikes since he assumed the role of District Attorney of Mississippi’s Fifth District in 1992—evidence that was not and could not in practical reality have been presented previously⁶⁷—reveal that he and his colleagues are far more likely to strike a black qualified venire member than a white qualified venire member. In both capital and non-capital cases from 1992 to 2017, Mr. Evans’s office was more than four times more likely to strike black qualified venire members than white

⁶⁷ At the direction of Mr. Flowers’s post-conviction counsel, a team of five attorneys, four law clerks, and a paralegal spent, collectively, more than 575 hours collecting and organizing these data. Ex. 74 (Patricia A. Brannan Aff. ¶¶ 6–8 (Mar. 1, 2016)) (accounting for 464.9 hours spent on this project); Ex. 75 (William McIntosh Aff. ¶ 12 (Mar. 10, 2016)) (accounting for 112 additional hours spent on this project). This total does not include the dozens of additional hours spent by statisticians and other experts to analyze the data. *See generally* Ex. 76 (Barbara O’Brien Aff. (Mar. 16, 2016)); Ex. 77 (John J. Green & David May Aff. (Mar. 15, 2016)). In view of the tremendous expenditure of both manpower and financial resources associated with this undertaking, there is no way, in practical reality, that trial counsel could have adduced these data at the trial stage. *See* Ex. 78 (Andre De Gruy Aff. ¶ 5 (Mar. 3, 2016)) (attesting that trial counsel would not have had the resources to complete the jury strike analysis).

This is also true of the analysis conducted by APM Reports, though counsel does not have the same information about the number of hours devoted to the project. Independent of the efforts of Mr. Flowers’s post-conviction team, though, APM Reports requested records, reviewed hand-written docket books at all of the courthouses in Mississippi’s Fifth District, visited the Mississippi Department of History and Archives and the Mississippi Supreme Court Archives, and scanned over 115,000 pages of court records and transcripts to collect its data. APM Reports then expended additional resources to analyze the data. *See* Will Craft, *Mississippi D.A. has long history of striking many blacks from juries*, APM Reports (June 12, 2018), <http://tinyurl.com/yx9afmnz> [hereinafter “Craft, Report”]. Again, there is no way that trial counsel could have raised these data during trial.

qualified venire members, a disparity best explained by race even when controlling for race-neutral factors. *See* Craft, Report. In capital cases specifically, Mr. Evans himself is eight times more likely strike qualified African-American venire members. *See* Ex. 76 (Barbara O’Brien Aff. (Mar. 16, 2016)) ¶ 8. And his discriminatory strikes were even more aggressive in the *Flowers* trials. In those cases, Mr. Evans struck qualified African-American venire members at a rate **more than 20 times** the rate of his strikes of white qualified venire members. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–11. To say that “[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity,” *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 240–241, is a vast understatement.⁶⁸ The conclusions that necessarily follow from these data are two-fold: (1) Evans is a willful and recalcitrant *Batson* violator and (2) he is at his most virulent when he is prosecuting Curtis Flowers.

The divided panel of the Mississippi Supreme Court that affirmed Mr. Flowers’s conviction on appeal did not have the benefit of this newly discovered evidence. *See Flowers VI(B)*, 240 So. 3d at 1124 (“The Court does not have evidence before it of a similar policy of the district attorney’s office or of a specific prosecutor that was so evident in *Miller-El II*.”). To be clear, Mr. Flowers maintains that it was error to affirm notwithstanding the ample evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection (among other things) before the Court at the time it decided his direct appeal. *Cf. id.* at 1154 (King, J., dissenting) (“Despite the same errors occurring in

⁶⁸ The Mississippi Supreme Court already acknowledged as much following Mr. Flowers’s third trial. There, “[a]t least 120 potential jurors indicated that they were of African-American descent, meaning that at least forty percent of the potential jury pool was African-American. This percentage closely tracks the racial demographics of Montgomery County, as defense counsel asserted that African-American citizens comprise forty-five percent of the county’s population. The prosecutor exercised all fifteen of his peremptory strikes on African-Americans, and the lone African-American who ultimately sat on Mr. Flowers’s jury was seated after the State ran out of peremptory challenges.” *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 936. On appeal, the Court noted that “though the sheer number of strikes exercised against a cognizable group of jurors is not itself dispositive . . . [s]uch a result cannot be considered ‘happenstance.’” *Id.* at 935-36 (citing *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003)) [hereinafter “*Miller El-I*”].

the trial that is the subject of this appeal, the Majority, in a stark departure from this Court's previous *Flowers* opinions, found that Flowers's conviction and death sentence should be affirmed . . . [T]he errors in this case, particularly the denial of Flowers's *Batson* claims highlighted by the United States Supreme Court, resulted in Flowers being denied his right to a fair trial[.]"); *id.* ("While this repetition of prosecutorial misconduct is alarming, the Majority's approval of the same is even more startling."). But to the extent the State's motivation for its exercise of peremptory challenges was a close question, the new evidence adduced in this Petition tips the scales, mandating a finding that those challenges violated *Batson* and Mr. Flowers's right to be tried by a jury selected through fair and race-neutral means.

Legal Principles

Exercising peremptory strikes on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 89. Where even a single juror is struck on the basis of race, structural constitutional error has occurred and the Mr. Flowers's conviction must be reversed. *Id.* at 100; *see also Dawson v. Delaware*, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (*Batson* violations are not subject to harmless-error analysis); *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 939 ("Based on the State's *Batson* violation, we are required to reverse . . . "); *Scott v. Hubert*, 610 F. App'x. 433, 433–434 (5th Cir. 2015) (discrimination on the basis of race in *voir dire* is a structural error that voids a conviction) (citing *Vasquez v. Hillery*, 474 U.S. 254, 261–264 (1986)).

In lodging a *Batson* claim, the party objecting to the peremptory strike must first make a *prima facie* showing that race was the reason for the exercise of the peremptory strike. *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 917. Once a *prima facie* case of discrimination has been established, the burden shifts to the party who exercised the strike to articulate a race-neutral explanation for

excluding that potential juror. *Id.* Finally, the trial court must determine whether the race neutral explanation “is merely a pretext for racial discrimination.” *Id.*

Critically, courts cannot take such explanations at face value. Rather, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, in deciding whether facially neutral reasons are pretextual, “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.” *Foster v. Chatman*, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (2016) (quoting *Snyder v. Louisiana*, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)); *see also Batiste v. State*, 121 So. 3d 808, 848 (Miss. 2013) (courts must “consider all relevant circumstances” in assessing whether a *Batson* violation has occurred); *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 937 (“While each individual strike may have justifiably appeared to the trial court to be sufficiently race neutral, the trial court also has a duty to look at the State’s use of peremptory challenges *in toto*.”). And as the Supreme Court has “said in a related context, determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial evidence of intent as may be available.” *Foster*, 136 S. Ct. at 1748 (alteration omitted) (quoting *Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). Although the “sheer number of strikes exercised against a cognizable group of jurors is not itself dispositive . . . the relative strength of the *prima facie* case of purposeful discrimination will often influence” *Batson*’s third inquiry. *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 935 (citing *Sewell v. State*, 721 So. 2d 129, 136 (Miss. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted).

A history of racial discrimination by the prosecuting office is relevant in assessing whether discrimination occurred, *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 263. So, too, are contrasting *voir dire* questions posed respectively to black and nonblack venire members; “the presence of unchallenged jurors of the opposite race who share the characteristic given as the basis for challenge”; “failure to *voir dire* as to the characteristic cited”; and lack of record support for the

cited characteristic. *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 917 (quoting *Manning v. State*, 765 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 2000)). All of these factors are present here, in spades.

A. The Prosecution Violated Mr. Flowers’s Equal Protection Rights When It Struck Prospective Jurors On The Basis of Race.

1. The Strength Of The *Prima Facie* Case.

Although, as noted above, statistics alone are insufficient to prove a *Batson* violation, “the relative strength of the *prima facie* case of purposeful discrimination will often influence th[e *Batson*] inquiry,” *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 935, and the statistics here are stunning. A jury pool that began with 42% African-American venire members was whittled down to 28% African-American venire members after strikes for cause, Tr. 1733–34, and only one African-American sat on the jury that convicted Curtis Flowers and sentenced him to death. To achieve that result, District Attorney Evans struck all but one of the African-Americans tendered for service. See App. A to Br. of Appellant, *Flowers VI* (Miss. June 18, 2013) [hereinafter “Appellant Br. App. A”]

The Mississippi Supreme Court split on the question of whether that violated *Batson*, demonstrating the question was close just based on the record at trial. See *FlowersVI(B)*, 240 So. 3d at 1159 (King, J., dissenting on *Batson* grounds, joined by Kitchens, P.J.); *Flowers VI(A)*, 158 So. 3d at 1088 (King, J., dissenting on *Batson* grounds, joined by Kitchens, J. and Dickinson, P.J.). As the dissenters recognized, the statistics surrounding the State’s exercise of peremptory strikes against African-American jurors in *Flowers VI* “are too disparate to be explained away or categorized as mere happenstance.” *FlowersVI(B)*, 240 So. 3d at 1161; *Flowers VI(A)*, 158 So. 3d at 1090. Instead, they “reveal a clear pattern of disparate treatment between white and African-American venire members.” *FlowersVI(B)*, 240 So. 3d at 1160; *Flowers VI(A)*, 158 So. 3d at 1089. Indeed, the statistics surrounding the State’s exercise of

peremptory strikes in *Flowers VI* are even more egregious than those the Supreme Court deemed “remarkable” in *Miller-El II* before reversing the Mr. Flowers’s conviction on *Batson* grounds. 545 U.S. at 240–241.

In *Miller-El*, the overall venire pool began as 18% African-American (there were 20 African-Americans in a 108-person venire panel). Nine African-American venire members were excused for cause or by agreement; after for-cause challenges, 11 African-Americans remained in the qualified venire. The State then peremptorily struck 91% of the eligible African-American venire members. One African-American ultimately served on the jury that convicted Miller-El. *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 240–241.

Here, the original venire was composed of 42% African-American jurors; after for-cause challenges, 28% remained. District Attorney Doug Evans then accepted the first African-American juror who survived for-cause challenges and struck the remaining five tendered for service—an 83% strike rate against African-American jurors. *See* Appellant Br. App. A. One African-American sat on the jury that convicted Curtis Flowers and sentenced him to death. *Flowers VI(A)*, 158 So. 3d at 1089. To state the obvious, “[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity.” *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 240–241. The trial court acknowledged as much, finding a *prima facie* case of discrimination. *Flowers VI(A)*, 158 So. 3d at 1047.

2. The Reasons Offered For The Strikes Were Pretext.

With respect to the determination of whether the reasons offered for challenged strikes are pretext, “[t]his Court has examined the number of strikes on a particular class, the ultimate ethnic or gender makeup of the jury, the nature of questions asked during *voir dire*, and the overall demeanor of the attorney.” *Randall v. State*, 716 So. 2d 584, 587 (Miss. 1998) (citing

Coleman v. State, 697 So. 2d 777, 786 (Miss. 1997)). In making this determination, courts must “consider all relevant circumstances,” *Batiste*, 121 So. 3d at 848, including “[t]he historical background of the decision,” *Arlington Heights*, 429 U.S. at 267. *See also Batson*, 476 U.S. at 93, 96 (“In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available’” and must “consider all relevant circumstances”) (quoting *Arlington Heights*, 429 U.S. at 266); *Manning*, 765 So. 2d at 519 (at *Batson* step three, Mississippi Courts consider five indicia of pretext: (1) disparate treatment . . . (2) the failure to *voir dire* as to the characteristic cited; (3) the characteristic cited is unrelated to the facts of the case; (4) lack of record support for the stated reason; and (5) group-based traits.) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, in addition to the strength of the *prima facie* case and other strong evidence of discriminatory intent, Mr. Flowers has uncovered powerful new evidence that makes clear that the State’s exercise of peremptory strikes in this case was motivated by race, and that the supposedly race-neutral justifications offered to justify those strikes were pretext. Although statistics alone are insufficient to make out a *Batson* violation, they are the lens through which other evidence of discriminatory intent must be viewed. When viewed as a whole, the evidence now before the Court leaves no doubt that the State’s exercise of peremptory strikes violated Mr. Flowers’s constitutional rights. “[I]ts direction is too powerful to conclude anything but discrimination.” *Miller El-II*, 545 U.S. at 265.

a. The prosecution’s history of racial discrimination in jury selection.

District Attorney Evans has a demonstrated and uninterrupted track record of racial discrimination in jury selection—not just in the six prosecutions of Curtis Flowers, but also in

every other case that he and his office have tried for which jury strike data were available. This pattern of discrimination is evident in both capital and non-capital cases.

i. Statistical analyses of capital cases tried by Mr. Evans.

During the summer of 2015, a team of ten (five attorneys, four law clerks, and a paralegal) spent, collectively, more than 575 hours attempting to collect peremptory strike data for every capital case Mr. Evans had tried during his tenure as District Attorney. Ex. 74 (Patricia Brannan Aff. ¶ 8 (Mar. 1, 2016)); Ex. 75 (William McIntosh Aff. ¶ 12 (Mar. 10, 2016)).

These efforts are explained in more detail in the affidavits of William McIntosh and Ashley Stancik, attached here to as Exhibits 75 and 79, but, briefly, Mr. Flowers's post-conviction team did the following:

- Identified all capital cases tried by District Attorney Evans, and the county in which each case originated and was tried. *See* Ex. 75 (McIntosh Aff.) ¶¶ 4–5.
- Traveled to five of the seven counties located in Mr. Evans's district to inspect court records relating to jury selection. To counsel's knowledge, Mr. Evans has never tried a capital case in Winston or Webster counties, so no records were obtained there. Where the relevant information was located in the court files, copies of relevant records were made. Information obtained included, among other things: (i) names, race, and gender of *voir dire* panel members; (ii) peremptory strikes exercised by the State; (iii) peremptory strikes exercised by defense counsel; (iv) names, race, and gender of tendered and struck jurors; and (v) names, race, and gender of seated jurors. *See* Ex. 75 (McIntosh Aff.) ¶ 6.
- Where the jury information described above was not available in the court clerk file, the post-conviction team traveled to Jackson to inspect records at the Mississippi Department of Archives and History and the Mississippi Supreme Court. *See* Ex. 75 (McIntosh Aff.) ¶¶ 7–8.
- Because race and gender information was not available for certain jurors, the post-conviction team undertook substantial additional efforts to obtain those data. These included, but were not limited to attempting to obtain the missing data: (a) from voter registration databases; (b) from DMV records; (c) from Office of Vital Statistics records; (d) from records housed at the Secretary of State's Office at the Elections Call Center of Mississippi; (e) from jury administration records; (f) by obtaining and/or purchasing it from political consultancies; (g) by reviewing

census reports; and (h) by contacting trial, appeal, and post-conviction counsel for the defendants in the cases for which data were missing. *See* Ex. 75 (McIntosh Aff.) ¶ 10; Ex. 79 (Ashley Stancik Aff. ¶¶ 4–9 (Mar. 7, 2016)).

- Ultimately, Mr. Flowers’s post-conviction team obtained complete data for 13 capital cases tried by Doug Evans, including four prosecutions of Curtis Flowers.⁶⁹ *See* Ex. 75 (McIntosh Aff.) ¶¶ 6, 9, 11.
- Once the universe of cases with complete data had been determined, post-conviction counsel worked with several experts to process the data. The steps those experts took to analyze the data are explained in detail in the Affidavit of Barbara O’Brien, attached hereto as Ex. 76, and the Affidavit of John Green and David May, attached hereto as Ex. 77.

In light of the staggering amount of resources—in terms of both manpower and cost—required to collect and analyze these data, this evidence could not, “in practical reality . . . have been raised at trial or on direct appeal,” and therefore is properly before the Court at this stage of the proceedings.⁷⁰ *Foster v. State*, 687 So. 2d 1124, 1129 (Miss. 1996).

The results of the data analysis are nothing short of shocking. Two separate statistical analyses, each described in detail below, reveal that, across the 13 cases analyzed, Mr. Evans exercises peremptory challenges at a much higher rate against black venire members than against white venire members:

⁶⁹ These include the prosecutions of: Billy Joe Barnett, Lawrence Branch, Roderick Eskridge, Deondray Johnson, Barry Love, Terry Pitchford, Christopher Rosenthal, Bradford Staten, Krishun Williams and Derrick Willis (tried together as co-defendants), and the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth trials of Curtis Flowers. In addition to the first two capital prosecutions of Curtis Flowers, District Attorney Doug Evans tried six additional capital cases in which the post-conviction team was unable to obtain race information for venire members. These cases therefore were excluded from the statistical analysis. These cases include the prosecutions of: Frederick Bell, Anthony Doss, Christopher Fair, Markeith Fleming, William Joseph Holly, Edwin Hart Turner. A detailed explanation of the efforts undertaken to obtain the missing information for these cases is set forth in the affidavit of Ashley Stancik at ¶¶ 4–9 (Ex. 79). Notably, of the 77 venire panel members in the Barnett case, post-conviction counsel were unable to obtain race information for two jurors. Ex. 75 (McIntosh Aff.) ¶ 11.

⁷⁰ To the extent the Court determines that trial counsel could have adduced this evidence prior to trial—which they could not have, Ex. 78 (De Gruy Aff.) ¶ 5—Mr. Flowers submits their failure to do so was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Strike-eligible venire member analysis: Professors Barbara O'Brien and Catherine Grosso undertook an analysis of Mr. Evans's peremptory strike rate of "strike-eligible" jurors—*i.e.*, potential jurors who were not excused for cause or because enough jurors had been selected by the time the court reached them. *See* Ex. 76 (O'Brien Aff.) ¶¶ 3–6 (explaining methodology). Across all strike-eligible venire members in the study, District Attorney Evans struck 65.1% of eligible black venire members, compared to only 8.2% of eligible white venire members. In other words, Mr. Evans was, on average, nearly ***eight times*** more likely to strike a black qualified venire member than a white qualified venire member. *Id.* at ¶ 8 & Table 2. There is less than a one in one thousand chance that a disparity of this magnitude would occur if the jury selection process were race neutral. *Id.* This massive disparity persisted when the data were analyzed in the context of each trial included in the study. In each of those cases, Mr. Evans struck qualified black venire members at an average rate of 65.1%, but struck qualified white venire members at an average rate of 8.1%. *Id.* at ¶ 8 & Table 3. Thus, prosecutors struck qualified venire members who were black at more than eight times the rate they struck qualified white venire members. *Id.*

When the four *Flowers* trials in the study were analyzed separately, the disparities were even sharper. In those cases, Mr. Evans struck 72.9% of qualified black venire members, compared to just 3.2% of qualified white venire members. *Id.* at ¶ 9 & Table 4. Thus, Mr. Evans ***struck qualified venire members who were black at 20.4 times the rate he struck white qualified venire members.*** *Id.* This pattern across the *Flowers* trials is consistent with the pattern evidenced in Mr. Flowers's most recent trial. *Id.* at ¶ 11 & Table 1. In that trial, Mr. Evans struck 71.4% of qualified venire members who were black, compared to 4.0% of qualified

white venire members. In other words, Mr. Evans struck qualified venire members who were black at 17.9 times the rate he struck qualified white venire members. *Id.*

Full venire analysis: Separately, Professors John Green and David May undertook an analysis of the rate of peremptory strikes as compared to the full venire panel. *See* Ex. 77 (John J. Green & David May (Mar. 15, 2016)) ¶¶ 3–6 (describing methodology). Using cross-tabulation analysis, which is used for identifying if there is a pattern between categories on one variable and categories on a second variable, they determined that, across the 13 cases in the study, District Attorney Evans was more than five times as likely to strike a black venire member than a white venire member (3.8% of white venire members versus 19.9% of black venire members). *See id.* ¶¶ 8–9. Based on this preliminary analysis, Professors Green and May concluded that there was a “moderately strong” association between a potential juror’s race and being struck by Mr. Evans. *Id.* ¶ 11. The probability of finding this association across the populations of potential jurors from 13 different cases if there was no association between race and being struck is less than one in one thousand. *Id.* ¶ 12.

Next, using logistic regression analysis, which is used to model the likelihood of a potential juror being struck by District Attorney Evans, Professors Green and May determined that, across the 13 cases analyzed, black venire members were more than six times (6.322) as likely to be peremptorily struck by Mr. Evans than white venire members. *Id.* ¶¶ 13–15. This finding remained true even when Professors Green and May controlled for the influence of any individual case factors that may have affected the analysis. *Id.* ¶¶ 19–22.

Finally, Professors Green and May conducted a layered cross tabulation to assess whether race was associated with being struck by District Attorney Evans. *Id.* ¶ 23. They ran this analysis separately for the non-*Flowers* and *Flowers* cases in the study. *Id.* Across the nine

non-Flowers cases, African-American venire members were more than 3.9 times as likely to be peremptorily struck than white venire members. *Id.* ¶ 23(a). Across the four *Flowers* cases, African-American venire members were nearly 16 times (15.769) as likely to be peremptorily struck as white venire members. *Id.* ¶ 23(b). From this analysis, Professors Green and May determined that in the non-Flowers cases there was a moderately strong association between the race of potential jurors and whether they were struck by Mr. Evans, and that in the Flowers cases, this association was strong. *Id.* ¶ 24.

Overall, on the basis of all methods of analysis they used, Professors Green and May determined that “black potential jurors had an increased likelihood of being struck by the DA relative to white potential jurors. We found this pattern consistently, even when controlling for individual court cases. Furthermore, the association between race and being struck was strongest (i.e. of the greatest magnitude) for the Flowers cases.” *Id.* ¶ 25.

ii. *Statistical analysis of capital and non-capital cases tried by Mr. Evans’s office.*

This pattern of racial discrimination in jury selection extended beyond capital cases. In 2018, a team of investigators and a data analyst from APM Reports added to the already-voluminous statistical evidence documenting Mr. Evans’s history of racial discrimination.

They gathered data on both capital and non-capital cases tried by Mr. Evans or others in his office from 1992 to 2017, and found that the prosecutors were 4.4 times more likely to strike black qualified jurors than white qualified jurors. *See* Craft, Report. Further, APM determined that this disparity was most directly tied to race, even when controlling for race-neutral factors such as the juror’s criminal history, or a prior relationship with the defendant.

Id.

APM's analysis was exhaustive and followed a well-established methodology. Because there are no complete records of trials in Mississippi's Fifth District, where Mr. Evans has served as the District Attorney, the APM team had to generate their own. Will Craft, *Peremptory Strikes in Mississippi's Fifth Circuit Court District*, APM Reports 3–4 <http://tinyurl.com/yxrqxcu2> (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) [hereinafter "Craft, Strike Methodology"].

They created a list of capital and non-capital trials through records requests and by reviewing hand-written docket books at each of the eight courthouses in the district. *Id.* They also visited the Mississippi Department of History and Archives and the Mississippi Supreme Court Archives to fill in any gaps. *Id.* In the end, they gathered more than 115,000 pages of court records and jury-selection transcripts from 418 trials that were prosecuted by Mr. Evans or one of his assistants from 1992 to 2017. *Id.*; *see also* Craft, Report.

After locating court files and transcripts of trial proceedings, the journalists catalogued five pieces of information:

1. A record of all the potential jurors called for jury duty, referred to as the venire.
2. A record of the peremptory strikes exercised by both the prosecution and the defense, written down by either the judge or the court reporter.
3. The race of each potential juror, written down by either the judge or the court reporter on the margins of the list of potential jurors.
4. The list of jurors selected for jury duty.
5. A transcript of voir dire, the process of questioning potential jurors prior to selecting a jury.

Craft, Strike Methodology at 3–4. The journalists recorded the information into a database,

which they subsequently made available online.⁷¹ Craft, Strike Methodology at 4; *see APM Reports / jury-data*, GitHub, <https://github.com/APM-Reports/jury-data>.

In total, APM identified race data on 6,763 potential jurors in 225 trials. Craft, Strike Methodology at 5. Of those 6,763, 5,131 potential jurors were eligible to be struck by the District Attorney’s office. *Id.* Of those 5,131, 65% were white, and 35% were black. *Id.* Two jurors were of another race. *Id.* APM analyzed the “raw strike rates” and found a “clear disparity” in the way prosecutors exercised their peremptory strikes. *Id.* at 6. For instance, prosecutors struck 49.81% of qualified black venire members, but only 11.21% of qualified white venire members. *Id.* In other words, prosecutors in the Fifth District were 4.4 times more likely to strike black qualified venire members than white qualified venire members. *Id.* This difference continued even after APM filtered the data to analyze strike rates in each of the seven counties in the district, for various categories of crime, and based on the race of the defendants. *Id.* APM “found no way to slice up the data where the state struck white and black jurors in equal measure.” *Id.*

To test whether race-neutral topics raised during *voir dire* explained the strike rates, APM read juror responses to questions in the 89 trials for which they had complete *voir dire* transcripts.⁷² *Id.* at 5. They then coded the juror responses to the questions asked during *voir dire* using a set of 67 variables, or characteristics that may have influenced the strike decision.

⁷¹ APM Reports described the process for this analysis as “arduous.” Craft, Report. Considering the tremendous amount of resources that went into collecting and analyzing the data, the evidence could not, “in practical reality . . . have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” *Foster*, 687 So. 2d at 1129. This evidence is properly before the Court at this time. However, to the extent the Court determines that trial counsel could have adduced this evidence prior to trial, Mr. Flowers submits their failure to do so was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Id. at 4–5, 9. Next, APM built a logistic regression model “[u]sing whether the juror was struck by the state or not as the dependent variable and the juror’s responses during voir dire as the input data.” *Id.* at 9. APM ran all of the 67 variables through the logistic regression model.⁷³ *Id.*

APM found that seven factors had a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a potential juror would be struck, including the juror being accused of a crime, the juror having family accused of a crime, and the juror knowing the defendant. Craft, Strike Methodology at 9.

However, race was one of the most powerful indicators in predicting whether a juror would be struck. *Id.* at 9–10. “[N]o variable explained away the importance of race.” *Id.* at 10, 13. The “vast” racial disparity in the prosecutors’ use of peremptory strikes “persisted regardless of how the jurors answered.” Craft, Report. For example, that a juror had been accused of a crime increased the juror’s chance of being struck by prosecutors. Craft, Strike Methodology at 11. But black potential jurors who had been accused of a crime were still struck at a much higher rate than white potential jurors who had also been accused of a crime. *Id.* Indeed, prosecutors struck 96% of black potential jurors accused of a crime, but only 60% of white potential jurors accused of a crime. *Id.*

The logistic regression model also produced an “odds ratio,” which “was essentially a measure of how a juror’s race affected his or her chances of being excluded from the jury by the

⁷² The strike rate for the smaller sample (89 trials) was similar to the larger sample (225 trials). *Id.* at 9. The ratio between whites and blacks struck by prosecutors was 4.4 for the larger sample and 4.8 for the smaller sample. *Id.*

⁷³ After APM Reports published its data and methodology, Professors O’Brien and Grosso reviewed the research critically to evaluate its quality. See Ex. 80 (Barbara O’Brien and Catherine M. Grosso Suppl. Aff. (Dec. 12, 2018)) ¶ 4. Professors O’Brien and Grosso concluded that the “research would hold up to rigorous peer review.” *Id.* at ¶ 6. Indeed, “APM Reports followed well-established and reliable research methods”—methods that “scholars use to analyze the role of race in jury selection.” *Id.*

prosecution.” Craft, Report. APM found that a “black juror’s odds of being struck were 6 1/2 times greater than the odds of an otherwise similar white juror’s despite answering questions during jury selection the same way.” *Id.*

Finally, APM Reports ran a logistic regression model on the strike data from the 13 capital cases tried by Mr. Evans. Confirming Professors O’Brien and Grosso’s analysis, APM also found that black potential jurors were over eight times more likely to be struck than white jurors in capital cases. “Being black was the greatest predictor of being struck in capital trials, even more than expressing hesitation about imposing the death penalty.” Craft, Strike Methodology at 12.⁷⁴

Overall, APM Reports concluded that black qualified venire members were significantly more likely to be struck by prosecutors in Mr. Evans’s office than white qualified venire members. *Id.* This remained true even after controlling for race-neutral factors. *Id.*

* * * * *

The obvious take-away from these data is that being African-American significantly increases a potential juror’s likelihood of being peremptorily struck by Mr. Evans.⁷⁵ *See, e.g.,*

⁷⁴ After reviewing APM Reports’ analysis of prosecutorial strikes, Professors O’Brien and Grosso also concluded that APM’s findings of strike disparities across 225 trials are consistent with their own analysis of prosecutorial strikes in 13 capital cases, though slightly lower. Ex. 80 (O’Brien and Gross Suppl. Aff.) ¶¶ 7–10. And APM Reports’ finding strengthened their confidence in the validity of their own analysis. *Id.* at ¶ 14.

⁷⁵ In three non-*Flowers* capital cases, Mr. Evans succeeded in seating all-white juries notwithstanding that the population of the counties from which the respective juries were drawn were more than 40 percent African-American. *See* Deondray Johnson, trial ct. case # 2002-0067-CR and Billy Joe Barnett, trial ct. case # 9943 (tried in Attala County, which was 42% African-American in 2010, *see* United States Census Bureau, *Attala County, Mississippi, 2010 Census Summary File 1*, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/0500000US28007 (last visited Feb. 25, 2019)); Christopher Rosenthal, trial ct. case # 2000-133-CR (tried in Grenada County, which was 41.7% African-American in 2010, *see* United States Census Bureau, *Grenada County, Mississippi, 2010 Census Summary File 1*, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/0500000US28043 (last visited Feb.

Ex. 77 (Green & May Aff.) ¶ 25; Ex. 33 (O’Brien Aff.) ¶ 7–11; Ex. 80 (O’Brien and Gross Suppl. Aff.) ¶¶ 9–14; Craft, Report; Craft, Strike Methodology. And the association between race and being struck was even stronger for the *Flowers* trials than in non-*Flowers* trials. Ex. 77 (Green & May Aff.) ¶ 25; Ex. 76 (O’Brien Aff.) ¶ 7–11. Moreover, it is clear that this disparity is not coincidental: Race was the most powerful factor explaining strike disparities over the course of Mr. Evans’s 26 years as District Attorney. Craft, Strike Methodology at 10–13; *see also* Craft, Report.

This new evidence supplies powerful confirmation that race was the reason only one African-American sat on the jury that convicted Mr. Flowers and sentenced him to death. That conclusion is underscored when the newly discovered data are viewed in tandem with Mr. Evans’s demonstrated track record of excluding African-Americans from jury service in the *Flowers* prosecutions—peremptorily striking every African-American tendered for service in *Flowers I* and *II*, using all of his peremptory challenges to strike African-Americans in *Flowers III* and *IV*, and warning off future potential African-American jurors by prosecuting two African-American jurors for perjury after *Flowers V* ended in a mistrial.

The Supreme Court made clear in *Miller-El II* that a history of systemic exclusion of minorities from jury service is evidence of a *Batson* violation. 545 U.S. at 263 (“There is a final body of evidence that confirms this conclusion. We know that for decades leading up to the time this case was tried prosecutors in the Dallas County office had followed a special policy of systemically excluding blacks from juries[.]”). In *Miller-El II*, the relevant history of systemic

25, 2019)). In a fourth capital case, Evans secured a jury of 11 whites and one African-American, notwithstanding that the venire after challenges for cause was 36 percent African-American. *See Pitchford v. State*, 45 So. 3d 216, 263 (Miss. 2010) (Graves, J., dissenting). Two justices of the

exclusion pertained to the prosecutor's *office*, and the Court found that to be powerful evidence of discrimination. *Id.* Here, the evidence is even more powerful because it demonstrates a history of systemic exclusion of African-Americans from jury service by the very prosecutor who tried the case at issue.

The Ninth Circuit also specifically recognized the relevance of a prosecutor's "history of unconstitutional race-based peremptory strikes" when determining whether a prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking jurors are pretextual in *Currie v. McDowell*, 825 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2016). In *Currie*, the same prosecutor tried the same defendant three times for the same crime. *Id.* After the first trial and conviction, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that the prosecutor violated *Batson* by striking African-American jurors from service. *Id.* at 606. During *voir dire* in the second trial, the trial court declared a mistrial after ruling that the prosecutor once again violated *Batson* by striking African-American jurors. *Id.* During the third trial, the prosecutor struck one African-American using a peremptory strike. *Id.* at 605. The court denied defense counsel's *Batson* claim, the case continued to trial, and the defendant was convicted. *Id.* at 608.

Back before the Ninth Circuit on habeas review, the court noted its obligation to inquire into "the totality of the relevant facts about a prosecutor's conduct," and concluded that the prosecutor's "history of *Batson* violations [was] one such relevant fact." *Id.* at 610 (internal quotations omitted). The court reasoned that in *Miller-El II*, "the Supreme Court used the fact that prosecutors belonged to a district attorney's office with a history of racial bias to bolster its finding of a *prima facie* case. In this instance, it is not only the same office, but the same

Mississippi Supreme Court dissented from the denial of relief on Mr. Pitchford's *Batson* claim, finding that Evans used peremptory challenges "to exclude African-Americans from the jury." *Id.* at 261.

prosecutor, who brings a history of *Batson* violations with him.” *Id.* at 610–611. The court granted the defendant habeas relief after holding that the prosecutor’s “history of *Batson* violations and pretextual reasons in this case lead us to conclude that race was a substantial motivating factor for his strike” of the African-American juror.⁷⁶ *Id.* at 614 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Again, the evidence is even more powerful in this case. Not only is there evidence that the same prosecutor struck jurors on the basis of race in a series of cases involving the same defendant, but there is also evidence that the same prosecutor and his office struck African-American jurors at a significantly higher rate than white jurors over the course of his career as District Attorney.

“As we were recently reminded in *Foster* . . . people hide discriminatory intent behind seemingly legitimate reasons.” *Veasey v. Abbott*, 830 F.3d 216, 236 (5th Cir. 2016). The trial judge erred in “blindly accept[ing] any and every reason put forth by the State, especially [given that] here, the State continues to exercise challenge after challenge only upon members of a particular race.” *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 937.

b. Disparate questioning of African-American and white jurors.

“[C]ontrasting *voir dire* questions posed respectively to black and nonblack panel members” are probative of purposeful discrimination, *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 233, and here, the State’s questioning of African-American and white jurors during *voir dire* was starkly different. Each of the five struck African-American jurors was asked at least five questions by the State

⁷⁶ The court also determined that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking the juror were pretextual because “each reason was either unreasonable, demonstrably false, or applied just as well to the non-black jurors [the prosecutor] allowed to remain on the jury.” *Id.* at 605.

during individual *voir dire*.⁷⁷ Those five jurors were asked a total of 146 questions, averaging 29 questions each,⁷⁸ whereas the average number of questions asked of white jurors was two, and no white juror was asked more than six questions. In fact, nine white jurors were asked no questions by the prosecution on individual *voir dire*, and 23 white jurors were asked no questions by the State other than generic inquiries related to bias and their understanding of a bifurcated trial. Of the 11 seated white jurors, none was asked more than three questions during individual *voir dire*, for a total of 12 questions and an average of 1.1 questions per seated white juror.⁷⁹ Perhaps most startling, the State tendered four white jurors—Larry Blaylock, Harold Waller, Marcus Fielder, and Bobby Lester—without having asked them a single question during individual *voir dire*, notwithstanding the fact that each had volunteered that they had relationships with defense witnesses. In contrast, the State probed deeply into those relationships when questioning African-American jurors, *see, e.g.*, Tr. 1406–07 (inquiring one-by-one into each of the witnesses African-American venire member Diane Copper knew), and relied heavily upon such relationships in justifying strikes against African-American jurors.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Alexander Robinson was the first African-American panelist tendered and the only African-American juror seated. Mr. Evans also asked Mr. Robinson five questions, but four repeated questions already asked by the judge. *See* Tr. 1147–48.

⁷⁸ *See* Tr. 965–966, 1164 (five questions to Carolyn Wright); Tr. 987–988, 1295–97 (28 questions to Tashia Cunningham); Tr. 960, 964–965, 974–975, 1302–07 (34 questions to Edith Burnside); Tr. 967–968, 989–991, 1362–64 (34 questions to Flancie Jones); Tr. 971–974, 1405–407 (45 questions to Dianne Copper).

⁷⁹ *See* Tr. 1123 (zero questions to Susan O’Quinn); Tr. 1155 (three questions to Janelle Johnson); Tr. 1178 (three questions to Lillie Mae Laney); Tr. 1182 (zero questions to Larry Blaylock); Tr. 1190–91 (three questions to Suzanne Winstead); Tr. 1196 (zero questions to Jennifer Chatham); Tr. 1209 (zero questions to Jeffrey Whitfield); Tr. 1223 (two questions to Barron Davis); Tr. 1255 (zero questions to Marcus Fielder); Tr. 1385 (zero questions to Emily Branch); Tr. 1412–13 (one question to James Hargrove).

⁸⁰ The prosecution also engaged in a line of questioning with potential juror Diane Copper wholly irrelevant to her ability to be a fair juror, and highly suggestive of “fishing” for a facially neutral pretext. During group *voir dire*, Ms. Copper had volunteered that she lived a couple of blocks from the Flowers residence, but stated that her house was not on the same street. Tr. 971. The State never asked other

This disparate questioning is strong evidence of pretext. *See Miller El-I*, 537 U.S. at 344 (“[T]he use of disparate questioning is determined by race at the outset, it is likely a justification for a strike based on the resulting divergent views would be pretextual.”).

c. Acceptance of white jurors sharing the proffered reason for the strike of African-American jurors.

Were more needed to expose the State’s true motivations in its exercise of peremptory challenges, a side-by-side comparison of African-American venire panelists struck by the State against white panelists whom the State accepted for service supplies it. “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 241. Here, the plausibility of Evans’s stated reason for several strikes is “severely undercut by [his] failure to object to other panel members who expressed views much like [the struck black jurors’].” *Id.* at 248.

Most apparent here was that the State’s treatment of jurors who knew defense witnesses varied markedly depending on the race of the juror. For example, as one of its claimed reasons for striking African-American venire panelist Carolyn Wright, the State asserted that she knew “almost every [d]efense witness in this case.” Tr. 1763. But Wright had specifically and unequivocally stated that she could put aside her connections to all of the witnesses she knew. Tr. 1165; *see also* Tr. 782, 909, 923, 925, 934, 1028, 1075–76. Moreover, she also knew

jurors about their proximity to the Flowers residence. But after Ms. Copper offered this information, the State prodded her with questions implying cause for concern that she was a “neighbor” of the Flowers family. Tr. 972, 974. Defense counsel objected to the use of such strong language when it appeared Ms. Copper was only indicating she lived in the general vicinity of the Flowers home, a seemingly insignificant fact considering the small size of the Winona community as a whole. When prodded by the State about whether the proximity of her residence would affect Ms. Copper’s thinking, she responded,

several prosecution witnesses, including Porky Collins and former sheriff Bill Thornburg. Tr. 906, 910.

The State also cited relationships with “many [d]efense witnesses” as a reason justifying its strike of Dianne Copper. Tr. 1793–94. In truth, what Copper had said was that she previously worked with Mr. Flowers’s father, Archie, Sr., at Wal-Mart, Tr. 770, 1406, but that being his former coworker would not affect her ability to fairly judge the case, Tr. 1408. Copper also stated she had previously worked with Mr. Flowers’s sister at Shoe World, but that it was for less than a year and they had a “working relationship.” Tr. 973. Moreover, Copper reported a possible pro-prosecution bias: her husband had worked at Tardy Furniture. Tr. 1030. And Copper reported that she knew many prosecution witnesses that could have generated bias in favor of the prosecution, including: Odell Hallmon, Tr. 910; Clemmie Fleming, Tr. 906; Katherine Snow Tr. 906; Sheriff Bill Thornburg, *id.*; and Patricia Hallmon Sullivan-Odom, Tr. 909. Mr. Evans did not question her about these relationships.

By contrast, the State was not at all concerned with white jurors’ relationships with defense witnesses. Pamela Chesteen, Harold Waller, and Bobby Lester were all tendered by the State despite each having reported relationships with defense witnesses.⁸¹

“No. No it wouldn’t be a problem.” Tr. 972. Nonetheless, the next day, the State asked several more questions about Ms. Copper’s residence. Tr. 1405.

⁸¹ The State also cited connections to the defense as among its justifications for the strikes of Edith Burnside and Tashia Cunningham. In both cases, these reasons are also made suspect by the State’s disinterest in white jurors’ connections to the defense. The State’s race-neutral reasons for striking Edith Burnside included her relationship with Curtis Flowers, whom Ms. Burnside said had been friends with her son *when they were children*. Tr. 768. During *voir dire*, she stated unequivocally on at least three occasions that the relationship would not affect her. Tr. 768; 975, 1027–28. Perhaps Mr. Evans did not believe her, though if so, the suspicion is raised that it was race that made him disbelieve her, given that he was so sanguine about white jurors’ connections to the defense that he did even bother to *voir dire* them on the issue. Even more suspect are the actions taken by the State with respect to Ms. Cunningham. Mr. Evans cited Ms. Cunningham’s relationship with Flowers’s sister, Sherita Baskin, and her purported “lie[] under *voir dire*” in saying that she did not work physically close to Baskin at ADP. Tr. 1775–76. Ms.

White juror Pamela Chesteen was tendered by the State despite having admitted she knew more than a dozen witnesses, including several members of Mr. Flowers's immediate family: Archie, Sr. (Crutis Flowers's father),⁸² Lola (Curtis Flowers's mother), and Archie, Jr. (Curtis Flowers's brother), Angela Jones, Connie Moore, Denise Kendle, Emmitt Simpson, Hazel Jones, Henry Stansberry, Kittery Jones, Latarsha Blissett, Liz Vanhorn, Nelson Forrest, and Rev. Jimmy Lewis Forrest. Tr. 792, 920–921, 923, 925, 928, 930–933; 935. When the judge asked whether she could set aside her relationships with Mr. Flowers's family, the best she could do was to say, "I will do my best." Tr. 793. Notwithstanding these ties to defense witness or Chesteen's equivocal answer on bias, Evans tendered Chesteen as a juror—without asking her any questions about these relationships. Tr. 1169.

Likewise, the State tendered white juror Harold Waller despite his acknowledgement of relationships with 17 witnesses. Tr. 1204. Waller indicated he had known Derrick Stewart and knew Liz Vanhorn, Rev. Billy Little, Robert Merrit, Barry Eskridge, Bill Thornburg, Porky Collins, Jerry Bridges, Randy Keenum, Randy Stewart, John Johnson, Wayne Miller, James

Cunningham testified that Ms. Baskin worked "at the front of the line, and I work at the end of the line," and characterized the relationship as "just a working relationship." Tr. 987. Ms. Cunningham was asked whether her relationship with Ms. Baskin would affect her and she said "no." Tr. 1297. As defense counsel noted in rebuttal, the State accepted similar assurances of neutrality from at least two white jurors, but it did not accept the truthfulness of Ms. Cunningham's testimony. Instead, during individual *voir dire*, Mr. Evans returned to the subject. Ms. Cunningham maintained that she did not work in close proximity to Ms. Baskin, even after Mr. Evans asked her to "think about that for a minute" and reminded her that she was "saying that under oath." Tr. 1296–97. Later, Mr. Evans called Crystal Carpenter, a quality control clerk at ADP, to testify that Ms. Cunningham and Ms. Baskin worked "about nine or ten inches" apart, "side by side." Tr. 1328–29. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Carpenter if she could obtain proof from "human resources" to substantiate her testimony, and she responded, "I will"; despite a second request by the defense, this evidence was never submitted. Tr. 1330, 1782. Mr. Evans did not claim to have conducted similar investigations into any of the white panellists' relationships.

⁸² Further, Ms. Chesteen had a work-related connection with Archie Flowers. She was a teller in the bank where Archie (and some other family members) were customers and she knew them from her work there. Tr. at 792–793.

Taylor Williams, Dennis Woods, and Carmen Rigby. Tr. 862, 905–906, 910, 912–913, 915–916, 918, 920, 924, 932, 1042–43. The State declined to ask a single question, on any subject, of Mr. Waller. Tr. 1204.

White juror Bobby Lester was also tendered by the State despite having admitted knowing over 25 witnesses in the case, including six defense witnesses: Emmitt Simpson, Hazel Jones, Latarsha Blissett, Liz Vanhorn, Nelson Forrest, and Rev. Jimmy Lewis Forrest. Tr. 920–921, 928, 930–932. Despite these numerous connections, the State declined to ask a single question of Lester on individual *voir dire*. Tr. 1338.⁸³

These race-neutral reasons, then, “are difficult to credit because the State willingly accepted white jurors with the same traits that supposedly rendered [black jurors] unattractive.” *Foster*, 136 S. Ct. at 1750.

d. Lack of record support for the reason cited.

That many of the reasons Mr. Evans cited for his strikes of African-American jurors are belied by the record is further proof that Mr. Evans’s strikes of African-American jurors were racially motivated. Indeed, where the stated reason for the strike is unsupported or plainly

⁸³ The disparate treatment of jurors who admitted they had not been completely truthful is also probative, albeit more complicated. Among the State’s reasons for striking prospective African-American juror Flancie Jones was her untruthful questionnaire response that she was strongly against the death penalty, an inaccuracy revealed by her answer to the very next question on the questionnaire that she “could consider the death penalty.” 1 Supp. C.P. 323b. She admitted her opposition to the death penalty in the questionnaire was a lie, stating “I guess I’d say anything to get off” being on the jury. Tr. 1364. While this lie provides a race neutral reason for the State to strike her, it also provides additional evidence of racial motivation. Prospective white juror Burrell Huggins was tendered by the State despite having lied on his questionnaire by denying that he had been summoned to serve on a jury previously. 1 Supp. C.P. 625. On individual *voir dire* Mr. Huggins was questioned about having been summoned for Flowers’s 2008 trial, and after several questions, Mr. Huggins admitted he had been summoned, then apologized, stating he is a generally honest person. Tr. 1649, 1728. Mr. Evans struck Ms. Jones but not Mr. Huggins. While they lied about different things on their juror questionnaires, both lies are relevant to the proceedings, and “[a] *per se* rule that a defendant cannot win a *Batson* claim unless there is an exactly

contradicted by the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court has not hesitated to find a *Batson* violation. See, e.g., *Hatfield v. State*, 161 So. 3d 125, 139 (Miss. 2015) (finding that juror was not asleep as counsel had claimed); *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 925–926 (finding that prosecutor’s reasons for strikes were blatantly contradicted by the record); *Conerly*, 544 So. 2d at 1372–73 (finding that prosecutor’s justification was pretext where prosecution explained that it struck juror based on her supposed inability to fill out a court form or disclose her age to the court but those explanations were directly contradicted by the record).

Here, the State mischaracterized the record with respect to several African-American jurors. Mr. Evans’s statement that Carolyn Wright had relationships with “almost every [d]efense witness” in the case, Tr. 1763, for example, was a half-truth. Ms. Wright also knew a plethora of prosecution witnesses; in fact, Ms. Wright acknowledged she knew more prosecution witnesses (19) than defense witnesses (17).⁸⁴ The State also cited Ms. Wright’s alleged relationship with Mr. Flowers’s sister, Sherita Baskin, as one of its reasons for striking Wright. Tr. 1763. This was untrue. Nowhere in the record did Ms. Wright mention any relationship with Ms. Baskin at all.⁸⁵ Tr. 1763. Finally, the prosecution cited Ms. Wright’s involvement in

identical white juror would leave *Batson* inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.” *Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 248, n.6.

⁸⁴ In total, Ms. Wright’s relationships with witnesses numbered seventeen: Archie Flowers, Sr., Connie Moore, Cora Flowers Tyson, the Flowers family, Denise Kendle, Emmitt Simpson, Frances Hayes, Hazel Jones, Kittery Jones, Larry Smith, Liz Vanhorn, May Ella Fleming, Nelson Forrest, Patricia Flowers Tyson, Ray Charles Weems, Rev. Jimmy Lewis Forrest, and Stacey Wright. The full list of acquaintance relationships Ms. Wright had with prosecution witnesses totals nineteen, as follows: Bart Eskridge, Beneva Henry, Bennie Rigby, Chief Johnny Hargrove, Clemmie Fleming, Danny Joe Lott, Dennis Woods, Doyle Simpson, Elaine Gholston, James Taylor Williams, Jerry Dale Bridges, Jessie Sawyer, Kenny Townsend, May Jeanette Fleming, Porky Collins, Vera Latham, Vernon Peeples, Vincent Small, and unspecified members of law enforcement.

⁸⁵ Mr. Evans also claimed that Ms. Wright “worked with [Flowers’] sister, Cora” at Shoe World. Tr. at 1774. The trial court agreed with defense counsel that the record did not support Mr. Evans’s assertion, saying “I don’t think this one worked with Cora at Shoe World.” *Id.* It was a different African-American panelist—Diane Copper—who worked with Cora at Shoe World. *Id.*

litigation with Tardy Furniture as one of its reasons for exercising a peremptory strike,⁸⁶ averring that Tardy Furniture “had to garnish her wages because of” the lawsuit. Tr. 1763. This, too, was inaccurate. Ms. Wright readily admitted Tardy Furniture had sued her and that she had paid it off, but the issue of garnished wages never came up. Tr. 965–967. Wright also testified she had nothing against the Tardy family and harbored no ill will. Tr. 1028. When the prosecution submitted “an abstract of justice court” from Wright’s lawsuit with Tardy Furniture, defense counsel’s question as to whether it contained “a garnishment order” went unanswered by the Court. Tr. 1770. Moreover, in addition to exaggerating the record, this reason reeks of pretext. Given that this trial was for a quadruple homicide—and only one of the victims was a Tardy—it blinks reality that the State would actually fear that a juror would be biased toward acquittal on the basis of prior litigation over an unpaid bill with Tardy Furniture.⁸⁷

With respect to African-American venire member Flancie Jones, the State claimed that she “is related to the Defendant . . . [h]e would be her nephew.” Tr. 1786. This was not true. Ms. Jones had testified that the “*court made me aware* that he is my sister-in-law’s sister’s son,” and said it would not affect nor influence her and she “could completely” set it aside. Tr. 754, 1363 (emphasis added). In fact, before having been told of the relationship, she “didn’t even know” about it. Tr. 989. And there is no significant relationship between Ms. Jones and Mr.

⁸⁶ When defense counsel asked the Court for time to investigate the prosecution’s proffered race-neutral reasons for striking Ms. Wright, she was rebuffed as making “an absurd request.” Tr. 1768. In light of this prosecutor’s blatantly discriminatory conduct in *Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 935 (characterizing the evidence as presenting “as strong a *prima facie* case of racial discrimination as we have ever seen in the context of a *Batson* challenge”), this request was not absurd.

⁸⁷ The State also cited a lawsuit with Tardy Furniture as one of the reasons for its strike of African-American juror Edith Burnside. Here, too, the State embellished the facts. The State claimed that Burnside “tried to deny” that she was involved in litigation with Tardy Furniture by saying she had settled the case. In fact, Burnside had testified she had an account with Tardy, but never denied that she

Flowers: Ms. Jones's testimony was that Curtis Flowers was her "sister-in-law's sister's son." Tr. 754. If there is any name at all for such a distant relationship, it is certainly not "nephew." Such exaggeration is probative of pretext. *Cf. Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 923 (strike violated *Batson* where the State exaggerated the juror's working relationship with Mr. Flowers's sister).

Turning to prospective juror Dianne Copper, the prosecution claimed that one of the reasons for its strike was that "[s]he's stated that she leaned toward favoring his side of the case." Tr. 1794. This statement was not only misleading, but disingenuous, given the State's leading questions. When prodded by the State about whether her working relationships with Archie, Sr. and Cora "may cause [her] to lean toward the defendant in the case," she responded "Yes, sir, it's possible," to which Evans responded, "Okay. Thank you, ma'am." Tr. 973. Notably, Ms. Copper volunteered a potentially significant relationship with the victim—a relationship that could favor the prosecution. Nevertheless, the prosecution declined to ask or infer whether that relationship would cause her to "lean toward" the prosecution; instead of asking Ms. Copper if she was "close" with the Tardy family, or if she ever "visit[ed] with" the Tardys, Mr. Evans asked a leading question attempting to minimize her association with them. Moreover, Ms. Copper admitted numerous relationships with prosecution witnesses, including Chief Hargrove, Clemmie Fleming, Danny Joe Lott, Dennis Woods, Doyle Simpson, Jerry Dale Bridges, and Porky Collins—relationships that might just as well have led to bias toward the prosecution, but these possibilities were not of interest to Mr. Evans because he was not attempting to assess her true feelings; instead, he was attempting to manufacture a reason to strike her.⁸⁸

had been sued. After Burnside was asked for clarification on the question, she acknowledged that she had been sued. Tr. 963–964.

⁸⁸ The prosecutor's later inquiry of Ms. Copper followed the same pattern of leading questions:

B. The State’s Racially Discriminatory Exercise Of Peremptory Strikes Also Violated The Constitutional Rights Of The Excluded African-American Jurors.

“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 87. Just as Mr. Flowers had a right to be tried by a jury selected by race-neutral means, the potential jurors, too, had a right to be free from discrimination.⁸⁹ *Powers*, 499 U.S. at 416; *see also Batson*, 476 U.S. at 87 (“Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try,” it also “unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded juror”). That right was violated. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a scenario where the harm to the community

MR. EVANS: And I think it was yesterday and my notes show that you said that the fact that you know all of these people could affect you and you think it could make you lean toward him because of your connections to all of these people. Is that correct?

MS. COPPER: It—it’s possible.

MR. EVANS: Okay. That would be something that would be entering into your mind if you were on the jury, wouldn’t it?

MS. COPPER: Yes, sir.

MR. EVANS: And it would make it to where you couldn’t come in here and, just with an open mind, decide the case, wouldn’t it?

MS. COPPER: Correct.

MR. EVANS: Okay. Nothing further, your Honor.

Tr. 1407. However, when then asked if she would follow the law and consider only the evidence presented in court, Ms. Copper said, “Yes sir. That’s correct.” Tr. 1409. And when asked by the trial court if she could find the defendant guilty, she said, “Yes, sir.” When asked once again if she could “listen to the evidence” and base her “decision strictly on the evidence and no outside factors,” she stated “[t]hat’s correct.” Tr. 1410.

⁸⁹ Mr. Flowers has standing to litigate this claim; “a defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race,” in large part because “a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights.” *Powers v. Ohio*, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).

from the State's discriminatory jury selection practices is more palpable, or runs more deeply, than this case.

That the State managed to seat all-white or nearly all-white juries in its prosecutions of Curtis Flowers is nothing short of extraordinary. The new evidence of Mr. Evans's track record with respect to peremptory strikes confirms that his strikes in Mr. Flowers's sixth trial were discriminatory. But this case shows that discriminatory strikes are not the only way to eliminate African-Americans from a jury.

During Mr. Flowers's fifth trial, the prosecution brought forth evidence indicating that one of the African-American alternate jurors, Mary Annette Purnell, had failed to answer questions truthfully during *voir dire* concerning her relationship with Mr. Flowers. Ms. Purnell was removed from the jury, charged with perjury, and incarcerated. Before Mr. Flowers's sixth trial, Ms. Purnell was prosecuted for two counts of perjury, for which she faced a potential 40-year prison sentence. Ms. Purnell pled guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence of 10 years, of which she would serve 15 months.⁹⁰

The State did not stop with Ms. Purnell. After a mistrial was declared due to the jury's inability to reach a verdict in *Flowers V*, African-American juror James Bibbs was also charged with perjury based on information provided by another juror that Mr. Bibbs had outside knowledge relevant to the case. There was no suggestion that Mr. Bibbs ever had contact with Mr. Flowers, any member of his family, or anyone connected to Mr. Flowers in any way. Nevertheless, Mr. Bibbs was charged and hauled off to jail straight away after the trial concluded, on \$20,000 bond. *Flowers V* Tr. 569–570 (“And Mr. Bibbs, you are free to go in handcuffs.

⁹⁰ See *Perjured juror in murder trial pleads guilty*, The Mississippi Link (Nov. 17, 2009), <http://themississippilink.com/2009/11/17/perjured-juror-in-murder-trial-pleads-guilty/>.

And when you post \$20,000 bond, you are free to be released at that time.”). Mr. Evans then indicted Mr. Bibbs for perjury. Ultimately, the State of Mississippi dropped the charges against Mr. Bibbs once the Attorney General’s Office took over the case in the wake of Mr. Evans’s recusal from further involvement, conducted an independent review, and concluded that the charges should be dismissed.⁹¹ But the damage had been done: African-Americans throughout Montgomery County learned the painful and unforgettable lesson that if they served on a *Flowers* jury, it would be at their peril.

Statements made after *Flowers V* indicated that the State viewed jury service by African-Americans in Montgomery County as problematic. During the Court’s questioning of Mr. Bibbs regarding his supposed perjury, the Court encouraged District Attorney Evans to enlist the assistance of the Prosecutor’s Association in lobbying the legislature to amend the laws of this State to allow prosecutors to move for change of venue. *Flowers V* Tr. 570 (“Mr. Evans, I would encourage you to get with the prosecutor’s association, the attorney general of this state and others in an attempt to get some legislation passed to address this problem[.]”). The State enthusiastically heeded that call to action. On the heels of the Court’s comments, the Mississippi Senate passed a bill that would draw the jury from a wider geographical area than the county where the crime was committed. Miss. SB 2069 (2009 Regular Session), <http://tinyurl.com/y3z3wxds>.⁹² Proposed legislation was also introduced in the Mississippi

⁹¹ *Charges dismissed against perjured Flowers’ juror*, The Mississippi Link (Oct. 8, 2009), <http://themississippilink.com/2009/10/08/charges-dismissed-against-perjured-flowers-juror/>

⁹² The bill was sponsored by Republican State Senator Lydia Chassaniol, a member of the Council of Conservative Citizens (“CCC”), who gave the keynote address at the CCC annual convention in 2009. See Ward Schafer, *Minister Blasts Mississippi Senator’s Connections*, Jackson Free Press (July 10, 2009), <http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2009/jul/10/minister-blasts-mississippi-senators-connections/>. The CCC’s Statement of Principles includes the following: “*We also oppose all efforts to mix the races of mankind, to promote non-white races over the European-American people* through so-called

House that would permit the prosecution in a capital case to move for a change of venue. Miss. HB 302 (2009 Regular Session), <http://tinyurl.com/y46b844s>. Although neither bill became law, they were representative of an overt effort to ensure that the jury in Mr. Flowers’s sixth trial would be whiter.

The message to the African-American community that emerged from these combined State actions was clear, and it was resounding: you are not welcome. *See* Ex. 82 (Max Mayes Aff. ¶¶ 10–12, 14, 16–17, 19, 21 (March 15, 2016)). That message permeated the African-American community especially deeply in light of the painful history of race discrimination in Mississippi, and in Montgomery County in particular. *See Miller-El II*, 545 U.S. at 237–238 (“Defendants are harmed, of course, when racial discrimination in jury selection compromises the right of trial by impartial jury . . . but racial minorities are harmed more generally, for prosecutors drawing racial lines in picking juries establish state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historic prejudice.”) (internal quotations omitted). And the message had its intended effect; several African-American prospective jurors have reported that they and other black venire members were aware of what had happened to James Bibbs, were fearful that the same thing would happen to them if they served on the jury, and thus made every attempt to avoid serving on the *Flowers* jury. *See* Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶¶ 10, 14, 16.

‘affirmative action’ and similar measures, to destroy or denigrate the European-American heritage, including the heritage of the Southern people, *and to force the integration of the races.*” Samuel Francis, *Statement of Principles*, ¶ 2, <http://conservative-headlines.org/statement-of-principles/> (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (emphasis added). The Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) has called CCC a “crudely white supremacist group” and has said of the organization: “The [CCC] is the modern reincarnation of the old White Citizens Councils, which were formed in the 1950s and 1960s to battle school desegregation in the South.” SPLC, *Council of Conservative Citizens*, <https://tinyurl.com/h2m9aho> (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). District Attorney Doug Evans also has delivered an address at a CCC meeting in Greenwood, Mississippi in 1991. *See* Ex. 81 (*DA Candidate Addresses Webster Chapter*, Citizen Informer Vol. 22 (Late Summer 1991)).

These prospective jurors remain fearful of retaliation even now, six years after Mr. Flowers’s trial. *See id.* ¶¶ 11–12, 17–21.

“Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is ‘a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.’” *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 87–88 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The State’s collective actions here—flagrant racial discrimination during jury selection, *see, e.g., Flowers III*, 947 So. 2d at 935; prosecuting several of the very few African-American jurors who did manage to make it onto a *Flowers* jury; and pursuing legislative action that would, effectively, make it easier for the State to seat white juries going forward—not only violated Mr. Flowers’s rights, but also violated the rights of the struck jurors and, more broadly, undermined public confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.

**GROUND E: CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF AN INTELLECTUALLY
DISABLED PERSON**

MR. FLOWERS’S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES THE
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HE IS
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED.

Mr. Flowers’s death sentences must be vacated because he is intellectually disabled⁹³ and thus ineligible for the death penalty. *See Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (categorically exempting intellectually disabled persons from capital punishment); *see also Moore v. Texas*, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017) (“Mild levels of intellectual disability . . . nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities.”); *Chase v. State*, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1026 (Miss. 2004) (hereinafter

⁹³ The terms “intellectually disabled” and “intellectual disability” have replaced the terms “mentally retarded” and “mental retardation” in the professional vernacular. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this change. *See Hall v. Florida*, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). This brief uses

“*Chase I*”) (“*Atkins* exempts **all** [intellectually disabled] persons—even those who are minimally [intellectually disabled]—from execution”) (emphasis in original).

Mr. Flowers’s claim that he is intellectually disabled and therefore cannot be executed is properly before the Court because the facts underlying this claim were not discovered until after trial and appeal. Moreover, the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act allows Mississippi Courts to grant relief if “the statute under which the conviction and/or sentence was obtained is unconstitutional” or if “the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law.” Miss. Code §§ 99-39-5(1)(c) and (d). Under well-settled law, illegal sentences, such as a death sentence for an intellectually disabled person, cannot be procedurally barred. *See, e.g., Stevenson v. State*, 674 So. 2d 501, 505 (Miss. 1996) (“[A defendant] can not be barred from challenging a sentence that we find as being unenforceable from the very beginning[A]n unenforceable sentence is nevertheless plain error and capable of being addressed.”). And the Mississippi Supreme Court has specifically held that constitutional questions about the imposition of the death penalty will be reviewed even if the issue was not properly preserved before the trial court. *Holly v. State*, 671 So. 2d 32, 42 (Miss. 1996).

Recent psychological evaluations show that Mr. Flowers is intellectually disabled and entitled to relief under *Atkins*, or at the very least is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

A. Mr. Flowers Is Entitled Relief Under *Atkins* Or, At Least, To An Evidentiary Hearing To Prove Further That He Is Intellectually Disabled.

“*Atkins* left to the states the task of defining intellectual disability.” *Chase v. State*, 171 So. 3d 463, 467 (Miss. 2015) (hereinafter “*Chase II*”). However, “states’ discretion to define

the term “intellectual disability,” and substitutes that term where “mental retardation” was used by courts

intellectual disability for Eighth Amendment purposes is not unlimited.” *Id.* at 469 (citing *Hall*, 134 S. Ct. at 1998). The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the medical community has a “significant role . . . in informing legal determinations of intellectual disability.” *Id.* at 470; *Moore*, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53 (“The medical community’s current standards supply one constraint on States’ leeway in this area.”). Mississippi has adopted the 2010 standards promulgated by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD”) and the 2013 standards promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) for use in determining whether a petitioner is intellectually disabled. *Chase II*, 171 So. 3d at 471, 487–488.

The 2010 AAIDD standard defines intellectual disability as being “characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills,” which must have originated prior to age 18. Robert L. Schalock, et. al, *Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support* 1 (11th ed. 2010). With respect to adaptive behavior, the AAIDD standard identifies three relevant domains:

The conceptual skills domain includes “language; reading and writing; and money, time, and number concepts.” The social skills domain includes “interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naïveté (i.e., wariness), follows rules/obeys laws, avoids being victimized, and social problem solving.” The practical skills domain includes “activities of daily living (personal care), occupational skills, use of money, safety, health care, travel/transportation, schedules/routines, and use of the telephone.”

and others.

Chase II, 171 So. 3d at 469 (internal citations omitted). For a diagnosis of intellectual disability under the 2010 AAIDD standard, an individual must have significant deficits in one of these three adaptive functioning domains. *Id.*

The 2013 APA standard similarly defines intellectual disability as “a disorder with onset during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.” APA, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* 33 (5th ed. 2013). As under the AAIDD standard, an individual who presents significant limitations in one of the three domains listed below is properly considered intellectually disabled under the new APA standard:

The ***conceptual (academic) domain*** involves competence in memory, language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition of practical knowledge, problems solving, and judgment in novel situations, among others. The ***social domain*** involves awareness of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy; interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social judgment, among others. The ***practical domain*** involves learning and self-management across life settings, including personal care, job responsibilities, money management, recreation, self-management of behavior, and school and work task organization, among others.

Id. at 37–38.

As the *Chase II* Court noted, “[t]he new AAIDD and APA definitions are similar and require the same three basic elements of intellectual disability as the earlier definitions: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation before age eighteen.” 171 So. 3d at 470.

Regarding adaptive functioning, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the focus of the inquiry is on an individual’s adaptive deficits, rather than his adaptive strengths, as confirmed by prevailing clinical standards. *Moore*, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 & n.8 (citing to AAIDD and APA standards and concluding that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overemphasized adaptive

strengths in finding that the defendant’s adaptive strengths “constituted evidence adequate to overcome the considerable objective evidence of [his] adaptive deficits”); *see also Brumfield v. Cain*, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) (“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have ‘strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise show an overall limitation.’” (quoting AAMR, *Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports* 8 (10th ed. 2002))).

At this stage of proceedings, to obtain a hearing on an *Atkins* claim in Mississippi, a petitioner must:

[A]ttach to the motion an affidavit from at least one [qualified] expert . . . who opines, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that: (1) the defendant has a combined Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) of 75 or below, and; (2) in the opinion of the expert, there is a reasonable basis to believe that, upon further testing, the defendant will be found [intellectually disabled.]

Chase I, 873 So. 2d at 1029. As shown below, Petitioner has established that Mr. Flowers is intellectually disabled, or at the very least, satisfies both criteria for an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim.

1. Expert Opinion That Petitioner’s IQ Is 75 Or Below, Which Is Within The Range Of Intellectual Disability.

On February 26, 2016, John R. Goff, Ph.D., administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV) to Mr. Flowers and obtained a Full Scale score of 75. Ex. 83 (John R. Goff, Ph.D. Aff. ¶ 20 (February 28, 2016)) [hereinafter “Goff Aff.”]. This score falls squarely within the acknowledged range for demonstrating sub-average intellectual functioning. *See Brumfield*, 135 S. Ct. at 2278 (“Brumfield’s reported IQ test result of 75 was squarely in the range of potential intellectual disability.”); *Hall*, 134 S. Ct. at 1999; *Atkins*, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 5;

Chase II, 171 So. 3d at 468. Moreover, when adjusted to account for the Flynn Effect,⁹⁴ Mr. Flowers’s Full Scale IQ score is 72. Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 22.

Dr. Goff also administered two validity tests—the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (“VSVT”) and the 21-item memory test—to Mr. Flowers in conjunction with his administration of the WAIS-IV on February 26, 2016. *Id.* ¶ 17. Those tests verified Dr. Goff’s clinical impression that Mr. Flowers put forth a genuine effort on the WAIS-IV and that he is not malingering his symptoms of intellectual disability. *Id.* ¶¶ 17–18.

Mr. Flowers’s IQ score of 72 recorded on February 26, 2016 is consistent with other indicia of his low IQ. As part of a psychological evaluation undertaken by the Mississippi Department of Corrections in April 2004, Mr. Flowers was administered the General Ability Measurement for Adults (“GAMA”). Ex. 84 (Miss. Dep’t of Corr., Psychol. Eval. Initial Screening (Apr. 29, 2004)). Dr. Fred J. Klopfer, who administered the test, rated Mr. Flowers’s “Intelligence Range” as “Below Average”—two deviations below “Average.”⁹⁵ *Id.*

These evaluations are consistent with measures of Mr. Flowers’s IQ during his developmental years. In 1978 (age 7) and 1979 (age 8), Mr. Flowers was administered the Short Form Test of Academic Aptitude (“SFTAA”), and received scores of 76 and 77, respectively. Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records). Applying the Flynn effect, Mr. Flowers’s score of 76 is adjusted to 74 and his score of 77 is adjusted to 75. Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 22.

⁹⁴ The Flynn Effect, or Flynn Correction, documents the phenomena by which IQ scores have increased over time, from one generation to the next. For the Wechsler (WISC and WAIS) and the Stanford–Binet IQ tests, the best rule of thumb is that Full Scale IQ gains have been proceeding at a rate of 0.30 points per year since 1947. This means that for every year that passes since an IQ test was “normed,” obsolescence inflates the score by 0.30 points. The Flynn Effect is considered to be an acceptable and necessary procedure to ensure correctness of IQ test scores. Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 22.

Based on all of the information described above, Dr. Goff concluded that Mr. Flowers has a combined IQ of 75 or below, which is within the range for a classification of intellectual disability. Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶¶ 20–22, 46; *Chase I*, 873 So. 2d at 1029.

2. Expert Opinion That Mr. Flowers Has Substantial Adaptive Skills Deficits That Manifested Prior To Age 18.

Dr. Goff has opined that “there are numerous indications for the presence of adaptive skills deficits during childhood and in adulthood determined by means of clinical evaluation and individualized measures.” Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 46. Further, Mr. Flowers’s “very substantial” adaptive deficits were present during the developmental period—i.e. before age 18. *Id.* ¶¶ 43, 41, 43. These conclusions are based on, *inter alia*: (i) the results of Adaptive Behavior Assessment System Scales testing administered to a cousin and childhood friend of Mr. Flowers and one of his former supervisors at work; (ii) statements in affidavits and/or interviews by Mr. Flowers’s friends and former teachers who knew Mr. Flowers during his developmental period; (iii) a review of Mr. Flowers’s school records and prior achievement testing records; and (ii) a review of Mr. Flowers’s employment records. *Id.* ¶ 6.

Mr. Flowers’s academic record was very poor throughout his childhood and adolescence, and provides substantial support for a finding of intellectual disability. As a first grader, he received “D” grades in Arithmetic, Reading, Spelling, and Writing, and a “C” in Language. Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records). Although his grades showed slight improvement at times during his elementary school years, his overall academic record was very poor. *Id.* In fact, his performance was so poor that he was placed into several remedial classes in elementary school.

⁹⁵ The possible outcomes on the examination include: “Very Superior,” “Superior,” “High Average,” “Average,” “Low Average,” “Below Average,” and “Well below Average.” Ex. 84 (Miss. Dep’t of Corr., Pscychol. Eval. Initial Screening).

Id.; *see also* Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 10. He was also placed in the lowest of five levels of students.

See Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 9. According to one of his fifth grade teacher, Olivia Townsend, Mr. Flowers struggled with academics, receiving many grades at or below 70, which “was an extremely low grade to receive in fifth grade.” *Id.* ¶ 35–36.

Mr. Flowers’s academic struggles only worsened when he reached junior high. In the eighth grade, Mr. Flowers failed Math and Social Studies, and barely passed English and Science. Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records). His eighth grade math teacher, Lillie Hamilton, confirms that Mr. Flowers “struggled in school” and “was one of the lowest performing students, if not the lowest, in his cohort.” Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 37. These numerous failing grades required him to repeat eighth grade. *Id.* at ¶¶ 8, 37. During his second year of eighth grade and in ninth grade, Mr. Flowers was again placed in a remedial reading class. Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records); *see also* Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 10.

These trends continued throughout high school. At Winona High School, classes were divided into four levels. Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 9. Levels 1 and 2 were for students on track to attend college. *Id.* Level 3 was for “average” students, and Level 4 was for the worst-performing students, who generally were heading toward vocational education. *Id.* Mr. Flowers was in Level 4, and was shifted into vocational classes for a large number of class credits in high school. *Id.* ¶ 14; Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records). His grades hovered mostly in the barely passing range throughout high school, and he failed Math in tenth grade and U.S. History in eleventh grade. Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records).

One of Mr. Flowers’s teachers, Ms. Annie Bennett, who taught him Science in eighth grade and “Family Living” in eleventh grade, has confirmed that Mr. Flowers struggled terribly in school, even with basic and vocation-oriented lessons. Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 38. The Family

Living course was a vocational course focused on “basic living skills,” such as making a grocery list or hands-on activities like cooking, cleaning a stove, cleaning the kitchen, dusting, giving a baby a bottle, making a bed, sewing a button or snap on a shirt. *Id.* Virtually all students got an “A” or “B” in the class, as long as they showed up and tried. *Id.* Mr. Flowers did show up and try, so the fact that he received a barely passing grade indicates that he did very poorly at all the exercises and assignments. *Id.*

Although Mr. Flowers graduated from high school, he did so last in his class (88/88). Ex. 85 (C. Flowers School Records). Interviews with Mr. Flowers’s teachers confirm that many students were passed through from grade level to grade level to ensure that they graduated, even if they were not actually able to perform at the minimum levels expected of them, a well-documented practice known as “social promotion.” Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 39–40.

In addition to his abysmal academic record, Dr. Goff relied on psychometric findings to assess Mr. Flowers’s adaptive deficits. *See id.* ¶¶ 24–29. He administered Adaptive Behavior Assessment System Scales tests to Kittery Jones, a cousin and childhood friend of Mr. Flowers, and Howard Alexander, a former co-worker and supervisor for Mr. Flowers. *Id.* ¶ 24. The results uniformly indicated “very substantial skills deficits” in most applicable areas. *Id.* ¶ 43. For example, the General Adaptive Composite scores were both in the 0.2 percentile; the Conceptual Composite scores were both in the 0.1 percentile; and the Practical Composite scores were both in the 0.1 percentile. *Id.* ¶¶ 26, 28.

These psychometric findings are consistent with other indicators of adaptive deficits that Dr. Goff considered, including the facts that:

- Mr. Flowers’s teachers and others who knew him in an academic setting viewed him as slow to react, and as having slow reasoning powers. *Id.* ¶¶ 36–39.

- Mr. Flowers’s long-term girlfriend stated that he never paid bills, handled rent money, or conducted other basic household or financial issues. *Id.* ¶¶ 30–31.
- Mr. Flowers’s former co-worker, who worked with Mr. Flowers at a convenience store starting when Mr. Flowers was around 13-years-old, stated that he was unable to perform basic tasks like making change and stocking shelves. *Id.* ¶ 32.
- Mr. Flowers’s cousin, who grew up with Mr. Flowers, described many instances in which Mr. Flowers injured himself due to clumsiness, and stated that Mr. Flowers would often get lost in the woods, unable to follow the voices of others in his group to get out. *Id.* ¶ 33.
- Mr. Flowers rarely held a steady job and never held a job requiring skills beyond manual labor. At the job he did hold for a notable length of time, he was supervised by his older brother. *Id.*

Dr. Goff thus concluded that the information he considered “uniformly indicate[s] that Mr. Flowers exhibited very substantial adaptive skills deficits in most applicable areas,” *id.* ¶ 43, and that “there are numerous historical indications for adaptive skills deficits and other ramifications of intellectual disability during the developmental period,” *id.* ¶ 46.

* * * * *

Based on all of the information described above, Dr. Goff has opined that Mr. Flowers is intellectually disabled. *Id.* ¶ 46. Mr. Flowers is therefore entitled to relief from his sentence of death under *Atkins*. At the very least, he is entitled to a hearing to prove that he is intellectually disabled. *Chase I*, 873 So. 2d at 1029.

GROUND F: IMPROPER JUROR COMMUNICATIONS

THE VENIRE’S ACTIONS DURING *VOIR DIRE* DEPRIVED MR. FLOWERS OF HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND VIOLATED MISSISSIPPI LAWS.

Mr. Flowers’s constitutional right to a fair trial was further compromised by certain prospective jurors’ inappropriate communications—among themselves and with the

public—during the *voir dire* process. This improper conduct also contravened Mississippi’s Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice and a standing procedural directive from this Court. Mr. Flowers’s convictions and sentences should be vacated on the basis of each of these violations.

A. The Venire’s Actions Deprived Mr. Flowers Of His Constitutional Right To An Impartial Jury And Violated State Law.

New evidence confirms that members of the venire at Mr. Flowers’s sixth trial undermined his opportunity to receive the impartial jury guaranteed to him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That conduct likewise violated the Court’s rules of procedure and a set of directions from Judge Loper specifically intended to protect the jury pool against improper influence. Specifically, while *voir dire* was underway, several members of the venire had improper contact with a trial witness and members of the victims’ families. In other instances, venire members’ racially-charged comments drove a prospective juror to tears and may have motivated black members of the venire to “self-strike” off of the jury. *No jury* drawn under such circumstances could fairly be considered constitutionally impartial or compliant with the procedural safeguards that this Court specifically prescribed for Mr. Flowers’s trial.

1. Constitutional Violations Of Mr. Flowers’s Right To An Impartial Jury.

The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial⁹⁶ “guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.” *Groppi v. Wisconsin*, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971) (internal quotations omitted). In order to be considered “impartial,” a jury must be protected against both external influences and internal bias. *See Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717,

722 (1961).

Well-settled precedent forbids jury contact with external influences “tending to disturb the [jury’s] exercise of deliberate and unbiased judgment.” *Mattox v. United States*, 146 U.S. 140, 149–150 (1892); *see also Hickson v. State*, 707 So. 2d 536, 544 (Miss. 1997) (“[I]t is absolutely imperative that the jury be unbiased, impartial, and not swayed by the consideration of improper, inadmissible information.”). To safeguard defendants’ rights, trial courts must consider the prejudicial effect of any external contact with the tendency to influence the verdict, whether or not it directly concerns the matter pending before the jury. *See Mattox*, 146 U.S. at 150–151.

In Mississippi, a trial court confronted with credible allegations of external jury influence must at least inquire whether good cause exists to believe there was “an improper outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information” presented to the jury. *Roach v. State*, 116 So. 3d 126, 132 (Miss. 2013). If so, the court is to conduct a post-trial hearing to determine whether it was “reasonably possible” that the verdict was thereby altered.⁹⁷ *Id.*; *see also United States v. Sylvester*, 143 F.3d 923, 932 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “when the possibility of outside influence on the jury arises, the failure to hold a hearing . . . constitutes an abuse of

⁹⁶ The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. *See Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145, 158–159 (1968).

⁹⁷ Similar steps are appropriate in instances of alleged improper influence upon jury pools. For example, in *Commonwealth v. Clemente*, 893 N.E.2d 19, 44–45 (Mass. 2008), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained that the trial court judge “conducted a proper inquiry” where venire members who participated in or overheard an inappropriate conversation regarding the case were not seated as jurors, and those seated submitted declarations of impartiality. Even absent evidence of particular improper conversations, the Court of Appeals of Washington approved the trial court’s creation of a “sufficient record” that the venire was not inappropriately influenced by the presence of a victim’s husband in the initial jury pool where the court “asked the jury pool whether any venire juror had heard of the case or knew the victim or the defendant,” and none did. *State v. Abrahamson*, No. 34498-3-III, 2017 WL 2259050, at * 4 (Wash. Ct. App. May 23, 2017). No such safeguards, or anything similar, were made available in Mr. Flowers’s case.

discretion and is reversible error” (internal quotations omitted)); *Tarango v. McDaniel*, 815 F.3d 1211, 1223 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Once a defendant shows an external occurrence having a tendency toward prejudice, federal law clearly requires a trial court to investigate the harmlessness or actual prejudice of the occurrence.”).

In addition, an “impartial” jury must be free from unfair bias. Although claims of jury impartiality focus not on unselected venire members but “on the jurors who ultimately sat,” *Ross v. Oklahoma*, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988), the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained that the right to an impartial jury trial contemplates both the absence of individually prejudiced jurors and “the right to be tried in an atmosphere in which public opinion is not saturated with bias and hatred and prejudice against the defendant,” *Seals v. State*, 44 So. 2d 61, 67 (Miss. 1950). Jurors should not “have to overcome that atmosphere, nor the later silent condemnation of their fellow citizens if they acquit the accused.” *Id.*

The facts show that the venire at Mr. Flowers’s trial was not adequately protected against either external influences or an internal atmosphere of bias. The special venire pool drawn for Mr. Flowers’s sixth trial included six hundred individuals from Montgomery County. Tr. 353, 1749–55. Portions of individual *voir dire* were conducted with all jurors present. *See generally* Tr. 955–1093. Other portions were conducted on an individual basis, outside the presence of other jurors. During those periods, members of the venire were asked to stay in a hallway outside the courtroom and instructed that they should not discuss the case: Judge Loper explicitly asked prospective jurors to keep their number cards with them in the hallway in order to “let everybody know you are a juror. *And they are not to speak to you.*” *Id.* at 1094 (emphasis added); *see also id.* at 1375–77 (prospective jurors were told they “can’t talk about the case”).

Nonetheless, multiple venire members now have reported that the jury pool divided along racial lines in the hallway, Ex. 86 (Willie Richard Robinson Aff. ¶ 3 (Mar. 9, 2016)); Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶ 7, and that prospective jurors acted in a manner entirely inconsistent with the preservation of an independent and impartial jury. According to one venire member, the husband of one of the victims, Bennie Rigby, passed through the courthouse hallway and conversed with several prospective jurors, Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶ 8, even though Mr. Rigby was listed as a witness for the prosecution, Tr. 1530, and a substantial number of prospective jurors confirmed in open court during *voir dire* that they knew Mr. Rigby personally, *see id.* at 819–824, 826–827, 829, 831, 915. *See also* Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶ 8 (attesting that other victims’ family members also spoke with prospective jurors in the courthouse hallway during the *voir dire* process)). Such “[p]rivate communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses” are “absolutely forbidden,” and should invalidate the verdict. *Mattox*, 146 U.S. at 150.

In addition to this improper outside influence, the jury pool was rife with bias. According to several venire members, prospective jurors discussed the case openly during the *voir dire* process, Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶¶ 9, 14, notwithstanding Judge Loper’s instruction to the venire that they “can’t talk about the case with anyone or among yourselves.” Tr. at 1094; *see also id.* at 1377 (confirmation of Judge Loper that the venire members had “been told they can’t talk about the case”). Some (mostly white) prospective jurors made comments such as “why we up here, he guilty.” Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶ 9. In other words, many members of the venire “already had their minds made up.” *Id.* ¶ 15. And according to another prospective juror, many white venire members loudly made abhorrently racist comments toward African-Americans, such as “they need to give them all guns and let them shoot themselves in

the head.” *Id.* ¶ 14. These comments drove a white female venire member to tears. *Id.* This prospective juror also believes that many black venire members deliberately removed themselves, or “self-struck,” from the jury pool following these comments. *Id.* ¶ 16.

These demonstrated compromises of impartiality among venire members implicate the “minimal standards of due process” owed to Mr. Flowers under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. *Groppi*, 400 U.S. at 509. It is difficult to imagine a stronger outside influence on prospective jurors than contact with a victim’s family, and particularly family members slated to appear as trial witnesses. *See State v. Roman*, 817 A.2d 100, 106 (Conn. 2003) (finding that trial court had abused its “wide latitude in fashioning the proper response to allegations of juror bias” where it failed to make “any meaningful inquiry into a specific and facially credible claim” that a juror had spoken with the victim’s family). Meanwhile, the venire’s courthouse hallway discussions plainly reflect an atmosphere in which public opinion is unacceptably “saturated with bias and hatred and prejudice against the defendant.” *Seals*, 44 So. 2d at 67.

These circumstances deprived Mr. Flowers of his constitutional right to an impartial jury and counsel in favor of a new trial. At the very least, consistent with *Roach*, 116 So. 3d at 132, further evidentiary inquiry is required as to the venire’s external influences.

2. Violations Of The Court’s Procedural Rules And Oral Directive.

The venire members’ open discussion of Mr. Flowers’s case and interactions with victims’ family members during *voir dire* also violated this Court’s own procedural rules and standing directives to the jury pool. These violations of state law provide an additional reason to vacate Mr. Flowers’s convictions and sentences. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(a).⁹⁸

⁹⁸ The Supreme Court of Mississippi has considered a Rule 3.06 violation as a cognizable basis for a mistrial. *See Thomas v. State*, 818 So. 2d 335, 346–347 (Miss. 2002) (carefully reviewing a mistrial

Mississippi Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice (“Rule”) 3.06 provides that “[j]urors are not permitted to mix and mingle with the attorneys, parties, witnesses and spectators in the courtroom, corridors, or restrooms in the courthouse. The court must instruct jurors that they are to avoid all contacts with the attorneys, parties, witnesses or spectators.” Rule 3.06 has been cited by the Mississippi Supreme Court as applicable to the venire as well as the impaneled jury. *See Thomas*, 818 So. 2d at 346–347 (citing *Robinson v. State*, 662 So. 2d 1100, 1104 (Miss. 1995)) (emphasizing importance of taking “allegations of jury tampering very seriously” where victim’s relative was accused of interacting with prospective jurors). Consistent with Rule 3.06, Judge Loper explicitly instructed the venire to keep their number cards with them in the hallway in order to “let everybody know you are a juror. And they are not to speak to you,” and that they could not “talk about the case with anyone or among yourselves.” Trial Tr. at 1094.

Notwithstanding these clear instructions, venire members spoke with Bennie Rigby and others related to the victims. Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶ 8. In similar circumstances, the Mississippi Supreme Court has “reiterated ‘the long honored principle that whatever tends to threaten public confidence in the fairness of jury trials, tends to threaten one of our sacred legal institutions.’” *Thomas*, 818 So. 2d at 347 (quoting *DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp.*, 601

motion related to venire contacts with a victim’s relative and cautioning that the defendant’s claim was “not to be taken lightly”). So, too, should a serious Rule 3.06 violation create a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(a). A violation of state trial rules may taint a conviction no less than its disagreement with state substantive law. And where, as here, evidence of a Rule 3.06 violation is not discovered until a defendant already has been convicted and sentenced to death, post-conviction proceedings should be capable of affording him relief. *See Batiste v. State*, 184 So. 3d 290, 291 (Miss. 2016) (evidence of improper jury communications with bailiffs during trial reflected “precisely [the] sort of ‘evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard,’ which is contemplated by the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act”) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(2)).

So. 2d 818, 830 (Miss. 1992)). The Court’s concern should be amplified where, as here, a victim’s family member is listed as a trial witness and speaks to the venire at the time of trial, and there is no confirmation during *voir dire* that any such discussions excluded reference to the case. *Cf. id.* at 346 (declining to grant a new trial where, unlike in this case, the record did not establish that prospective jurors spoke with the victim’s relative on the morning of *voir dire*, and *voir dire* questioning only showed that one venire member spoke with the relative at another time on a topic unrelated to the case).

In fact, the prospective jurors in this case made no mention of their discussions with Bennie Rigby and other members of the victims’ families during *voir dire*. Their silence denied trial counsel the opportunity to raise a prompt challenge to these interactions, and casts serious doubt on the impartiality of the jury’s verdict. *See United States v. Pridgeon*, 462 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming mistrial requested by prosecution where juror spoke to defendant’s witness and family, noting that the trial judge had “no way of ascertaining the true content of conversations that took place in violation of his express order” and that the juror “may have developed some subtle emotional inclination toward the defendant from her conversations with the defense witnesses and the defendant’s relatives”); *Quinones v. Commonwealth*, 547 S.E.2d 524, 529 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing on other grounds and noting that the trial court also erred in refusing to investigate allegations that a juror communicated with a trial witness, which “called into question the integrity of the trial”).

All of these facts regarding the jury pool’s inappropriate interactions with the victims’ family members—including a trial witness—which have been confirmed and amplified by new evidence from post-trial interviews with venire members, create substantial uncertainty regarding the impartiality of the jury that convicted Mr. Flowers and sentenced him to death. Nothing in

the *voir dire* record allays that concern. Nor were counsel made aware of the venire's out-of-court contacts with external influences during *voir dire*. Particularly given that counsel needed to be present in the courtroom for individual *voir dire*—and that all parties were entitled to rely on Judge Loper's explicit instruction that prospective jurors were not to speak with the public or "talk about the case," Tr. 1094—evidence of these improper contacts with the venire were not available at the time of trial.

Mr. Flowers's convictions and sentences should be vacated under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(a) in response to this critical violation of Mississippi's rules of practice. *See Batiste*, 184 So. 3d at 294 (granting defendant leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief and explaining that he was "entitle[d] . . . to a hearing to enable the circuit court to ascertain what communications were had between bailiffs and/or other persons and the jury and to determine, insofar as is possible, what impact, if any, those communications had on [his] conviction and sentence"); *Ex Parte Smith*, 213 So. 3d 313, 326 (Ala. 2010) (capital defendant was "inherently prejudiced" by contact between penalty phase venire and victim's relatives, and thus was entitled to a new hearing).

GROUND G: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

MR. FLOWERS WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND ANALOGOUS PROVISIONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. *See Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To establish that trial counsel was ineffective, Mr. Flowers must satisfy a two-part test. First, he must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient by "showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” *Id.* at 687. Second, the Mr. Flowers must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense; *i.e.*, that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. *Id.* at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. *Id.*

The Mississippi Supreme Court has admonished that, “at a minimum, counsel has a duty to interview potential witnesses and to make independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” *See, e.g., Ferguson v. State*, 507 So. 2d 94, 96 (Miss. 1987). In other words, “[w]hile counsel is not required to exhaust every conceivable avenue of investigation, he or she must at least conduct sufficient investigation to make an informed evaluation about potential defenses.” *Davis v. State*, 980 So. 2d 951, 954 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing *Ross v. State*, 954 So. 2d 968, 1005 (Miss. 2007)). That did not happen here. Defense counsel failed to satisfy even these minimal obligations.

Specifically, Mr. Flowers’s trial counsel were ineffective in the following critical respects:

First, trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of Mr. Flowers’s intellectual disability, *see* Ground E, which may have impacted the jury’s verdict not only with respect to sentencing, but also with respect to the guilt-or-innocence phase of trial.

Second, in the alternative to the grounds for relief concerning new and material evidence, counsel failed to retain experts to rebut two of the State’s most damning pieces of evidence against Mr. Flowers: (i) the State’s ballistics expert’s testimony that he had concluded with 100% certainty that the bullets found at the scene of the crime were fired from the same gun as

those found in Doyle Simpson's mother's fencepost, and (ii) a second State expert's testimony that the bloody shoeprint found at Tardy Furniture was consistent with a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill athletic shoe. Both of these conclusions were suspect. But without an expert to explain why, trial counsel left themselves powerless to rebut this critical evidence.

Third, in the alternative to the grounds for relief concerning the State's failure to disclose its investigation of third party suspects and its presentation of false testimony regarding the same, *see supra* Grounds B and C, Mr. Flowers submits that trial counsel failed to investigate alternative suspects, when doing so would have allowed them to present a more compelling defense theory than that which they presented at trial.

Fourth, notwithstanding that at the time of his sixth trial Mr. Flowers had spent many years on Mississippi's death row with a spotless disciplinary record, trial counsel failed to fully investigate or present this powerful evidence of Mr. Flowers's personal qualities and lack of future dangerousness.

Fifth, defense counsel failed to object to the State's improper closing argument, resulting in application of a harsher standard on appeal.

Sixth, trial counsel failed to present admissible evidence that would have rebutted the eyewitness testimony of a key State witness Clemmie Fleming.

Seventh, in the alternative to the grounds for relief concerning the State's failure to disclose evidence relating to a .380 handgun found near Tardy Furniture several years after the murders, *see supra* Ground B, Section D, trial counsel failed to adequately investigate or present evidence relating to that .380 handgun.

Eighth, in the alternative to the grounds for relief concerning the State's failure to disclose that Investigator John Johnson's notes were false, *see supra* Ground B, Section E, trial counsel failed to adequately investigate or present evidence relating to these false notes.

Ninth, in the alternative to the grounds for relief concerning the State's failure to disclose material impeachment evidence relating to its star witnesses Odell Hallmon and Patricia Sullivan-Odom, *see supra* Ground B, Section C, trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present this impeachment evidence.

Tenth, in the alternative to the grounds for relief concerning new evidence, *see supra* Ground F, trial counsel failed to seek sequestration of the venire or a mistrial on the basis of improper venire conduct.

Eleventh, trial counsel failed to adequately pursue DNA testing prior to trial.

Finally, trial counsel failed to present expert testimony that, contrary to the State's theory of the case, it is highly unlikely that only one person could have committed the Tardy murders alone.

These claims are properly before the Court. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally more appropriate for review at the post-conviction stage than on direct appeal. *See, e.g., Sandlin v. State*, 156 So. 3d 813, 819 (Miss. 2013); *Gowdy v. State*, 56 So. 3d 540, 543 (Miss. 2010); *Wilcher v. State*, 863 So. 2d 776, 825 (Miss. 2003); *see also Shinn v. State*, 174 So. 3d 961, 965 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ("It is unusual for this Court to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the claim is made on direct appeal[.]") (internal quotations omitted).

A. Mr. Flowers Was Denied His Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsel's Failure To Develop And Present Evidence That He Is Intellectually Disabled.

At trial, defense counsel did not present any evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability despite the fact that this evidence was readily available to them. As described in Ground E, *supra*, Mr. Flowers has a tested IQ of 72, and myriad sources of evidence—including developmental-stage IQ scores, school records, medical records, employment records, an evaluation by a Mississippi Department of Corrections psychologist, and interviews with family, friends, and teachers who knew Mr. Flowers during his childhood and adolescence—confirm that Mr. Flowers is intellectually disabled.

Trial counsel's failure to present this compelling evidence to the jury denied Mr. Flowers his right to the effective assistance of counsel, in three distinct ways. First, had trial counsel presented evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability prior to trial, there is a reasonable probability that the Court would have found Mr. Flowers to be intellectually disabled. This would not only have taken the death penalty off the table, but it also would have meant that the State would not have had the benefit of trying Mr. Flowers before a death-qualified—and thus, more conviction prone—jury. Second, if trial counsel did not succeed in using evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty, they could have used it to present a powerful mitigation case during Mr. Flowers's sentencing phase. Even if the jury would not have found evidence sufficient to conclude that Mr. Flowers is intellectually disabled and thus *ineligible* for the death penalty, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted for a life sentence in light of his limited intellectual functioning. Third, trial counsel could have presented evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability during

the guilt-or-innocence phase of trial, which may have led the jury to reach a different verdict altogether.

1. There Is A Reasonable Probability That, Had Defense Counsel Introduced Evidence Of Mr. Flowers's Intellectual Disability Prior to Trial, The Court Would Have Found Him To Be Intellectually Disabled And The State Would Have Been Precluded From Seeking The Death Penalty.

Had defense counsel adequately investigated Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability, they could have presented this evidence to the Court for a pre-trial determination of Mr. Flowers's eligibility for the death penalty. *See, e.g., Baxter v. State*, 177 So. 3d 394, 398 (Miss. 2015), *reh'g denied* (Nov. 12, 2015) (noting that, prior to trial, the trial court found defendant ineligible for the death penalty, so his trial proceeded non-capitally). In light of the substantial evidence that post-conviction counsel have now adduced on this question, there is a reasonable probability that the Court would have found Mr. Flowers to be intellectually disabled and thus categorically ineligible for the death penalty. *See* Ground E, *supra*.

It is difficult to imagine an error more prejudicial than trial counsel's failure to take this critical step. Had Mr. Flowers been deemed exempt from the death penalty prior to trial, he would have had the obvious and enormous benefit of not facing the possibility of a capital sentence. But a finding of intellectual disability also would have stripped the State of the opportunity to seek a death qualified jury. The significance of this cannot be over-stated. Research has repeatedly and consistently shown that death qualification stacks the deck against defendants by producing juries that are especially prone to convict. *See, e.g., James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court Decision Making and Legal Developments*, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 379, 394 (2004) ("A recent meta-analysis involving 14 articles, and a total of 20 studies involving different experimental methods, reached the

conclusion that that death-qualified jurors are more conviction-prone than excludables.”); Adam M. Clark, *An Investigation of Death Qualification as a Violation of the Rights of Jurors*, 24 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 29 (2005-2006) (“Among its various objections to the death penalty, the [American Psychological Association] includes the fact that psychological studies have shown that death-qualified juries are more conviction prone.”).

This is because, for one, death-qualified jurors tend to have more punitive attitudes about criminal justice than those excluded through death qualification. See Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, *The Impact of Death Qualification, Belief in a Just World, Legal Authoritarianism, and Locus of Control on Venirepersons’ Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials*, 25 Behav. Sci. & Law 57, 66 (2007); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, *Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes*, 8 J.L. & Hum. Behav. 31, 45 (1984). Moreover, the death qualification process itself biases the jury against the defendant. See Craig Haney, *On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process*, 8 J.L. & Hum. Behav. 121, 129 (1984) (“By requiring the attorneys and judge to dwell on penalty at the very start of the trial, the death-qualification process implies a belief in the guilt of the defendant on the part of these major trial participants.”); Hon. J. John Paul Stevens, *Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner* (Aug. 6, 2005), <https://tinyurl.com/y6txtdum> (noting that death qualification “creates an atmosphere in which jurors are likely to assume that their primary task is to determine the penalty for a presumptively guilty defendant”).

These biasing effects are exacerbated for African-American defendants like Curtis Flowers. African-Americans oppose the death penalty at significantly higher rates than whites. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr., *Shrinking Majority of Americans Support Death Penalty* (Mar. 28,

2014), <https://tinyurl.com/qft8av5>; Frank Newport, *In U.S., 64% Support Death Penalty in Cases of Murder*, GALLUP (Nov. 8, 2010), <https://tinyurl.com/jq7vcws>. The result, of course, is that African-Americans are excluded from jury service on death qualification grounds at far higher rates than whites. That was true in Mr. Flowers's case—16 African-American members of the venire were excluded on the basis of their opposition to capital punishment, compared to only four white venire members.⁹⁹ See Appellant Br. App. A.

The creation of a whiter jury through the death qualification process is extremely consequential in cases where the accused is African-American. See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, *Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination*, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 481, 490 (2009) (in experimental study, finding that concentration of white men on any given jury contributed to significantly higher rates of death sentencing in scenarios with a black defendant); William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys., *Death sentencing in Black and White: An empirical analysis of jurors' race and jury racial composition*, 3 U. of Pa. J. Const. L. 171 (Feb. 2001) (archival study of 340 capital trials finding that the greater the proportion of whites to black jurors, the more likely a black defendant was to be sentenced to death, particularly if the victim was white); Samuel R. Sommers & Pheobe C. Ellsworth, *White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom*, 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 201 (Mar. 2001); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, *Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty*, 30 J. Legal Stud. 277, 279 (June 2001)

⁹⁹ Moreover, black jurors who express reservations about capital punishment are subject to exclusion through peremptory strikes even if they do not meet the *Witherspoon/Witt* criteria. Those reservations are easily spun into purportedly race-neutral explanations for strikes, further reducing the available pool of black jurors likely to actually serve on capital juries and providing cover against potential *Batson* claims.

(examining juror interviews in South Carolina and finding that black jurors were much less likely to vote for death than whites in first vote of penalty deliberations); William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, *Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White*, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1497, 1499–1500 (Summer 2004).

The cumulative effect of these phenomena is that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict than juries that have not been death-qualified, particularly if the defendant is black and the jury is majority white. This fact is not lost on prosecutors, some of whom have acknowledged that they pursue death qualification when under pressure to secure a conviction. Richard Salgado, *Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green*, 2005 BYU. L. Rev. 519, 532 (2005) (“[R]esearchers have suggested that prosecutors sometimes seek the death penalty in cases unlikely to receive that degree of punishment merely in the hopes of impaneling a death-qualified jury, thus enhancing their likelihood of prevailing in the guilt phase of the trial.”); Tina Rosenberg, *The Deadliest D.A.*, NY Times Magazine (July 16, 1995), <https://tinyurl.com/y5qlsd3y> (quoting a former homicide prosecutor as saying that, “[e]veryone who’s ever prosecuted a murder case wants a death-qualified jury”). This very case shows that is so. District Attorney Evans opted to try Mr. Flowers non-capitally in his fourth trial. But after that trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict, Mr. Evans reversed course back to trying Mr. Flowers capitally—no doubt because his chances of securing a conviction would be higher with a death-qualified jury.

For all of these reasons, trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of Mr. Flowers’s intellectual disability to the Court prior to trial was enormously prejudicial, and Mr. Flowers

deserves a new trial.

2. There Is A Reasonable Probability That The Jury Would Not Have Sentenced Mr. Flowers To Death If Trial Counsel Had Presented Evidence Of His Intellectual Disability.

Counsel have a duty to conduct a thorough investigation into possible mitigating evidence, consider all viable theories, and develop evidence to support those theories. *See Davis v. State*, 87 So. 3d 465, 472–473 (Miss. 2012); *Hill v. Lockhart*, 28 F.3d 832, 845 (8th Cir. 1994) (“‘Given the severity of the potential sentence and the reality that the life of [the defendant] was at stake,’ we believe that it was the duty of [petitioner’s] lawyers to collect as much information as possible about [petitioner] for use at the penalty phase of his state court trial.”) (internal quotations omitted). Here, counsel’s failure to marshal a wealth of readily available records and testimonial evidence that would have established Mr. Flowers’s intellectual disability rendered their performance deficient. *See Neal v. Puckett*, 286 F.3d 230, 240 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (noting that counsel’s performance is deficient if he failed to gather readily available information that would have cost no more than a few phone calls or postage stamps); *Jermyn v. Horn*, 266 F.3d 257, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming finding of ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to present a body of available but under-investigated mitigating evidence).

There is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694; *see also Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). To reach this conclusion, the Court need only determine that “at least one juror could reasonably have determined that because of [Petitioner’s] reduced moral culpability, death was not an appropriate sentence.” *Neal*, 286 F.3d at 241; *see also Wiggins v. Smith*, 539 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (had defense counsel presented available mitigating evidence, “there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.”);

Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that counsel had to convince only one of twelve jurors to refuse to go along with a death sentence).

Here, had defense counsel adequately investigated Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability and presented it to the jury, there is a reasonable chance that at least one juror would have voted for a life sentence. Mitigation evidence of intellectual disability is "exactly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from jurors." *Smith v. Mullin*, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing the power of mitigation evidence of intellectual disability and mental illness); *see also Glenn v. Tate*, 71 F.3d 1204, 1211 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing empirical evidence of juror sympathy to claims of "organic brain problems"); *Brewer v. Aiken*, 935 F.2d 850, 862 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (same); *Van Tran v. State*, 66 S.W.3d 790, 802–803 (Tenn. 2001) (discussing an empirical study that "found that jurors in capital cases attached 'significant mitigating potential' to evidence that the defendant was" intellectually disabled and that "[e]vidence that the defendant was [intellectually disabled] was almost as powerful as lingering doubt over his guilt," with nearly 75 percent of the jurors surveyed noting that evidence of [intellectual disability] would make them less likely to vote for death) (internal quotations omitted).¹⁰⁰

Trial counsel's failure to develop and present evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability was particularly prejudicial in light of the fact that their investigation apparently revealed little other compelling mitigating evidence to present on Mr. Flowers's behalf. Indeed, after 13 years of investigation and four prior capital trials, the mitigation case at Mr. Flowers's

¹⁰⁰ *See also* Stephen P. Garvey, *Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?*, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1538–39, 1559 (1998) (finding evidence of intellectual disability and mental illness to be the most persuasive mitigation evidence); Samuel P. Gross, *Update: American Public*

sixth trial spanned less than 90 pages of the more than 3,500-page trial transcript, and was limited to testimony from several family and community members who testified generally that Curtis was a good person and a good singer, a prison minister who testified that Curtis had taken some religious classes while in prison, and an expert who opined that Mr. Flowers was unlikely to be a future danger if the jury sentenced him to life. *See* Tr. 3274–61.¹⁰¹

Moreover, even if the jury would not have found unanimously that Mr. Flowers was intellectually disabled, trial counsel’s deficient performance still was prejudicial because one or more jurors may well have decided that Mr. Flowers’s diminished intellectual capacity was sufficiently mitigating to warrant a life sentence. *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 396 (holding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence that the defendant was “borderline [intellectually disabled]”); *id.* at 398 (“Mitigating evidence unrelated to [death-eligibility] may alter the jury’s selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution’s death-eligibility case”); *Brownlee v. Haley*, 306 F.3d 1043, 1055 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of borderline intellectual disability because an individual “right on the edge” of intellectual disability suffers some of the same limitations . . . as those persons described by the Supreme Court in *Atkins*). In other words, one or more jurors may have concluded that Mr. Flowers is not intellectually disabled, and thus still “eligible” for the death

Opinion on the Death Penalty—It’s Getting Personal, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1448, 1468–69 (1998) (finding intellectual disability to be “much more” mitigating than other potential factors).

¹⁰¹ In its entirety, the defense’s mitigation case included the testimony of: Nelson Forrest, a pastor who sang with Mr. Flowers at church who discussed Mr. Flowers’s singing voice, Tr. 3275–77; Jimmy Lewis Forrest, a second cousin of Mr. Flowers who also discussed Mr. Flowers singing at church, Tr. 3278–80; Reverend Billy Little, a minister who preaches to prisoners who testified that Mr. Flowers had taken religious courses during his time in prison, Tr. 3283–91; Crystal Ghoston, Mr. Flowers’s 16-year old daughter who learned that Mr. Flowers was her father when she was 14, who testified that she loved her father, Tr. 3298–3300; Kenyatta Knight, the mother of Crystal Ghoston, Tr. 3301–04; Lola and Archie Flowers, Mr. Flowers’s parents, who testified that Curtis was a good person and a beautiful gospel singer,

penalty, but nevertheless concluded, due to the closeness of the question or some remaining doubt about whether he is intellectually disabled, that death was not an appropriate punishment.

3. There Is A Reasonable Probability That The Jury Would Not Have Convicted Mr. Flowers If Trial Counsel Had Presented Evidence Of His Intellectual Disability.

Moreover, had trial counsel investigated and developed evidence relating to Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability, they could have presented some of this evidence during the guilt-or-innocence phase of trial to demonstrate that, in light of his limited intellectual abilities and history of low functioning, Mr. Flowers was not capable of pulling off a highly efficient, execution-style quadruple homicide—let alone doing so all by himself, as was the State's theory. That virtually everyone who knew Mr. Flowers as a child and young adult described him as unable to complete complex tasks and highly accident prone, and that family members and friends were afraid to go hunting with him because he could not shoot a gun, Ex. 83 (Goff Aff.) ¶ 15, all would have been highly probative on this issue. It is hard to imagine this crime being committed by any single person, but it is entirely implausible to think that someone like Mr. Flowers could have done it.

Defense counsel also could have presented evidence of Mr. Flowers's intellectual disability to help rebut the State's focus on inconsistencies in statements Mr. Flowers gave to law enforcement shortly after the murders. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 1818 (during opening statement, Mr. Evans stated: "We'll show you that [Mr. Flowers] was interviewed about this crime. He g[a]ve inconsistent statements about where he was, what times he did things. . . ."). Numerous courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized the enhanced propensity of intellectually disabled defendants to give inconsistent statements, including even false confessions. *See*

Tr. 3334–41, 3347–61; and James E. Aiken, a prison consultant who provided expert testimony regarding

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–321 (explaining that intellectually disabled defendants are more likely to give false confessions, and also “are typically poor witnesses”); *United States v. Preston*, 751 F.3d 1008, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing ways in which evidence of intellectual disability can go to guilt-or-innocence, including explaining false confessions); *Singletary v. Fischer*, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336–337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (collecting evidence showing that persons who are intellectually disabled are more likely to give false confessions); Brandon L. Garrett, *Judging Innocence*, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 88–89 (2008) (finding that of the thirty-one cases of wrongful convictions in which a false confession was given, 35% of those defendants are intellectually disabled); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, *The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World*, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 899, 920, 971 (2008) (finding that at least 22% of cases included in a false confession data set involved intellectually disabled defendants).

Trial counsel’s failure to present the substantial and readily available body of evidence of Mr. Flowers’s intellectual disability was constitutionally deficient. Mr. Flowers deserves a new trial or, at the very least, a new sentencing hearing.¹⁰²

B. Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Counter Expert Ballistics And Shoeprint Evidence.

1. Failure To Counter Ballistics Evidence.

Trial counsel’s failure to rebut the State’s ballistics expert’s testimony rendered their performance constitutionally deficient and prejudiced Mr. Flowers. First, the State’s contention that Doyle Simpson’s never-recovered gun was used to commit the murders was central to its

Mr. Flowers’s low propensity for future dangerousness, Tr. 3305–33.

¹⁰² To be sure, Mr. Flowers now seeks a hearing under *Atkins* to establish that he is not death-eligible. But such a hearing would not cure the prejudice Mr. Flowers incurred due to defense counsel’s failure to seek this determination prior to trial. That is because, as described herein, trial counsel’s failure to do so

case against Flowers. To prove this critical fact, the State relied on the testimony of ballistics examiner David Balash, who relied on toolmark examination analysis to conclude that the bullets recovered from the crime scene were a “100 percent match” with bullets that law enforcement dug out of a fencepost in Doyle Simpson’s mother’s backyard. As discussed *supra* in Ground A, Section B, Mr. Balash’s analysis and testimony were wholly unreliable. The toolmark examination on which he relied has been roundly discredited as junk science. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 29 (Tobin Aff.) ¶¶ 15, 24, 27–31, 52–53. And not only was Mr. Balash’s “100 percent certain” conclusion that all five bullets were fired from the same weapon based on unscientific speculation, it impermissibly implied a zero percent chance of error. *See* Ex. 28 (Spiegelman Aff.) ¶ 7. Mr. Balash’s testimony that gunshot residue (GSR) was found on Mr. Flowers’s hand was also impermissible. Ex. 29 (Tobin Aff.) ¶ 57 (“[I]nterpretation of the presence of GSR is problematic and a major basis by which the FBI no longer offers GSR analysis as a forensic service.”). Indeed, GSR particles can be found in any number of law enforcement equipment articles and are easily transferrable. *See id.* For that reason, the FBI has stopped providing that service. *Id.*

The jury never heard any of these facts. They should have. Effective trial counsel would have engaged an expert to testify to these developments in the ballistics field and to discredit the supposed match between the bullets found at the crime scene and those recovered from Doyle Simpson’s mother’s fencepost. Trial counsel also should have engaged an expert to testify to the unreliability of GSR analysis and the reasons for its demise. Trial counsel’s failure

not only resulted in the imposition of an unconstitutional sentence, but also substantially prejudiced Mr. Flowers with respect to the jury’s decision in the guilt-or-innocence phase.

to do so was not the product of strategy, Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 6, but rather a fundamental under-appreciation of the importance of the State's ballistics evidence.

Mississippi courts have found similar failures by trial counsel to support reversals of convictions. *See, e.g., Howard v. State*, 945 So. 2d 326, 352 (Miss. 2006) (finding that trial counsel's failure to obtain bite mark expert to rebut the State's expert constituted deficient performance); *Willie v. State*, 204 So. 3d 1268, 1288 (2016) (finding that trial counsel's failure to rebut the State's expert's "absolute[ly] certain" and "conclusory" testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court recently vacated an Alabama prisoner's conviction upon finding that the failure to retain an adequate ballistics expert constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. *See Hinton v. Alabama*, 571 U.S. 263 (2014). In that case, the State's ballistics expert testified that six bullets recovered from three different crime scenes were all fired from the same weapon. *Id.* at 264. The defense retained an under-qualified ballistics expert because they wrongly assumed that there was not enough funding to retain a more-qualified expert. *Id.* at 266. The Supreme Court held that "trial attorney's failure to request additional funding in order to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly believed that he had received all he could get under Alabama law constituted deficient performance." *Id.* at 274.

What happened here is worse. In *Hinton*, trial counsel retained an expert who was insufficiently qualified; here, defense counsel retained no expert at all. Instead, they relied on State Crime Lab analyst Steve Byrd, without assuring he was prepared to counter the State's ballistics evidence. Indeed, defense counsel failed even to provide Mr. Byrd with a copy of Mr. Balash's report and prior testimony. Tr. 2738. *See Caro v. Woodford*, 280 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to ensure expert had relevant materials).

So when it came time for Mr. Byrd to testify, he was forced to concede that he had not read Mr. Balash's report and therefore could not criticize it. Tr. 2738. Then, on cross examination, Mr. Byrd went on to partially corroborate Mr. Balash's testimony by testifying—as he did in *Flowers I and II*—that the bullet found inside the mattress at the scene of the crime,¹⁰³ was fired from the same weapon that fired the bullets found at Doyle Simpson's mother's house. Tr. 2740.

Because of defense counsel's errors, the jury heard only what the State wanted it to hear: uncontested ballistics testimony tying Mr. Flowers to the crime. This prejudiced Mr. Flowers's defense; the State's ballistics-related theory was a central component of a weak circumstantial case, with little physical evidence to substantiate it. And we know the State's "toolmark" evidence was wrong; as described in Ground A, Section B, *supra*, the FBI and DOJ have both said just that. Had trial counsel successfully rebutted Mr. Balash's testimony, and demonstrated that there was no way to know whether the shots fired at Tardy Furniture on July 16 came from Doyle Simpson's gun, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.

2. Failure To Counter Shoeprint Evidence.

Likewise, trial counsel's failure to challenge the State's shoeprint expert's testimony with expert testimony of their own was ineffective and prejudiced Flowers's defense. At trial, the State's trace evidence examination expert, Joe Andrews, offered his analysis of a bloody footwear impression found at Tardy Furniture on the morning of July 16. Mr. Andrews testified that he examined photographs of shoeprint impressions from the scene of the crime, a pair of Nike flight tennis shoes belonging to Mr. Flowers, and a set of outsoles that would have been consistent with the Fila shoes originally packaged in an empty shoe box found at Mr. Flowers's

¹⁰³ The bullet found in the mattress was recovered by the State's investigators almost one month after the crime. Tr. 2522–26.

girlfriend Connie Moore's home following the murders.¹⁰⁴ Tr. 2596–03. In response to questioning by the State regarding whether the bloody shoeprint impressions left at Tardy Furniture were left by the “same type [of] shoe that would have been purchased” in the Fila shoe box recovered from Ms. Moore's home, Mr. Andrews responded that the impressions were “consistent in design and size with” a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill shoe. Tr. 2611. Although Mr. Andrews did not say it, the prosecutor turned his “consistent with” testimony into a certainty, arguing during closing that the bloody shoeprint found at Tardy's was made by a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill shoe:

Let's talk about those shoes. . . . Of all the shoes in the world, they were able to say that is a Fila Grant Hill IT Mid. . . . Fila Grant Hill, second edition, men's high top. That's a lot of individual characteristics to be able to tell about a shoe.
What else could they tell? They could tell what size it was. It was size 10 1/2. So you have got a special kind of shoe of a certain size.

Tr. 3196 (emphasis added).

Mr. Andrews's testimony was inaccurate and misleading, especially as argued at closing. Trial counsel could have shown that the shoeprint impressions from the crime scene could have been made by a wide range of shoe sizes—specifically, they could have been made by a shoe anywhere from a size 8 1/2 to 11. Ex. 2 (Wilcox Aff) ¶ 5. This is not a subtle difference. The supposed evidence that a bloody shoeprint found at the crime scene was, without a doubt, made by a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill shoe, and that it just so happens that a size 10 1/2 Fila

¹⁰⁴ In any case, the evidence linking Mr. Flowers to that empty shoebox found in Ms. Moore's home was sparse. Aside from Patricia Sullivan-Odom's dubious account, the closest investigators ever came to linking Mr. Flowers to the shoe that left the bloody print at Tardy's was their seizure of an empty shoe box labeled “MS Grant Hill No. 2 mid FILA, red, navy and blue, size ten and a half,” from Ms. Moore's home. See Tr. 2106. But, as Ms. Moore testified, the shoes that had once been contained in that box were purchased for her son, Marcus, who wore size 10 1/2 at the time, and had since grown to size 12. Tr. 2856, 2864. That Mr. Flowers had no connection to the box, or the shoes once contained in, it was

Grant Hill shoebox was found at Mr. Flowers's girlfriend's house is exactly the sort of "perfect fit" evidence that could unduly influence a jury. That is no doubt what the State hoped would happen. As Assistant District Attorney Hill implored during closing argument:

[W]hen the first time they went to Curtis' house to look around . . . there in the bedroom in a chest of drawers is a shoe box. *Can you imagine what kind of shoe box of all the shoe boxes in the world, what kind was it?* Fila Grant Hill. Ladies shoes? No. *Size 9 1/2?* No. *Size 10 1/2.* There is the box. Right there in Curtis' bedroom in his apartment in his chest of drawers. There is the shoe box right there. What does it say? *10 1/2 Grant Hill Fila shoes.* Men's.

Tr. 3196–97 (emphases added). And because the shoeprint evidence was "scientific" evidence testified to by an expert, there is a substantial likelihood that the jury automatically gave it significant weight. See Ground A, Section B. Defense counsel knew or should have known of this obvious risk, and should have taken steps to counteract it.

Moreover, Mr. Andrews testified that Fila produced 221,189 size 10 1/2 Fila shoes with outsoles matching the shoes originally packaged in the shoe box retrieved from Connie Moore's home. Tr. 2620. He further explained that 221,393 size 10 Fila shoes were sold and 200,199 size 11 Fila shoes were sold. *Id.* In total, Fila sold nearly 2 million pairs of shoes with the particular style of outsole design that the State relied on as evidence tying Mr. Flowers to the crime. *Id.* As evidenced by Mr. Andrews's testimony regarding just the number of size 10, 10 1/2, and 11 Fila shoes produced, it is clear that the number of shoes produced ranging from size 8 1/2 to size 11 is significantly greater than 221,189. Accordingly, whereas Mr. Andrews's testimony left the jury with the impression that there existed only 221,189 pairs of shoes that could have made the partial shoeprint impression found at the crime scene, the truth was that there actually were several million pairs of shoes that could have made that impression. Had

further supported by the Mississippi Department of Public Safety's determination that none of the latent

defense counsel hired an independent expert to check Mr. Andrews's analysis, they would have known all of this and could have both presented this strong rebuttal evidence to the jury and much more effectively cross-examined Mr. Andrews. Their failure to do so rendered their performance deficient.

In light of the dearth of physical evidence available in Mr. Flowers's case, the information contained in shoeprint-expert Alicia Wilcox's report emphasizes the prejudice that flowed from trial counsel's failure on this score. Because no physical evidence connected Mr. Flowers to the crime scene—none of his fingerprints, hair, blood, or other DNA was found at the scene—the State had no choice but to build its case against Mr. Flowers around circumstantial evidence, unproven theories, and unreliable witness testimony. However, the State was confident it could explain away its lack of physical evidence because of one supposedly critical fact—Mr. Flowers wore size 10 1/2 shoes. The State reiterated this point several times throughout the trial and underscored the argument in its closing arguments:

[Mr. Flowers's neighbor, Ms. Elaine Gholston], knows [Mr. Flowers] has a pair of Grant Hill Fila tennis shoes because she has seen him wearing them. Okay . . . we will take note of the importance of that in a few minutes.

Tr. 3190.

Let's talk about those shoes. First of all, from the photographs, they were able to determine some things. They were able to tell what kind of shoes. . . . What else could they tell? They could tell what size it was. It was a size 10 1/2. So you have got a special kind of shoe of a certain size.

Tr. 3196.

[L]et's talk some more about the shoes. When Officer Johnson spoke with [Mr. Flowers] he asked him, determined the first day what size shoes do you wear? 10 1/2. He had 10 1/2's on his feet. About a day or two later when they had

fingerprints lifted from the box matched Mr. Flowers. Tr. 2696.

contact with him again they took those shoes off his feet. And they are a size 10 1/2. They searched his house and they took a second pair of 10 1/2's. Curtis wore a size 10 1/2. That's for sure. Because he had them on his feet, and he said he wore 10 1/2's. So that puts the shoes on his feet. What did they say? If the shoe fits.

Tr. 3197.

Without evidence challenging Mr. Andrews's testimony, the jury was left with the distinct and misleading impression that the shoeprint was made by a size 10 1/2 Fila Grant Hill tennis shoe, the same size shoe Mr. Flowers allegedly wore. This was obviously damaging to the defense. A juror might not be so inclined to believe the State's "the shoe fit" theory if expert testimony was provided to show that the shoe print could have been made by a shoe as small as a size 8. Yet, Mr. Flowers's trial counsel never even considered consulting or hiring an expert to rebut Mr. Andrews's testimony. *See* Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 8; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 5.

This failure was not the product of strategic decision-making; counsel just did not think to do so. *Id.* This error rendered trial counsel's performance ineffective, and demands that Mr. Flowers's convictions be reversed. *See Thomas v. Clements*, 789 F.3d 760, 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding defense counsel ineffective for failing to consult expert to rebut State's expert testimony where counsel admitted "his failure to reach out to an expert was not a conscious decision—he just did not think to do so").

C. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Third Party Suspects.

Mr. Flowers submits that even through the exercise of due diligence, trial counsel could not have been expected to unearth evidence that the State suppressed and lied about. As explained in Grounds A, B, and C, *supra*, the State suppressed its investigation of third party suspects Marcus Presley, LaSamuel Gamble, and Steven McKenzie and the material evidence that flowed from that investigation, as well as its investigation into Willie James Hemphill. In

light of the State's repeated representations to defense counsel and the Court that no such evidence existed, trial counsel's failure to investigate these leads was reasonable. If, however, the Court concludes that trial counsel should have ascertained these facts, then Mr. Flowers is entitled to relief due to counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to do so.

1. Counsel's Failure To Investigate Alternative Suspects Was Prejudicial.

Trial counsel's failure to investigate and turn up evidence regarding alternative suspects was highly prejudicial. Had counsel conducted such an investigation, they would have unearthed a veritable treasure trove of information relating to third party suspects. First, counsel would have learned about Marcus Presley and LaSamuel Gamble, two men from the Birmingham, Alabama area who spent the summer of 1996 committing a string of robbery-murders closely resembling the Tardy Furniture murders. Specifically, as detailed in Grounds A and B, *supra*, defense counsel would have discovered that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble committed their robbery-murders execution style and in broad daylight; that their weapon of choice was a .380 handgun; that the .380 used in the Birmingham area murders jammed repeatedly, like the gun used in the Tardy Furniture murders; that LaSamuel Gamble wore Fila shoes during at least one of these murders; and that Gamble and accomplice Steven McKenzie went to Mississippi in July 1996 carrying a .380 handgun, and later returned to Birmingham with cash. Second, counsel would have seen the true extent of the State's interest in Willie James Hemphill. As explained in Grounds A and B, *supra*, counsel would have found out that the State had launched a manhunt to track Mr. Hemphill down; that the State had questioned him for hours about the murders; and that Mr. Hemphill wore Fila Grant Hill shoes and lived only a few blocks from the furniture store.

This evidence would have been admissible at trial. Courts generally permit presentation of third party perpetrator evidence where a defendant can show that there is some “*reasonable possibility* that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense.” *Andrews v. United States*, 179 A.3d 279, 295 (D.C. 2018) (quoting *Winfield v. United States*, 676 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1996) (emphasis in original); *see also Krider v. Conover*, 497 F. App’x 818, 820–821 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that third party perpetrator evidence must be more than “speculative” to be admissible) (citing *State v. Adams*, 280 Kan. 494, 505 (2005)); *Gore v. State*, 119 P.3d 1268, 1276 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that a defendant may put forth third-party perpetrator evidence “so long as there is some quantum of evidence, which is more than mere suspicion and innuendo, that connects the third party to the commission of the crime”). Third-party evidence need not prove a defendant’s innocence to be admissible; instead, the focus is on whether the evidence would “tend to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.” *McCullough v. United States*, 827 A.2d 48, 55 (D.C. 2003) (emphasis removed) (internal quotations omitted); *see also People v. Ghobrial*, 420 P.3d 179, 283 (Cal. 2018) (holding that third-party culpability evidence is admissible if it is “capable of raising a reasonable doubt of [the] defendant’s guilt”) (internal quotations omitted); *Curry v. State*, 820 S.E.2d 177, 180 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (“The proffered evidence, however, ‘must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence . . .’”) (quoting *Woodall v. State*, 754 S.E.2d 335, 343 (Ga. 2014)); *State v. Grant*, 799 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (“Evidence implicating a third person in a crime can consequently fall short of establishing probable cause of the guilt of that person and, nonetheless, establish a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.”).

The evidence connecting the Alabama suspects to the Tardy Furniture murders easily clears this low bar. Far from mere suspicion or innuendo, the evidence connecting Mr. Presley

and Mr. Gamble to the Tardy Furniture murders is plentiful, tangible, and specific. The *modus operandi* of both sets of crimes was nearly identical: execution style murders in which the victims were killed with one or two bullets to the head, during the course of robberies, in broad daylight. Ex. 13 (Presley Tr.) 1166, 1364, 1575–77, 1605–12. The gun that Mr. Presley and Mr. Gamble used during their spree of robbery-murders was a .380. Like the .380 used to commit the Tardy Furniture murders, it had a habit of jamming, requiring the user to manually clear the gun, ejecting live rounds to be left behind. See Tr. 2150–51 (describing that the weapon used in the Tardy Furniture murders jammed, requiring it to be manually cleared, which ejected live ammunition onto the floor); Ex. 13 (Presley Tr.) 1140–41, 1364; Ex. 12 (Gamble Tr.) 1148–49, 1199, 1201, 1883, 1965–66, 1975. LaSamuel Gamble was wearing Fila shoes at the time he committed the murders for which he was convicted. Ex. 12 (Gamble Trial Tr.) 1955 (“Mr. Gamble: . . . The Filas, those are my olds shoes, you know what I’m saying? Those shoes I had on during the robbery.”). And Marcus Presley has now sworn an affidavit in which he attests that between July 10 and July 17, 1996, LaSamuel Gamble, along with co-defendant Steven McKenzie, went to Mississippi for several days. Ex. 15 (Presley Aff.) ¶¶ 4, 7–8. Mr. Gamble was carrying the .380 handgun when he left for Mississippi, and when he returned to Alabama, he “had money on him that he did not have before he went to Mississippi,” and told Mr. Presley that he “saw a few licks while they were in Mississippi. By licks he meant places to rob.” *Id.* ¶¶ 9–10.

Likewise, the Hemphill evidence would have been admissible. The evidence connecting Mr. Hemphill to the scene of the crime is persuasive—so persuasive, in fact, that the State launched a manhunt to find Mr. Hemphill. Ex. 3-J (ITD Ep. 10 Tr.) at 19. Mr. Hemphill had a violent criminal history, had been seen near the furniture store the morning of the murders, and

exclusively wore size 9 or 10 Fila Grant Hill sneakers. *Id.* at 20–21. Taken together, these facts accumulate into the requisite “quantum of evidence” for admission. *Gore*, 119 P.3d at 1276. So too would this evidence have injected “reasonable doubt” into the proceedings. *McCullough*, 827 A.2d at 55 (internal quotations omitted). The State repeatedly postured that it “never had any evidence that showed anything other than” Mr. Flowers’s “guilt,” Tr. 442, and that Mr. Flowers “was the only one that was an initial suspect,” Tr. 2935. These claims were important for the State’s case, given the tenuous nature of the evidence connecting Mr. Flowers to the crime. But we now know they were false. The Hemphill evidence undermines the State’s bravado and suggests that even the State harbored doubts as to Mr. Flowers’s guilt.

Had the evidence implicating alternative suspects been presented, there is a reasonable probability that it would have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors and resulted in a different verdict. *See, e.g., Fatumabahirtu v. United States*, 148 A.3d 260, 268 (D.C. 2016) (granting writ of error *coram nobis* based on counsel’s failure to investigate alternative suspects, “conclud[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different had trial counsel performed an adequate investigation”); *Ex Parte Sifuentes*, No. AP-75,815, 2008 WL 151087, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008) (granting state post-conviction relief based in part on trial counsel’s failure to investigate alternative suspects, finding that “had an adequate investigation been conducted, there is a reasonable probability that the evidence that would have been discovered and presented at trial would have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors and resulted in a different verdict”).

2. Counsel's Failure To Investigate Alternative Suspects Constituted Deficient Performance.

Defense counsel's failure to investigate and present this information at trial was not the product of strategic decision-making. Trial counsel simply neglected to pursue any investigation relating to the Alabama suspects or Mr. Hemphill,¹⁰⁵ neglected to give critical thought to many aspects of the case, and failed to rethink strategy in between trials. Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶¶ 6, 12; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 11. Trial counsel's only effort to identify another perpetrator was to point to Doyle Simpson. That was not a strategic decision, but the result of a failure to learn the facts about the Alabama suspects and the Hemphill investigation. It thus was unreasonable. *See, e.g., Ross*, 954 So. 2d at 1006 (“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation will not pass muster as an excuse when a full investigation would have revealed a large body of [helpful] evidence.”) (quoting *Dickerson v. Bagley*, 453 F.3d 690, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2006)); *id.* (“It is not reasonable to refuse to investigate when the investigator does not know the relevant facts the investigation will uncover.”) (quoting *Dickerson*, 453 F.3d at 97); *Horton v. Zant*, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[O]ur case law rejects the notion that a ‘strategic’ decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.”); *Turpin v. Helmeci*, 518 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ga. 1999) (“[T]he right to reasonably effective counsel is violated when the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy.”) (internal quotations omitted).

¹⁰⁵ As explained in Grounds B and C, *supra*, this failure on trial counsel's part was largely the result of the State's several and repeated *Brady* violations. But to the extent the Court finds that this does not excuse defense counsel's failure to investigate, Flowers is entitled to relief on this ineffective assistance claim.

D. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate And Present Evidence Relating To Mr. Flowers's Lack Of Future Dangerousness And Adaptability to Prison.

In addition, trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present the full body of available mitigating evidence regarding Mr. Flowers's lack of future dangerousness and adaptability to prison. *See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard*, 545 U.S. 374, 380–381 (2005) (defense counsel must provide effective representation in presenting mitigation case to jury); *Davis v. State*, 87 So. 3d 465, 469 (Miss. 2012) (capital defendants are entitled to effective representation both at the guilt phase and the penalty phase).

At the time of his sixth trial, Mr. Flowers had been incarcerated continuously for nearly 13 years, mostly on death row. *See, e.g., Ex. 87* (Miss. Dep't of Corr. Offender Summary Report (Feb. 26, 2016)) (noting entry date of 10/17/1997). During that time, Mr. Flowers had, remarkably, not incurred even a single minor infraction. *See, e.g., Ex. 88 at 1* (Miss. Dep't of Corr. Male Inmate Reclassification Score Sheets (June 28, 2010)) (noting no Institutional Disciplinary Reports). Thus, unlike most capital defendants, Mr. Flowers's lengthy history of excellent prison conduct supplied defense counsel with a wealth of useful and specific evidence to put before the jury during sentencing.

Mr. Flowers had a right under *Lockett v. Ohio*, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and *Skipper v. South Carolina*, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), to present this evidence to the jury. *See Hansen v. State*, 592 So. 2d 114, 147 (Miss. 1991). And defense counsel had a corresponding obligation to investigate and present such evidence. *Rompilla*, 545 U.S. at 380–381. Trial counsel's failure to do so severely prejudiced Mr. Flowers; had defense counsel convinced the jury that Mr. Flowers was a "model prisoner" who had adapted extremely well to prison, there is a reasonable probability that at least one of those jurors would have voted to spare his life. *See Wiggins*, 539 U.S. at 513;

Emerson, 91 F.3d at 907.

Mitigation evidence includes “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” *Eddings v. Oklahoma*, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting *Lockett*, 438 U.S. at 604). Evidence of good behavior in prison is classic mitigation evidence. *Skipper*, 476 U.S. 1. Likewise, evidence that a defendant is not “a future danger to society” is also mitigation evidence. *Davis*, 87 So. 3d at 470 (citing *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 370–371).

Had trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, they would have had at their disposal substantial mitigation evidence relating to both of these factors. According to Mississippi Department of Corrections staff, Mr. Flowers is a “model prisoner.” Ex. 89 (Benjamin Lewis Aff. ¶ 4 (Mar. 16, 2016)).¹⁰⁶ At the time of his sixth trial he had not incurred even a single disciplinary infraction during his almost 13 years in prison. See, e.g., Ex. 88 at 1 (Reclassification Score Sheet). And since his sixth trial, he still has incurred only a single minor infraction, for lending another inmate a pen. See, e.g., *id.* at 2 (Miss. Dep’t of Corr. Male Inmate Reclassification Score Sheet (Oct. 2, 2015)) (noting one RVR on 7-7-10); Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 18; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 18. Mr. Flowers’s prison records also indicate that, on multiple occasions, he was classified with the best possible ratings (zero) for multiple categories, including: history of institutional violence; severity of prior felony convictions; escape history; and severity of most recent serious disciplinary reports. See, e.g., Ex. 88 at 3–5 (Reclassification Score Sheets) (dated Apr. 27, 2005; May 15, 2006; Nov. 17, 2006)).

¹⁰⁶ Counsel for Mr. Flowers was informed by Ms. Cotton, Petitioner’s Mississippi Department of Corrections Case Manager, that she regards Mr. Flowers as a “model prisoner.” Ms. Cotton also stated that Mississippi Department of Corrections rules prevent her from providing an Affidavit to this effect. *Id.* ¶¶ 4–5

Had trial counsel conducted a thorough investigation, they also would have discovered, and been able to present to the jury, evidence that guards allowed Mr. Flowers to leave custody to eat supper with his family in the period leading up to a prior trial. *See* Ex. 90 (Archie Flowers Aff. ¶¶ 3–7 (Mar. 15, 2016)); Ex. 91 (Lola Flowers Aff. ¶¶ 3–7 (Mar. 15, 2016)). That is uniquely compelling evidence of a lack of future dangerousness. It is highly unusual that law enforcement would permit a purported quadruple murderer this sort of freedom. And it shows, in the professional opinion of the law enforcement personnel entrusted with his incarceration, that Mr. Flowers was well-behaved and trustworthy. According to law enforcement personnel, therefore, Mr. Flowers was not a flight risk and did not pose a danger to society even while on trial for his life. Yet, trial counsel failed to present any of this evidence to the jury, or even inquire about the topic with his family. *See* Ex. 90 (Archie Flowers Aff.) ¶ 7; Ex. 91 (Lola Flowers Aff.) ¶ 7.

Although trial counsel generally are “presumed to have rendered adequate assistance,” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690, that presumption does not apply where trial counsel fail to conduct an adequate investigation. *See Rompilla*, 545 U.S. at 395. Such a failure to investigate cannot be excused on tactical grounds as “[i]t takes no deep legal analysis to conclude that an attorney who never seeks out or interviews important witnesses and who fails to request vital information was not engaging in trial strategy.” *Davis*, 87 So. 3d at 469; *see also Williams*, 529 U.S. at 396 (noting that counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation cannot be justified on tactical grounds).

Here, the record makes clear that trial counsel’s failure to present this evidence was not strategic. Trial counsel adopted a strategy of attempting to demonstrate that Mr. Flowers was not a future danger. Specifically, they made an effort to show the jury that Mr. Flowers posed

no risk of future dangerousness by presenting the testimony of James Aiken, an expert in future dangerousness. Tr. at 3296, 3305–33. Trial counsel therefore obviously understood the importance of showing that Mr. Flowers was not a danger to society and made the strategic decision to attempt to do so. Trial counsel simply failed to follow through on their chosen strategy, and thus provided ineffective assistance. See *Leatherwood v. State*, 473 So. 2d 964, 970 (Miss. 1985) (finding ineffective assistance when defense counsel “chooses a defense and then does not follow through on his chosen strategy”). Moreover, trial counsel had the power to subpoena pertinent documents from the Department of Corrections and to subpoena testimony from Department of Corrections’s employees. See, e.g., Miss. Const. art III, § 26; *Patton v. State*, 109 So. 3d 66, 79 (Miss. 2012) (recognizing the right to call witnesses with relevant and material testimony). They simply failed to take advantage of this right.

This failure prejudiced Mr. Flowers because the jurors tasked with deciding if he should be granted mercy were not made aware of the full picture of his character. Defense counsel’s error was particularly harmful because the mitigation evidence that trial counsel failed to present came from records and employees of the Department of Corrections, and thus would have been uniquely compelling. These witnesses “would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed towards one of their chargees” resulting in the jury giving such evidence “much greater weight.” *Davis*, 87 So. 3d at 472 (internal quotations omitted) (“*Skipper* clearly stands for the proposition that testimony from disinterested prison personnel about an inmate’s conduct is highly probative”).

Because of trial counsel’s failures, the jury that sentenced Mr. Flowers to death never learned that Mr. Flowers was a model inmate, well-adjusted to prison, or that he was regarded as so lacking in future dangerousness by the State that he was permitted to *leave custody* for supper

with his parents. Had the jury been presented with the entire picture, there is at least a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted to spare his life. This requires that Mr. Flowers's death sentences be reversed. *See id.* at 471–472 (finding that, where trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to put on an adequate mitigation case, “the decision in *Skipper* leads to the inescapable conclusion that [Mr. Flowers's] death sentence must be reversed”); *Rompilla*, 545 U.S. at 393 (explaining that where the potential mitigation evidence “bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury,” prejudice results even if “it is possible that a jury could have heard it all and still have decided on the death penalty”).

E. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During The State's Closing Argument.

Trial counsel also were ineffective for failing to object to the State's repeated mischaracterizations of the evidence during closing argument.

The principles governing prosecutorial misrepresentations are well-settled under both Mississippi law and the federal Constitution. The purpose of a closing argument is to fairly sum up the evidence. *Rodgers v. State*, 796 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (Miss. 2001). “[The prosecutor] may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence, and he may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from the facts” *Bell v. State*, 725 So. 2d 836, 851 (Miss. 1998) (collecting authorities). But the prosecutor—obviously—cannot “state facts which are not in evidence.” *Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink*, 131 So. 817, 821 (Miss. 1930); *see also Miller v. Pate*, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding due process violation where prosecutor misrepresented material evidence); *Flowers II*, 842 So. 2d at 556 (holding “cumulative effect of the State's repeated instances of arguing facts not in evidence [denied] Flowers his right to a fair trial”); *Dunaway v.*

State, 551 So. 2d 162, 163 (Miss. 1989) (“[P]rosecuting attorneys must exercise caution and discretion in making extreme statements in their arguments to the jury, if for no other reason than to save . . . the additional time, expense and effort involved in a retrial.”). Here, the State made repeated, significant misrepresentations of material facts during closing argument. These mischaracterizations glossed over serious flaws and filled otherwise irreconcilable gaps in the prosecution’s theory of the case against Mr. Flowers. Defense counsel failed to object to any of these misrepresentations during closing argument. This failure violated Mr. Flowers’s right to effective assistance of counsel. *See, e.g., Zapata v. Vasquez*, 788 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015); *Hodge v. Hurley*, 426 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005).

As discussed at length throughout this Petition, the State’s case against Mr. Flowers depended in large part upon the reliability of its patchwork timeline of Mr. Flowers’s movements on the morning of July 16, its flimsy motive theory, the jury’s willingness to reject Doyle Simpson as a legitimate alternate perpetrator, and the jury’s acceptance of the improbable proposition that one person could have committed all four homicides in the manner reflected at the crime scene and in the autopsy results. There were evidentiary problems with each of these critical components that threatened to undermine the State’s case. So the State did what it had to do to win its case: mischaracterize the evidence during closing argument to fix these problems and fill these gaps.

1. The Timing Of Sam Jones’s Discovery Of The Crime.

Sam Jones discovered the bodies at the furniture store, and the timing of that discovery within the chronological sequence alleged by the State was essential to the prosecution’s theory of the case. On direct examination by the prosecution, Mr. Jones testified that Bertha Tardy had called him “a little after 9:00” on the morning of the crime, and he had traveled to the store

shortly thereafter. SJ Tr. 8. He was unequivocal on this point:

A: Yes. She called me around, it was a little after 9:00.

Q: Called you a little after 9:00.

A: A little after 9:00.

Id. Mr. Jones was also certain that he had arrived at the store before 9:30 a.m.:

Q: All right, and what did you do after she called?

A: I got to the store; it was before—it was right at, between 9:15 and 9:30.

Q: Okay.

A: I will put it like that. It wasn't 9:30.

Id.

Because this account of the timeline did not square with other eyewitness accounts,¹⁰⁷ the State immediately attempted to adjust Mr. Jones's account of when he had arrived:

[Prosecution]: Okay. And I think—I might have misled you a little bit. It was, *when you got to the store, that was going to be closer on up to 10 o'clock, wasn't it?*

[Defense]: Object[ion] to leading, Your Honor.

The Court: Overruled.

SJ Tr. 9. Nothing in the rest of Mr. Jones's testimony contradicted his initial sworn statement that he had discovered the crime sometime between 9:15 and 9:30. Nor did the State offer any

¹⁰⁷ Evidence establishing that the murders had already occurred by 9:30 a.m. posed two significant problems for the State. First, it conflicted badly with the accounts later elicited from Porky Collins and Clemmie Fleming. Mr. Collins was the only witness to report seeing Mr. Flowers in the immediate vicinity of the furniture store, presumably just *before* the crime, and Ms. Fleming was the only person who claimed to have seen Mr. Flowers running away from the store, presumably just *after* the crime—and both claimed to have made their sightings *shortly after* 10:00 a.m. See PC Tr. 1606–10; Tr. 2367–70 (Clemmie Fleming's account). The tension is self-evident: If Mr. Flowers had committed a quadruple homicide by 9:30 a.m., why would he be standing outside the crime scene more than half an hour later?

Additionally, if Sam Jones's account was correct, then the crime scene was unattended and unmonitored for at least fifty minutes between his discovery of the murder and the arrival of Chief Hargrove. Even if the prosecution's unilateral revision of Mr. Jones's testimony was correct, there was ample time for unknown people *other than the killer* to enter the unlocked door of the furniture store, step in the blood on the floor, and leave undetected. This possibility is consistent with the observations of Mr. Jones, who testified that he did not see a shoe print at the time he entered the store and discovered the victims, but did see a print when he later reentered the store with Chief Hargrove. SJ Tr. 22–24, 34.

other testimonial or evidentiary fix for the glaring discrepancy between Mr. Jones's testimony and that of Porky Collins and Clemmie Fleming, both of whom testified that they had seen Mr. Flowers outside of Tardy's after 10:00 a.m. on July 16. Instead, the State simply seized on the opportunity during closing argument to change what Mr. Jones had said. After identifying the "timeline" as the first of a set of "connections" that would establish Mr. Flowers's guilt, Tr. 3188, the State purported to remind the jurors of Mr. Jones's account:

Mr. Sam Jones came into the store *slightly after 10:00* on the morning of the 16th and discovered the bodies. The 911 dispatched, dispatched the MedStat ambulance crew at 10:20 am. Chief Hargrove was the first to arrive between 10:20 and 10:21 am. Hargrove is on the scene and locks down the crime scene.

Tr. 3189 (emphasis added). That, of course, is not what Mr. Jones testified. This was a material alteration of Mr. Jones's account in a direction that dishonestly resolved the otherwise problematic discrepancy with the stories told by Mr. Collins and Ms. Fleming. Nevertheless, defense counsel failed to object.

2. Mr. Flowers's Nonexistent "Beef" With The Store.

The State also needed to offer the jury some reason to believe that Mr. Flowers, a gospel singer with no criminal record, had a motive to commit the quadruple homicide at Tardy Furniture. But not a single witness at Mr. Flowers's trial offered anything useful to the State on this score. The closest any witness came was Investigator Jack Matthews, who said that Bertha Tardy's daughter, Roxanne Ballard, had told him "about one incident where they had recently let an employee go by the name of Curtis Flowers." Tr. 2482.¹⁰⁸ According to the District Attorney's Investigator, John Johnson, this did not result in any "fights," "cuss outs[,] big

¹⁰⁸ Other testimony would later indicate that the "incident" Ballard related to Investigator Matthews concerned Mr. Flowers having accidentally damaged the golf cart batteries, *see* Tr. 2665, and that, despite the battery incident, the store owner loaned Mr. Flowers thirty dollars before he left work, Tr. 2496–97.

arguments . . . [or] threats to anybody[.]” Tr. 2923.

Notwithstanding the absence of any record evidence from which the jury could conclude—or even reasonably *infer*—that Mr. Flowers was angry or vengeful over his termination from the furniture store, the prosecutor stood before the jury in closing argument and characterized Jack Matthews’s unremarkable testimony of Mr. Flowers having been “let . . . go” as evidence of *hostility* between the defendant and his former short-term employer:

The investigators learned pretty quickly when they were asked who in the world could have had some reason, *some motive, some anything to attack four people like this. Have you had anybody that’s had a beef with the store? Just one.*

Tr. 3189 (emphasis added). According to the testimony, however, investigators never “learned” any such thing. All they were told was that Mr. Flowers had lost his job after failing to show up for work for three days—nothing more. In the face of this material misrepresentation to the jury about the critical element of motive, trial counsel again stayed silent.

3. Porky Collins’s Reaction To The Photo Array Containing A Picture Of Doyle Simpson.

One of the central disputes at trial was whether Doyle Simpson, rather than Mr. Flowers, was the actual perpetrator of the crime. The prosecution therefore had a strong interest in avoiding testimony that would strengthen Mr. Simpson’s profile as a suspect while at the same time preserving any evidence that pointed to Mr. Flowers’s guilt. Porky Collins’s testimony served both of these interests; he had purported to identify Mr. Flowers as a man he had seen outside the furniture store, but portions of his account (e.g., the presence of a dirty two-toned brown car, like Doyle Simpson’s, on the street near the store, and his identification of a second man outside of the store) had also pointed toward Mr. Simpson. From the State’s perspective, therefore, the chances of success at trial would be maximized by achieving the combination of a

strong and unequivocal eyewitness identification of Mr. Flowers by Mr. Collins, while simultaneously neutralizing the parts of Porky Collins's testimony that favored Doyle Simpson as the killer.

But as with Sam Jones's testimony, there was at least one element of Mr. Collins's story beyond the State's control. Several weeks after the murders, Mr. Collins was shown two photo arrays and asked if he recognized any of the individuals as the man he had seen outside of the furniture store. The first array included a picture of Doyle Simpson, and Mr. Collins selected it, saying it "look[ed] like the person he'd seen," Tr. 3031. Unhappy with that result, investigators showed Mr. Collins a second array omitting Mr. Simpson and adding Mr. Flowers, to which Mr. Collins responded, "I believe that's him, it looks like him." Tr. 3032. For the State, Porky Collins's reaction to the photo arrays was a troublingly mixed bag: by pointing to both Curtis Flowers and Doyle Simpson, it simultaneously diluted the probative value of the identification of Mr. Flowers, and reinforced the suggestion that Mr. Simpson was the real killer.

The State's solution to this conundrum was the same as its solution to the trouble with Sam Jones's account: misstate the facts in closing argument. And that is exactly what the Prosecutor did:

Here are two line-ups. These line-ups were shown to Porky at the same setting. First was this one that has Doyle Simpson's picture on it. Because later on when they did this line-up, they already knew that the gun came out of Doyle's car. And so they gave this thing to Porky first and said is the guy that you saw in front of Tardy's in this group. *Now, if he was going to make a misidentification, ladies and gentlemen, that would have been the perfect time for him to pick one of these guys and say yeah, there he is right there. But you know what? Porky did not misidentify anybody. He said the guy ain't in there. . . .* Porky was offered a prime chance to mess up. The perfect chance to make a mistake. He almost—It didn't develop out the way it, but it was almost like a trick. *You know, see if he is in there. No, he is not. Is he in this second group? Yeah. That's him right there. So that's pretty strong identification, isn't it?*

Tr. 3193–94 (emphases added). Again, the prosecutor lied. And again, trial counsel failed to object.

4. The Location And Distribution Of The Victims At The Crime Scene.

Regardless of where each victim had been found in the store, the State’s insistence that one person, acting alone, committed four execution-style killings with five bullets was already a stretch. But the actual location of each victim at the crime scene made this theory even more implausible. According to diagrams and notes prepared by Mississippi Crime Laboratory personnel, three of the victims were separated from each other by approximately five feet, while the fourth victim was found more than fifteen feet away from the others. *See* Trial Ex. S-39; S-40; S-51, *Flowers* VI.¹⁰⁹ That arrangement meant either that a single assailant managed to place precision shots in all four unrestrained victims despite their separation by substantial distances, or that this crime was not the work of a single assailant.

The likelihood of jurors accepting the State’s lone gunman theory depended upon the State’s ability to overcome the obvious common sense barriers to its plausibility. Nothing could be done about the number of victims or the small number of bullets used to kill them; both of which undermined the lone gunman theory. What the State could—and did—do, however, was subtly but effectively mislead the jury into believing that carrying out the four killings was not as physically demanding as it seemed. To do so, the State completely misrepresented the contents of the crime lab documents. Whereas those documents showed the separations described above,

¹⁰⁹ The diagrams admitted as State’s Exhibits 39 and 51 were not drawn to scale, but it is possible to deduce the approximate distances separating the victims by viewing them in combination with the partial measurements recorded in State’s Exhibit 40. The fact that the victims were separated by considerable distances is also confirmed by the crime scene photographs. *See* C.P. 2237 CD in folder name: “Photos: Photos from Envelopes #2,3,4 and B & W shoeprint” at image0000068A; image0000111A; image0000174A; and image0000210A.

according to the prosecutor at closing argument, “all four victims [were] basically laying in a pile, in a group right at the front counter in Tardy Furniture store.” Tr. 3188. That was not true, or even close to true. Once again, trial counsel made no objection.

* * * * *

By not objecting to these significant misrepresentations during closing argument, trial counsel utterly failed to function as the counsel guaranteed Mr. Flowers by the Sixth Amendment.

See, e.g. Hodge, 426 F.3d at 385–387 (finding trial counsel ineffective where they failed to object to prosecutor’s misrepresentations of evidence during closing). While the misrepresentations described above would have been too subtle for the jury to see through (and that was exactly the point), they should have been obvious to defense counsel. That conclusion is underscored when one considers that trial counsel were already on notice of the State’s willingness to misrepresent critical facts during closing argument to explain away glaring evidentiary gaps. Indeed, one of Mr. Flowers’s prior convictions was overturned on the basis of this very same kind of misconduct, *relating to some of the very same facts* misrepresented during closing arguments in Mr. Flowers’s most recent trial.

In *Flowers II*, the prosecution argued that Sam Jones received the call from Bertha Tardy at 9:30 a.m. and arrived at the store close to 10:00 a.m.: “[Jones] said he received a call around 9:30. I recall; I wrote it down. It took him 15 to 20 minutes to get there.” *Flowers II* Tr. 2693.

That is nearly identical to what the prosecution argued in Flowers’s most recent trial: “Mr. Sam Jones came into the store slightly after 10:00 on the morning of the 16th and discovered the bodies.” Tr. 3189. This also is untrue; in both cases, Mr. Jones testified that Bertha Tardy had called him and he had arrived at the store sometime before or around 9:30. *Flowers II* Tr. 1584; SJ Tr. 7–8.

Also in *Flowers II*, District Attorney Evans argued that Flowers had a beef with the store: “Curtis Flowers was mad. You notice in your statement when Jack Matthews read it at least four or five different times in there. He talked about how he had been terminated, how he had been let go.” *Flowers II* Tr. 2759. Again, that is nearly identical to what the prosecution argued in Mr. Flowers’s most recent trial. Tr. 3189. And again, it was unsupported by what the evidence actually showed. In *Flowers II*, however, trial counsel properly objected to the prosecution’s misrepresentations, and the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s conduct was so egregious that it required reversal of Mr. Flowers’s conviction. Here, however, trial counsel failed to object, which the Court noted when it denied Mr. Flowers’s claim on appeal. *Flowers VI*, 158 So. 3d at 1046; Tr. 3189.

Counsel’s failure to object cannot be chalked up to strategic decision-making. Instead, counsel blatantly failed to recognize and protest the very same distortions that led to a reversal by the Mississippi Supreme Court in *Flowers II*. Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 19 (“[T]here was no strategy involved in [the] failure . . . to object to several improper statements by the prosecution . . . we just were not paying enough attention.”); Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 21. Given the fact that trial counsel was on notice of the prosecution’s willingness to make these types of mischaracterizations, that a proper objection on this *very same issue* in *Flowers II* had resulted in a reversal of conviction, and that trial counsel admits there was no strategic decision to stay silent, the failure to object here fell below the objective standard of reasonableness required by *Strickland*.

This failure prejudiced Mr. Flowers in two crucial ways. First, trial counsel’s failure to object allowed admission of inaccurate material evidence into the record, thereby “painting an incorrect picture for the jury of the events surrounding . . . the murders.” *Flowers VI*, 158 So.

3d at 1085 (Dickinson, J., Dissenting). As described above, the State tainted the jury's perception of the evidence in four key ways: (i) glossing over evidence establishing that the murders had already occurred by 9:30 a.m., evidence that called into serious doubt the timeline articulated by the prosecution, and the eyewitness testimony of Porky Collins and Clemmie Fleming; (ii) manufacturing a motive for Mr. Flowers to commit the murders; (iii) bolstering Porky Collins's shaky and equivocal eyewitness identification of Curtis Flowers by explaining away the fact that he had also picked Doyle Simpson out of a photo array; and (iv) presenting an inaccurate description of the victims which made it easy for the jury to believe an assailant with unexceptional marksmanship skills could have committed the killings, instead of requiring the jurors to buy into the State's actual theory—that one person could possess the combination of skill and speed necessary to shoot four unrestrained adults in the head as they stood separated by the distances observed at the scene. A proper objection to the State's mischaracterizations of these crucial evidentiary points would have made clear to the jury that they were not to consider this improper evidence, and would have highlighted the severe flaws in the State's theory of guilt.

Indeed, had trial counsel properly and timely objected to these falsehoods during closing argument, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.

Second, by not contemporaneously objecting to the State's mischaracterization of facts during closing arguments, trial counsel failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal. When trial counsel contemporaneously objects during closing argument, appellate courts review the trial court's ruling on that objection for abuse of discretion. *See Netherland v. State*, 909 So. 2d 716, 718–719 (Miss. 2005) *reh'g denied* (Sept. 15, 2015) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court's ruling on objection to closing statements). On the other hand, “the failure to object to the prosecution's statements in closing argument [generally] constitutes a

procedural bar.” *Flowers VI*, 158 So. 3d at 1043 (internal quotations omitted). While the Mississippi Supreme Court nevertheless exercised its discretion to review Mr. Flowers’s challenge to the prosecution’s statements on appeal, it did so under the more burdensome plain error analysis. *See id.* at 1046 (“Flowers failed to object to the statements during closing, therefore, we apply the plain error doctrine on appeal.”). To reverse under plain error analysis, the error “must have resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” *Id.* at 1043 (internal brackets and quotations omitted). Although Mr. Flowers submits the errors here satisfied that standard—and although three Justices would have granted Mr. Flowers relief even under that heightened standard, *Flowers*, 158 So. 3d at 1087–88 (King, J., dissenting)—this claim would have been analyzed under the less stringent abuse of discretion standard had trial counsel contemporaneously objected. And had Mr. Flowers’s claim been analyzed for abuse of discretion, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.

F. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Impeach Key State Witness Clemmie Fleming With Readily Available Evidence.

Trial counsel were ineffective for failing to impeach with readily available evidence the State’s star witness, Clemmie Fleming—the only witness to place Mr. Flowers at Tardy Furniture the morning of the murders. Defense counsel knew or should have known of witnesses that contradicted her testimony, as well as a recorded recantation by Ms. Fleming herself. But counsel presented none of this evidence.

Ms. Fleming’s testimony was devastating to Mr. Flowers’s defense. She testified that on the morning of July 16, 1996, she hired Roy Harris to drive her to Tardy Furniture so she could pay off her furniture bill. Tr. 2367–68. According to Ms. Fleming, when they arrived at

the store, she decided not to go inside because she was not feeling well—a convenient explanation for why no one saw her near Tardy’s that morning. *Id.* Rather than park in front of Tardy’s, Roy Harris supposedly turned his car onto the road running alongside Tardy Furniture. *Id.* At that point, Ms. Fleming says, she saw Curtis Flowers “running hard” like “somebody was after him,” about 90 feet away from the store. Tr. 2369–70. Ms. Fleming testified that she had known Mr. Flowers most of her life, and that when she saw him running she said to Roy Harris, “there go Curtis.” Tr. 2369.

This testimony was critical to the State’s case. The State acknowledged as much during closing argument:

Then you have Clemmie Fleming. What about Clemmie? *And this is huge.* She said she saw Curtis running hard at the back of the store . . . She knows him. No mistake. Doesn’t have to pick him out of a line-up. She knows him. Knew him on sight. Recognized him instantly.

Tr. 3194 (emphasis added). Clemmie Fleming was the only eyewitness who testified to having seen Mr. Flowers near Tardy Furniture immediately after the murders. And her testimony as an eyewitness was more compelling than that of Porky Collins, who did not know Mr. Flowers, was shifting and equivocal when shown a photo array, and had difficulty identifying Mr. Flowers in the courtroom at his first trial. Tr. 3032; *Flowers I* Tr. 435. Indeed, Ms. Fleming’s testimony that she saw Mr. Flowers running away from Tardy’s on the morning of July 16 was arguably the most damning eyewitness testimony presented at trial. What could be more suggestive of guilt than a suspect sprinting away from the scene of a crime?

But Ms. Fleming’s testimony was patently false.

1. Counsel's Failure to Call Mr. Harris Constituted Deficient Performance.

Ms. Fleming was not with Roy Harris when he saw a man running near Tardy's Furniture on the morning of July 16. Ex. 9 (Harris Aff.) ¶ 3. Mr. Harris was alone at the time, and he did not recognize the man. *Id.* ¶¶ 2–3. If defense counsel had presented Mr. Harris as a witness, he would have testified to that fact. *Id.* ¶ 5 (stating that trial counsel never contacted him, and that he would have been willing to testify if they had). He recently recounted these same facts to investigative reporters, explaining that Doug Evans had pressured him to testify that the man he had seen was Mr. Flowers. Ex. 3-B (ITD Ep. 2 Tr.) at 16–17.

There was no excuse for trial counsel's failure to present this readily available evidence. Defense counsel undoubtedly knew of Roy Harris and what the substance of his testimony would be. Among the few details of Ms. Fleming's story that remained consistent across the six trials was her testimony that she was with Mr. Harris on the morning of July 16 when she supposedly saw Mr. Flowers running away from Tardy's. *See* Tr. 2367–68; *Flowers V* Tr. 419–421; *Flowers IV* Tr. 214–216; *Flowers III* Tr. 1396–97; *Flowers II* Tr. 1842; *Flowers I* Tr. 552. And Mr. Harris himself testified for the defense on three prior occasions,¹¹⁰ including during *Flowers III*, when Ray Charles Carter was lead defense counsel. *Flowers III* Tr. 1761–73. Mr. Harris' prior testimony was that, although he saw a man running near Tardy Furniture on the morning of

¹¹⁰ That the three trials in which Mr. Harris previously testified resulted in convictions is inapposite to the question of whether his testimony would have been material or compelling to the jury. All three of those convictions were the product of prosecutorial misconduct. *See Flowers v. State*, 947 So. 2d at 939 (reversing convictions upon finding multiple *Batson* violations); *Flowers v. State*, 842 So. 2d 531 (Miss. 2003) (*Flowers II*) (reversing conviction on prosecutorial misconduct grounds upon finding that (i) the State's strategy of continuously referring to killing of other furniture store employees violated Flowers's right to fair trial; (ii) the State improperly attempted to impeach three defense witnesses' testimony without factual basis; and (iii) the prosecutor's closing argument lacked evidentiary foundation); *Flowers v. State*, 773 So. 2d 309, 325–330 (Miss. 2000) (*Flowers I*) (reversing conviction on prosecutorial misconduct grounds where State attempted to impeach a witness without factual basis and introduced improper argument).

July 16, Clemmie Fleming was not with him at the time and the man he saw running was not Curtis Flowers. *See, e.g., Flowers III* Tr. 1762–65; *Flowers II* Tr. 2301–02, 2305; Ex. 9 (Harris Aff.) ¶ 2. Mr. Harris further testified that he had driven Ms. Fleming on July 16, but it was not until more than an hour after he had seen the man running while he was alone, and they did not drive to Tardy Furniture together. *See, e.g., Flowers II* Tr. 2302–03; Ex. 9 (Harris Aff.) ¶¶ 3–4.

Defense counsel had no strategic reason for failing to present Mr. Harris as a witness, and their failure to do so therefore cannot be insulated from scrutiny on that basis. Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 11; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 9. Indeed, although the decision whether to call a particular witness is ordinarily “the epitome of a strategic decision” of the sort courts will rarely disturb, that is true only where the decision is made after thorough investigation, and only if the decision is actually made for a strategic purpose. *See Small v. Florida Dep’t of Corr.*, 470 F. App’x 808, 812 (11th Cir. 2012); *see also Davis v. State*, 743 So. 2d 326, 339 (Miss. 1999) (“[W]hile attorneys will be granted wide discretion as to trial strategy, choosing defenses and calling witnesses, a certain amount of investigation and preparation is required. Failure to call a witness may be excused based on the belief that the testimony will not be helpful; such a belief in turn must be based on a genuine effort to locate or evaluate the witness, and not on a mistaken legal notion or plain inaction.”). Here it was not.¹¹¹ Trial counsel simply failed to do their job. Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 11; Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 9; *see Vaca v. State*, 314 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Mo. 2010) (“Counsel may choose to call or not call almost any type of witness or to introduce or not introduce any kind of evidence for strategic considerations. Here however, experienced defense

¹¹¹ “There are many valid reasons for not calling witnesses: their testimony as a whole may be more harmful than helpful, their testimony may be impeached, their testimony may be cumulative, the witnesses may be unwilling or uncooperative; witnesses may be beyond the jurisdiction of the court or it may be

counsel candidly admitted that, without consideration and for no strategic reason, he failed to call a mental health expert. His failure to consider was ineffective.”).

And given that trial counsel clearly intended to discredit Clemmie Fleming, “counsel[’s] failure to offer all evidence they had” to do so “was inexcusable.” *Woodward v. State*, 635 So. 2d 805, 810 (Miss. 1993); *Anderson v. Butler*, 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (counsel ineffective for failing to follow through on stated strategy of calling expert witness to testify); *see also Eldridge v. Atkins*, 665 F.2d 228, 236 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[Counsel’s] ‘strategy’ not to use [certain witnesses] was not so much trial strategy as it was an accommodation to his own inadequate trial preparation . . . [A]lthough it may have been a trial decision of counsel not to pursue [certain] testimony it was counsel’s lack of preparation which went a long way in inducing him to make it.”). Trial counsel’s failure to use readily available information to pursue a stated strategy rendered their performance deficient.

2. Counsel’s Failure to Present Ms. Fleming’s Recorded Recantation Constituted Deficient Performance.

On direct examination by defense counsel, Latarsha Blissett stated flatly that her cousin Clemmie Fleming admitted to her between the first and second trials that she had lied. Tr. at 2819–20.

Q. And what did she say?

A. She told me that—if she talked to people, that she saw Curtis running from the store that they would pay off her furniture note or give her some money for her furniture. That is what she said she was going to do. That is what they asked her.

Q. Okay. Did she say she actually saw him? Did she really see him running?

A. She told me she didn’t see him, and that they haven’t gave her no money.

beyond the financial ability of the defendant to provide for the witnesses’ appearance.” *Leatherwood*, 473 at 969–970. None of these reasons are present here.

- Q. She said she didn't see Mr. Flowers running and that she was saying that she saw him for that purpose of not paying for her furniture or getting some money?
- A. Her furniture was going to be free and she was—they were going to give her the money to do away with the bill if she would have said she saw Curtis. So that is what she done for the money, for the furniture.

Id. But on cross-examination, Doug Evans employed an effective tactic: paint Ms. Blissett as biased and unreliable.

- Q. Earl—I am fixing to get into that. Earl is the defendant's cousin, isn't he?
- A. Um-hum.
- Q. And Earl was your boyfriend.
- A. Right.
- Q. You had a lot of reasons to want to help out, didn't you?
- A. No, I did not.

Id. at 2822–23.

Defense counsel seemed wholly unprepared for this predictable line of questioning, asking on redirect that Ms. Blissett merely reaffirm that her testimony was true. *Id.* at 2824. But counsel had in its files slam-dunk evidence that Ms. Clemming had said exactly what her cousin was claiming. Not only did they know that the two women “had the conversation a second time . . . over the phone,” *id.* at 2820, the defense *had the recording of that conversation.*

See, Ex. 8 (Audio Recording of C. Fleming and L. Blissett (Sep. 12, 1998)) (contained in the files of trial counsel that were to post-conviction counsel). On that phone call, Ms. Fleming stated that she only saw Mr. Flowers “way, way from the store,” and “on the other side of town.”

Id. at 0:05:00–55. Clemmie insisted:

Ms. Fleming: Hell no, I ain't seen him come out no goddamn store . . . I ain't seen, you know I ain't seen that man come out no store . . . Hell no, I ain't see him come out no store . . . No, I ain't seen him come out the store.

Id. And, exactly as her cousin testified on the stand, Ms. Fleming said that she had been promised that she wouldn't have to pay her outstanding balance to Tardy Furniture:

Ms. Blissett: The folks that called you, did they tell you they gonna to pay it off or give you the money or what?

Ms. Fleming: They ain't tell me shit. They just say don't worry bout this money that's all they told me.

Ms. Blissett: Well that's the same thing as they gonna, you ain't got to pay for it, right?

Ms. Fleming: Mmm hmm, Yeah

Ms. Blissett: Well did you end up paying for it?

Ms. Fleming: I paid so much on it I think I owe two hundred dollars, and I ain't paid no more off.

Ms. Blissett: You got to pay rent cuz?

Ms. Fleming: Yes I do.

Id. at 0:02:45–0:03:13. Indeed, Ms. Fleming needed the money. She explained to her cousin, “I ain't got no job.” *Id.* at 0:08:50. And once Ms. Fleming lied in the first trial, her cousin told the court that “[s]he said that she didn't change her story, didn't, didn't tell the people that what she told them was a lie because if they—if she told them that she was lying they was going to take her kids, and she was going to go to jail. And she didn't want to lose her children.” Tr. 2820.

The recorded conversation would not just have rehabilitated Ms. Blissett's credibility. The prior inconsistent statement would have discredited Clemmie Fleming—defense counsel's primary strategy with this witness. As with the available-but-unused evidence from Mr. Harris, “counsel[']s failure to offer all evidence they had was inexcusable.” *Woodward*, 635 So. 2d at 810.¹¹² This is just as true if defense counsel failed to use the recantation simply because they

¹¹² Frederick Woods, who was not called at trial, corroborates the fact that Ms. Fleming lied during her testimony. He swears in an affidavit that, sometime between 2000–2002, “I asked Clemmie if she had actually seen Curtis Flowers running from the area of Tardy's on the day of the murders. Clemmie told me that she had not, and that she made up the story to get the reward money.” Ex. 10 (Woods Aff.) ¶¶ 2–3. Mr. Woods also attests that, if defense counsel had asked him to testify at trial, he would have

filed to adequately the case file. *See, e.g., Vega v. Ryan*, 757 F.3d 960, 966–967 (9th Cir. 2014) (failure to discover and present an apparent recantation in the case file is deficient representation under *Strickland*).

3. Counsel’s Failures to Discredit Ms. Fleming Were Prejudicial.

These failures prejudiced the outcome of Mr. Flowers’s trial. Had defense counsel successfully discredited Clemmie Fleming’s damaging testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Roy Harris would have shown that her testimony was impossible. And Ms. Fleming’s own quadruple recantation—on tape, in her own voice—would have put her fiction to bed *and* explained why she lied in the first place. Without Ms. Fleming’s story, the prosecutor would be left without any witness placing Mr. Flowers near the crime scene. In the words of the prosecution, the jury would have thought, “this is huge.” Tr. 3194.

Defense counsel’s failure to present this readily available testimony was ineffective. *See, e.g., Branch v. Sweeney*, 758 F.3d 226, 235–236 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing ineffective-assistance claim where counsel failed to call two witnesses who would have discredited testimony that the petitioner shot the victim); *Toliver v. Pollard*, 688 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2012) (failure to call two witnesses to resolve “a swearing match between the two sides” about who ordered the shooting of the victim was ineffective assistance) (internal quotations omitted); *Steinkuehler v. Meschner*, 176 F.3d 441, 444–445 (8th Cir. 1999) (failure to cross-examine critical State witness with readily available information that was key to petitioner’s defense was ineffective assistance); *Harris v. Reed*, 894 F.2d 871, 878–879 (7th Cir.

shared this information with the jury. *Id.* ¶ 4. Trial counsel’s failure to do so likewise constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

1990) (failure to call two witnesses in a murder trial who saw someone other than the defendant running from the crime scene was ineffective assistance); *State v. Jenkins*, 848 N.W.2d 786, 795 (Wis. 2014) (failure to call an eyewitness to the shooting who would “contradict or impeach the eyewitness upon whom the prosecution’s entire case relied” was ineffective assistance); *Wicoff v. State*, 900 S.W.2d 187, 101–102 (Ark. 1995) (failure to call witness who would have testified that one of the victims admitted that she had fabricated her allegations against defendant was ineffective assistance).

G. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Present Evidence Of The .380 Found And Turned Over To Law Enforcement In 2001.

In 2001, Annie Armstrong was living at 106 Knox Street in Winona, Mississippi, just one block away or so from where Tardy Furniture was located. Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 2. Her son, Jeffrey, was living with her at the time. *Id.*; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 2. In October of that year, Jeffrey’s dog went underneath the house and was barking. When Ms. Armstrong and Jeffrey went outside to try to get the dog to come out, they noticed that he seemed to be digging for something. Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 3; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 5. Both saw that the dog had dug up a rusty gun from the crawl space under Ms. Armstrong’s house—a gun that they later determined was a .380 handgun. Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 3; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 6–7. Jeffrey placed the gun in a shed behind the house after it had been recovered, having been aware that a .380 handgun had been determined to be the weapon that was used at the Tardy Furniture murders and that the weapon was never recovered. Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 3–4; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) at ¶¶ 6–8; Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 1. Several days later, Jeffrey Armstrong was stopped for speeding by Officers Vince Small and Dan Harrod of the Winona Police Department, during which he informed them

of his discovery of the .380 handgun. Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 1; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) at ¶ 9. Thereafter, Mississippi law enforcement officers came to Ms. Armstrong's house and retrieved the gun that the Armstrongs had recovered. Ex. 72 (A. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 5; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) at ¶ 10. No one from the Winona Police Department had any further contact Jeffrey Armstrong regarding questions, concerns, or requests about the gun recovered. *See* Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶¶ 11–12; Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 2.

Defense counsel knew all of this, at least as of 2006—prior to Mr. Flowers's fourth, fifth, and sixth trials. In fact—after Mr. Flowers's brother put Jeffery in touch with Mr. Flowers's defense attorneys—Jeffrey Armstrong gave a written statement to defense investigator Mike Wilson on August 18, 2006, which previewed all of the information to which Ms. Armstrong has now attested. *See* Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 1–2; Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 14. Additionally, Jeffrey Armstrong told defense investigators that he had seen Police Chief Johnny Hargrove at Wal-Mart several weeks after turning the gun over, and that he asked Mr. Hargrove whether they had confirmed whether the gun he'd found was used in the Tardy Furniture murders. Ex. 30 (J. Armstrong Statement) at 2. According to Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Hargrove replied that they did not need to do testing of the newly found gun, because they knew they had the “right person.” *Id.*

Trial counsel did not follow up with Jeffrey after his initial written statement despite Armstrong giving a statement that contradicted any notion that the State had sufficiently disclosed exculpatory evidence. *See* Ex. 71 (J. Armstrong Aff.) ¶ 14. Their failure to follow up was not the product of strategy, *see* Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 12, and rendered their performance deficient. Counsel cannot simply overlook or ignore key pieces of information that could be

beneficial to their client. *See Wilson v. State*, 81 So. 3d 1067, 1075 (Miss. 2012) (“[A]t a minimum, counsel has a duty to interview potential witnesses and to make independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.”) (quoting *Ferguson*, 507 So. 2d at 96); *Seidel v. Merkle*, 146 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Counsel’s disregard for conspicuous pieces of evidence that pointed to a potentially fruitful trial strategy cannot be described as anything short of defective representation”). Likewise, when counsel makes choices of which witnesses to use or not to use, those choices must be based on counsel’s proper investigation. No such proper investigation happened here.

Trial counsel’s failure to follow up on this promising investigatory lead prejudiced Mr. Flowers. Given that the murder weapon was never recovered, the fact that a .380 handgun was found several years after the murders approximately a quarter mile away from Tardy Furniture, and that the gun was rusty, suggesting it had been buried for some time, was highly probative. Indeed, the State’s contention that Curtis Flowers had used Doyle Simpson’s gun to commit the murders was central to their theory of the case. If the gun found by the Armstrongs in 2001 had been tested according to the State’s now-discredited toolmark examination methodology, Mr. Flowers could have rebutted the State’s bunk ballistics evidence on its own terms by showing that this .380 was either: (i) the murder weapon, but not Doyle Simpson’s gun; or (ii) Doyle Simpson’s gun, but not the murder weapon. Even if counsel had not been able to recover the .380 handgun—which counsel could not have procured given the State’s failure to turn it over coupled with their repeated statements that they had turned over all the evidence, *see* Ground B, *supra*—further investigation in the .380 handgun would have also been relevant to other aspects of Mr. Flowers’s defense. For instance, the existence and discovery of the gun could have been introduced to show that the route map, as proposed by the State, that Mr.

Flowers allegedly took was incompatible with the location of the possible murder weapon. Moreover, the existence of the .380 handgun, having never been investigated by the State, if introduced at trial would have shaken the jury's confidence that the State completed a full and thorough investigation of the murders.

Indeed, one of defense counsel's chosen strategies during Mr. Flowers's sixth trial was to demonstrate that the State's investigation into the Tardy Furniture murders was shoddy, incomplete, and unprofessional. This was, in fact, the primary focus of defense counsel's opening statement:

Ladies and gentlemen, we will show you that this investigation was terribly flawed. That it was incomplete. And remains incomplete . . . [W]e would show you that the investigators engaged in what I call tunnel vision and confirmation bias . . . Ladies and gentleman, you will hear that this was a leaderless investigation . . . You get chaos. You get confusion. That's what we had in this investigation . . . And we intend to call someone who's going to tell you that the investigation in this case, lead [sic] by Mr. Evans and his top assistant, failed to conform to even the minimum standards in the profession for the documentation required to support any effective investigation of a homicide or major felony . . .

Tr. 1822–24, 1828–29. Further, defense counsel proffered the testimony of an expert witness, Robert Johnson, who would have testified as to the shoddiness of the State's investigation. *See, e.g.,* Tr. 3087–91, 3103–07 (proffer of Robert Johnson). Although the Court ultimately disallowed Mr. Johnson's testimony (after initially granting defense counsel's motion in limine to admit Mr. Johnson as an expert witness), Tr. 3108, 3122, the fact remains that one of defense counsel's primary strategic objectives at trial was to prove the inadequacy of the State's investigation. Testimony that a .380 handgun that could have been the murder weapon was found and turned over to law enforcement, but never tested or disclosed to defense counsel, would have greatly strengthened this line of attack against the State's case. But because defense

counsel failed to pursue any further investigation of this lead, the jury never heard it.

Trial counsel's failure to investigate and present this evidence was constitutionally deficient and requires that Mr. Flowers be granted a new trial. *See Woodward*, 635 So. 2d at 810 (trial counsel's "failure to offer all of the evidence they had" in furtherance of a stated strategy is ineffective); *Leatherwood*, 473 So. 2d at 970.

H. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Present Evidence Of Investigator John Johnson's False Notes.

Mr. Flowers submits that through the exercise of reasonable diligence, trial counsel could not have discovered that Investigator John Johnson's notes were false. *See* Ground B, Section E, *supra*. The State actively suppressed this evidence, and trial counsel would not have reasonably expended resources to seek out exculpatory information where the State said there was nothing to be found. *Id.* If this Court disagrees, however, then trial counsel's failure to investigate the integrity of John Johnson's notes and present evidence of their falsity at trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Newly discovered evidence has made clear that the State failed to disclose that John Johnson, its lead investigator, fabricated evidence to support the State's theory of the case. *See generally id.* He attributed dozens of false statements to the witnesses whom he interviewed, including multiple false statements that Mr. Flowers was seen wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes. *Id.*

The State then relied on Johnson's notes at trial to reinforce the credibility of its lead investigator, and the integrity of its investigation in general. *Id.*

Trial counsel's failure to uncover these false statements was prejudicial. Had Johnson's pattern of fabricating witness statements been introduced at trial, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have lost all confidence in the State's investigation and theory of the case

against Mr. Flowers. The State's attempt to tie together scattered circumstantial evidence to make its case against Mr. Flowers was already tenuous. If the jury knew that the State's investigator had gone so far as to fabricate witness statements during his investigation, the State's case would have fallen apart. The jury would have doubted the State's motives and the integrity of its evidence. It would have seen the State's case for what it was: an attempt to convict Mr. Flowers at all costs, regardless of the truth.

Further, once trial counsel discovered the falsity of Mr. Johnson's notes, trial counsel likely would have focused on and identified additional evidence undercutting the integrity of the State's investigation. For example, trial counsel would likely have introduced the testimony of Earl Campbell, a witness who previously contradicted Mr. Johnson's notes by testifying that he had not, in fact, seen Mr. Flowers wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes. *Flowers I* Tr. at 832–835. The State had previously attacked Mr. Campbell credibility by pitting his word against Mr. Johnson's notes. *Id.* at 835. Armed with the response that Mr. Johnson's notes were not, in fact, worthy of the trust usually afforded to law-enforcement officials, trial counsel likely would have called Mr. Campbell again, further exposing the flaws in the State's investigation and contradicting its theory of the case. Similarly, trial counsel likely would have uncovered the fact that, contrary to his testimony, Edward McChristian had not seen Mr. Flowers on the morning of the Tardy Furniture murders; he only said so because Mr. Johnson told him that he had. *See* Tr. at 2302; *contra* Ex. 3-B (ITD Ep. 2 Tr.) at 13–14.

If the Court finds that trial counsel should have uncovered the false nature of Mr. Johnson's notes through reasonable diligence, trial counsel's failure to do so constitutes deficient performance. This was not a strategic decision. Indeed, as discussed above in Ground G, Section H, *supra*, one of defense counsel's chosen strategies during Mr. Flowers's sixth trial was

to demonstrate that the State’s investigation into the Tardy Furniture murders was shoddy, incomplete, and unprofessional. This was, in fact, the primary focus of defense counsel’s opening statement, *see* Tr. 1822–24, 1828–29, and the focus on an expert witness whom defense counsel proffered to testify, *see, e.g.*, Tr. 3087–91, 3103–07 (proffer of Robert Johnson). Testimony that the State’s lead investigator had falsified witness statements in his investigation notes, and then relied on those notes at trial, would have substantially bolstered this attack. But because defense counsel failed to pursue any further investigation of this lead, the jury never heard it.

Moreover, a failure to investigate such as this cannot be excused on tactical grounds as “[i]t takes no deep legal analysis to conclude that an attorney who never seeks out or interviews important witnesses and who fails to request vital information was not engaging in trial strategy.”

Davis, 87 So. 3d at 469; *see also Williams*, 529 U.S. at 396 (counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation cannot be justified on tactical grounds).

Trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of Mr. Johnson’s false notes constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and requires that Mr. Flowers be granted a new trial.

I. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Uncover Critical Impeachment Evidence Relating To Key State Witnesses Odell Hallmon and Patricia Sullivan-Odom.

Mr. Flowers submits that the State suppressed material impeachment evidence regarding its star witnesses, Odell Hallmon and Patricia Sullivan-Odom, in violation of its *Brady* obligations. *See* Ground B, Sections B and C, *supra*. This impeachment evidence—including Mr. Hallmon’s backroom deals with District Attorney Doug Evans, and Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s pending tax-fraud indictment—could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence, and was actively concealed by the State. *Id.* If this Court disagrees,

however, then trial counsel's failure to uncover this critical impeachment evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Attacking the credibility of these two witnesses had no strategic downside. And without their testimony—including the only direct evidence in the case, that Curtis confessed; and the only testimony that Mr. Flowers was seen wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes on the day of the Tardy furniture murders—there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of trial would have been different. *See id.* Trial counsel's failure to uncover and use this impeachment evidence therefore constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and requires a new trial.

J. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Seek Sequestration Of The Venire, Or A Mistrial, Following The Venire's Improper Discussions.

In Ground F, Mr. Flowers explained that he was denied his right to a fair trial due to irregularities with the jurors, including impermissible interactions with the victims' family members, including a trial witness, and improper, premature discussions about the case. Mr. Flowers also discussed why the facts supporting this claim were not available to trial counsel. If this Court believes that these facts were reasonably discoverable, however, then trial counsel were also ineffective in failing to request sequestration of the venire from the public and/or seeking a mistrial ruling after the prospective jurors' inappropriate conversations came to light.

“Because jurors are presumed to be impartial and indifferent, counsel is expected to take affirmative action if he or she feels that the jury deciding the defendant's fate is or will be biased.” *Riley v. Cockrell*, 215 F. Supp. 2d 765, 781 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (indicating that counsel's failure to take such affirmative action “would establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel”); *see also People v. Tyburski*, 518 N.W.2d 441, 459 (Mich. 1994) (Boyle, J., concurring) (explaining that the revelation of influencing information during non-sequestered

voir dire could “cause the entire process to be aborted” or give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).

In this case, reasonable counsel would have taken corrective action to sequester venire members from the public and each other. This was not a typical trial: it was, in fact, the *sixth* for Mr. Flowers on the same gruesome set of crimes, which were well-known in the Montgomery County community. The special venire for this trial drew six hundred individuals, many of whom were asked to remain together in a courthouse hallway during the individual *voir dire* questioning. Some members of the venire knew numerous trial witnesses (including members of the victims’ families) and spoke with them in the hallway during *voir dire*. Ex. 82 (Mayes Aff.) ¶ 8.

With this trial environment in mind, defense counsel should have sought early sequestration of individual venire members. Indeed, Mr. Flowers’s lead trial counsel has acknowledged that:

[m]uch of the *voir dire* process at the sixth trial was conducted in a ‘group’ format . . . Many of the white potential jurors had reached a predetermined view on Mr. Flowers’s guilt. There was palpable pressure from the local white community to convict Mr. Flowers. ***We should have sought individual voir dire*** and we should have also moved the case from Montgomery County.

Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 19 (emphasis added). At the very least, however, counsel should have moved for a mistrial when it became apparent that certain venire members were: (a) discussing the case among themselves; (b) speaking with trial witnesses, particularly members of the victims’ families; (c) announcing their pre-formed opinions regarding Mr. Flowers’s guilt; and (d) making racist remarks that intimidated prospective jurors and may have compelled black members of the venire to remove themselves from the jury pool.

There is a reasonable probability that the result of Mr. Flowers’s trial would have been different, but for these professional errors of counsel. It is hard to imagine that venire members’ public discussions of Mr. Flowers’s presumed guilt did not influence the seated jurors. In addition, as the *Pridgeon* court emphasized, there is a strong possibility that prospective jurors may have “developed some subtle emotional inclination” disfavoring Mr. Flowers after interacting with prosecution witnesses outside of court. 462 F.2d at 1095. This is particularly true with respect to Bennie Rigby and other victims’ family members. And it is possible that racist remarks made by some prospective jurors—coupled with the history of persecution of African-Americans who had served on juries in prior *Flowers* trials, see Ground D, *supra*—compelled some black members of the venire to “self-strike” off of the jury, which interfered with Mr. Flowers’s right to be tried by a meaningfully representative pool of his peers. See *id.* Effective counsel would have challenged these issues promptly in furtherance of a different result.

K. Trial Counsel’s Failure To Pursue Pre-Trial DNA Testing Was Ineffective.

Remarkably limited DNA testing was performed on the evidence recovered from the crime scene. As a result, the State possesses evidence recovered from the Tardy crime scene that has never been tested for DNA, including four blood-stained \$10 and \$20 bills.¹¹³ The State also possesses evidence, such as the victims’ clothing, that requires additional testing with modern testing tools and techniques. See Ex. 92 (Miss. Crime Lab: Evidence Submission

¹¹³ See Ex. 92 (Miss. Crime Lab: Evidence Submission Forms (Crime Lab Case No. J96-3536-01C)) at Evidence Submission Form for Ex. Nos. 51–54 (July 26, 1996) (noting two \$10 bills and two \$20 bills, respectively) recovered from the crime scene and tested for blood stains; *id.* (requesting “SEROLOGY–EXAMINE EXHIBITS #51 THROUGH #54 FOR BLOOD STAINS”); blood was identified per Ex. 93 (Miss. Crime Lab Serology Worksheets for Exs. 51–54 (Aug. 24 and 27 1996)).

Forms).¹¹⁴ Trial counsel failed to demand or perform sufficient DNA testing on these materials. This failure was deficient and it prejudiced Mr. Flowers.

The available evidence is potentially exculpatory as DNA testing would result in one of two outcomes, both of which are beneficial to Mr. Flowers. DNA testing would either identify DNA from the true perpetrators of the murders or it would reinforce the absence of Mr. Flowers's DNA, which would further buttress his long-stated protestation of innocence. Unlike cases in which the defendant admitted being at a crime scene but claimed not to have been involved in the crimes, Mr. Flowers has always maintained that he was not at Tardy Furniture at the time of the murders. *See, e.g., LaFevers v. Gibson*, 182 F.3d 705, 722 (10th Cir. 1999); *Grayson v. State*, 879 So. 2d 1008, 1017 n.3 (Miss. 2004). The State's single shooter theory requires that Mr. Flowers alone carried out the four homicides. Yet, the DNA testing performed prior to Mr. Flowers's trials demonstrated that Mr. Flowers's DNA was not connected with the bodies of the victims. *See* Ex. 94 (Letter from Deborah Haller to Anne Montgomery of GenTest Lab. (Sept. 3, 1996)) (requesting DNA testing on items of Mr. Flowers's clothing); Ex. 95 (Letter from Dana Johnson to Connie Brown of GenTest Lab. (Oct. 22, 1996)) (enclosing known blood samples from the victims); Ex. 96 (GenTest Lab., Inc. DNA test results (Dec. 26, 1996)) p.6 ¶ 6 (finding that the genetic profile produced from Mr. Flowers's clothing is "not consistent with the reference blood of the victims"). Additional DNA testing promises to be exculpatory as the absence of Mr. Flowers's DNA at the crime scene and/or the presence of any other person's DNA on or around the victims' bodies would prove Mr. Flowers's innocence.

Notwithstanding the importance of DNA testing to innocence claims, such as Mr.

¹¹⁴ For example, *see id.* at Evidence Submission Forms for Exhibit Nos. 62–64 (July 29, 1996) (clothing belonging to the victims) and Exhibit No. 67 (part of a mattress removed from the crime scene,

Flowers’, trial counsel failed to secure DNA testing of all physical evidence prior to the sixth trial, despite such testing being readily available and despite advances in DNA technology since the time of the original DNA tests. Trial counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel’s representation fell below the prevailing standard of reasonableness of capital trial counsel, who ordinarily pursue DNA testing in the context of innocence claims as compelling as Mr. Flowers’s. *See, e.g., Bagwell v. State*, 763 S.E.2d 630, 634 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014), *reh’g denied* (Oct. 21, 2014), *cert. denied* (Feb. 27, 2015) (finding trial counsel’s failure to conduct DNA testing prior to trial to be ineffective assistance of counsel).

Indeed, there was no reason to avoid seeking the testing as Mr. Flowers had been cleared of matching the DNA profiles recovered from the victims’ vicinity. Trial counsel’s failure to secure additional DNA testing cannot have been—and was not—motivated by sound trial strategy. *See* Ex. 22 (Carter Aff.) ¶ 8 (admitting that there was no strategic reason not to seek additional DNA testing prior to trial, and that counsel “just never thought to pursue it”); Ex. 21 (Steiner Aff.) ¶ 10 (same). The State was unable to argue at trial that there was one iota of DNA evidence connecting Mr. Flowers to the murders. Therefore, trial counsel knew there was a very low probability of the results of additional DNA testing placing Mr. Flowers at the crime scene at the time of the murders. However, trial counsel failed to demand or perform full DNA testing prior to Mr. Flowers’s trial.

Mr. Flowers intends to request that all physical evidence held by the State be made available for DNA testing now, pursuant to Mississippi Code § 99-39-5. But the critical point here is that trial counsel failed to do that before the sixth trial. That failure prejudiced Mr.

nearly a month after the initial investigation) (Aug. 13, 1996).

Flowers because additional DNA testing would have provided additional support for Mr. Flowers's innocence. Full DNA testing would have resulted in one of two beneficial outcomes for Mr. Flowers: either the identification of the true assailants; or more extensive DNA results showing no trace of his presence, further buttressing Mr. Flowers's innocence claim. The absence of this helpful evidence, which would have been particularly compelling to a jury, was due to trial counsel's deficient performance and it resulted in Mr. Flowers's innocence claim being placed before the fact finder without the full, available support. That failure and resulting prejudice mandate reversal and a new trial.

L. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Present Expert Testimony Showing That, Contrary To The State's Theory Of The Case, It Is Highly Unlikely That A Person Could Have Committed The Murders Alone.

The Tardy Furniture murders were remarkable for their lethal precision and the close proximity of the bodies. Three victims were killed with one shot each to the head. *See* Tr. 2011, 2018, 2032, 2034. The fourth was killed with two head shots, either of which would have been fatal. Tr. 2028, 2030. The State steadfastly maintained that a single perpetrator carried out the murders. Yet trial counsel failed to proffer expert testimony about the level of firearms proficiency required to perform such a feat. Had counsel done so, they would have laid bare the State's improbable theory of the case. Appropriate expert testimony would have shown that one untrained individual could not have committed the Tardy Furniture murders alone. Rather, it is far more likely that the murders were committed by two more people acting in collaboration. Trial counsel's failure to introduce such expert testimony constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defense counsel could have proffered expert testimony from an individual such as Robin L. Miller, Chief Special Warfare Operator (SEAL) (Ret.). Chief Miller served 20 years in the

Navy, retiring last year. He spent his entire career in the Special Operations community, including seven years at Naval Special Warfare Development Group (commonly referred to as SEAL Team Six). After reviewing relevant portions of the sixth trial transcripts, autopsy documents, crime lab reports and work sheets, ballistics reports, and crime scene photos, Mr. Miller concluded: “In my experience, I find it highly unlikely that one person was able to commit this crime without extensive firearms training. It is my belief that at least two people committed this crime.” *See* Ex. 97 (Robin L. Miller Aff. ¶ 7 (Feb. 26, 2019)).

This expert conclusion is founded on undisputed facts. The shots were remarkably precise and the bodies were located close together with no evidence of a significant attempt to flee. This is consistent with a multiple-perpetrator scenario in which one person controls the victims and the other kills them, and it is *inconsistent* with a single-perpetrator scenario in which victims inevitably try to flee. Moreover, there is evidence that the murder weapon jammed—making it even more improbable that a single person could control several individuals long enough to carry out these precise attacks. *See* Tr. 2150–51. Failure to call a witness that could explain these straightforward principles to the jury constituted deficient representation.

Trial counsel did not attempt to introduce the testimony of an expert on the level of firearm proficiency required in such shooting scenarios, which prejudiced Mr. Flowers. Had the defense introduced evidence by Mr. Miller or anyone with experience that qualified them to testify on the subject, they would have rebutted the State’s theory of the case. Their failure meant that the jury never heard crucial expert testimony that would have eviscerated the State’s fanciful single-perpetrator theory.

GROUND H: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATIONS

MR. FLOWERS’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND MISSISSIPPI LAW WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT PERMITTED WITNESS TESTIMONY FROM PRIOR TRIALS TO BE READ INTO THE RECORD.

“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” *Goforth v. State*, 70 So. 3d 174, 183 (Miss. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).¹¹⁵ The “central concern” of an accused’s confrontation right is “to ensure the reliability of the evidence against [him] by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” *Maryland v. Craig*, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990); *see also Goforth*, 70 So. 3d at 187 (“The goal of the Confrontation Clause is to assess the reliability of evidence by testing it in the crucible of cross-examination.” (citing *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. at 60)); *Hutto v. State*, 227 So. 3d 963, 983 (Miss. 2017) (“The right of a criminal defendant to cross examine witnesses against him is at the heart of the Confrontation Clause.”) (alterations omitted) (quoting *Armstead v. State*, 196 So. 3d 913, 917 (Miss. 2016)). That safety mechanism failed here.

At Mr. Flowers’s trial, the prior trial testimony of Porky Collins, a key prosecution witness who died prior to Mr. Flowers’s sixth trial, was read aloud to the jury and into the record.

Ordinarily, this would not have violated Mr. Flowers’s right to confrontation because Mr.

¹¹⁵ The Supreme Court has held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. *Pointer v. Texas*, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); *see also Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). Moreover, Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution mirrors the Confrontation Clause in the United States Constitution. Miss. Const. art III, § 26 (“In all criminal prosecutions the

Flowers was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Collins in the prior trial. *See Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (holding that the Confrontation Clause forbids “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination”). But the circumstances of this case are far from ordinary. The egregious misconduct that has pervaded the State’s prosecution of Mr. Flowers since its inception, much of which only came to light in the months after Mr. Flowers’s conviction was affirmed on appeal, rendered that earlier cross-examination inadequate to protect Mr. Flowers’s constitutional right to confrontation. For this and myriad other reasons, Mr. Flowers’s trial was fundamentally unfair and his conviction must be reversed.

This claim is properly raised on post-conviction review because the evidence showing the prosecution’s suppression of evidence was not discovered until after Mr. Flowers’s trial concluded. As a result, Mr. Flowers’s Confrontation Clause claim was not raised, or capable of being raised, at trial or on appeal. M.R.A.P. 22(b); *see also* Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-39-3(2).

The purpose of affording criminal defendants the right to confrontation is widely acknowledged: cross-examination enables the defendant to “test the credibility of the witness and the reliability of his proffered testimony.” *United States v. Richardson*, 781 F.3d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 2015). “The absence of proper confrontation at trial ‘calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.’” *Kittelson v. Dretke*, 426 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). The Constitution mandates the meaningful opportunity to cross-examine: no other procedural protection will do. *Crawford*,

accused shall have a right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him[.]”); *Goforth*, 70 So. 3d at 183 (“Article 3, Section 26, of the Mississippi Constitution affords this same right [to confrontation].”)

541 U.S. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”). To satisfy this right, criminal defendants must be afforded an “adequate” opportunity for cross-examination. *Richardson*, 781 F.3d at 243. Cross-examination may be found inadequate where a “new and significantly material line of cross-examination” is uncovered “that was not at least touched upon in the first trial.” *Mancusi v. Stubbs*, 408 U.S. 204, 215 (1972).

That exactly describes what happened in Mr. Flowers’s case. As described in detail in Grounds A, B, and C, Mr. Flowers has uncovered substantial new evidence that the State improperly and unconstitutionally suppressed, and which no jury has ever heard. Thus, although Mr. Flowers’s prior trial attorneys had an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Collins, they were denied an *adequate* opportunity to do so by the State’s suppression of material evidence regarding third party suspects. Had trial counsel been privy to this information, as they should have been, they would have pursued this new and material line of cross-examination.

Specifically, the State suppressed evidence regarding alternative suspects Presley, Gamble, McKenzie, and Hemphill, denying Mr. Flowers the opportunity to adequately cross-examine Mr. Collins regarding the events that took place the day of the crime. Mr. Collins testified that he caught a brief glimpse of two black men arguing outside of Tardy Furniture on the morning of July 16. As one of only two witnesses whose account specifically placed Mr. Flowers at Tardy’s, Mr. Collins’s testimony was critical to the State’s case. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Mr. Collins focused on the facts relating to his eyewitness identification—specifically, his need for glasses, medications he was taking which caused

memory problems, his fuzzy recollection of the appearances of the two men he saw, and his later shifting and equivocal identification during a photo array. *See* PC Tr. 1610–03.

Had the State disclosed its investigation of the Alabama suspects and Willie Hemphill, the defense could have questioned Mr. Collins about whether specific characteristics of the two men he saw matched these alternative suspects. Instead, trial counsel were limited to distinguishing, in the abstract, physical characteristics of the men Mr. Collins saw from the physical characteristics of Mr. Flowers. But without knowledge of the other suspects, trial counsel had no specific basis to contend that Mr. Collins saw two men other than Mr. Flowers. *See Blackston v. Rapelje*, 780 F.3d 340, 354–355 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that the confrontation of witnesses at the first trial was not constitutionally adequate because subsequent recantations by the witnesses “contained important new information” that was “not cumulative,” in part because “no other evidence gave the jury any specific reason to believe that the witnesses were lying on the stand during the first trial”). Moreover, Mr. Collins’s testimony that he saw two men arguing in front of Tardy Furniture is more consistent with a theory involving Mr. Gamble and Mr. McKenzie, or Mr. Gamble and Mr. Presley, than a lone gunman theory involving only Mr. Flowers. If the State had disclosed its investigation, the defense could have developed that point. As it was, they could not.

The State’s suppression of this evidence denied Mr. Flowers the right to the meaningful cross-examination to which he was constitutionally entitled. And the admission of this testimony into Mr. Flowers’s sixth trial violated his right to confrontation. In *Goforth*, 70 So. 3d at 182–183, for example, one of the State’s key eyewitnesses who had given a written statement to police implicating the defendant was later in a car accident which resulted in significant and unrecoverable memory loss. The defendant argued that the witness’s memory

loss precluded her from effectively cross-examining the witness at trial about the prior written statement, and therefore that her right to confrontation was violated. *Id.* The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed, finding that the demands of the Confrontation Clause are not satisfied every time the declarant is “physically present and subject to cross-examination[.]” *Id.* at 185. Instead, the touchstone is the opportunity to “*meaningfully* confront and cross-examine the witness against him[.]” *Id.* at 183 (emphasis in original). Just as the witness’s memory loss in *Goforth* precluded the defendant in that case from having an opportunity to subject his testimony to the crucible of cross-examination, so too did the State’s suppression of relevant evidence in Mr. Flowers’s case.

Further, in *People v. Torres*, the State introduced into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of the State’s key witness who had become unavailable before trial. 962 N.E.2d 919, 920 (Ill. 2012). The defendant argued that his counsel did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing because he was “not possessed of the same documents and materials that he would have been possessed [of] at a true trial.” *Id.* at 927 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the defendant’s prior opportunity was inadequate. *Id.* at 933. The court found significant that defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was “not privy” to inconsistent statements the witness gave to the police, “statements that counsel might have used to confront [the witness] and see if further changes in [his] version of events might be forthcoming[.]” *id.* Likewise, the court recognized that defense counsel’s ignorance of the fact that the witness was facing deportation was significant, given that this fact “might have furnished a formidable incentive for [the witness] to curry favor with the State.” *Id.* Based in part on “the pertinent information of which counsel was not apprised,” the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s right to

confrontation had been violated. *Id.* 933–934. Here, too, counsel was prevented from adequately confronting Mr. Collins because counsel did not possess information key to Mr. Flowers’s cross-examination. And here, too, counsel would have benefitted from additional cross-examination based on this new and important evidence.

This violation of Mr. Flowers’s Confrontation Clause rights was far from harmless. “Harmless errors are those ‘which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.’” *Connors v. State*, 92 So. 3d 676, 684 (Miss. 2012) (quoting *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)). In determining whether an error is harmless, courts consider “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). Porky Collins was among the State’s most crucial witnesses. Because defense counsel were shielded from information that would have allowed them to subject his testimony to meaningful cross-examination, there can be no assurance that Mr. Collins’s testimony was reliable. *See Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[T]he [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence[.]”).¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Mr. Flowers was also denied his right to confront Odell Hallmon and Patricia Sullivan-Odom on the critical matter of their credibility. “[T]he right to cross-examination includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable.” *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); *Hutto*, 227 So. 3d at 983 (Miss. 2017). The right to cross-examination is “effectively denied when a defendant is prohibited from “expos[ing] to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” *Kittelson v. Dretke*, 426 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)); *Scott v. State*, 796 So. 2d 959, 964 (Miss. 2001) (“[T]o deny the defendant the right

GROUND I: MISSISSIPPI'S DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, *Robinson v. California*, 370 U.S. 660, 666–667 (1962), forbids the “inflict[ion]” of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Mississippi’s Constitution echoes that prohibition. Miss. Const. art. III, § 28 (forbidding “[c]ruel or unusual punishment”). The determination of which punishments fit those forbidden criteria is made “not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.” *Atkins*, 536 U.S. at 311. To that end, courts consider “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to determine “which punishments are so disproportionate as to be ‘cruel and unusual.’” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 561, 589 (quoting *Trop v.*

to fully explore an aspect of the witness’s credibility is equivalent to denying him the right to fully confront the witnesses against him.”).

As detailed in Ground B, Section B, *supra*, the State suppressed evidence of Doug Evans’s deals of leniency with Odell Hallmon and Hallmon’s false testimony in exchange for favorable testimony against Curtis Flowers. And as laid out in and Ground B, Section C, *supra*, the State suppressed evidence of Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s federal tax fraud indictment and of subsequent favorable treatment given to her. By suppressing this evidence, Mr. Flowers was prevented from properly challenging Mr. Hallmon’s and Ms. Sullivan-Odom’s biases and motivations for testifying favorably for the prosecution. Without the evidence, Mr. Flowers was not able to expose their incentive to lie.

And this violation of Mr. Flowers’s right to confrontation was not harmless. The case against Mr. Flowers was flimsy at best. But Mr. Hallmon and Ms. Sullivan-Odom provided testimony essential to that case. Being able to question the two about the suppressed evidence would have destroyed their credibility, and the State’s case.

Finally, Mr. Flowers was denied his right to adequately confront Mr. Miller, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Johnson about alternative suspects. As described in Ground B, Section A, *supra*, the State suppressed material exculpatory evidence of alternative suspects, and Mr. Miller, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Johnson each falsely testified about the State’s investigation of those suspects. Without the suppressed evidence of alternative suspects, Mr. Flowers was unable to impeach and expose the false testimony of Mr. Miller, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Johnson—all key players in the State’s investigation, who provided critical testimony in support of the State’s case. Such impeachment evidence would have discredited the investigators’ testimony; undermined the integrity of the State’s entire investigation; and debunked the State’s grandiose claims that Curtis Flowers was the only suspect, and that all of the circumstantial evidenced pointed to him.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). Thus, the Clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishment “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” *Weems v. United States*, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); *see also Furman v. Georgia*, 408 U.S. 238, 429–430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); *Trop*, 356 U.S. at 100–101 (plurality opinion).

The Supreme Court's blessing of capital punishment in 1976 was conditional. It depended upon “society’s endorsement of the death penalty for murder,” *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), and the punishment’s “comport[ment] with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment,” *id.* at 182. The last forty years have completely eroded those twin factual premises. *See Glossip v. Gross*, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2762 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). And in Mississippi, the death penalty is administered arbitrarily, divorced from any legitimate penological justification. The time has come to recognize that Mississippi’s death-penalty regime constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

A. Standards Of Decency Have Evolved To The Point That The Death Penalty Can No Longer Be Tolerated.

Support for the death penalty in American society has waned dramatically in recent years: When *Gregg* was decided, thirty-five states had enacted new statutes that provided for the death penalty. 428 U.S. at 179–180. Today, nearly the same number of jurisdictions—thirty-one—has retreated from the death penalty. *See* Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *Jurisdictions With No Recent Executions*, <http://tinyurl.com/y9mmhjqe> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter “DPIC, *No Recent Executions*”]. Since 1976, ten states and the District of Columbia have joined the ten that already had abolished the death penalty altogether, bringing

the total number of jurisdictions without the death penalty to twenty-one.¹¹⁷ Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *States With and Without the Death Penalty*, <http://tinyurl.com/mhztjwm> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter DPIC, *States With and Without the Death Penalty*]. Three states have seen their Governors impose moratoria on the death penalty,¹¹⁸ *id.*, in light of the “uneven way the punishment is carried out,” Maria L. La Ganga, *Death penalty is sought against James Holmes, but governor stands in the way*, L.A. Times (July 22, 2015), <http://tinyurl.com/pp6views>; *see also* Ronald J. Tabak, *Capital Punishment*, in *The State of Criminal Justice* 193, 209–213 (2018) (describing Colorado, Oregon, and Pennsylvania’s moratorium on executions). The remaining eight states have not carried out an execution in the past 10 years and three of them (Kansas, New Hampshire, and Wyoming) have not executed a prisoner in over twenty years. DPIC, *No Recent Executions*.

Moreover, in those jurisdictions that continue to execute prisoners, the practice is “freakishly” rare. *Furman*, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). In the last ten years, since 2009, ten states administered fewer than five executions; in most cases, just one or two. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976*, <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter “DPIC, *Number of Executions*”]. The upshot is that nearly every execution—roughly 84% over the last five years, since 2014—took place in just five states: Texas, Florida, Missouri, Georgia, and Alabama. *Id.* This concentration was particularly apparent in 2018, when Texas carried out more than half of the year’s 25 executions. *Id.*

¹¹⁷ They are: Connecticut (2012), Delaware (2016), Illinois (2011), Maryland (2013), Massachusetts (1984), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York (2007), Rhode Island (1984), Washington (2018), and the District of Columbia (1981).

There is even further concentration at the county level. *See Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2779–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that a handful counties within a few states are responsible for issuing the overwhelming majority of death sentences). In 2017, just three counties—Riverside, California; Clark, Nevada; and Maricopa, Arizona—handed down more than 30% of all death sentences nationwide. Ronald J. Tabak, *Capital Punishment*, in *The State of Criminal Justice* 193, 194 (2018). More troubling still, just five prosecutors are responsible for “one out of every seven individuals on death row.” Fair Punishment Project, *America’s Top Five Deadliest Prosecutors: How Overzealous Personalities Drive the Death Penalty* 18 (June 2016), <http://tinyurl.com/hp9eymr>. Mississippi, for its part, has executed only 21 people in the 40 years since it reinstated the death penalty, and has not executed anyone since 2012. *See* DPIC, *Number of Executions*.

These trends confirm that the death penalty is no longer consistent with prevailing standards of decency and, as a result, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

B. Mississippi’s Death Penalty Is Especially Inhumane.

The current administration of the death penalty in Mississippi is particularly incompatible with the “basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment,” that the Supreme Court emphasized in *Gregg*. 428 U.S. at 182.

Mississippi’s death penalty scheme is plagued by excessive delays and death-sentenced inmates are housed in unduly restrictive and inhumane conditions. Mr. Flowers has been on Death Row for over 22 years, well above even the lengthy 12–15 year delay that Mississippi

¹¹⁸ Colorado, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Washington was a member of this group until last year, when the the state’s Supreme Court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional.

death row inmates face on average. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *Time on Death Row: 'The Faces of Mississippi's Death Row,'* <http://tinyurl.com/y2mo5lz5> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter “DPIC, *Time on Death Row*”]. These delays far outstrip the sentence applied by the jury, which issued a sentence of death, not death plus 22 years in solitary confinement. See *Lackey v. Texas*, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). And while conditions on all death rows are severe, the conditions of Mississippi’s death row unit at the State Penitentiary at Parchman are particularly draconian. Mississippi death row inmates typically spend 23 hours a day in solitary confinement. DPIC, *Time on Death Row*. Prisoners at Parchman have been subjected to extreme heat,¹¹⁹ insect infestations, malfunctioning plumbing and exposure to human excrement, and a lack of access to medical care and clean water. See Winter & Hanlon, *supra* n.119 at 2, 5.

The history of inhumane conditions at Parchman Farm is long and well-documented. Parchman originated as a plantation prison during the Jim Crow era under Governor James K. Vardaman, also known as the “White Chief.” Vardaman believed that a prison farm, “like an efficient slave plantation,” was needed to provide African-Americans with “proper discipline, strong work habits, and respect for white authority.” David M. Oshinsky, “*Worse Than Slavery*”: *Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice*, 110 (The Free Press, ed. 1996).

The farm originally consisted of fifteen work camps, with organizational structures eerily similar to the slave plantations of the antebellum South. *Id.* In the 1972 case *Gates v. Collier*,

¹¹⁹ The temperatures in some cells have had heat indexes measured in excess of 130 degrees Fahrenheit. See Margaret Winter & Stephen Hanlon, *Parchman Farm Blues: Pushing for Prison Reforms at Mississippi State Penitentiary*, Am. Civil Liberties Union 5 (2008), <http://tinyurl.com/yy9hrfuu>.

a federal judge noted the particularly harsh conditions for African-American prisoners at Parchman:

The policy and practice at Parchman has been and is to maintain a system of prison facilities segregated by race, and by which the black inmates are subjected to disparate and unequal treatment. Approximately twice the number of blacks are required to live in the same amount of dormitory space as white inmates. Inmates are assigned to the 12 major residential camps on the basis of race. Inmates are assigned to work details according to race. Blacks have not been afforded the same vocational training opportunities as have the white inmates . . . Black inmates in some instances have been subjected to greater punishment or more severe discipline than have white inmates for similar infractions of penitentiary rules. Historically, Parchman employees have been only of the white race and not until recent months have any blacks been employed as civilian personnel.

349 F. Supp. 881, 887 (N.D. Miss. 1972). After reviewing a litany of unsanitary conditions and gross abuses, the court concluded that the “deprivation of basic human needs for housing, food and medical care is not merely unnecessarily cruel and unusual, but is calculated to retard, if not prevent, the process of a prisoner’s rehabilitation.” *Id.* at 894.

Yet, even after the reforms precipitated by the *Collier* decision, conditions at Parchman remained constitutionally inadequate and extreme, even when compared to other death rows. In 2003, a federal court found that the conditions on Mississippi’s death row—including malfunctioning toilets that spilled human waste into cells, excessive heat, mosquito infestations, and a failure to properly treat prisoners suffering from mental illness—violated “minimal standards of decency, health and well-being.” *Russell v. Johnson*, No. 1:02-CV-261, 2003 WL 22208029, at *8 (N.D. Miss. May 21, 2003); *see also* Am. Civil Liberties Union, *Appeals Court Affirms that Mississippi Death Row Conditions are Unconstitutional*, (June 30, 2004), <http://tinyurl.com/y2e939l7>.

And even following further reforms to the death row unit at Parchman following this suit, significant concerns remain. In October of 2015, the Health Department issued a boil-water alert for the prison after a sample revealed the presence of coliform bacteria, and the prison has consistently struggled with water sanitation issues. Jerry Mitchell, *Aging infrastructure plagues Parchman*, Clarion-Ledger (Oct. 5, 2015), <http://tinyurl.com/y5rg2fs4>. Several prisoners reported getting sick from the water, suffering from cramps, diarrhea, rashes, and vomiting. *Id.* Indeed, the Mississippi Department of Finance and Administration concluded that \$38 million is needed to address the conditions at state prisons, including the death row unit at Parchman. *Id.*

In 2016, state health department officials shut down one of Parchman's largest kitchens—serving over a third of the prison's more than 3,300 inmates—after giving it the lowest grade possible. Inspectors identified roaches crawling on the kitchen wall and in coolers, ceiling leaks, flooding, and signs of rodents, among other violations. Jerry Mitchell, *Health woes shut Parchman kitchen*, Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 29, 2016), <http://tinyurl.com/yy9rx6qs>. And in 2018, a string of unexplained inmate deaths—including two inmates' suicides at Parchman on the same day—prompted calls for an investigation from state legislators. Sarah Fowler, *Ten inmates dead in less than 3 weeks in Mississippi prisons*, Clarion-Ledger (Aug. 22, 2018), <http://tinyurl.com/y5osexl5>.

The harsh conditions at Parchman do not relate only to physical problems with the prison. Psychiatrists have described the conditions at Parchman as “toxic,” and have found that they cause inmates to suffer auditory hallucinations, panic attacks, and other psychiatric symptoms. DPIC, *Time on Death Row*. More generally, the Supreme Court—some 125 years ago—observed that the practice of solitary confinement has generated “serious objections” since the early 1700s. *In re Medley*, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). The Court acknowledged that

prisoners, “after even a short confinement,” were known to fall into a “semi-fatuous condition . . . and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide.” *Id.* Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century commentators recognized as much: The “human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation” appeared prominently in the works of Charles Dickens and British prison reformer John Howard. *Davis v. Ayala*, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

“[R]esearch still confirms what [the Supreme] Court suggested over a century ago: Years on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.” *Id.* at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

This abuse is “well documented.” *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Craig Haney, *Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement*, 49 *Crime & Delinquency* 124, 130 (2003) (“cataloguing studies finding that solitary confinement can cause prisoners to experience ‘anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, and self-mutilations,’ among many other symptoms”)). Indeed, “even a few days of solitary confinement will predictably shift the [brain’s] electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern toward an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.” Stuart Grassian, *Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement*, 22 *Wash U.J.L. & Pol’y* 325, 331 (2006). Long-term effects are even more deleterious. A 2014 study of the New York State prison population concluded that inmates in prolonged solitary confinement were about seven times more likely to harm themselves than prisoners in the general population. *See* Homer Venters et al., *Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates*, 104 *Am. J. Pub. Health* 442, 445 (Mar. 2014). To this end, many medical associations—including the American Psychiatric Association, the American Public Health Association, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the Society of Correctional Physicians, and Mental Health America—have issued formal policy

statements decrying the practice of solitary confinement.¹²⁰ This evidence proved so convincing that a federal court recently held Virginia's practice of automatically placing death row defendants in solitary confinement unconstitutional. *Porter v. Clarke*, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 533 (E.D. Va. 2018).

But it is not just the fact of solitary confinement or inhumane conditions that makes the death row environment particularly egregious: "The dehumanizing effect of solitary confinement is aggravated by uncertainty as to whether a death sentence will in fact be carried out." *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, speaking of a period of only four weeks, described this "uncertainty before execution [as] 'one of the most horrible feelings to which [a prisoner] can be subjected.'" *Ruiz v. Texas*, 137 S. Ct. 1246 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting *In re Medley*, 134 U.S. at 172). And inmates in Mississippi and elsewhere have come within days, or even hours, of execution before later being exonerated. In 2013, Willie Manning was just four hours away from being executed when the Mississippi Supreme Court stayed the execution.¹²¹ *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

These lengthy delays undermine the penological purpose of the death penalty by disaggregating the sentence's imposition from its execution. As Justice Stevens once

¹²⁰ See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, *Position Statement on Segregation of Prisoners with Mental Illness* (2017), <https://tinyurl.com/yywp5bmy>; Am. Public Health Ass'n, *Solitary Confinement as a Public Health Issue, Policy No. 201310* (2013), <https://tinyurl.com/yyez84z2>; Nat'l Alliance on Mental Illness, *Public Policy Platform*, § 9.8 (Dec. 2015), <http://tinyurl.com/yy56uzgl>; Soc'y of Correctional Physicians, *Position Statement, Restricted Housing of Mentally Ill Inmates*, Am. College of Correctional Physicians (2013), http://accpmed.org/restricted_housing_of_mentally.php; Mental Health Am., *Policy Position Statement 24: Seclusion and Restraints*, (Dec. 2015), <https://tinyurl.com/y3p5mpe3>.

¹²¹ Manning's conviction and death sentence was based primarily on the testimony of an FBI expert who said a hair sample and ballistics evidence linked Manning to the crime, two forensic practices which the DOJ and FBI now acknowledge are highly unreliable and deeply flawed. As of 2015, 74 convictions that had been overturned involved the hair analysis used to convict and sentence Manning to death. See Kate Briquetelet, *Willie Jerome Manning spends two decades in prison over faulty hair science: On Death Row for the Wrong Hair*, Miss. Innocence Justice (Apr. 27, 2015), <http://tinyurl.com/y2m7n6u7>.

recognized: “[D]elaying an execution does not further public purposes of retribution and deterrence but only diminishes whatever possible benefit society might receive from [the prisoner’s] death.” *Thompson v. McNeil*, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). So too here: Mr. Flowers’s long years of solitary confinement are not “attributable to any special penological problem or need”; rather, “[t]hey arise simply from the fact that he is a prisoner awaiting execution.” *Ruiz*, 137 S. Ct. at 1247 (Breyer, J., dissenting). And punishment without penological purpose is necessarily cruel and unusual. *Kennedy v. Louisiana*, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (citing *Gregg*, 428 U.S. at 173, 183, 187); *Atkins*, 536 U.S. at 319; *Enmund v. Florida*, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).

And the potential for grave inaccuracies in death penalty convictions also renders the imposition of Mississippi’s death penalty unconstitutionally “cruel.” The Supreme Court has emphasized the “qualitative difference” between the death penalty and other forms of punishment due to the finality of death. *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing *Woodson v. North Carolina*, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Such a distinction creates a “corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” *Woodson*, 428 U.S. at 305.

The lack of accuracy in past capital convictions—both in Mississippi and across the country—fails to meet this constitutional demand for heightened reliability. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the number of exonerations in death penalty cases as “disturbing.” *Atkins*, 536 U.S. at 320 n.25. According to some estimates, 164 people have been exonerated in capital cases since the early 1970s. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *Innocence and the Death Penalty*, <http://tinyurl.com/ycbpkvux> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter “DPIC, *Innocence & the Death Penalty*”]. In 2015 alone, six death row inmates were exonerated, including one in Miss.

Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *Innocence: List of Those Freed From Death Row*, <http://tinyurl.com/5fxxa5> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). Since then, another seven death row inmates have been exonerated. *Id.*

Overall, researchers estimate that the rate of false convictions among death sentences in the United States is roughly 4%. Samuel Gross et al., *Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death*, 111 PNAS 7230, 7230–35 (2014) (study of all death sentences from 1973 through 2004 indicating that 4.1% of those sentenced to death are in fact innocent). This is due, in large part, to bad science and prosecutorial misconduct. For instance, a 2016 study reviewing over 1,500 cases in which convicted prisoners were ultimately exonerated determined that the types of crimes for which the state is most likely to seek the death penalty are “the same crimes in which the state is most apt to participate in the production of erroneous evidence . . . from false confession to untruthful snitches, government misconduct, and bad science.” Scott Phillips & Jamie Richardson, *The Worst of the Worst: Heinous Crimes and Erroneous Evidence*, 45 Hofstra L. Rev. 417, 448 (2016). Tellingly, false confessions were markedly more common in death penalty cases than in less heinous murder cases. *See id.* at 441.

Three recent Mississippi cases highlight the potential for inaccuracy in capital cases. In 2015, the state dropped charges against death row inmate Willie Manning after this court found that egregious misconduct infected his trial and reversed his conviction. *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Court found that the State withheld material evidence from the defense and a key witness recanted his testimony. *See* Death Penalty Info. Ctr., *Charges Dropped Against Willie Manning; Becomes 153rd Death Row Exoneree*, <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6129> (last visited February 21, 2019); *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct.

at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting). One year earlier, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction and death sentence of Michelle Byrom, citing numerous problems with her case. Specifically, Byrom's attorney never presented mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase, and the jury in her case was never told that her son, Junior, had confessed to the killing. Jerry Mitchell, *Almost executed by Mississippi, Michelle Byrom free*, Clarion-Ledger (Dec. 2, 2015), <http://tinyurl.com/ph9rnts>. Byrom eventually agreed to an *Alford* plea and was released from state prison. *Id.* Likewise, in 2008, Kennedy Brewer was exonerated after spending seven years on death row and an additional eight years in jail awaiting trial. Brewer's conviction had been overturned in 2001 after DNA tests proved he did not commit the crime, but he remained in jail for five more years as prosecutors sought a new trial. Brewer was the first person in Mississippi exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing. Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, *Kennedy Brewer*, <http://tinyurl.com/y26ey2tb> (last updated June 30, 2017). In total, four people have been exonerated after capital murder convictions in Mississippi. DPIC, *Innocence & the Death Penalty*.

For all of these reasons, Mississippi's death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

C. Mississippi's Death Penalty Is Unconstitutionally Arbitrary.

Finally, the Mississippi death penalty is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual because it is shot through with caprice. Imposition of the death penalty is, in practice, arbitrary. Defendants sentenced to death in Mississippi are especially hard-pressed to find any explanation for why they, and not scores of others, must die. Their fate is not tied to the details of their crimes or personal history. Rather, it is left to prosecutors that wield near-absolute charging discretion and a system that is statistically more likely to kill black men because they are

black—especially when they are convicted of murdering a white person.¹²²

¹²² This discrimination is a violation of both the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Studies have repeatedly shown that “capital cases that involve [b]lack defendants, particularly when the victims are [w]hite . . . are especially prone to racially-biased outcomes.”

Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, *Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury*, 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 573, 586 (2011). This finding confirms many other research studies showing the same—studies conducted both before and after *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The petitioner in *McCleskey* sought relief under the Equal Protection clause based on a comprehensive scientific study showing that the death penalty was far more likely to be imposed on a black defendant, especially with a white victim. *Id.* Similar studies show that this is true for Mississippi. For example, a 1985 study of Mississippi’s capital punishment “essentially replicate[d]” the conclusions of the *McCleskey* study, including the finding that a defendant was 4.9 times more likely to receive a death sentence if the victim was white as opposed to black. See David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, *Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis* 258–260 (1990) (citing Richard Berk & Joseph Lowery, *Factors Affecting Death Penalty Decisions in Mississippi* (June 1985; unpublished manuscript)). In 1990, the Government Accounting Office synthesized existing research on whether race of the defendant, or the victim, influences the likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to death, concluding that “[i]n 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty.” See United States Gen. Accounting Office, *Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities* 5 (Feb. 1990), <http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140845.pdf>. More recent studies of capital punishment in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Carolina have documented a similar pattern of racial disparities. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster et al., *Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999*, 4 U. Md. L.J. of Race, Relig., Gender & Class 1 (2004); Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen Thaman, *Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death Eligible Cases*, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 305 (2009); David C. Baldus et al., *Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999)*, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 486 (2002); Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, *The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina*, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 161 (2006). And more recently, researchers presented a nationally-representative group of respondents with a triple murder trial scenario while varying the maximum penalty (death vs. life without parole) and the race of the defendant. Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin & Kimberley B. Kahn, *Possibility of Death Sentence Has Divergent Effects on Verdicts for Black and White Defendants*, 39 L. & Hum. Behav., available at <https://tinyurl.com/y44bzn9s> (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). “Respondents who were told life-without-parole was the maximum sentence were not significantly more likely to convict Black (67.7%) than White (66.7%) defendants. However, when death was the maximum sentence, respondents presented with Black defendants were significantly more likely to convict (80.0%) than were those with White defendants (55.1%).” *Id.* at 1.

The conclusion to be drawn from this immense body of research is clear: the race of the defendant and the race of the victim have both a material and substantial impact on capital charging and sentencing. *McCleskey* was wrong the day it was decided, and the time for courts to revisit and overturn that decision is long overdue. *McCleskey*, a narrow 5-4 decision, is widely regarded as a stain on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence—the modern day *Dred Scott* or *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Although the Court recognized the “racially disproportionate impact” in the Georgia death penalty system, it required that the petitioner show a specific “racially discriminatory purpose.” *McCleskey*, 481 U.S. at 280. Justice Powell, who authored the *McCleskey* majority opinion, admitted just four years later that he wished he had voted the other way. Archives, *Justice Powell’s New Wisdom*, NY Times (June 11, 1994),

To be constitutional, the death penalty must not be applied in an “arbitrary and capricious” fashion. *Gregg*, 428 U.S. at 188. Mississippi similarly requires that courts determine whether the death sentence has been imposed under influence of “passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.” Miss. Code § 99-19-105(3)(a). To avoid our “own sudden descent into brutality,” the death penalty must be parceled out in a proportional manner. *Kennedy v. Louisiana*, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). Accordingly, the “punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders’” whose “extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” *Id.* (quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 568). Evidence spanning nearly half a century, however, suggests that the death penalty is not reserved for the “worst of the worst.” *Kansas v. Marsh*, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting op.) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is instead doled out according to irrelevant factors—including race.¹²³

Data about the imposition of the death penalty in Mississippi and around the country demonstrate that it is arbitrarily imposed, particularly along racial lines. In Mississippi, roughly 55 percent of offenders currently on Death Row are non-white, *see* Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,

<http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/11/opinion/justice-powell-s-new-wisdom.html>. And thirty years after *McCleskey* came down, race persists as a significant factor in determining whether a criminal defendant will be sentenced to die, in Mississippi and across the country. Black defendants accused of killing white victims, like Mr. Flowers, remain more likely to be put to death than their counterparts simply because they are black and/or because their victims are white. If equal protection is to mean anything, surely it should preclude a capital punishment system that treats defendants differently based on race.

¹²³ Researchers have been unable to find any meaningful correlation, in fact, between the heinousness of a person’s crime and the likelihood he will receive a capital sentence. *See, e.g.,* John J. Donohue III, *An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?*, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 637, 678–679 (2014). On the contrary, numerous studies—some commissioned by states themselves—have demonstrated that the death penalty is routinely imposed based on a host of irrelevant factors. *See, e.g.,* Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, *Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study*, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1227 (2013); Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, *The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina*, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 161 (2006); Raymond Paternoster et al., *Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death*

National Statistics on the Death Penalty and Race, <http://tinyurl.com/24okccg> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter “DPIC, *Race Statistics*”], notwithstanding the fact that far less than half of the State’s population (40.8 percent) is non-white, *see* United States Census Bureau, *Quick Facts: Mississippi*, <https://tinyurl.com/y32u3wo3> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). These data are reflective of the disturbing composition of the nationwide death row population, where over 57 percent of offenders are non-white, *see* DPIC: *Race Statistics*, even though only 23 percent of the national population is non-white, United States Census Bureau, *Quick Facts: United States*, <https://tinyurl.com/ybpzln7> (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). And—startlingly—while just 13 percent of the national population is African-American, *id.*, more than 41 percent of death row inmates in the United States are African-American, DPIC, *Race Statistics*.

This very case illustrates the arbitrariness of Mississippi’s death penalty regime. Mr. Flowers allegedly murdered three white people and one plack person, and was charged with capital murder. Odell Hallmon confessed to murdering three black people, and to grievously injuring another with intent to kill. Doug Evans did not even consider charging Hallmon with capital murder, and had settled the matter before even speaking to the victims’ families. *See* Ex. 3-E (ITD Ep. 5 Tr.) at 14–19; *see also In the Dark S2 E. 5: Privilege*, APM Reports (May 28, 2018), <https://www.apmreports.org/story/2018/05/22/in-the-dark-s2e5>.

This arbitrary and race-based imposition of the death penalty cannot meet the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. *Cf. State v. Gregory*, 427 P.3d 621, 635–636 (Wash. 2018) (striking down death penalty because it was arbitrarily administered, largely on the basis of race).

Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 Md. L. J. on Race, Religion, Gender, and Class 1 (2004) (commissioned by Maryland governor); *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2760–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

* * * * *

Two Supreme Court Justices have recently concluding that the death penalty writ large “now likely constitutes a legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishment[t].” *Glossip*, 135 S. Ct. at 2756 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII). Connecticut's Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the same conclusion, directing that the state's remaining death row inmates be resentenced to life without the possibility of parole. *See State v. Peeler*, 140 A.3d 811, 811 (Conn. 2016). The Delaware Supreme Court held Delaware's death penalty statute unconstitutional in August 2016. *Rauf v. State*, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016). And just last year, the Washington Supreme Court struck down Washington's death penalty on the ground that it is “administered in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. *State v. Gregory*, 427 P.3d 621, 633 (Wash. 2018).

It is time for the Court to evaluate the constitutionality of Mississippi's death penalty.

GROUND J: CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE OF ERRORS

MR. FLOWERS WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ANALOGOUS PROVISIONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION DUE TO THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL OF THE ERRORS IN HIS TRIAL.

The errors and misconduct which infected Mr. Flowers's trial must be “considered collectively, not item-by-item,” when assessing the prejudice they caused. *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 436; *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 397. This Court, therefore, must consider the cumulative prejudice of these errors, not just the prejudice based on each individual instance of prosecutorial misconduct and/or inadequate representation. In other words, even if the Court does not find that any single deficiency, taken in isolation, resulted in prejudice, the cumulative effect of these

errors and misconduct denied Mr. Flowers a fundamentally fair trial and demands that his convictions and sentences be reversed. See *Randall*, 806 So. 2d at 217 (“When all errors are taken together, the combined prejudicial effect requires reversal.”) (citing *Williams*, 445 So. 2d at 810); see also *Gonzales v. McKune*, 247 F.3d 1066, 1078 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e can see no basis in law for affirming a trial outcome that would likely have changed in light of a combination of *Strickland* and *Brady* errors, even though neither test would individually support a [P]etitioner’s claim for habeas relief.”).

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, premises considered, the Court should find that Mr. Flowers is entitled to post-conviction relief and reverse his convictions or, at a minimum, his death sentence. At a minimum, Mr. Flowers requests that the Court grant him an evidentiary hearing on the issues.

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of February, 2019.

CURTIS GIOVANNI FLOWERS, Petitioner

By: 

W. Tucker Carrington, MB# 102761
Mississippi Innocence Project
P.O. Box 1848
University, MS 38677-1848
Tel: 601-576-2314
E-Mail: wtc4@ms-ip.org



David P. Voisin, MS Bar # 100210
P.O. Box 13984
Jackson, MS 39236-3984
Tel: 601-949-9486
Email: david@dvoisinlaw.com

Jonathan L. Abram*
Kathryn M. Ali*
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109
Email: jonathan.abram@hoganlovells.com
Email: kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
Tel.: 202-637-5681
Tel: 202-637-5771
* Admitted *pro hac vice*

Benjamin J.O. Lewis*
4915 Thirteenth Street N.
Arlington, VA 22205
Email: bjolewis@gmail.com
Tel: 919-600-3708
* Admitted *pro hac vice*

Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney for Curtis Giovanni Flowers hereby certifies that he has electronically filed the foregoing, using the ECF system, which sent notifications of such filing and a copy of the referenced audio recording exhibit via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Hon. Jim Hood
Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Mississippi
P. O. Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205-0220

Brad A. Smith
Special Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Mississippi
P. O. Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205-0220

Jason L. Davis
Office of the Attorney General of Mississippi
P. O. Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205-0220

SO CERTIFIED, this the 28th day of February, 2019.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'W. Tucker Carrington', written over a horizontal line.

W. Tucker Carrington, MB# 102761

Counsel for Petitioner